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INTERNATIONALE SCHULE FÜR INTERKULTURELLE PHILOSOPHIE
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL FOR INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY
ÉCOLE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE INTERCULTURELLE*

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(Ed.)**

**Interaction and Asymmetry between Cultures in the
Context of Globalization**

**Documentation of the IV. International Congress
of Intercultural Philosophy**

Digitale Edition
Aachen / Barcelona 2021

Für die Druckedition:
IKO-Verlag
Frankfurt/M. 2002

Digitale Edition:
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Prologue

The IV. International Congress for Intercultural Philosophy was held in Bangalore, India, September 16 through 20, 2001, as a continuation of the endeavor to develop an intercultural philosophy¹. This congress was possible due to a conjoint effort between the Latin American Department of the Institute of Missiology Missio, in Aachen, Germany, and the Shanthi Sadhana Research Institute in Bangalore, India.

The topic of this Congress was: "The Interaction and Asymmetry Between Cultures in the Context of Globalization." The analysis of the topic was based upon the papers presented, as well as the discussions carried out during the plenary debates following each conference.

The papers presented during the IV. International Congress for Intercultural Philosophy are included in the present volume.

My pleasant duty is to express my appreciation of the generous financial support received from the Missiology Institute, as well as to commend the Shanthi Sadhana Research Institute for its hospitality and effective organization. I wish to extend this appreciation to the Director of the Shanthi Sadhana Research Institute, Dr. Vincent G. Furtado.

I also wish to convey my appreciation to Martin J. Rüber for his care in the preparation of this edition and to Barbara Sweet-Hansen and Rosa Lalor for the translations of the papers presented in Spanish.

Finally, for the interested readers, I would like to indicate that the V. International Congress for Intercultural Philosophy will be held at the Pablo de Olavide University in Seville, March 3 through 7, 2003. The topic for discussion will be: "The Reconstruction of our Philosophical and Curricular Traditions from the Challenges derived from the Intercultural and Gender Debate."

Raúl Fornet-Betancourt
-Editor-

¹ Cf. Raúl Fornet-Betancourt (ed), *Kulturen der Philosophie. Dokumentation des I. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Aachen 1996; *Unterwegs zur interkulturellen Philosophie. Dokumentation des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Frankfurt 1998; y *Kulturen zwischen Tradition und Innovation. Stehen wir am Ende der traditionellen Kulturen? Dokumentation des III. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Frankfurt 2001.

Walter Fernandes

Key Note Address:

Globalisation and the ethics of a single culture

Today the middle class and the media accept globalisation as the norm. But it has come to mean imposition of a single culture and economy on the world in the name of the free market. Besides it seems to impoverish the majority. Hence we need to understand it and study its ethical implications. Globalisation may be good if it means going beyond one's selfishness and limited horizons to the world around. But because it is a single economy some view it as neo-colonialism that compromises national freedom, especially of its industry. But to us it is an ethical issue not primarily because of what it does to the powerful but because it further impoverishes the communities of the already poor whom the God of History created in His own image and on whose side He has shown Himself. It denies them the right to a human life with dignity. As such it is a challenge to those who believe that every human being has a right to the fruits of God's creation. Those who believe in these rights view it not only as an economic or political issue of control over industry or national freedom but also as a right of the poor to be respected as an ethnic group, as a community with its own culture and identity.

Basic to globalisation is control over production and the market to the profit of a few. It requires acceptance of a new culture that upholds the supremacy of the market and rejects those who are unable to cope with it. Overconsumption by the global North and middle and upper classes in the South causes poverty in the global South. Such impoverishment is basic to globalisation. In order to ensure the acceptance of this economy, the economic decision-makers create a new culture geared to its value system. It involves rejecting those who cannot fit into it. Hence the need to study it. With that we shall at first look at recent developments.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF GLOBALISATION

The major development of the last two decades is the unipolar world and the absence of competition. It has made it possible for the Group of 8 (G-8) that takes economic decisions for the rest of the world to impose a single econ-

omy. Basic to it are unequal international trade and economic relations. Often, as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is based on the poor country depending on a single commodity whose international price keeps falling while that of the finished goods they import from the rich keeps rising. So the balance of payments (BOP) crisis or the foreign debt trap are intrinsic to it. We shall not go into its details but shall only look at the ethical issues that affect the right of many peoples to basic needs like food, shelter and education. Despite food shortages many of these countries are forced to switch over from staple food to commercial crops in order to repay their foreign debt. It results in a BOP crisis as in Mozambique or famines as in Sahel in the 1980s. It has led to malnutrition and has forced them to cut down on the educational and health services (Dreze and Sen 1989).

Neo-Liberalism and Impoverishment

The present form of globalisation continues the processes developed in the colonial era. It began with the effort to transform the economies of the colonies to make them subservient to the industrial revolution in the colonising country and supply capital and cheap raw material to it. The countries like those of South Asia that had a manufacturing base, were de-industrialised and turned into captive markets for its finished goods (Fernandes and Roy Choudhury 1998). The present era of globalisation has carried these unequal relations forward. They are reflected in financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. When a BOP crisis is caused because of these unequal relations, the rich countries use these institutions to impose a structural adjustment programme (SAP) on the defaulter "the core of which is encouragement to these countries to allow their economies to be merged with those of the outside world" (Corea 1999: 15). The "outside world" is the rich countries. SAP includes among others, conditionalities like reducing fiscal deficit to 5% of GDP, privatisation of the services and elimination of subsidies.

The G-8 present the globalisation they impose on the world as economic liberalisation or free trade and free market. It includes "internationalisation of capital and trade" i.e. foreign investment but not labour. To be considered free and fair, it should include free flow of trade, capital and labour. In practice, it is a one way imposition by the rich countries in search of high profits. They demand free access of their capital to the global South but put ever more restrictions on visas for their workers. That the poor do not count in the search for profit but pay its price is seen both from the nature and extent of their this investment. Most of it is on high profit luxury items, meant for the

minority that can afford them. Their price increases so does the income of this minority. But the basic needs of the people are neglected. For example aerated water gets priority when the majority lack clean drinking water. Such investment leads to temporary economic growth counted in terms of GNP (gross national product) but results in more poverty and a growing gap between the rich and the poor (Reddy 1995: 210-211).

As for its extent, many countries, especially African, experienced food riots in the 1980s linked to impoverishment and price rise resulting from liberalisation. Despite them and growing poverty, foreign investment rose from \$77 billion in 1983 to 200 billion in 1992 and 320 billion in 1995 (Kurien 1997: 137). It can also be seen from capital outflow. Between 1984 and 1988 when many countries were facing a BOP crisis, the net outflow of capital from the Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries on whom SAP was imposed was \$143 billion (Reddy 1995: 215). Many of them had also experienced food riots. Thus the free market is based on structural inequalities that lead to the impoverishment of the majority in the poor countries. With enormous economic power concentrated in their hands, those having access to capital can destabilise a whole economy, as the events in South-East Asia and Mexico in the late 1990s showed. It results in the poor being denied a right to a livelihood through displacement, impoverishment, pollution and ecological destabilisation.

What is new is that this globalisation is associated with neo-liberalism. The neo-liberal dominant discourse proclaims that markets are self-regulated provided they are deregulated. no market can operate without regulation the real question is, therefore, regulated by whom and to whose benefit? What is presented as deregulation is nothing more than a pattern of secret regulation unilaterally decided by trans-national capital (Amin 1999: 25).

One can see these unequal relations among others, in the growing disparities in the global income and resource use. I have said elsewhere (Fernandes 1998) that in the late 1960s, 32.5% of the world's population accounted for 87.5% of its income (Johnson 1974: 58). In 1978, 82% of it was generated by 25% of the population mostly in the North (Demeny 1981: 298). A decade later, 15.4% controlled 78.2% of it (Chossudowsky 1991: 25-28). According to estimates, today 80% of the world's income is enjoyed by 15% of its population. The ratio of low to high income economies grew from 1:28 in 1970 to 1:50 in 1990 (Oommen 1997: 23). It is seen also in differential access to the resources. 17% of the world's population living in the rich coun-

tries uses 85% of its wood, 70% of the global energy, 75% of its metals and 60% of its food (Desrochers 1997: 141). The natural resources that are the livelihood of the rural poor are monopolised in order to continue this lifestyle. They are transformed into a raw material to the benefit of the industrialist. For example, the World Bank funded forestry project of Madhya Pradesh in India has in reality become a mode of changing forests, the tribal livelihood, into plantations for industrial species. With it, the tribals and other rural poor are denied access to them (Sahgal 1998). Environmental degradation is intrinsic to it.

The next feature of the present stage of globalisation is technological transformation resulting in the reduction in employment and livelihood opportunities, particularly of the poor. Jobs are reduced despite rise in production. "Employment adjustment" is a SAP conditionality. The industrial decision-makers ensure it firstly through mechanisation which is integral to liberalisation. Loss of jobs is true not merely of the global South. Also the employment figures of the OECD countries show that, the number of jobs have declined. The difference is that they are welfare States with unemployment insurance which most poor countries cannot afford. Most of the OECD population lives in the formal sector while in the poor countries a majority is in the informal sector. In India, for example, in 1985, the year in which the process of liberalisation became visible, the formal sector employed 30 millions in a total workforce of 300 millions, 23 millions of them in the public sector. By 1991, when liberalisation was formalised, their number in the private sector had come down to 6 millions (Pattanaik and Panda 1992: 210). In the 1990s India's GNP grew by 6 to 8% per year, but employment generation was negative. By ILO estimates 8 million jobs were lost in India during two years after 1991 (VAK Team 1996: 167). In 1998 the workforce in the formal sector was 28 millions. Another million jobs are expected to be lost in 2001 (*India Today*, 12th August 2001).

Another source of negative employment generation is portfolio investment meant to buy up local companies rather than invest in new units even for the limited production of luxury items. In countries like India that had developed an autonomous economy, 60 to 70% of the capital inflow is portfolio investment. According to the Annual Economic Survey (Govt. of India 1998: 87), the total foreign investment between 1991 and 1997 was \$20,832 million. Only \$7,153 million of it (34.34%) was direct investment and the remaining \$13,679 (65.66%) portfolio. It has financial implications which we shall not discuss here. What concerns us is the loss of jobs. Given the mo-

nopoly that ensues, many small units are forced to close down. An assumption of liberalisation is that the economy of a poor country should be globally competitive. But it ignores its impact on local competitiveness and the viability of small units. Studies around Goa and Bangalore in the mid-1990s showed that a large number of small enterprises have closed down (INSAF 1997). According to the statement of four former prime ministers of India, half a million such units have closed down in the 1990s.

Many studies show that loss of jobs and impoverishment are its consequences. Even by official statistics, in India the proportion of families living below the poverty line (BPL) rose to 37% in 1992-93 while according to studies it was 48% (VAK 1996: 167). It is in this context that one has to see the withdrawal or drastic reduction of agricultural and food subsidies that result in loss of jobs and price rise. Based on this SAP conditionality India reduced fertiliser subsidies after the 1991 policy. So its price rose by 30% in a year. The small farmer owning less than a hectare often used fertilisers as a land substitute to double production. Because of the sudden rise in its price, many small farmers stopped using fertilisers and went BPL. Some of them sold their land. Many others in Andhra Pradesh and later in Punjab committed suicide.

Also food subsidies are to be reduced except to the BPL families. The fact that millions of families remain above the poverty line through these subsidies is ignored. They may end up BPL without them, as it happened to the small farmers who were denied fertiliser subsidies. Another stipulation is that food for the public distribution system (PDS) be bought in the open market, not through government procurement. It is possible in a year of plenty. In a lean year it would have to be imported at market prices. That can cause a BOP crisis or increase the burden on the tax payer and raise middle class pressure to reduce subsidies. The PDS clientele being powerless is unable to defend its interests. In India the price of rice and wheat rose by 20 to 35% during 1992 but the quantity made available under PDS declined by 50% (CWDS 1995).

New Law for the New Society

Another feature of liberalisation is monopoly over the natural resources, the livelihood of the poor. To ensure control over the economies of South, the countries of the North have in recent years finalised a set of Conventions and Agreements. Through them, those who over-consume the resources, ensure that the poor preserve the environment on their behalf. We are referring in

particular to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) signed during the 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the GATT Agreement signed at Marrakech, Morocco, on April 15, 1994 and the Tokyo Protocol on Climate Change.

CBD was an effort by the rich countries to take control of bio-diversity most of which is in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The countries of the North tried to legalise their stand that bio-diversity belongs to the whole world. They could then have controlled it as a common property. But in this case most countries of the South came together to prevent such an action and asserted their sovereign right over the natural resources. So CBD safeguards the interests of the South that accounts for more than 90% of the world's bio-diversity. As a result, its Nos. 3 and 4 speak of the sovereign rights of States. Art. 10 (c) 2.4 acknowledges the contribution of farmers and other rural, indigenous and tribal communities to the preservation of bio-diversity. However, the governments that fought for their sovereignty, failed to recognise the rights of the communities that have preserved it for centuries. CBD does not recognise their right over it. They are not entitled to compensation for the loss of bio-diversity they have preserved or for the genes the corporate sector pirates from them (Shukla 1994: 589).

The GATT Agreement signed two years later, does not even recognise the sovereign right, much less that of the local communities. Its Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allows mutated genes to be patented, though not living organisms in their natural form. Based on its claim that traditional knowledge is in the public domain, it denies the communities that have developed it, all rights over it. Only what it calls inventions can be patented. Often the "new products" are minor modifications of what these communities have preserved. At times patents are got for user practices already prevalent among them. Consequently, the communities that have developed these knowledge systems over centuries do not have a right over them once the corporate sector that monopolises biotechnology patents them on claims of being new inventions. Thus the economic forces that had till now tried to take control of the natural resources, are trying to monopolise the traditional knowledge systems by de-legitimising the communities that have developed them. It is an attack on their very identity, as such goes beyond impoverishment, to dehumanisation.

These and other Agreements are also a part of the process of extending the culture of a consumer society to the countries of the South. As an integral part of this move many countries have initiated policies that will result in a

more intense attack on the environment and destroy the people's livelihood. An example in India is the new approach to forests. To restrict ourselves to one, studies indicate that the World Bank Forestry Programme in Madhya Pradesh is in reality meant to turn forests into plantations for industrial raw material. The tribals and other forest dwellers, many of whose needs the forests have to meet, are denied access to them. Even when access is granted, they are of no use to them since almost exclusively commercial species are planted, that cannot meet their food, fodder and medicinal needs (Sahgal 1998).

Another major demand is control over land. In India, the draft rehabilitation policy of the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India begins by stating that the new economic policy will result in greater investment. More land will be required. It thus implies that there will have to be more displacement for development projects. It adds that most natural and mineral resources are found in the tribal areas (MRD 1994: 1.1 & 4.1). So displacement should be taken for granted in these regions in order to facilitate investment. To achieve it, the right of the poor to inhabit any part of India's territory and to a life with dignity is sacrificed.

Studies show that most States take this suggestion seriously. For example, Orissa had acquired 40,000 ha for industries, 1951-1995. The present trend is to acquire 1,00,000 ha in a decade (Fernandes and Asif 1997). AP has already acquired in five years half as much land for industry as it did in 45 years. The acquisitions for mining are higher than that, mainly for foreign companies that are eyeing this sector (Fernandes et al. 2001). 11.5% of the landmass of Goa is on perpetual mining leases to private companies since 1948, 38% is under forests and 3.2% was acquired for other projects, 1965 to 1995. If the plans go through, another 7.2% of its landmass will be acquired in the next five years (Fernandes and Naik 1999).

The rationale of many projects is questionable. For example, the Indian Navy that controls the Goa airport as well as a People's Committee that studied the proposed private airport have said that the present one can be expanded to meet future needs for some decades. But the proponents of the airport are not impressed. Questions are asked about the need for a second airport in Bangalore. Ritu Dewan's economic analysis shows that a new port in Maharashtra or Gujarat can survive only by stealing traffic from the three existing major ports in these States. But plans are afoot to build a private port in Gujarat. India has deprived more than 40 millions of their livelihood in the last five decades in the name of national development. More

than 75% of them are poor. Less than a third of the displaced have been resettled. But more are being deprived of their livelihood for the profit of a few.

What is said of India is equally true of many other countries. A new law on land acquisition is on the anvil in Pakistan and Bangladesh, both of which want foreign investment. None of these countries respect the right of the victims of development. It is equally true about other countries, for example the Amerindians of Amazonia, those to be displaced by the seven dams on the Bio-Bio river in Chile (Downing 1997), Mount Apo in the Philippines and others elsewhere. Despite such consequences on human beings, most persons in the rich countries and the middle and upper classes in the poor nations, concentrate on saving the natural environment, and ignore the victims of this degradation.

CULTURAL CHANGES FOR ECONOMIC DOMINATION

Intrinsic to globalisation is a consumerist society. Homogenisation of culture, control over information and desensitisation of the middle class go hand in hand. By culture we do not mean only the externals of language, song and dance as many understand. A culture is a value system, a world-view governing a society, an identity of a community that makes it human. To destroy it is to cut at the basis of their very existence. Another way of ensuring that the system continues is Agreements like the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and GATT (WTO).

These components add up to a neo-liberal economy. Because of it some like Verzola (1998) call globalisation the third wave of colonialism, after political and military control exercised by European countries over the global South and the second of controlling the economies of the South through foreign aid and military alliances, without being physically present. The present system combines consumerism with a new culture and new laws. With globalisation focus shifted to the imposition of a single market economy on the whole world. Much more than in the first two phases, change of culture is basic to this process. The tool used today is the information technology. The main value projected is consumerism. Linked to it is an apparent absence of alternatives and the powerlessness of those who lose out.

Single Economy and Single Culture

To begin with consumerism, this single economy is based on creating new

needs and providing money to a few consumers to buy them. It is easier in countries like India with a large population than in smaller ones. But even some not so big ones like the Philippines, follow it. Concentration of wealth in a few hands is intrinsic to it (Desrochers 1997b: 201-202). To ensure it, salaries of the minority in the formal sector have been raised. With it the middle class will have more money to spend on luxury items. The rest may be impoverished further. Over-consumption by a few and impoverishment of many is integral to this economy. That is not new in the sense that it is basic to a colonial economy. The difference today is that such an economy is imposed on the whole world as the only possible alternative, and a culture created to favour it. Social status is linked to consumerism, money and new goods. A message is given is that globalisation is like a fast express train accessible to everyone.

Countries are urged to get aboard and if they do succeed in getting aboard, they will then be carried on to higher and higher levels of prosperity. If they fail to board it, they will be left behind and marginalised. So the message to the world community and particularly to the developing countries coming from the North is that globalisation and liberalisation are the best thing that has happened in recent years not only to the world in general but also to the countries of the Third World (Corea 1999: 14).

We have said above that SAP demands that fiscal deficit be reduced to 5% of GDP. Most countries do it by cutting down on what is known in India as the planned sector i.e. development schemes, subsidies and welfare measures like health, not by reducing wasteful expenditure that is called unplanned expenditure. The latter includes high salaries that ensure that the middle class becomes the main client of a consumer society. As a result, the health services, environment protection, education and other social components are ignored. Instead of catering to these needs, the IMF suggests SAP as the only solution. In its scheme, the social and other services have to be privatised. So they reach those who have money to buy them.

To propagate the consumerist value system and get it accepted, globalisation requires control over the information technology and the media. This value system is propagated through the TV serials, the commercials and other means of communications. In that sense it continues the process initiated in the previous stage of colonialism. To make the economy of the colony subservient, 19th and 20th century colonialism changed the legal system and land ownership. Besides, no colonialism is possible without internal collabo-

rators. The colonialist chose the dominant classes to administer the masses on their behalf. This class was reproduced in the coloniser's culture and value system through "civilising education". It presented the colonised peoples as communities without a culture, waiting to be civilised. Education meant to reproduce their leaders into this "civilisation" and get them to internalise the value system of the Industrial Revolution and transfer it to the masses was its tool. The local technology, culture and economy had to be delegitimised in order to change the value system of the colonised in favour of the coloniser. Some call this process cultural imperialism.

In relation to the third world, cultural imperialism can be defined as the systematic penetration and domination of the cultural life of the popular classes by the ruling class of the west in order to reorder the values, behaviour, institutions and identity... to conform with the interests of the imperial classes. In past centuries the church, educational system and public authorities played a major role in inculcating native peoples with ideas of submission and loyalty in the name of divine or absolutist principles..... In the contemporary world, Hollywood, CNN and Disneyland are more influential than the Vatican, the Bible or the public relations rhetoric.... (Petras 1994: 2070).

The cultural thrust is primarily towards the middle class, the main industrial consumer. This class and the elite of the South have to be made collaborators of globalisation i.e. foreign economic control as the only alternative. They have to see it as beneficial to themselves. The North, in its turn, ensures the acceptance of the value system accompanying it, by taking control of the means of communications (Rajagopal 1994: 1660). The single economy is no doubt imposed on the poor nations by the OECD in general and G-8 in particular, through the IMF and the World Bank. But a strong demand for it comes from the domestic elite that see

a definite advantage for themselves in a globalisation which effectively improves their living standards even as it leaves the mass of the population without any obvious benefit, and in some cases, may even worsen their material conditions (Ghosh 1997: 3).

Getting the middle and upper classes to accept consumerism is only the first step. It is equally important to de-politicise them i.e. desensitise them to growing poverty by catering to their selfish instincts by increasing the money put at their disposal. Through it the system ensures that the talk of poverty alleviation all but disappears even as an ideology of political discourse. In India under pressure from the middle class, the political leadership

has moved away from the altruistic tradition of the freedom movement that had got the leaders to express their concern for the poor through relief measures of creating a social infrastructure (Kothari 1991: 554-555). The middle class was in the forefront of the fight for the rights of the marginalised in East Asia that took the form of massive investment in the education, nutrition, health and hygiene of the masses (Colonel-Ferer 1998). Once this class is desensitised to poverty, it stops demanding a more equal new society. The media play the role of imposing the value of consumerism on this class and of desensitising it to poverty through means such as the higher financial resources put at its disposal to ensure a consumerist society.

Fundamentalism as Culture

Religious fundamentalism is another major development of recent decades. It is a global phenomenon that hides economic interest. For example the Gulf War that was for the control of petroleum was presented as a conflict between "Christian-Muslim" or "Civilised-Uncivilised" countries. Besides, its growth has coincided with consumer oriented liberalisation. Consumerism, poverty and fundamentalism grew together. One can ask whether the media and the economic forces consciously or unconsciously divert attention from the problems of growing poverty through a fundamentalist revival in order to de-sensitise the middle class. To understand it, one has to remember that colonial injustice was often defended in the name of religion, particularly Christianity. As a result, the colonised elite felt its identity threatened. After independence when it is in power, it attempts to rediscover it through a fundamentalist revival. To the Muslim World revival marks the end of the Crusades and of the "Christian Empire" that had defeated them. To the Hindu upper classes, it is reacquisition of power and an identity that they perceive to have lost at first to the Muslims and then to the Christian colonialists (Hasan 1989: 128-129). In that sense religious fundamentalism is not an exclusively economic phenomenon as some analysts would have us believe. It also has a cultural and psychological aspect of a dominant class and caste search for a new identity.

In the case of the middle class, fundamentalist revival is linked to the market economy and consumerism. In South Asia and many other parts of the world the middle class, the most fervent supporter of consumerism, is also the strongest foundation of fundamentalism. This class, the main beneficiary of liberalisation, has been brought up in the western value system of productivity as a symbol of progress. But there was in it some social consciousness

that got it to fight for the rights of the oppressed or introduce welfare policies. With competition for the few jobs and demand for more consumer goods its social conscience has been weakened.

So in much of Asia of the 1980s, the two phenomena of the middle class strengthening its hold on society and the growth of fundamentalism have gone hand in hand. To focus on India alone, the economic crisis that weakened the country and resulted in the 1991 policy is linked closely to concentration on producing or importing more and better quality goods for the middle class during the 1980s. In this decade one also witnessed middle class resistance even to the limited reforms made till then when in fact the country needed more radical reforms. It is symbolised, among others, by the opposition to the reservation policy and many anti-Dalit riots in different parts of India. Pressure from this class weakened the efforts in the direction of social justice. So the political leadership moved away from the post-independence altruistic tradition and abandoned all talk of poverty alleviation. When radical reforms were needed, it abandoned or diluted the limited gains made till then (Narayan 1986: 96-106).

That is where religion becomes an alibi. This class that demands a western consumerist lifestyle, needs an alternative to the loss of the social dimension as well as a "national" identity. The ruling elite on the other side is in search of an "Indian" identity in reaction to what it calls colonial attacks on its culture. The two find a meeting point in a fundamentalist revival. In India the ruling elite finds an "indigenous identity" in a dominant upper caste controlled caste system which it legitimises in the name of *Hindutva*. The middle class is able to enjoy the benefits of a western type of consumerist society without qualms of conscience by resorting to the same "Indian" identity. This class thus begins to perceive the religious minorities as trying to deprive them of the benefits of national development, which they perceive as belonging by right to them. Similar statements can be made about Islam, Buddhism and others.

As a result, fundamentalism has grown side by side with consumerism. The printed and electronic media complete this vicious circle through the value system that most of their serials as well commercials propagate. In India the process started in the mid-1980s with which the beginning of liberalisation is identified. Is it an accident that *Doordarshan* began to transmit mythological serials like the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharat* from the mid-1980s and then tried to pacify the minorities by serialising the Bible and by proposing to do the same with the Koran? These and other factors turned the middle class

search for a consumerist society and religious fundamentalism into a national identity. This role of the media is crucial for integrating the middle class into the global system. In India, for example, it created a single "platform that could be 'shared' in some sense right across the country" (Rajagopal 1994: 1660).

Thus the global industrial forces find an ally in the middle class that has lost its sense of distributive justice and is finding an identity in the combination of a consumerist culture with religious fundamentalism. With the media reinforcing this culture, the economic forces succeed in legitimising and ensuring their domination. What is said of India is equally true of most of Asia, particularly South Asia. Also criminalisation grows along with fundamentalism. One can ask whether those who are impoverished by the economic policies that focus on growth without justice are used as storm troopers both for communal attacks and criminal activities. The two are interlinked. Both are linked to consumerism and impoverishment. Because of lack of space we shall not make a deeper analysis of the phenomenon.

SOME ETHICAL ISSUES

One can give many more implications of the present form of globalisation linked to the single economy and the homogenisation of culture. Among them is its impact on ethnic groups like the tribals and Dalits or gender implications in the sense that women of every class feel its impact more than men do. But we shall focus only on its ethical implications. As stated above, globalisation is the third phase of colonialism to which is intrinsic homogenisation of culture. It existed also in the age of neo-colonialism through its legitimisation of socialism versus capitalism. We shall not go deeper into it except to say that one of the two superpowers won in 1989. A major consequence of globalisation is that the alternatives that were developed to the neo-colonial economy during the last four decades have been sidelined. In their absence a sense of powerlessness has overtaken the South, particularly the poor in these countries.

From Exploitation to Exclusion

That gives us the first major ethical issue around culture and globalisation. The role of culture in this economy imposed in the name of the free market is to get globalisation accepted as the only alternative and ensure high profits to the producer. A sense of powerlessness of the poor is a consequence of the

apparent absence of alternatives. It also legitimises a consumerist society. On the other side, in most countries the middle class and the elite are the collaborators of globalisation. They support foreign economic control as the only alternative. Since it caters to their needs they view consumerism as being in their interest. The North uses culture to ensure this acceptance. For the middle class to accept this value system, the economic decision makers to present those opposed to it or who cannot cope with it as misfits. The groups that do not fit into a consumerist society have to be excluded from the worldview of the middle class.

Thus the marginalised communities make a transition from the age of exploitation to an era of exclusion. They do not even count as an object of pity. For the value system of the free market to be effective, the middle class needs to forget them and abandon all talk of poverty alleviation. If the problems of this class are presented, it is done in the comfort of the drawing room. The problem is presented in such a way that this class does not feel responsible for it. It is made to feel that the poor are responsible for their own situation because they do not know how to respond to the opportunities offered by liberalisation. If the problems get intensified, they can be attributed to the politician or other actors, not to over-consumption and the factors that increase the gap between the rich and the poor.

Homogenisation of culture has implications also for the dominant classes that have for centuries thought of their own culture as genuine and have treated the rest as uncultured or uncivilised. When possible they have imposed their culture on the subalterns. A foreign culture is a threat to their domination. But eventually they come to a compromise with the colonisers and integrate themselves into their system. To the oppressed, on the contrary, a search for liberation is intrinsic to their status. An assertion of their culture whenever possible is a part of this search. They view an encounter with an outsider to be a step in this direction. They expect it to be a step away from themselves towards freedom from oppression.

Globalisation is one such encounter and they view it as a part of this search. But its homogenisation marginalises them further instead of taking them towards liberation. Till now they were exploited, alienated from their livelihood and turned into suppliers of cheap raw material and cheap labour. Now they are treated as non-humans. In it humans are those who can be integrated into a consumerist society, who have money to buy new products that bring high profits to the producer. The rest are not fully human. Thus the single culture emanating from globalisation results in their dehumanisation. As

such it goes against their economic right to a share in God's creation, to a life with dignity. That is the first ethical issue.

The dehumanisation that accompanies globalisation is also an attack on the identity of the subalterns. To them the natural resources are not merely of economic use. They have built an economy, culture, social system, political structures and religious ethos around them. Their identity as an ethnic group, as a human community is linked to them. In the name of profit, the new economy tries to take control over them. They are declared non-productive till they are used a raw material. A culture of productivity is introduced in order to legitimise the alienation of their livelihood. With it they are deprived of a right over the resources that they have protected for generations and treated as a livelihood. The knowledge systems they have developed over centuries are relegated to the common domain. As such they have no right over them. Thus the single culture developed in the name of a free market further reinforces their sub-human status. Hence the second ethical issue concerns the right of every community to be human. The first right we referred to above is mostly in the economic domain. The right to be human that we are speaking of now go to their psychological and social being, their identity.

Consumerism and Fundamentalism

Also fundamentalism attacks this identity. We have analysed above the link between the market economy, consumerism and fundamentalism. We have said that fundamentalism is a mode of diverting middle class attention from the problems of the poor by desensitising them to impoverishment. It fills the vacuum created by the lack of social consciousness and their integration into a western type of consumerist society by giving them a new "native" identity. To the upper classes, it is reacquisition of power and an identity that they perceive to have lost either to the Muslims or to Christians and of retaining the power they had accumulated in the past. The middle class borrows this identity from them and joins them in collaborating with the global forces of economic control. These classes are ready to be reintegrated into a foreign culture under another name of globalisation and collaborate with the outsiders.

This collaboration extends also to suppressing those who give to the subalterns a sense of hope and liberation. That concerns another right of the subalterns. At various stages of history they have used religion as a tool of liberation. For example, studies show that religious conversion has often func-

tioned as a liberating force to the oppressed. They went in search of religions that they perceived as egalitarian. In reality most of the religious bodies have not treated them as equals. But through conversion they have got a positive self-image. That is a crucial step in the human liberation of individuals and communities. Whether they were objectively free or not, they viewed their new religion as a liberating factor.

Fundamentalism is an attempt to reinsert them into a system that they perceived as enslaving. Thus the fundamentalist revival that accompanies the single culture of globalisation, raises the question about the right of the sub-alterns to equality. The effort to take control of land and other resources in the name of profit and negative employment generation deprive them of their economic support. The laws that relegate their knowledge systems and resources to the common domain and deprive them of right over them, hit at their very identity as a community. This process is reinforced by the fundamentalist revival that turns religion that they view as liberative, into a tool of oppression and subjugation.

Search for Solutions

These are some of the questions that have to be asked about the single culture that comes with the present form of globalisation. Like "civilising education", the legitimising principle in the first stage of colonialism, productivity and profit have become the main criteria of progress today. The human being is forgotten and the poor are excluded from this society. It is a dehumanising experience. The tools of cultural propagation like the mass media have become means of spreading this message. Culture in this case is the set of values that may take the form of fundamentalism or consumerism. It may take the form of a nationalist fervour in the name of defeating an enemy or the populist television programmes that keep the mind of the viewer away from political and social issues. Religion is used to support the culture of consumerism and of profit. The apparent lack of an alternative reinforces this culture.

That is where an option for the poor makes sense as an ethical issue. The forces behind this culture are also the ones that hide the impoverishment of the majority to the benefit of a small minority. So our option in favour of the excluded has to be seen as a major ethical value. Often the temptation is opt for the dominant culture that is the most visible. In reality a genuine option has to lead one to search for another culture, another set of values away from those meant for a small consumerist class. Against the present form of glob-

alisation that glorifies consumerism and profit, it has to propagate a new form of globalisation that takes peoples and nations away from selfish profit seeking to one based on sharing. A new concept of humanity has to be propagated, that question the marginalisation of the majority for the profit of a few.

This ethics is a challenge to the Christian conscience because 7 of the G-8 countries claim to be Christian. At times they defend their decisions in the name of Christianity as they did in the Gulf war. That is a challenge to people committed to the Gospel of Him who came to give the good news to the poor. The South does not have all the alternatives. In fact today we do not even know what the alternative is. But under no circumstances can persons committed to the poor accept the absence of alternatives as a justification of a dehumanising system. A search has to be made for alternatives and one has to march slowly towards them.

The factor to be borne in mind is that today this sinful system condemns the majority to a sub-human existence. A search for alternatives involves among others, acknowledging our share in the processes in this state of sinfulness. It also demands that the sinful state be remedied and a new world proclaimed prophetically. It involves a meaningful search for alternatives, in co-operation with all people of good will. In this search one has to go beyond condemning the sin of globalisation as evil. One has to go beyond it by announcing a positive message. To achieve it, one has to identify the type of globalisation that is acceptable, the factors that have resulted in its present form and viable alternatives to it. From there one needs to go to a new society based on the empowerment of the powerless.

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Raúl Fornet-Betancourt

Interaction and asymmetry between cultures in the context of globalization: an introduction

With the start of this "International Congresses for Intercultural Philosophy" in Bangalore, we meet for the fourth time within the framework of this initiative. I would, therefore, like to begin by giving a brief summary of the previous three congresses, not to revisit the history of this initiative, but to reiterate the fundamental end that we wish to accomplish with it, as well as to define the broader context of the topic of this current congress.

In the "First International Congress for Intercultural Philosophy", held in Mexico City, from March 6 to 10 of 1995, it was said that the initiative set forth then, had the intention of contributing to the realization of a fundamental task that we agreed to present, as a conjoint working program to promote a radical transformation of philosophy deriving from and through the dialogue between the different philosophical cultures of humanity. As the first step in this undertaking, the Congress in Mexico was conceived as an international forum for sharing information and for the discussion on the possibilities and/or the difficulties existing in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, regarding the development of the program for an intercultural transformation of philosophy.¹

The second Congress, held in São Leopoldo, Brasil from April 6 to 11 of 1997, continued the thread of sharing and the greater mutual acquaintance between philosophers of various continents, placing the emphasis on a more concrete aspect: the analysis of the problems arising from the dialogue of African, Asian, or Latin American philosophy with the dominant philosophical tradition of the West. The emphasis on this aspect was due to the fact that the discussions of the first Congress proved that communication between the philosophies of the "South" was not often direct. Instead, communication was steered through the relationship of each one with Western philosophy, and therefore it was considered convenient to explain that relationship, in order to know to what extent, the priority of a dialogue with the West hindered a truly open philosophical dialogue at the world

¹ See Raúl Fornet-Betancourt (Ed.), *Kulturen der Philosophie. Dokumentation des I. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Aachen 1996.

level. On the other hand, the second Congress, contributed to define with precision, the task of the intercultural transformation of philosophy in a twofold sense. First, because the discussion among participants clearly substantiated that an intercultural transformation of philosophy is not feasible without a change of attitude on the philosopher's part, and in general with all persons involved in teaching philosophy. A personal change or "conversion" would be necessary that is motivated, precisely by the fact that there is a willingness to assume interculturality as a life and thinking position, and it would certainly upset the thinking habits acquired through our monocultural socialization and learning processes or, in other words, thinking habits that are destined to produce and reproduce a homogenous culture. Postulated in more positive terms: this would posit a change that would impel us to restate the way we understand the "image" and "duty" of the philosopher, and also what we call the "philosophical tradition", and that we transmit in our research and teaching, understanding that this restating is but the beginning of a relearning of our thinking from the dialogue with "the other", and to be in a position to better dialogue with the other!

The second point to specify is: because the discussion also evidenced that the intercultural transformation of philosophy that we took on with this initiative, is not an end in itself. We do not propose to transform philosophy only to minister to the philosophers or professionals of philosophy – in the dominating and reductionist sense of the term –, but to better serve the world. That is, we want to transform philosophy interculturally because we believe that it could and should help to transform the historical world of the human beings of today.² Evidently then, this task of the intercultural transformation of philosophy also connotes the task of contextualization, or in more exact terms, a recontextualization, due to the fact that the intercultural philosophical dialogue presupposes the recognized existence of (conscious) contextual philosophies. Therefore, because we do not want it to remain in abstract terms, the intercultural transformation of philosophy implies, the return of philosophy to the contextual worlds where humanity, embodied in men and women culturally and generically "positioned", writes its plural history; that is, to contextualize philosophy in the historical worlds that unmistakably evidence the plurality of humanity. It makes no sense to

² See Raúl Fornet-Betancourt (Ed.), *Unterwegs zur interkulturellen Philosophie. Dokumentation des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Frankfurt, 1998.

speak of interculturality without a cultural-contextual plurality. Without diversity, what reigns is a tautology or, the resounding echo that results from a colonizing process.

To avoid any misunderstanding, let us indicate succinctly, that the contextualization implied in the intercultural transformation of philosophy, is a process that certainly manifests plurality, not as a reflected image of a fragmented reality, but as the quality that distinguishes or dignifies reality in as far as it is a result of historical processes. Contexts are not islands, or isolated geographical spots, they are historical constellations that, as such, are always frontier worlds; worlds that define frontiers, still and all, adjusting these frontiers according to the rhythm of its relationship with others. That is why the plurality that contextualization manifests, is not disintegrating, quite on the contrary, it is a condition for intercultural communication – as has been suggested previously –, and therefore an essential task of an intercultural transformation of philosophy.³

To expedite our work in this initiative, however, the decisive point was that the discussion during the second Congress abetted to substantiate the challenge of the contextualization of philosophy. The urgency for undertaking this challenge was fully understood. It began with the concrete analysis of the situation and the role that the so called "traditional" cultures, that is the "cultures on the periphery", play out in today's world, which are powerfully impacted by the complex set of economical, political, technological strategies, that are summarized under one word: globalization. I stress that this idea was decisive in the immediate continuation of our work, because it was based on this idea that the program for the next Congress was drawn up.

The "Third International Congress for Intercultural Philosophy" organized by our own Missiology Institute in Aachen, Germany, from November 22 to 25 of 1999, oriented its program toward the analysis of the current development of the cultures with the underlying phenomenon of globalization. Understanding, however, that globalization, in general, represents an enormous challenge for a modern reorganization in the Western style, for Africa, Asia and Latin America, the Third Congress dealt with the topic of its program, considering, above all, the aspect regarding the question of

³ See Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, *Transformación intercultural de la filosofía. Ejercicios teóricos y prácticos de filosofía intercultural en el contexto de la globalización*, Bilbao, 2001.

how the cultures of the "South" produce and manage, in the context of globalization, the conflict between "their" traditions and the innovations that the dynamics of modernity (Western) imposes upon them. It must be said that the interest in the analysis of the current situation of the so called "traditional" cultures, that this Congress posed, responded to the need to find an answer to the question of whether globalization and the changes at the cultural level that it may provoke, tend to obliterate the "traditional" cultures, or if this supposition is merely a part of the ideological discourse on globalization.⁴

The discussion of this aspect of the topic showed that the development of the contextual cultures in Africa, Asia, Latin America and also in Europe and North America, generates the thesis that, even in the context of globalization, cultures are life practices that spur specific dynamics, holding accountable the relationship they maintain with what they recognize as "their" traditions – a relationship which logically cannot be reduced to the affirmation –, which decides the direction or sense of the ulterior development of a culture.

Based upon these ideas, that presuppose that each culture can produce and be aware of the conflict between tradition and innovation independently of its confrontation with European modernity, a hypothesis was put forth that stated that the "modernization" of "traditional" cultures can come about in a plural manner and not necessarily by way of the West. With this hypothesis there was the risk, at the same time, to obtain a hopeful result to the issue posited by our Third Congress: The reappearance and the reactivation of contextual cultures – that, curiously, are explained as a reaction to globalization –, but, above all, that the alternative projects that are articulated within this reappearance and reactivation of contextual cultures, grant the expectation that the era of globalization does not pass in the history of humanity, as the age in which it lost its "traditional" cultures. Notwithstanding it must be said, that the emphasis placed in clarifying the dialectic between tradition and modernity within cultures, placed on the sidelines a fundamental aspect which would clarify the general topic, which is the question of power intercultural relations.

This is, then, the genesis and/or the elucidation of the topic for this "Fourth

⁴ See Raúl Fornet-Betancourt (Ed.), *Kulturen zwischen Tradition und Innovation. Stehen wir am Ende der traditionellen Kulturen? Dokumentation des III. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Frankfurt 2001.

International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy", for which the exact formulation is: "Interaction and Asymmetry Between Cultures in the Context of Globalization."

Allow me then to introduce a few ideas that are important in order to center our discussion for this Congress, and also to underline certain aspects of the topic that might escape our awareness.

►For the discussion on the topic of the asymmetry between cultures in the context of globalization, it is important to take into account that when we speak of "asymmetry between cultures", we are referring to an asymmetry that comes from outside the cultures, because it is the historical result of a colonialism that, to some extent, is perpetuated by multinational enterprises and financial centers with their strategy of market globalization. This globalization, governed by the spirit of the neoliberal system, creates, as the reports from the UN on the situation of humanity attest to⁵, an asymmetrical world in which inequality is reaching a peak and, this is true not only in the so-called Third World but also in the rich and highly industrialized countries. It seems obvious to me that the asymmetry between cultures deals directly with an asymmetry that is an essential part of the internal dynamic by which the neoliberal system reproduces itself, because it is this asymmetry in international relations (economic, financial, military, etc.), that is, the asymmetry in the globalized world of today, which offers the broader context for the "meeting" of cultures. This leads to two aspects: That cultures "meet" in a world that, because it is socially and politically structured in an asymmetrical manner, cannot envision them as equal; and, consequently, those cultures that are not dominant in this world, are left to struggle for their own survival; a struggle that conditions, of course, their relationship with their own traditions, as well as the interchange with other cultures that feel threatened by the asymmetry of power in the "world order".

This type of asymmetry is what is at the core of the topic of the congress when speaking of "asymmetry of cultures".

But, it is important to note that the fact that the program of our Congress stresses this type of asymmetry (that I will call "external" for practical reasons) should not let us be unaware of another type of asymmetry that is also present and that I will call "internal", that points to the asymmetry

⁵ See UNDP (Ed.) *Human Development Report, 1999*, New York 1999, and also UNDP (Ed.) *Human Development Report, 2000*, New York 2000. It can also be seen on the web: <http://www.un.org/publications>

"within" the cultures, or the asymmetry that is produced by the cultures themselves, in the process of constituting their own traditions, their institutional organization or the regulation of their lifestyles, both collective as well as individual. We should, therefore, try to critically analyze this "internal" asymmetry, explicitly focusing on the importance that social space has for the members of a culture in their relationship with the culture; and, of course, of gender differences as a source of asymmetry. This takes me to the second idea:

►The analysis of power relationships at the intracultural level, that is, in family structures, in social interaction, in the institutional organization of religious cult, etc. In our "own" cultural worlds, this evidently implies a capacity for cultural discernment which at the same time means that the members of a culture are not – or should not be – slaves of their own traditions. A deep critical analysis of the production of asymmetry (particularly at the intracultural level) leads us to ask about the type of relationship that the members of a culture maintain with that culture, specially with what could be called the hard core of the culture, which are the recognized and shared traditions among its members. For this reason I would like to mention some observations related to this aspect of the topic of our discussion. Without tradition, there is no culture, because culture presupposes a common memory as well as shared experiences. Cultures cannot be such, without generating tradition, daily life tradition, linguistic tradition, political tradition, religious tradition, and so forth. But, cultures cannot be reduced to their constituted traditions. Better stated: Cultures cannot be considered museums where cultural traditions are in custody, like untouchable pieces. Walter Benjamin forewarned this fact when he cautioned on the danger of converting culture into a fetish and promoting an "image", instead of seeing it as an ambivalent historical process that is decided in and with the cultural practices of the people.⁶

I believe that at least two arguments attest to this thesis, which I will present succinctly. The first regards the historical character of any cultural tra-

⁶ Walter Benjamin, "Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft", in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Tome III, Frankfurt 1972, pages 283 and forward; "Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker"; in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Tome II-2, Frankfurt 1977, pages 477 and forward; and "Erfahrung und Armut", in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Tome II-1, Frankfurt 1977, pages 213 and forward. See also, Michael Großheim, ">>Die Barbaren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts<<. Moderne Kultur zwischen Konservierungswille und Überlieferungsfeindschaft", in *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (2000) 220-252.

dition. What I want to say is, that traditions are born or generated in the course of the gestational history of a human community struggling to reach the fundamental consensus that identifies it as such; therefore cultural traditions are never homogeneous or monovalent entities, not even for whoever identifies with them. For this reason, it seems to me, that what is known in the West, since what Petrus Abaelard's famous work, *Sic et non* (1121), demonstrated in a very eloquent manner, that a cultural tradition seen in a unified manner and having a fundamental consensus, in this case the catholic theological tradition, could be subjected to diverse, even contradictory, readings.⁷

The second argument is based upon the experience that, if every human being comes into the world within a culture, the human being does not inherit the traditions of the culture of origin as a genetic code, rather, the human being is reared within the culture.

Traditions are not inherited. They are transmitted fundamentally through social learning in the family, school, "cultural" centers, worship centers and other institutions where the traditions of a culture are embodied, precisely to ensure their transmission.⁸

⁷ See Petrus Abaelard, *Sic et non*, in Minge *PL* 178.

⁸ See the contributions of the new German philosophy of culture. For example, Hubertus Busche, "Was ist Kultur? Erster Teil: Die vier historischen Grundbedeutungen", in *Dialektik. Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie* 1 (2000) 69-90; and "Was ist Kultur? Zweiter Teil: Die dramatische Verknüpfung verschiedener Kulturbegriffe in Georg Simmels 'Tragödie der Kultur'", in *Dialektik. Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie* 2 (2000) 5-16; Ludger Heidbrink, "Kompensatorische Kulturkritik. Verteidigung eines aktuellen Programms", in *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (2000) 190-220; Matthias Kettner, "Kulturrelativismus oder Kulturrelativität", in *Dialektik. Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie* 2 (2000) 17-38; or the monographic issues of *Dialektik. Kulturen-Kontraste*, 2 (1999); and *Revista Anthropos: Ciudadanía e interculturalidad* 191 (2001), and the bibliography in both indicated. But equally suggested are the contributions made by the cultural anthropology, the cultural studies and the history during the last years. See also, James Clifford/George Marcus (Eds.), *Writing Culture*, Berkeley (CA) 1986; Néstor García Canclini, *Consumidores y ciudadanos*, México 1995; Néstor García Canclini, *Culturas híbridas. Claves para entrar y salir de la modernidad*, México 1997; and *La globalización imaginada*, México-Buenos Aires-Barcelona 1999; Clifford Geertz, *Dichte Beschreibungen. Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme*, Frankfurt 1983; Pedro Gómez García (coord.), *Las ilusiones de la identidad*, Granada 2000; Stuart Hall (Ed.), *Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, London/New Delhi 1997; Stuart Hall/Paul Du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London/New Delhi 1996; Erich Hobsbawm, *On History*, London 1998; E. Hobsbawm/T. Ranger (Eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983; Walter D. Mignolo, *Local histories/global designs: coloniality, subaltern knowledges and border*

The third idea I wish to share with you, complements the previous one. If cultures are historical formations and its traditions are transmitted and are learned through a complex set of social practices, then the question arises, following Levy Strauss' elimination of the "biologization" of race⁹, shouldn't we "deculturalize" the notion of culture, understanding this, as the deconstruction of the current definitions, that too swiftly tend to fix the patterns of a culture, often manipulated by the dominant social groups in a culture, in order to consecrate, as "one's own", certain traditions, while excluding others as "inauthentic"? In this sense, "deculturalization" of the notion of culture means, to liberate the culture of its dominating "image", calling attention to the asymmetry that it reflects and showing, based on the rescue of the oppressed possibilities in the process of asymmetrical configurations, which in every culture (at least at the level of its dominating image or stabilized order), not only generates "one's own", but also the exculturation of possibilities that could have also been one's own. I am referring to what I have previously explored in another publication, as the dialectics of liberation and oppression within each culture.¹⁰ What I am interested in underlining is the aspect that, from the perspective of this dialectic, the task of deculturization of culture, is presented to us as a socio-political relocation of the current definitions of culture, to show precisely how within them, for example, culture is reduced to a "cultural world", the world of the spirit, the world of the "cultural values and heritage", and so forth; worlds that are all centered and organized, structurally and institutionally in the traditions of the educated, high class of society. The task toward deculturalization of our image of culture can help us break the power of the administrators of culture and, above all, to overcome the tendency to make culture the space where certain traditions are worshiped, and, in turn, consider it as a complex social process (because it encompasses the spectrum from the religious to the economic, as well as the administrative aspects), by which traditions are generated, of course, but in this case, we refer to traditions that are *practiced*. That is to say, that they orient the cultural practices of the people that are identified by them and, for this reason, are always subject to

thinking, Princeton 2000; and Chandra Mukerji/Michael Schudson (Eds.), *Rethinking Popular Culture*, Berkeley (CA) 1991.

⁹ See Claude Lévy Strauss, "Race et historie", in *Anthropologie structurale deux*, Paris 1973, pages 377 and forward.

¹⁰ See Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, "Supuestos filosóficos del diálogo intercultural", in *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana* 5 (1998) 51-64.

possible transformations due to the fact that the practice of a tradition implies its continuous adjustment to the contextual changes that can be produced in the day-to-day world of the persons that are oriented within that tradition, among other ways of considering other possibilities of transformation, as those which can occur with a generational change.

A deculturalization of our image of culture would be, in summary, to work with the idea, such as Herder¹¹ saw, that there is no such thing more deceiving to decide on one definition of culture and apply it with the pretension of a definite value, to every people and every epoch. Cultures put us on the way, but these are not built paths ready to be recognized with a foreseen itinerary.

►The focus on the deculturalization of the notion of culture from a new optic of discussion and from another aspect of the topic of our Congress could also be important. I am referring to the aspect of the interaction between cultures under the ensuing conditions of globalization. In fact, an understanding of cultures in terms of concrete cultural practices can help to pose the interaction between cultures in a concrete and historical sense, that is, to work with the hypothesis that it is not necessary nor do we have to search for interaction as the interchange between "culture blocks" separated by the diversity of their fixed traditions, but, quite on the contrary, as a concrete dialogue process in which "the cultures" themselves do not participate, but do it through individuals, groups, sectors, institutions and so forth, that are recognized as its members and that as live "representatives" of their culture, transmit their cultural differences in all their ambivalence and historicity.

Understood this way, the interaction between cultures could be the best method to understand and experience cultural differences as variable qualities and not as static properties.

In the context of globalization, however, it would be naive not to assume the fact that interaction between cultures only can result in a greater enrichment of the human being and the enhancement of life in general – which, in the end, is what matters –, if the asymmetry of power that characterizes international relations today is corrected. Calling attention to this aspect – a part of this asymmetry of power is the discourse that presents, as an undeniable truth, that the interaction between cultures has to abide by

¹¹ See J.G. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, in *Werke in fünf Bänden*, Tome 4, Berlin/Weimar 1982, pages 10 and forward.

the challenge of modernization launched by the West.¹² Interaction, however, cannot mean an exercise of power that implies the confrontation of the other with a preconceived "study plan", if it wants to participate in the history of the world. Therefore, I suggest another idea:

►From a truly intercultural point of view it is necessary to stress the fact that the discourse on cooperation between the cultures of peoples is a deception unless it is accompanied by policies that overcome, in an unequivocal and efficient manner, the asymmetry of power that characterizes the prevailing "world order" and that is promoted by the current globalization process. Only by creating conditions of social justice and equality at the world level, can we guarantee a free interaction in which the cultures, without the fear of being colonized, can accept and promote from within a mutual transformation in their lifestyles, their work, their community organization, their education and so forth.

In the context of the current neoliberal globalization, the interaction between cultures should be posited as an alternative, and not simply an item integrated within the project of a globalized world, that would be sanctioned by it. Consequently, the demands for reform that underline the need for the establishment of structures and adequate institutions that politically regulate and configure current globalization or, the demands that urge the cultures of the "South" to prepare themselves to participate in this globalization¹³, are without a doubt, necessary; but if we want a truly intercultural world, these demands have to be complemented with others even more radical. For example: a demand for politics that foster the reinforcement of self determination practices in marginalized cultures.¹⁴ An interaction of

¹² See Harald Müller, *Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen. Ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington*, Frankfurt 1998; and Rainer Tetzlaff (Ed.), *Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck*, Bonn 2000.

¹³ See Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Ed.), *Globalisierung gestalten*, Bonn 1998; Dieter Senghaas, *Zivilisierung wider Willen*, Frankfurt 1998; Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul, "Wer ist der Volkssouverän auf internationalem Parkett?", in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 6.8.2001, page. 5; and Leopoldo Zea, "Prepararse para la globalización", in *Exelsior*, 5.7.2001, pages. 14-17.

¹⁴ See Luis Villoro, "Aproximaciones a una ética de la cultura", in León Olivé (Ed.), *Ética y diversidad cultural*, México 1993, pages. 131 and forward; as well as his book: *El poder y el valor. Fundamentos de una ética política*, México 1997; and Juan Carlos Scannone, "Normas éticas en la relación entre culturas", in David Sobrevilla (Ed.), *Filosofía de la cultura*, Madrid 1998, pages. 225 and forward. Interesting is also the discussion between "liberals" and "commonitarians" over the politics opposite to the "minority cultures". For example: Will Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Ox-

cultures, free from domination and control by a hegemonist center – which is hegemonist and dominating precisely because it presents itself as the central reference for cooperation between peoples and cultures –, cannot exclude the possibility that certain cultures would prefer to change the course (or meaning) of a world that is under the effects of a neoliberal globalization, before being obliged to enter into it. That is to say, these cultures might prefer more than just the mere possibility of "modifying" the current globalization, and propose another alternative which would be the initiation of mutual transformation processes by way of recontextualization and, eventually the proposal to universalize some of their traditional values (such as, for example, a reciprocated economy). And it is precisely because of this possibility that we should ponder on the free interaction between cultures as a historical alternative to the neoliberal globalization project. As can be inferred, this presupposes, the need to link cultural interaction to an alternative political project at a global scale. To further explain this aspect I would add another discussion item:

Understood in this manner, free interaction between cultures entails a clear political dimension, because it is a program that wants to ensure the preservation of cultural diversity for the humanity of the future, not as an exotic and marginalized reserve, but as a diversity of true worlds with historically active cultures and, therefore as active participants in dialogue. When we speak of cultural interaction, we undoubtedly speak of processes of transformation in the different cultures; processes from which the resulting experience of interaction conveys the very important issue of the type of culture we want and wish to transmit as a value. This is the reason for which the discussion often centers around the strictly "cultural", that is, on the issue of the future of the cultures. However, it is equally important, in the discussion of this topic, to be aware of the political dimension mentioned above, and to express it overtly. In other words, we must tackle the question: "What cultures do we want in the future?" the answer to which depends on another question: "In what world do we want to live and practice our cultures?" Or better yet: "What world do we want to build upon the foundation of our cultures?" This is why I believe that cultural interaction has to be seen as essentially united to an alternative political project; a pro-

ford 1995; Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and >The Politics of Recognition<*, Princeton 1992; Michael Walzer, *On Toleration*, New Haven/London 1997; Sheyla Benhabid, *Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit*, Frankfurt 1999; Jürgen Habermas, *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen*, Frankfurt 1996.

ject that can critically demonstrate that the discourse on the alleged need to be integrated in the world market of the hegemonist system is an ideological discourse, and that instead, it should promote the contextual developmental models as a plural basis of a livelihood of solidarity in diversity.¹⁵

And, I should add before ending, that to consider the interaction between cultures as a source for alternative political action in the context of neoliberal globalization, implies the need, on the other hand, to once again take up the question on the relationship with our own cultural traditions and ask, not only about the possibilities for transformation – which has been the aspect underlined up to the moment – but also the possibilities of an orientation toward the task of building a common future.

Facing an intercultural political project, I believe that we should not relinquish the possible bearing that the traditions, that cultures consider valuable, may have, because it represents a necessary clue to know what we can let go off and what we should keep, or propose as the heritage that we are able to transmit and universalize in the framework of a livelihood in solidarity.

¹⁵ See Samir Amin, *El eurocentrismo. Crítica de una ideología*, México 1989; the monographic issues of *Alternatives Sud: L'avenir du développement* 1 (1997) and *Pouvoirs locaux et décentralisation* 3 (1997); and also the publications of the World Forum for Alternatives, among them: *L'autre Davos, mondialisation des résistances et des luttes*, Paris 2000.

Srinivasa Rao

1. The philosophical perspectives of cultural asymmetry and the challenges of Globalization

In making my presentation, I assume that the concept, the process as well as the actual implementation of Globalization is both a known and a felt fact in our societies. I am well aware that in making this assumption I am risking the possibility of widely differing interpretations of the contents of this paper, depending upon the listeners' own understanding of the concept of Globalization. But, then, it is both natural and inevitable that in a matter like Globalization we all tend to bring into play our own specific understanding of this phenomenon and what it means to us in terms of our own lives and cultures. Unfortunately, Globalization is not as uniform and as universal a concept as we all would wish it to be because it has a fairly strong amount of built-in cultural specificity and I think that the most basic problems involving Globalization are rooted in this built-in cultural specificity.

Globalization is a concept that has originated entirely within the context of the developed societies out of the dynamics of their own socio-economic and scientific-technological culture. The model for development evolved by these developed societies is also clearly determined by their culture. It is essentially believed by all those authorities concerned with development that this model can be applied universally. But there are certain very important and vital assumptions that underlie this model of development which forms an essential part of the concept and the process of Globalization. One such assumption, it appears to me, is that there is a definite, discernible hierarchy of cultures in the world and that one major objective of Globalization and development is to enable the cultures that are at the lower end of the hierarchy to climb up to a much higher level. This higher level of culture is that which is presently found in the most developed societies.

It is possible to characterize such a concept of Globalization and development as west-centric and accuse western societies of trying to dominate the less developed societies of the world. But this way of looking at the phenomenon does not reveal everything. It would be more fruitful to ask why western societies are so enthusiastic about bringing other societies and cul-

tures in line with their own societies by "imposing" or exporting their own notions of Globalization and development. There is a very natural reason why they want to do this. Globalization has been seen and felt by them to be very beneficial. Besides, the model of development that they prescribe for the rest of the world is one which has been found by them to have been very beneficially applied in their own societies. Since it is not at all unnatural to think that what is good for oneself is also good for everybody else, we find that several agencies that are concerned with developmental issues across the globe are unhesitatingly in favour of a specific concept of Globalization and development.

There is no doubt that some of the great ideas that ought to be treated as the index of any civilized society developed and took concrete shape in the west. I have in mind here ideas like liberty, equality, democracy and human rights. The all-round development that has taken place in the west is very much due to the power exercised by these ideas over the affairs of society in the previous century. But what distinguishes the west from the rest of the world is the relative primacy accorded to these ideas. Ideas like equality have been present in varying forms and degrees in all cultures of the world though they may not have been given the same position and role as in the west. Hierarchies have always existed and they do exist within every society including the developed societies even today. Inequalities still rule the world. While the existence of absolute poverty within the undeveloped and the developing societies is surely a cause for concern, even stray cases of such poverty that may be found within the developed societies should be a cause of even greater concern.

One of the stated objectives of Globalization is the improvement in the quality of human life all over the world. This objective is undisputedly a very urgent and a laudable one. But there is a definite notion of "the quality of human life" associated with the received notion of Globalization and development. This notion is definitely culture-specific to the developed societies and is, at present, almost completely hijacked by organizations that are in the forefront of international business and has received a uniform interpretation that all-round development of any society is synonymous with the growth of consumerism in that society. That is, a dominantly materialistic outlook on life which characterizes all developed societies, is held out to all the undeveloped, under-developed and developing societies in the world as a model worthy of emulation. This is going to lead to certain very detri-

mental consequences for all those societies that share a cultural asymmetry with the developed societies.

If we make a survey of all undeveloped, under-developed and developing societies in the world, we find that the ruling world-view in all of them is definitely non-materialistic in its core or essence. Had they been quite materialistic to any significant degree in their outlook, they would not have continued to remain the materialistically poor lot that they are today. Our survey would also reveal that in all those societies where some development has taken place and is still taking place, there is a concurrent emergence of distinct segments of population whose overall attitude to life is decidedly materialistic. Nearly all influences coming from outside of such societies are from the developed societies and these influences seem to be chiefly working in the direction of strengthening and promoting a materialistic view of life. This is being done as an integral part of the programme of improving the quality of life in those societies. The idea of the quality of human life is not either easily definable or quantifiable, but it definitely has a specifiable physical and material dimension. There are some most basic necessities of life that must first be met in any society whatever like proper food, clothing and shelter. In their absence, any talk of the quality of human life has no meaning. But taking care of these basic physical needs is not enough in the case of human beings who also naturally possess a potential for evolving an inner life of their own. Therefore, in the matter of ensuring a quality human life, something more than providing a materially comfortable life is needed and this consists of certain vital inputs that go into protecting, promoting and improving an inner life. But a dominantly materialistic view of life is one in which the development of such inner life is either largely ignored or severely trivialized.

All human societies without exception have their own history and culture, a unique past and tradition, which must be regarded as possessing an invaluable intrinsic worth of its own. Such cultures and traditions are the lifelines of a people and they are the sole evidence we have for claiming to be distinct human beings existing as descendants of other human beings who have lived in the past. We are all inheritors of certain ways of living that embody many milestones in the development of the human race and its culture. The development of the human race and its culture is a cumulative and accumulative process in which there are distinctive inputs from every culture that has existed on earth in the past and that are existing now. Though these inputs are usually specific to certain human groups that have lived in

certain geographic areas, they are still very much part of the total heritage of the whole human race. If these distinctive cultural elements are destroyed or damaged, something valuable and beautiful in the heritage of mankind is lost for ever. It is very much like the loss of an entire species from our environment. There is thus on every existing society a certain responsibility for preserving the unique and invaluable cultural legacies from the past and the most developed societies have this responsibility to the highest degree.

But is this responsibility being felt even in a faint way today? What exactly is the usually prevailing attitude in the developed societies towards the lifestyles, cultures and traditions of the undeveloped, under-developed or developing societies of Africa, Asia and Latin America? Are they at all thinking in the direction of protecting, preserving and promoting what is vital and invaluable in these cultures and traditions? Is the protection and promotion of a diversity of cultures an integral part of the process of Globalization and development that is being formulated, implemented and promoted by them? Are there developed societies that have perceived the need for protecting and revitalizing traditional cultures in different parts of the world and have therefore thought of the ways in which the so-called "backward" societies can be assisted without destroying the vital elements in their traditional cultures? If the developed societies are not doing any of the above things, why? What is the cause of such inaction?

I think the answer to the above half a dozen vital questions is a series of 'No's. The developed societies are persuaded that backward societies are backward exactly because of their backward traditional cultures. The acceptance of the hierarchy of cultures, be it explicit or implicit, comes in handy to legitimize the practice of branding traditional cultures as backward. I am not here justifying everything pertaining to all the traditional cultures as just, right and good. Certainly, many of the traditional cultures are too deeply rooted in the past, have developed rigid orthodoxies in many respects and are not by themselves able to appreciate the need for change and reform. Certainly, these are factors that very severely impede their rising above poverty and deprivation.

But, do these facts justify branding whole traditional cultures as backward? If a society is too deeply rooted in its past, does the remedy for it consist in completely uprooting it from its past? Are only some elements from the past of a society responsible for its present unsatisfactory condition or is its past as a whole the culprit? Are there not ways of changing some of the or-

thodox beliefs in a society without damaging its belief-systems as a whole? Are there not ways of persuading a backward society to make it realize the need for changes and reforms in its life-style without destroying that life-style altogether? Is the very notion of a backward culture quite rational, innocent and harmless? And above all, what exactly is a backward culture?

If we take a look at the societies that are typically described as backward, like tribal societies with their traditional cultures that are sometimes thousands of years old, one striking feature of them all is that they are well-knit, mostly localized communities with a life-style that is largely characterized by self-sufficiency. Individualism is nonexistent in that life-style. Tribal life-styles are basically communal and the life of any member of the tribe is lived entirely within the tribe. Tribal communities are very largely self-sufficient and there are still many tribes in the world that have no contact of any kind with the world outside their communities. Their wants are few and these are satisfied without much difficulty and without any outside assistance. They have languages without scripts and all their myths, beliefs and legends are embodied in an unbroken, living oral tradition. They have their own festivals, celebrations, songs and dances. They are fully integrated with the environment in which they live and they use that environment without damaging it. According to civilized societies that know about them, these tribes have a "primitive culture". At the earliest opportunity, any "civilized society" would not at all hesitate to reform these primitive people and give them a "better" culture. And no one would ever give a second thought to destroying such primitive cultures by entertaining the doubt whether such destruction is right and justified.

Such is the thought structure that underlies and dominates the concepts of Globalization, development, modernization and progress as envisaged by developed societies. The success of the industrial revolution, spearheaded by the enormous development of science and technology, has been so heady in all the developed societies that they have easily and confidently concocted a universal prescription for the maladies of all backward societies: removal of backwardness. Since backwardness is the result of traditional cultures that are stagnant and primitive, the replacement of all traditional cultures by a single modern culture of the developed societies would be an effective cure for all backwardness. This medicine for backwardness may be bitter, but it has to be pushed down the throats of all backward societies for their own good and in their own interest.

The unconsciously or consciously entertained belief in the hierarchy of cultures runs so deep that it is not realized by the developed societies that every culture represents the inner and psychic life of a people and therefore any attempt to replace the culture of those people amounts to an invasion of the common inner space of that community. It is an attempt to alter the basic structure of the psyche of that people. The wholesale characterization of traditional cultures of tribal societies as backward is also due to the fact that they are very much living and functioning examples of self-sufficiency. But no concepts of Globalization and development are ever compatible with this notion of self-sufficiency. The very survival of Globalization and development hinges on the notions of dependence and inter-dependence. The inner dynamics of Globalization is consistently and forcefully directed towards destroying all self-sufficiency and replacing it by dependence.

Globalization is also an ideology that is wedded to the notions of a monolithic culture and a culture of dependence. There is no assured and genuine scope within it for intrinsically varying cultural life-styles and cultural independence. All variation should be reduced as much as possible and all independence and self-sufficiency should be brought down as much as possible. Not only should there be as much uniformity as possible in all external aspects of human life, but there should also be a similar uniformity in the inner life of the people of the whole planet. The ideal form of life consists of a "Global Village" in which there exists no distinction between inter-relatedness and dependence.

Globalization is also an undemocratic or even an anti-democratic ideology appearing in the garb of a democratic ideology. We think that Globalization is successfully breaking national boundaries when it is actually building up nothing more than a vast international colony exclusively for the benefit of the developed societies. Under its influence, communities that were growing food for themselves and were self-sufficient in food are now growing commercial crops like tobacco for others and are importing food for themselves from outside. Communities have been forced, in subtle or not so subtle ways, to destroy their forests in order to increase the quantity of their farm lands just to grow such commercial crops or to supply the best of timber in the world to the affluent classes in developed societies. If they do not have enough foreign exchange to import required quantities of food when there are frequent droughts due to the extensive destruction of forests, they are starving to death. Nowadays, people are no more transported to another

continent where they slog and die as slaves; they now die just where they live.

While the issue of human rights has recently come to the fore and a universal charter of human rights has been formulated, no one has yet thought it fit to formulate the equally important charter of human duties. Unless the developed societies come to specifically recognize that they have certain fundamental moral duties towards undeveloped, under-developed as well as developing societies, the existing concept and pattern of Globalization will not change. Also, the chances of Globalization and developmental processes working to the very detriment of those whom they are supposed to benefit will always remain and such chances can never be eliminated. The charter of human rights is rather eloquent on the issue of physical needs and does not recognize how important it is to protect and promote distinctive life-styles that represent different cultural traditions that have their own intrinsic worth. Since there is no charter of human duties where such protection and promotion should have their rightful place, they should at least be accommodated in the charter of human rights. The right to one's own inner life is a fundamental right which every self-conscious human being must be allowed to enjoy without any restrictions and severe interferences from outside.

One of the most important but severely neglected asymmetries between the culture of the developed societies of the west and those of the less developed societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America concerns their general attitude towards Mother Nature. The western attitude to Nature has its origin in the Book of *Genesis* where God is said to have granted dominion to man over the whole of Nature. This attitude has basically remained unaltered since Biblical times and the entire development of science and technology in the west has all along been guided by the idea of achieving domination over Nature. Nature is the greatest and God-given source of raw materials out of which man is entitled to fashion various products for his limitless consumption and enjoyment. Even Aristotle who precedes *The Bible* and was non-Christian in his outlook formulated his theory of four-fold causation only on the model of building artefacts for human consumption and use. Therefore it may not be wrong to hold that a totally utilitarian approach to Nature and viewing Nature as nothing but a giant, soulless mechanism has always characterized all western thought. This idea of Nature as a soulless mechanism was given a new lease of life in the thinking of Descartes who is universally regarded as the founder of modern western

philosophy. Nature is there solely to be used, and even abused, to serve human goals and purposes and if at all any preservation of Nature is called for, it is only to ensure that this inexhaustible source of raw materials does not get depleted, very severely polluted or damaged due to human error, thus threatening the very survival of mankind.

The Asian, African and Latin American conception of Nature is diametrically opposed to the western conception depicted above. In none of the cultural traditions of these countries can we find the sort of very sharp dividing line between man and Nature which we find clearly and firmly drawn in the west. In all these cultures Nature is eternally and inextricably bound up with man's life and destiny. The idea of Nature as a "Mother" is peculiar to many of these cultures. The cult of the Mother Goddess, for whose existence we have archaeological evidence all over the world including some of the long extinct pre-Christian cultures in the west, is one of the oldest religious cults of mankind. Even those traditional societies which conceived of God as a masculine entity still treated Nature very reverentially. All these societies used Nature and its products, but behind such use there never was any idea or assumption that Nature was there just to be used by them. On the other hand, many of these traditional cultures definitely held the belief that natural resources should not be used up indiscriminately. This is very much evidenced by their practice of earmarking certain areas of the forests and hills as God's territory which, therefore, would be strictly forbidden for use by humans or even by animals.

What Globalization is attempting to do is to urgently replace such traditional cultures by the "modern" culture of the developed societies while, in fact, what is even more urgently required is a fundamental transformation in the very outlook of the west concerning other traditional cultures and also a total revision of its own basic attitude towards Nature. As I see it, Globalization is very much standing on its head and it very urgently needs to find its feet. It needs to urgently reform itself before it can attempt any reform of traditional societies and cultures along its own preferred paths. In this urgent task, perhaps it can make use of a very fragile page or two from the huge, unused book of traditional cultures.

Maqbool Ahmed Siraj

2. The Cultural and Religious Traditions of Islam and Challenges of Globalisation

Today Islam is a religion of nearly 1200 million followers who are found all over the globe. There are nearly 66 Muslim nation-states which constitute 30 per cent of the total membership of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). Over 300 million Muslims live as minorities outside the Muslim nation-states. Islam shapes the lives of these Muslims. It is one of the three great faiths that emerged out of the land of prophets in and around Palestine, the two other being Christianity and Judaism.

Islam is youngest of all faiths that owe their origin to patriarch Abraham. It is strictly monotheistic and retains all the divine teachings revealed through Prophet Muhammad in pristine form. Besides the holy Quran, Islam bases itself on a great heritage of literature known as *Sunnah* of the Prophet. This preserves in great detail the words and action of the Prophet inasmuch as his guidance is available in the minutest quarter of a Muslim life. Besides this Islam also has the benefit of a great amount of literature interpreting the Quran together with the Sunnah. This is known as *Fiqh* or jurisprudence which allows a great amount of flexibility for Muslims in their day-to-day lives and also provides formula and methodology for deducing guidance for all aspects of life. It is here that a lot of variety gets introduced in Islam as the Fiqh has four great schools. Above all, Islam has provided for the instrument of *ijtihad* which keeps the door open for constant legislation in keeping with the urges of time and society.

This being the basic premise for spiritual guidance of a common Muslim, be it for an individual or for the collective life, Islam's response to globalisation has to be viewed in this light. Before we proceed to look at the current Islamic world, it will be better to have a bird's eye view of the fundamentals of Islam.

Islam: Tenets and Practices

Islam brooks no partnership unto God's divinity. Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, was a human being appointed as the final prophet by God to show the right path to humanity. All members of the human race are servants

of God who have been allowed great amount of freedom in leading a life of their choice but the right path has been shown by God in different ages by different prophets. Islam believes in unity of humankind and gives due recognition to tribal, ethnic, linguistic identities. Islam lays great stress on family as the primary building block of society. It recognises basic human rights and freedom which come along with responsibilities. In order to ensure social peace, it has laid great stress on morality, respect for elders, care of the parents, rights of fellow individuals be they neighbours, beggars, relatives, wayfarers, underprivileged in the society etc. Islam enjoins sexual segregation and fixes roles and responsibilities and rights and duties of men and women in keeping with their biological, psychological and physical make-up. In public life it is generally evident in the form of physical segregation in spheres of work of the two sexes although some overlapping could be seen by way of liberal interpretation or under the influence of the West. Women are thought to be more attuned to upbringing of children, housekeeping and domestic roles while men are the main bread earners, warriors and protectors of family. Besides the basic forms of worship like 5-time prayers, fasting, Hajj and zakath (parting with 2.5 per cent of your accumulated wealth annually), these basic rights and duties complete the individual's relationship with God and fellow human beings. In the sphere of politics, Islam establishes God as the sovereign whose guidance should be held supreme in framing of laws. A lot of flexibility is allowed in legislation but not the deviance from the divine commandments. Democracy could be easily part of contemporary Islam as Islam has urged a system of consultation (*shoora*) for the management of collective affairs of the human society. In matters of economy, Islam does not lay down any elaborate framework as economy, as it is understood today, was not a necessity in the age of Prophet Muhammad. The broader contours of Islam's economic teachings are evident from stress on circulation of wealth (no hoarding of essential commodities, no patch of land to be allowed to remain fallow for more than three years etc), trade to be promoted, prohibition of interest in order to promote entrepreneurship, profit and loss sharing based investments, zakath or ush'r (tithe) in order to support the really poor in the society etc.

Overall, Islam lays stress on Godliness in human life in order to ensure social, political, economic justice in this life and salvation in the life hereafter. The concept of day of judgement infuses a believer's life with the fear of accountability which acts as a regulator at every step of life.

Contemporary Islamic World

Though, all these precepts and practices have a far lighter hold on the Muslims and the Muslim world today, Islam remains a big question mark for the entire world, for its definitive teachings. Islam and Christianity were at war with each other during the first millennium of Islam and the history saw frequent ingress and pushbacks into each others' territories. But between 1700 and 1950, the Islamic world came under the total sway of the colonial Western powers. It saw a great amount of Western influence in the Muslim world inasmuch as much of its educational system, economic framework, laws, political administration adopted Western ways. Islamic world continues to be ruled by the Western educated elite and economy is still tied to the Western production centres. Most Muslim countries are still raw material suppliers. Despite a few being rich, all Muslim countries are still categorised as developing countries. The low attainments in education, skill development etc keep these countries dependent on the West for most of the consumer goods or at least the technologies involved in their production. Most of them have emerged as nation-states although nationalism is still viewed as alien to Islam. But broadly they are reconciled to the present status because the current national boundaries are taken as cultural faultlines though in matters of Arabic-speaking Middle East, the heart of Islam, it is still not fully palatable. However during the last 50 years most of the Islamic lands have freed themselves from the colonial rulers and slowly begun reclaiming their souls. The pattern of political administration is still not certain in the Islamic world. While a few are still under outdated monarchies which are being propped up by the West, others are under autocratic rulers such as Gaddafi, Saddam, Basheer, etc. Yet others frequently slip in and out of democracy such as Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen. Turkey is under Western style democracy which is even more secular than the most of the countries in the West while Malaysia has a highly regulated democracy. Iran has truly freed from the Western clutches and trying to blend democracy with Islamic rule while Afghanistan is descending into Taliban style fanaticism which bears no semblance with the desired pattern of Islam. Largest Islamic country, Indonesia has been so long under autocratic rule that the first flush of democratic rule has unleashed a host of repressed forces threatening its very existence. In a few more countries, the West itself is supporting the suppression of democracy such as Algeria, Morocco, and for some time in Turkey because it is Islamic parties that are ushering the democracy there. The struggle of Muslims to free themselves from unrepresentative governments, tyrants and dictators has therefore been

dubbed fundamentalism by the Western press, albeit the British, the French and the Americans also waged the same struggle against their oppressive regimes only two centuries ago.

Islam in the West

Ironically, much as Muslims would like their own countries to prosper with social and economic justice, the same has not been possible due to the West's exploitative agenda in the developing world. The West has been attracting the money from the developing world for the Swiss Bank rather than for investment. The stolen wealth stored in the Swiss Banks by heads of several countries is much more than the foreign debts they have.(1) Absence participative governance and distributive justice has led to flowering of genius and lack of development in the Islamic countries and thereby it loses lot of its genius to the West where Islam has gained a firm foothold during the last 50 years(2). Muslim students, scientists and professionals who visit the West decide to stay away from their repressive regimes and contribute to the West. This has even led Islam to make ingress in the West, no doubt benefitting from the liberal and democratic ethos prevalent there. Now almost all Western capitals have thriving Islamic centres, mosques, schools, Islamic research and dawah bases besides active contact with Muslims in the Islamic countries.

Globalisation

Meanwhile, Globalisation has emerged as the new slogan from the West. In its outer manifestation, it presents itself as a new economic framework for the state controlled economies in the third world. Its emergence has come about in the wake of decline of the Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It pleads for the free movement of finances and investments and turning the whole world into a seamless market with lifting of trade and tariff barriers. Market is regulated by demand and supply and acts as the main deciding factor for benefitting from the capital. Availability of capital, goods, technology, know how etc are the key determinants of the success of any economy. Competition is thought to be the ultimate key to decide the survival of fittest. It bases itself on thrift and transfer of savings to the capitalists by returning the rewards in the form of interest to the depositor of the savings. The essence of Globalisation lies in revival of capitalism on a global scale. It has got nothing to do with cultural values or civilisational issues. Emerging as it is from the west, it is bound to propagate hedonism, seeking of

pleasure and escape from pain. It provides the impetus of self-interest for economic progress.(3)

Challenges Posed by the Globalisation

The challenges posed to Islam and the Muslim countries by Globalisation are much more grave in the field of political and economic domination than to the religious and cultural traditions. Islam has withstood colonial domination and its religious precepts, practices and even cultural mores have largely remained unscathed. During the last 200 years, the impressive array of Orientalists did indeed try to interpret Islam in the light of medieval hostility. But within 50 years of free rule, Islam has emerged in pristine and pure form, throwing out the yoke of orientalism(4) and establishing its intellectual base in several of the Western languages. Yes the distortion goes on in the audio-visual form and media to some extent, but largely the Western intellectuals now avoid the pitfalls of Orientalism in serious research and publication.

Media

However, Islamic culture faces the challenges in the field of media and entertainment due to global reach of the Western media and the domination of Western languages mainly English, Spanish and French. The Western media is seen as a big challenge in the Islamic world, not merely because of its dominance but also because of its massive network, ability to tarnish and twist the image of Muslims and Islam and capacity to manipulate the world public opinion. While the West would insist on the free access to global market, its worldview remains biased because of the strictly nationalistic framework within which its so called "free" media has to work. So the national interests are considered above the interests of a nebulous, global civil society. While the West's languages are understood by the elite in the Islamic world, major Islamic languages such as Arabic, Persian, Urdu or Turkic are incapable of being understood by the Western elite. This media dominance enables it to sustain the myth of Jewish homeland in support of Israel, but Arabs are unable to even convince the West of illegality of Israel's occupation of West Bank and Gaza. Similarly, while Palestinians' just struggle to reclaim their original homeland is dubbed terrorism in the Western media, the Muslim media is incapable of telling the world that 'Jihad' is not equivalent of Holy War. US multinational Union Carbide's killing of thousands in Bhopal is not viewed as seriously in the West as Libyans' alleged complicity in Lockerbie bombing of PanAm plane. The Western media carefully avoids the term of

'US terrorism' for the act of shooting down of Iranian jetliner over the Gulf water killing 253 innocent passengers and refuses to hand over the US navy personnel to Iran. But Usama Ben Laden is hounded for killing some dozen American Embassy personnel in Nairobi. Yet the Western media sees no imbalance in the Western attitude. The terms of intellectual exchange between the West and the Islamic world are therefore tilted in favour of the West. The world believes what the West has to say on world events.

A specific instance of this unequal playground for Islam and the West is seen in the Salman Rushdie episode when the West could not be convinced that Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses* was a gross violation of the freedom of expression even by the Western standards as blasphemy against Jesus Christ, banning of *Spycatcher* by the government of Britain, US ban on Indonesian book on Suharto's exploits, were equally violative of the freedom of expression. Islamic world's concern against sacrilege of Islam's holy figures is dubbed infringement of freedom to express but not the German laws against underestimating the Holocaust, BBC's circular to reserve the term "assassination" for the Israelis and "killing" for Palestinians(5) and the French insistence on compulsory exclusion of English words. The West is still not reconciled to the fact that freedom to express does not include the freedom to defame or satirize the religious figures of religions other than Christianity.

Entertainment & Advertisement

The Western entertainment and advertisement industry also constitutes a potent challenge for the Islamic traditions and culture. Be it the Hollywood films, MTV channels, pornographic websites on Internet, the vulgarisation and commodification of women in advertisements have morally deleterious implications for the Islamic world. There is genuine concern over ingress of these influences on the Islamic people due to globalised media channels and coming of age of Internet. Nudity, free mixing of sexes, pub culture, excessive use of music, lottery and gambling, fashion and glamour shows do not gel with Islamic ethos.

Family

The family is under assault in the West. The Islamic world looks with concern at the overdose of sex, drugs, crimes, passion play in the entertainment doled out by the Western media. No wonder then why the single parent homes, extra-marital relationships, child mothers, abortions, condom-dispensing machines in schools, illegitimate children, incestuous, homosex-

ual and live-in relationships, lack of care for the elderly, prostitution, renting the womb, are a dreadful spectre for the Islamic people.

The nudity and vulgarity being promoted in the name of fashion shows, the women's sensuality peddled in the garb of beauty contests, the mindless exploitation of women in advertisement and entertainment, the physical emaciation of kids being glamourised through toys such as Barbie dolls (the message conveyed is thinner and taller girls are prettier and sexier) are abhorrent for the Islamic world.

It is obvious that Muslim families in the Orient are also under strain, given the impact of globalisation, economic pressures and the influence of TV. Still, however, Muslim families in general are much more tightly knit and provide much more security than the average Western one.

The West hardly realizes its folly that it has robbed the women of their dignity by hurling them in the furnace of industrialisation. The Western women undergo the double torture of having a career as well as reproductive and family responsibilities. Sans marriage, live-in relationships burden the women even more. Children born out of wedlocks are heavy albatross around the necks of Western women. The life for them is a precarious balancing feat between the career and family while the men go scot free, free from care of economic concerns and sex that previously came with responsibilities. The West will be paying for its sin of striking at the roots of family very soon. The West would realize that Islam too promotes the dignity of women, not by victimizing them through freedom in the Western sense, but by offering them protection within safer precincts of home, modest dresses and family responsibilities.

Consumerism

Islamic people are sensitive to pleasures of consumption, transported through globalisation. In the Islamic world qualitative aspects of life are still frequently valued above quantitative ones. Indeed, that quality of life – composure, leisure, contemplation, friendship, hospitality, generosity etc – as a specifically Islamic concern should ring a bell with many Westerners frightened by crass materialism. Globalisation as defined by maximization of profits and accumulation of consumer goods bases itself on greed. In the past greed was always considered a vice. In our times, not only has it gained legitimacy, but those who manage to accumulate most wealth and possessions are exalted among us as a model of success, for their spirit of competition and for their skill in outwitting their rivals.

There is a basic difference between Occident and Orient. The Occident obviously cherishes quantitative aspects to a point where nothing is of real value, i.e., money value, that cannot be quantified i.e., digitalised. In fact, there is a general denial of non-quantifiable values and merely spiritual truths. Seen from this standpoint Western man's life is more oriented towards 'having' while the Muslim's life is more dedicated to 'being'.

The West has overheated lifestyle to an extent which cannot be part of sustainable development. It believes in consuming more and more in order to keep the economy robust. In pursuit of gratification of its created "needs", it has built up the economic myth that expansion of our economies is depends upon the expansion of our consumption. This does not gel with cultures of many communities. It has led to relentless exploitation of natural resources.(6)

Though the present Islamic world seems to be pursuing the same economic goals as the West, but there is a rankling sense of disenchantment among the religious leaders all over the Islamic world over the definition of progress and development. The Quran and the *Sunnah* are consistent in their denunciation of greed and acquisitiveness. Even Indian ethos of *tyaga* (renunciation) are in line with the Islam. Father of the Indian nation Mahatama Gandhi says: If you are taking anything you do not need, you are stealing it from someone else. When asked about desirability of achieving the living standards of Britain, Gandhi is reported to have said: "When the people of that island nation need half the world's resources to maintain that standard of life, imagine how many planets would be needed to satisfy the needs of the 40 crore Indians."

Homosexuality

It is said development carries the seeds of destruction within. Globalisation has the real potential of threatening the Orient with perversities such as Homosexuality and recognition of such marriages. It is a symptom of decadence, indicative of a declining civilization. Wherever such perversities became commonplace, Sodom and Gomorra or Pompeii, civilization committed suicide. The West will perhaps needs to find a mid way between two extremist approaches to sex, i.e., between puritanical celibacy (of course, under the Christian influence) and sexual licentiousness manifested by total absence of taboos such as homosexuality. But currently, it is the Orient which is bearing the brunt of cultural onslaught from the West. Permissiveness with regard to values may finally prove to be the undoing of the Western civilization.

The challenges of globalisation are not unique to Islam or Muslims alone. In fact all indigenous communities with deep roots in native soils are facing the erosion of values due to the onslaught of Western culture and values where elders lose respect, women are seen as commodity, education is an investment, permissiveness allows even homosexual marriages, needs are artificially created, nature is exploited beyond its strength to replenish, and human bonds are quantified. All of us need to make a fresh reassessment of values and needs of the human society.

Notes and References

- 1- The personal estates and assets of King Hassan of Morocco in Spain account to \$40 billion while the country's total foreign debt is merely \$7 billion.
- 2- According to *Arabia-the Islamic World Review*, a monthly magazine from London (1985), now defunct, nearly 25,000 scientists from the Muslim world work in the US itself.
- 3- Faridi, Fazlur Rahman, *Globalisation aur Uske Maashi wo Saqafathi Asrath*(Urdu), Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, New Delhi, July 2001
- 4- Zia Gokalp, William Cantwell Smith, HAR Gibbs, George Sale, Hurgronje, are no longer the authorities on Islam in the modern Islamic research. Rather a good number of modern Western authors such as Murad Hoffman, Annemarie Schimmel, Roger Garaudy, Edward Said, Jeffery Lang, T. B. Irving, Leopold Asad, have emerged as the spokesmen of Islam in the Western languages.
- 5- Hassan Suroor, *The Hindu*, "Political correctness BBC Style," dt. August 6, 2001
- 6- The West is accused of deforesting wide patches of land, indulging of overfishing, producing more CFC gases thereby widening the ozone hole in the atmosphere. (Ref. Wendy Tyndale, *Towards Sustainably Development: A shift in Values*, Commentary, Just World Trust, August 2001, Kuala Lumpur).

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Murad Hoffman, *Islam and the Future of the World*, Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, New Delhi, March 2000

Prof. Khurshid Ahmed, *Islam and the New World Order*, Markazi Maktaba Islami Publisher, New Delhi, January 1997

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Andrew Anil Sequeira

3. The Hindu conception of reality as the ideal symmetry of cosmo-social relationships and the challenge of globalization

The topic as stated here includes a twofold presupposition: one, that an ideal symmetry of cosmo-social relationships is intrinsic to the Hindu conception of reality; two, that these cosmo-social relationships are today challenged by the so-called phenomenon of globalization. If the former demands an accurate justification, the latter a correct verification. This is what is precisely attempted here from a philosophical point of view and it is hoped that adequate justice is done in the space of a short essay.

I. THE HINDU CONCEPTON OF REALITY

The cosmo-social relationships of the Hindus are the result of their overall conception of Reality as such and hence for a right understanding of the former, we do stand in need of a basic explanation of the latter. This task of explaining the Hindu conception of reality however is more easily said than done. For it is fraught with more than one difficulty, as any one who is a little acquainted with India and the Hindu world would readily agree.¹ For one thing, an accurate grasp of the Hindu conception of reality can only be had from its original sources, namely the Vedic literature whose content at first sight does not seem at all either to be homogeneous or even very coherent. For another, the Vedic literature itself is more ancient than any other known source of literature and merely beginning to unravel the dense fabric of its thought involves an extremely deft intellectual manoeuvre, demanding the knowledge of all the resources at our disposal, literary, historical, archaeological, religious, linguistic etc. For still a third, the Vedic literature is not only ancient but also has a distinct genre. It is religious, mythological and poetic at one and the same time. It all means that quite a different kind of methodology is necessary to achieve our goal.

The actual methodology made use of here consists of grasping what is known as the humanly meaningful and logically consistent 'symbolic universe'² which is said to lie at the foundation of any given culture or system

of thought. It is known to provide a comprehensive integration of all the available discreet elements as well. We intend to trace the symbolic universe of the Vedas or more specifically of the Rigveda as it is said to constitute the ultimate source of inspiration and the fountainhead of all subsequent Hindu religious traditions, philosophy and culture.

A. THE HINDU SYMBOLIC UNIVERSE

The Indologists who have been at work to unravel the intricate thought of the Vedas to find its rationality have been successful in constructing the Hindu symbolic universe in terms of four seminal concepts, namely *asat*, *sat*, *yajna* and *rita*.³ Since these concepts form the key to the understanding of the Vedic thought and also the rest of the Hindu tradition and philosophy, it is imperative that we acquaint ourselves with them a bit more in detail.

1. ASAT: Literally it means Non-Being or non-existence. Though as a term it is negative, it is however not something entirely negative. For the Vedas tell us that *sat*, Being or existence, comes from *asat*.⁴ Since being is said to come from non-being, one may well ask what this non-being or *asat* exactly is. The Vedas which express things mythically, answer this question in the form of a story. *Asat* is variously spoken of as *Vritra*, the dragon or *Ahi*, the serpent, and both these are symbols of check, restraint, suppression and darkness, implying a reality of covering, with-holding or suppressing that which seeks to emerge or express itself. Philosophically understood, it is nothing but the primal, undifferentiated matter or energy that is said to crave for reproduction or multiplicity. Correctly said, *Asat* is the ground of all potentialities that try to become actualities.⁵

2. SAT: It means Being or existence and as we noted above it has its origin in *asat*. This coming of *sat* from *asat* is in fact what is known according to Vedas as *sristi* or 'creation'.⁶ The Vedas of course recount it all in mythological terminology. Briefly the narration goes as follows: In the 'beginning' there 'was' but one Unseen Reality, the source of both *asat* and *sat*. *Asat*, personified by the wicked *Vritra*, the 'encloser', restrainer and suppressor was opposed by the natural force of expansion, personified by *Varuna* and his army of *adityas*. If the former represented bondage, the latter freedom. At the initial stage the force or power of the former was actually

greater so that a new champion had to be found and it was *Indra* who then accomplishes the separation of *sat* from *asat*. *Indra* splits apart what was so far a unity to become multiplicity. It was all however not achieved without an indispensable means, namely *yajna* and that brings us directly to the third seminal concept.

3. YAJNA means sacrifice and in the Vedas it is perhaps the most important and cardinal concept. For *yajna* or sacrifice is said to be the primordial act which makes both Being and beings to be and also sustain them in being.⁷ Again in mythological terms, it is the *Prajapathi-* or *Purusha-*sacrifice, which is said to give birth to Being and beings or everything that come to be. This might sound a bit strange to our ears, but one need seek to appreciate the Vedic rationale. We are told that the original unity and power of *asat* were rent asunder to give rise to *sat* or a multiplicity and it itself was actually the primordial sacrifice. Now as long as there is unity, the problem of order, cohesion, and continuity does not arise. But the moment an autonomous multiplicity appears, there surges automatically the danger of disorder, chaos and destruction. Given the multiplicity it is necessary to keep it going, on the one hand, and avoid all chaos or self-destruction, on the other. It means that if multiplicity, the outward movement, is not to go out of control, there need be an activity of 'turning-in' back into the original unity by the negation of the outward movement. The individual autonomy claim must die or must be sacrificed so that unity is preserved. This should even take place continuously so that unity and multiplicity can be and also continue to be in perfect and peaceful co-existence. Briefly, therefore *asat* must sacrifice itself to give birth to *sat* which in turn must sacrifice itself once again so as to return to the ground of unity. For reality to continue to be, this continuous process, accomplished by sacrifice has to be evidently sustained and regulated and also steer clear of all mess. Hence there is the need of another reality, namely *rita* or Order.

4. RITA: or Order⁸ is spoken of by the Vedas in respect to all the above-mentioned three seminal concepts and we can understand it all by getting the right hang of things. *Asat* is the original undifferentiated potentiality out of which all multiplicity derives. *Sat* by contrast is the dispersed multiple reality. What eggs out *sat* from *asat* as well as what makes it efficient by the turning-in of multiplicity back into unity is *yajna*, the sacrifice. However for the reality to exist, it is not enough that the *sat* egged out of *asat* is

sacrificed once. The sacrifice itself need continue and the entire process need be guided in an orderly fashion so that not only unity and multiplicity could be maintained but also they can continue to exist efficaciously and harmoniously. This is what *rita*, the principle of Order, precisely achieves. For *rita* is the fundamental constitutive factor of reality both as Order and the power that makes for Order. Without *rita*, the entire reality would be nothing but a mere confusion or great chaos.

B. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE HINDU SYMBOLIC UNIVERSE

It is to be known therefore that the Hindu conception of Reality which is at the root of the entire Hindu philosophical thought and religious tradition is basically ontological as it spells out the entire existential reality in terms of to-be and coming-to-be, of Being and beings. It is also 'theanthropocosmic', as designated by authors like Raimundo Panikkar,⁹ in as much as God, Man and the universe are all considered and explained in a holistic manner. Since the understanding of God, Man and the universe has a direct bearing on the cosmo-social relationships of human beings, it is important to have a brief look at them.

1. GOD: Generally the Hindu conception of God is pigeonholed into a whole gamut of polytheism, henotheism, pantheism, monism and even monotheism.¹⁰ The Vedic literature of course makes mention of a multiplicity of Gods and Goddesses and hence does not immediately reveal a God who is One and only Transcendent Absolute. However a careful reading of the Vedas as expounded in the 'symbolic universe' does affirm One Absolute or generally called *Brahman* even if God and the Gods, named and worshipped, are in no way intended to negate this fundamental unity of the One and only Absolute. The Vedic conception in fact ploughs through the two positions. Basically God is one and is mysterious, unknowable, and ineffable and is to be spoken of more in negative rather than positive terms. However viewed from Man's point of view, God has to be referred to with a 'polytheistic' or 'henotheistic' expression. For God who is One cannot but be acknowledged and worshipped by Man under many a name and form (*namarupa*).¹¹ If we are to choose a terminology to express this entire understanding of God, it can perhaps be said as '*advaitic* Absolutism'.

2 MAN: Man is looked upon by the Hindus in a twofold way, phenomenal and essential. According to the former, Man is being in the realm of *sat*, populates this phenomenal world and is more an instance of the species of 'living' being than someone wholly unique. Among the living beings, the 'spirit' and 'life' are much more developed in Man than in any other beings, either plants or animals, whence Man enjoys a distinct superiority. However the most important thing regarding Man is the 'essential' nature or Man in his specific essence. Essentially Man is *atman* or 'self'¹² and as *atman*, Man is the same as *Brahman*. Existentially this is confirmed by the fact that Man though mortal insatiably longs for immortality.¹³ Absolute liberation is the goal of Man and *rita* demands that this typical feature of Man is taken care of in the best way possible. To this end, the Hindu symbolic universe has another two sets of doctrines: namely the *purusharthas* and the doctrine of *karma* and *samsara*.

3. PURUSHARTHAS: They are the distinct human goals in life and are four in number. They comprise all the basic human values sought by Man as Man.¹⁴ The first is *kama* meaning 'pleasure'. It is however not to be understood merely as sense gratification, as it is at times done but rather as the first principle of all activity, the creative and procreative power in reality and as such the basis of all love, affection, friendship, beauty, loyalty, devotion and aesthetics.¹⁵ It is *kama* that makes life creative, productive, artistic, loveable and beautiful. Family, art, architecture and all finer things and manifestations in life are born of *kama*. The second is *artha* or wealth, power and possessions. It connotes the entire material, social, economic and political equipment of life, necessary for Man's well-being and comfort.¹⁶ The third is *dharma* which means the form or principle of a thing by virtue of which something is what it is.¹⁷ A principle is to be understood as the law of being and hence dharma stands for all the socio-cultural and religio-moral duties and obligations envisaged in the customary usages and observances and varyingly applied to different classes, professions, states and stages of life. A good moral conduct is nothing other than the practice of dharma in all its aspects and the faithful observance of dharma is what makes for *moksha*, the fourth and actually *parama-purushartha* (the highest goal of Man). *Moksha* is liberation, absolute freedom or the definitive homecoming to Brahman, having fully attained self-realization.¹⁸ Man therefore has a clear purpose in life and a definite goal to achieve, even while living on this earth and making use of all its assets and resources.

4. KARMA AND SAMBARA¹⁹: The doctrine of *karma* means to say that every action has its consequent results and these results deserve a just retribution in terms of merit or demerit. But the important point is that in justice both merit and demerit are to be fully worked out in one's life. But in case it cannot be accomplished in one lifespan, then there comes the necessity of doing so in subsequent lives. Karma is therefore primarily concerned with the implacable working of cause and effect in this world, the primacy of the ethical reality and the supremacy of divine justice. *Karma* which calls for future life/lives for fruition and accordingly demands that one undergo a series of births and rebirths is what is termed as the *samsara* or the cycle of rebirths by the Hindus. *Samsara* continues inexorably until one has fully burnt away all the residues of *karma* and broken thereby the cycle of *samsara*. Once that is completed, then one does become fit to be with *Brahman*, the source of all Reality.

5. UNIVERSE: It is *sat* in its diverse and glorious manifestation. Coming as it does from *Brahman*, everything in it from the least to the greatest depends on *Brahman*, reveals some particular aspect of *Brahman*, and at the end is dissolved in *Brahman*. The Bhagavad Gita says it all perfectly. "Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, understanding and self-sense, this is the eightfold division of my nature. This is my lower nature. Know my other higher nature which is the soul by which this world is upheld... know that all have their birth in this. I am the origin of all this world and its dissolution as well. There is nothing whatsoever that is higher than I. All that is here is strung on me as rows of gems on a string".²⁰ It means, in the ultimate analysis, the nature of the universe is to be always acknowledged as transitory. Real on the other hand is *Brahman* and only *Brahman*.

II. THE IDEAL SYMMETRY OF COSMO-SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The cosmo-social relationships of the Hindus, while taking into account the above-mentioned factors, are governed further by two other institutions: one refers to the society as a whole, and is called *varnadharma* and another to each particular individual and is known as *ashramadharma*. Both serve to order the life of relationships, societal and personal, even as they include specific duties and obligations.

The *varnadharma* is generally transcribed as 'caste-system'. However neither the term 'caste' nor the underlying concept it holds are properly Hindu in origin. For early in Hinduism, *varna* denoted just a category, a '*gattung*'.²¹ It was fluid and functional.²² Being the result of the demand of *rita*, a demand to order the society, it was based on the principle of bearing the burdens of the society and not so much sharing its spoils. It referred directly to the service and orderly co-operation between individuals in keeping with their diverse gifts and talents. Numberless may well be the vocations in life, the *varnas* are just four in number: *brahmana* or priest-teacher; *kshatriya* or warrior-king; *vaishya* or traders-craftsmen; and finally *shudras* or manual labourers. Each *varna* is important in its own way and when each one fulfills one's duties, the life in the society becomes well-organized, smooth, and orderly. As such it is something that we need not only desire but also always strongly cherish. Later and unfortunately, due certainly perhaps to some historical reasons, *varna* did come to be conjoined with *jati* or birth and thus turned out to be the source of immense exploitation, confusion and conflict.²³ Hence it is necessary to add here that *varna* system in its present form falls much below the ideal relationships and as such certainly leaves much to be desired.

The *ashramas*²⁴ or the stages of life are there to order and organize the life of the individual human being, giving a comprehensive solution to the physical, psychological, intellectual, spiritual and moral growth and fulfillment. The *ashramas* are also four in number. The first *ashram* is *brahmacarya* or that of a student, dedicated to learning while living a life of celibacy, austerity and frugality. The second is *grihastha* and commences with the celebration of the *vivaha samskara* (marriage) and concerns the entire life of a householder. The third *ashram* is *vanaprastha* and refers to the time of retirement whereby one, after having accomplished all the responsibilities of married life, devotes oneself to a life of penance, meditation, and the achievement of the spiritual personhood. Finally one enters the *ashram* of *samnyasa*, intending to concentrate solely on the attainment of *moksha*, the total liberation or self-realization.

With the preceding understanding of the Hindu conception of reality, we can easily proceed to explain the ideal cosmo-social relationships of human beings. As said earlier, they are governed entirely by the understanding of the various elements of the Hindu symbolic universe, the essential nature and purpose of Man and the overall systematization of life both of the society and the individual. Intended to preserve the Order and harmony pervad-

ing the reality as a whole, they may be said to integrate Man's threefold basic experience.

First of all, Man needs to experience life in its fullness by prospering and flourishing in the world of love, family and community. Life is emphatically 'worldly' and one is not to exclude the material dimension. What is harmful to Man, on the other hand, is not the sane and right enjoyment of all that is good, right and beautiful but their abuse, repression and meaningless renunciation. This experience is concretized in the two *purusharthas* of *artha* and *kama* and during the two stages of life, namely *brahmacharya* and *grihastha*. Secondly, Man need also live piercing so to say the first experience. For true happiness and fulfillment in life is achieved not so much by the total immersion into the temporal life of the world and Man's non-atman aspect, as by the effort to overcome meaningfully the worldly experiences and achieve the supra-temporal dimension of our human reality or properly the atman aspect of life. The last two *ashramas*, *vanaprastha* and *samnyasa* even as the *mokshapurushartha* correspond to this endeavour on the part of Man.

Man however is also known to be only too easily liable to take to extremes or stress either purely the atman or non-atman aspect of his life. But normal and fruitful is the experience that synthesizes and integrates them both. Hence there arises the need of a third experience which can harmoniously combine the previous two experiences and keep them in proper focus and perspective. Involvement, enjoyment, affirmation, accumulation etc. are to be balanced with withdrawal, elimination, negation and renunciation etc. This is what is precisely achieved by the *dharmapurushartha*. At all times and in all things, while acting or refraining from it, Man should respect the intrinsic form or law of all realities, must be faithful to their general and particular working pattern and thus uphold and maintain the overall Order, Symmetry and Harmony. When all these experiences are realized simultaneously, they do blend the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the material, activism and passivism and finally come to preserve the holistic and optimistic view of life and reality.

III. THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION

At the out set it might be good to be clear about the phenomenon, concept and process of globalization before we can speak of its challenges. The

phenomenon of globalization could be understood in a limited sense, that is, just restricted to economy, trade and markets or in a wider and broader sense, encompassing all aspects of human life. In either sense, I with certain other authors am inclined to believe that it is after all not a wholly new reality.²⁵ Over thousands of years emigration, trade, travel, exchange of know-how including science and technology, spread of religious and cultural influence etc. have been happening in the history of mankind. However the magnitude and gravity, the pace and process etc. with which globalization is taking place today have certainly no comparison to any time in the past, thanks to the newer, faster and better means of communication, production, travel etc.

Next, the reality of globalization, just as every other reality involving human activity is obviously ambiguous. It has its benefits and also serious setbacks. It can enrich the world as a whole scientifically, culturally, economically etc. Pervasive poverty in every aspect of human life, for example, did dominate the world not long ago. However today it has been overcome almost globally thanks to the great advantages of technology, efficacy of international exchange and the social and economic merits of living in open rather than closed societies. At the same time however globalization has also manifested serious flaws and follies. Its fruits have not at all reached all sections of the society. There has not been a fairer distribution of its advantages. The level of inequality is the central issue in this connection and it makes for grave concern unlike all the beneficial changes ushered in by globalization.

Further globalization as it presents itself today has been also the object of mixed reactions, albeit for different reasons. If on the one hand, it has managed to attract some whole-hearted promoters and loyal supporters, it has also fashioned for itself many a vociferous opponent, on the other. Different cultures, religious convictions, spiritual traditions, social and political interests, not to say selfish loyalties do play a role here and naturally they all play a vital role either in the acceptance or rejection of the process of globalization.

The challenges that the Hindu world could possibly meet from the reality of globalization therefore are to be verified accordingly. Globalization in the limited sense of the word, I think, will always be welcome in India, as the Hindus have a positive attitude towards *artha* or wealth, power and possessions and *kama* or normal human gratifications. However it is rather unlikely, if not wholly impossible that they would accept globalization in

all its details and in every field, unless it approaches them with the beneficial aspects. The broad and universal understanding of reality that Hindus entertain makes for an open and generous spirit and as such they positively assist Hindus to absorb values, ideas and ideals, no matter which source they come from. However it is difficult to imagine that they could be easily persuaded to give up their consistent symbolic universe for anyone different. Certain things like pure materialism, indiscriminate consumerism or just any one-sided emphasis on mundane life can simply be beyond their imagination due to such things as the doctrine of atman, the demands of dharma, the sane goal of *mokshapurushartha* and the belief in the inexorable operation of karma and *samsara*.

It is especially difficult to think of any immediate and significant influence that may come to be exercised by globalization on the social institution of *varnadharma* as it has been inseparably conjoined with *jati* and terribly communalized at the present juncture by the political system of the country. For that matter even *ashramadharma* cannot be easily dislodged from the Hindu psyche as the ideals of at least *brahmacarya*, *grihastha* and *samnyasa ashramas* are rather unshakably ingrained in the concrete life style of the Hindus. All in all and to say it all in very few and simple words, the influence of globalization in its the present form can only be peripheral as far as the Hindus are concerned, for good as well as bad effects of globalization are unable easily to sound a chord of their unique symbolic universe and consequently also of their cosmo-social relationships. In fact it will be a very arduous, if not an utterly formidable task.

IV. CONCLUSION

The cosmo-social relationships of the Hindus are clear even as the challenges that globalization poses today. It is evident that the whole Hindu symbolic universe rests on very solid pillars and the Hindu conception reality is a comprehensive and compact edifice. The various elements of this structure are so very intimately interlinked and interbuilt that it is impossible to touch or remove any one of them without dismantling the whole. Because the Hindus think everything primarily in terms of being, the highest point of view available, it is not difficult for them to have the broadest vision of things, that is to say, see everything from their own ontological perspective and then either accept and absorb them or just leave or even reject

them. This course of action is obviously easier when things are seen to go along with their own conception and organization of the reality. But if things are clearly opposed, they may well make a dent on their life, but only gradually and not without serious opposition. From this perspective therefore it may not be wholly wrong to affirm that the cosmo-social relationships of the Hindus shall be able to withstand any challenge coming from any quarters of globalization, as they have been already done for the last few millenniums with regard to many other challenges.

Notes

¹ Hindu world as such is too varied and complex a reality both in content, belief and practice. Hence it must be stated that our treatment here is only basic and general.

² A terminology signifying the basic understanding that there exists a comprehensive integration of all the discrete institutional elements in a given culture whereby the whole reality becomes humanly meaningful and logically consistent and intelligent. For more details cf. P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, Middlesex, 1975, 118ff.

³ These four concepts are said to be intentionality-structures or four original languages so that any statement in the Rigveda can be traced to one or other of them where the meaning of the statement is grounded. These four languages are said to function as four spaces of discourse, four ways of viewing the world within which human action takes place and from which any statement in the text gains meaning. Cf. for more details, Antonio T. de Nicolas, *Meditations through the Rigveda*, Boulder & London, 1978.

⁴ Cf. R.V.10. 72. 3; A.V. 8.4; 17.1.9.

⁵ Cf. Antonio T. De Nicolas, *op. cit.* 89ff.

⁶ *Ibid.* 115f.

⁷ Cf. Raimundo Panikkar, *The Vedic Experience*, Mantramanjari, London, 1977, 346ff.

⁸ For the right meaning of the term, Cf. Antonio T. de Nicolas, *op. cit.* 159ff.

⁹ Raimundo Panikkar, *op. cit.*, 325; cf. also S. Radhkrishnan & C.A. More, *A Source book in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton, 1957, xxv.

¹⁰ Cf. for a brief summary, A.C. Bose, *The call of the Vedas*, Bombay, 1954, 32ff.

¹¹ The Rigveda puts it as follows, "They speak of Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni, and there are the superna and garumat; the One Being, the wise call by many names..." (RV. I. 164. 46). Or again, "Him with fair wings, though only one in nature, wise singers shape with songs in many figures" (RV. X. 114. 5).

¹² For a good explanation of the concept of atman, see H. Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern people*, Hawaii, 1964, 89ff.

¹³ *Aitereya Aranyaka*, II. 3. 2.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Hiriyanna, *Indian conception of Values*, Mysore, 1975, 6f.

¹⁵ Cf. C. Kulkarni, *Vedic Foundations of Indian Culture*, Bombay-Dharwar-Bangalore, 1973, 78.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 69ff.

¹⁷ Cf. S. Radhkrishnan, *Hindu Dharma*, in *Religion and Society*, London, 1948, 107; K. Luke, *The Rigvedic Conception of Dharma*, in *God's Word among Men*, G. Gispert-Sauch (ed), New Delhi, 1973, 36.

¹⁸ M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.* 270ff.

¹⁹ Cf. for a good explanation, S. Radhkrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life*, London, 1927, 54f. Also, R. Panikkar, *op. cit.* 571ff.

²⁰ *Bhagavad Gita*, VII. 4 –7.

²¹ Cf. K. Luke, 'Social Classes: Indo-European Tradition' in *Jeevadhara*, 6(1976), 239. It is not at all easy to explain the origin and growth of varna. The many theories put forward by different author are not entirely satisfactory. Varna which means colour cannot really refer to the colour of the skin of the people, as some would like to suggest. For all the possible colours are seen to exist in everyone of the castes. More plausible, on the other hand, is the theory put forward by Emile Benveniste, who basing his studies on the research of Indo-European language suggests that it indeed refers to colour but not of the skin but of the clothes worn by the different classes of people. Cf. E. Benveniste, *Indo-European language and society*, tr. By Elizabeth Palmer, London, 1973, 227f.

²² Cf. RV III. 44. 5; IX. 112. 3. These verses give us to understand that different professions could be desired by one and the same person, and even were followed in one and the same family.

²³ Cf. S.C. Dubey, *Indian Society*, New Delhi, 1992, 48ff.

²⁴ Cf. T. .M. .P. Mahadevan, *Outlines of Hinduism*, Bombay, 1966, 77ff.

²⁵ Cf. Dr. Samir Amin, *Globalization yesterday and Today*, in *Colonialism and Globalization*, W. Fernandes & A. Dutta (ed), New Delhi, 1999, 22ff.

Ursula Klesing-Rempel

4. Power Relations, Gender Construct and Interculturality

Since the XX Century, "globalization" appears as the core of the model of industrial societies. These societies are consistently built upon the perspective of a desirable and only possible socioeconomic order. Seemingly, this order makes unnecessary to think about politics, because no viable alternative exists for that model of life. Therefore, one of the characteristics that emerge in contemporary societies is the slow but steady disappearance of the social and political conflict that existed previously in opposing programs and sociopolitical discourse, and certain decay in their significant issues and values. In this global arena, persons living in the farthest places of the world are able to receive information, through satellite, that involves the possibility of identifying with any product, image, or idea. In many cases, this is experienced as a cultural threat which, in turn, prompts the need to defend one's own culture.

In the global process, the production of knowledge is organized as a theoretical body that names, conceives and categorizes the reality emerging from the discourse on modernity, which is imposed on the various particular expressions that begin to structure different developmental alternatives, as in the case of indigenous peoples.

The understandable discomfort generated by the concrete consequences of the globalizing policy manifests itself in various ways: peaceful and violent, individual and collective, as alternative projects and as common actions performed by women who have dropped resistance as a project for the future and who rather act as a counterweight to the dominating state and world discourse.

Theoretical discourses as well as modern social research – that for many years have held the other culture as their object of study – not only leave doubts about the bonds between the production of knowledge and the social relations, but also about the objectification of cultural identities, the projective character in the identification of the "other", and the cognitive objectivity in scientific discourse.

Recently those "other" individuals or groups, from cultures studied by the social sciences, are taking the floor and beginning to voice their own dis-

course and demand dialogue; without having been sufficiently recognized – so far – as subjects who are building their own life project. The dominant discourse does not still perceive them as persons and cultures with multiple faces, and able to objectify their own reality in order to interpret it and reflect on it. In particular, the absence of female informants and thinkers is of great concern because this means that women, as creators of culture and thought, have been left on the margin of their own cultures.

The scientific challenge of creating concepts and categories that spell out the complexity of a diverse reality, often became in a separation between the concrete reality and its scientific interpretation. The risk taken, thus, is that representations resulted in a fixed conception of structures and persons. The researcher/observer of other cultures separated from the relationship among subjects and strove to point out the difference between the articulation of concrete culture and scientific rationality: having the other ontologically fixed into "other", standardized and, above all, denying to it the confrontation with *its* own cultural reality and the reciprocal interchange. This attitude has contributed to keep the belief, from the scientific point of view, that each culture is a *natural* fact.

Since the Latin American colonization, the knowledge about indigenous cultures has been structured primarily within a rigid dichotomy: *absorption by the other or resistance to the other*. It prevails, in discourses, the fear of losing identity at the thought of blending beliefs, lore, and doctrinal bodies that constantly induce cultural changes. The dialogue among cultures, perceived as the conscious possibility of creating multidimensional knowledge in the relationship *informant-interpreter*, poses the urgent need for severing the rigid parameters that negate epistemological creativity in the process of relating knowledge.

The complex realities of the indigenous worlds have been analyzed, interpreted, and assessed from a perspective of rigid binary concepts: *assimilation-resistance, death-survival, local past-global future, cultural preservation-entry to the modern world*. These dual concepts have repeatedly been incorporated into scientific discourse without taking into account that, as of the Conquest, the indigenous people have been in touch with the modern world, experiencing permanent processes of renewal, political negotiation, and cultural innovation.

The recent postcolonial debates in Latin America seek to deepen into the understanding of problems posed by the epistemological colonial discourse and discover the acritical adaptation of occidental conceptions to the proc-

ess of interpretation of the Latin American reality, as well as its consequences in the construction of knowledge about the other and its development.

The aforementioned debates question the modern discourse of social sciences, that has acquired general acceptance and significantly determined the understanding of the world by proposing "forms of knowledge that become categories and universal concepts for the analysis of any reality, and incorporate normative propositions that define the right thing for all the peoples of the planet (. . .). These knowledge bases, thus, become the patterns from which the deficiencies or backwardness that occur as a result of the primitive or traditional aspects of all societies, are analyzed and detected." (Edgardo Lander, 2000)

The first information on indigenous cultures was based on the primary perception of the "*Amerindian-nature*" (Edgardo Lander, 2000), that totally ignored, deprecated, and destroyed the person and her body of knowledge in the name of a fight to overcome ignorance and the "necessary" religious mission to save the savage souls.

The logical consequence of the colonial discourse is the subsistence, to some measure, of the conceptual dichotomy "*ominion-submission*". In spite of the current vindication of the indigenous peoples, these have not been able to liberate themselves, in a desirable total manner, from the rigid dual perception. The concept of development was incorporated into colonial discourse in order to rule over the indigenous reality, regulating their practices and subjectivity forms; and subtly comparing the person and the people, within the parameter of a *developed* or *underdeveloped* being, equivalent to feeling *inferior* or *superior* to others.

It can be ascertained that the drawback of this historical perception, of these persistent representations, particularly of the culture of the indigenous peoples, is still in force. It can be seen in some Latin American and western theorizations, in general, as well as in public life and national politics, which leads to two interpretations:

a) *Essentialist*: the ethnic groups understood as constant genealogical unities, with objectifiable characteristics as language, origin, religion, cosmivision and other features that are the result of various centuries of survival, resistance, and cultural continuity. It would seem, in these terms, that culture and identity are things that all its members possess as absolute and natural elements.

b) *Of situational and relational nature*: the ethnic conscience of identity is built in the differentiation from other ethnic groups, it is fluid and presents a situational dependency. The fluid character is due to the slow but sustained process of approaching a full participation in the modern society.

As of the armed conflict in Chiapas, in 1994, the binary interpretation on indigenous people was severed, because they themselves brought up a multidisciplinary discourse. It shows a concrete thought, emerged from the indigenous reality, that bonds the particular with the universal, reformulating the democratic project as a life project in which the values of the community can meet and have a dialogue with the values of universal humanity. It is the first step to overcome the limited perspective of a structural multiculturalism and make advance the conception of a participative multicultural society.

Gender Construct

As many other categories and concepts from the postcolonial discourse and the western academic world that attempt to explain reality, the *category of gender* was also incorporated into the Latin American feminist discourse.

The need to seek partnerships among women from all over the world to debate the particular situation of those that share experiences of submission, exclusion, and violence, led them to debate and work together in national and international meetings, and carry out a common task learning, at the same time, to respect the cultural differences.

Undoubtedly, this process of discussing for about 20 years the gender category from different ideological currents has made available the present plurality of positions and subjects for analysis within the diversity of feminist articulations in the academic researches, in public politics, and in the indigenous cultures.

The core of the gender category clarifies, in an elemental sense, that which constitutes the social relationships based on the differences between the sexes. The feminist current adds another point: any human group in the world, seen in its cultural context, is divided by gender and, in this division, the feminine still demarcates a concrete and experiential-exclusion space that takes the primary form of relations that mean power.

The gender category opens up to a constant construct that seeks to explain the persistent inequality between men and women, the meanings that specific activities acquire in social interaction and, consequently, discover the

nature of these interrelationships both among individual subjects and also in the social and political organization.

In the same sense, "sexuality and reproduction are analyzed as cultural and symbolic constructs, whose meanings can only be understood within a broad cultural context that takes into account – on one hand – the relations among the available symbols and the normative, educational, scientific, legal, and political concepts and – on the other – the social relations that approach the subjective identity and the transformation of individuals as elements that have adopted the culture traits of another group" (Alice Scott, 1995).

In the field of Social Sciences, the differences between men and women have been metaphorically conceptualized as binary oppositions that determine the interpretation of what women are, in a close relationship with men, under a universal conceptual tendency that aligns the masculine with culture and the feminine with nature, the objective with the subjective, the rational with the emotional. How is it possible then, in this scope, for women to define themselves facing the *category of subject*, which is an organized hub shared by some women?

The gender category should have, as an indispensable reference, the cultural context, understood as vital space. Based on this category, the so-called essentialist and universal discourse, historically expressed in the phrase "biology is destiny", is questioned (Verena Stolcke, 2000); and attempts "to transcend the biological reductionism by interpreting the relationships of men and women as cultural constructs [that are] engendered by attributing social, cultural, and psychological meanings to the biological sexual identities" (Verena Stolcke, 2000).

By contributing certain elements that explain the social construct of relationships between men and women in their particular and universal cultural context, the gender category overcomes the essentialist view of culture, it facilitates the processes of *denaturalization* of the existing social relations and opens up to the idea that culture and relations between sexes constitute vital and dynamic processes where the personal and collective identities can be transformed from their historicity.

The concept of culture is taken, thus, to concrete and social life spaces. The subject emerges as a producer of her own culture in which she designs significant nuclei with meaning and orientation to daily life. The potentiality of this process is sheltered by an open and unfinished reality, in movement, and constant restructuring.

In general, epistemology does not establish a gender difference in the process of building knowledge. It understands it in the strict sense of the *subject*, that is to say, supposing that both man and woman are in the same social and cultural condition.

The use of gender, understood as a fluid category and in a process of constant revision, severs the homogenizing epistemological discourse in the construction of knowledge.

How would one apply the category of gender to indigenous peoples so as to not to fall in a new western interpretation and production of knowledge about cultures?

There are few studies on the specific situation of the indigenous woman. This prevents analyzing the applied concepts. Furthermore, the absence of women as informants of culture is pretty evident. In general, it is the traditional authorities of indigenous cultures who grant permission to carry out studies in their communities and they are still, for the most part, the informants.

"Until the '80's, state census did not record any specific information on the indigenous population separated by sexes" (Paloma Bonfil, 2000). The specific living conditions of the indigenous woman have just recently been taken into account, from the gender point of view.

Broadly speaking, the available information on the indigenous woman refers to her traditional role in the transmission and preservation of culture, understood basically as the use of the language and the revitalization of customs. Her domestic space is interpreted as the principal milieu of her daily activities.

The formation of the indigenous woman shows a much lower level than her male counterpart, and the extended monolingualism represents one of the concrete obstacles to fluidly relate to the outside world.

Both in public community action and in national society, the woman has been practically invisible. Her possibilities of participating in the making-decision processes are very limited. And her economic and social contribution is neither clear nor recognized as a cultural value.

More than the official agencies, the nongovernmental organizations are the ones that pay attention to the need of educating and training female community-based workers in the various community fields; offering women a specific identity and a space of their own to act within their community. This is still a fragile space because, due to the cultural norms, the work of the female community-based workers ends up when they marry.

In contrast, the social male power within the indigenous culture becomes visible in political positions; as major o governor; religious positions, as caretaker (or steward), dancer or captain; participation in the group of traditional authorities, land ownership, or the right to take part in the decision-making processes at assemblies. This gender monopoly of the higher positions of economic, political, social, and cultural power, prestige and authority, determines the developmental characteristics of the community and has been widely studied because of its cultural and political importance.

The role played by men within the indigenous communities is legitimized by consensus in rules and norms, such as tradition, ethnicity, and customs. As a whole, these norms represent the "*cultural defense*" discourse that may be used with a vindication nature but whose acritical use subsumes the *natural right of man* to legitimately exercise gender violence, domestic violence that includes, in many cases, both psychological and physical violence, and denies women the intellectual possibility of creating their own discourse.

Gender and interculturality

In many aspects of indigenous cultures, there is certain tension in gender relations because the traditional values that ensure cultural continuity are questioned, interpreted and valued as unmovable; and the issue of their widening is raised towards the self-realization of women and their empowerment, both within the cultural context and the collective world.

Would it be possible to combine the predominant form of a concrete way of thinking with the particular, and this with the universal? Would it be possible to construct sets of knowledge that value their own culture and, at the same time, elements from universal civilization?

The conflict in Chiapas and the organized groups in which indigenous women began their personal and cultural awakening have begun to discover the personal identity of the "self", the "indigenous woman", "poor" and, in some cases, "Zapatista". These are cultural and political elements that specify "differences that make us, the indigenous, indigenous, which are neither recognized nor respected" (Commander Esther, speech before the Deputy of Chambers, March 2001). Commander Esther, whose discourse represents the voices of many indigenous women, proposes a broadening of identities, closely related to a coherent consciousness of the individual and collective identities that suffer limitations in the political context of an inequitable, unequal and exclusive society.

The construct of identity makes it necessary to achieve *visibility* in one's own culture, as the first step to be recognized as the subject of a discourse exclusive to the indigenous woman. The *recognition* as a thinking being that knows how to construct knowledge for social transformation is the ulterior step in the possibility of seeing oneself as subject.

The daily life of women in the indigenous communities, according to Commander Esther's description, "is tough. For many years we have been suffering pain, oblivion, disdain, marginalization and oppression (....). As we are girls, they think that we do not have any value, that we do not know how to think, work or live our lives (...); we are forced to marry, whether we want it or not; they do not ask for our consent." There is a clear gender exclusion and a denial of the sexual preferences and affectivity as an essential aspect of the enjoyment of the human being within her own culture. The Zapatista leader expresses it conclusively so as to accomplish the necessary changes – a common demand of women in the present world of local, national, and universal differences –: "We have struggled for change and will continue to do so (...). We want a world where the respect to difference is balanced with the respect to that which makes us equal".

Commander Esther refers, thus, to the *denaturalization* process of gender relations, a demand covering the spectrum from the local to the universal that is spurring a dynamic change in social relations. Furthermore, it represents a step towards the breaking of the so-called *complementarity* of roles, that involves a punitive stigmatization that falls on the indigenous woman in a *natural* way, within an asymmetrical relationship between men and women.

The gender category, in the context of interculturality, prompts to reflect on the representation of social relations in search of a life project, in which social justice and the plurality of structures and concepts on the individual and collective identities of each culture are taken into account; that also express a universal demand.

Gender construct is the bond between academic and non-academic women of the world who have matured a plurality of discourses as the result of mutual learning.

The growing potential of subjects to analyze their own culture is oriented to conceive it as unfinished and in a continuous process of change. Culture is presented, then, as "an open and dynamic articulation, a specific articulation between the limit of what is given and what is it possible to be given" (Hugo Zemelman, 1998), that opens the space of potentialities and possi-

bilities to transform the world. The cultural patterns and the recovery of subjectivity in the construction of valuable and instrumental knowledge are part of the construction of the subject itself.

The increasingly growing poverty of the indigenous population – socioeconomic problem that has been present from the Conquest to the globalization era and still a long way from being solved – is one of the most serious obstacles to achieve the transformations that guarantee a decent life, within and outside one's culture. The indigenous women have discovered their potential as thinking and acting subjects, in the process of constructing knowledge that allows them to value their personal and cultural identity; presenting in a reflective way conceptual demands, whose solutions would culminate in a democratic, participative, plural, and at the same time, ethnic and local society, based on a construction of power in accordance with an ethics of civil society.

The challenge for postcolonial social sciences entails recognizing the participation of indigenous women in the construction of knowledge about the diversity of historical processes that have placed them in an asymmetrical position with respect to indigenous men. This recognition would serve, for example, to spur studies on masculinity that allow to explain it as a symbolic category, interdependent with femininity, on the influence of catholic religion on all gender processes within the indigenous cultures; or any other study that would lead to the epistemological understanding of the concepts of gender and interculturality.

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5. Globalization and the victims of exclusion: from a liberation ethics perspective

In this lecture I will merely refer to some fundamental theses.¹ The strategy of the argument will take the following path: I will begin with some older reflections by Paul Ricœur about universal civilization and its particular cultures (§1). I will summarize a non-eurocentric historical perspective that is pertinent to the Modern Globalizing System (§2). I will describe the asymmetrical location of the "participants" that has resulted from the violent process of inclusion in the World System (§3). I will point out to certain aspects through which one can see ethical and critical demands within the horizon of globalization (§4). To conclude (§5) I will suggest some relevant topics for future discussions.

§ 1. UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION AND PARTICULAR CULTURES?

In 1961, as I arrived to Paris from a work-related stay of two years in Israel, I had the chance to attend some classes at the Sorbonne and to read an article by Paul Ricœur published in *Esprit* entitled "World Civilization and National Cultures."² According to Ricœur, "World Civilization" – which already entails the entire problematics of "globalization" – is constituted on the basis of the scientific spirit,³ the technical and instrumental structures and a rationalized and universalized politics and economy which in turn generates a form of life that eventually becomes globalized ("the inevitable standardization of housing, clothing...")⁴. But when one asks, with an optimism that is appropriate to the times, about the signification of such a civilization, Ricœur points out that such questioning amounts to coming to terms with the only humanity".⁵ An entry of the masses to the elemental goods, a struggle against illiteracy and an increment in the means of consumption and culture. Even though he already writes critically:

En même temps qu'une promotion de l'humanité, le phénomène d'universalisation constitue une sorte de subtile destruction [... du] noyau créateur des grandes civilisations, des

grande cultures, ce noyau à partir duquel nous interprétons la vie [...] le noyau éthique et mythique de l'humanité.⁶

Indeed, world cultures have to reckon with the other cultures that belong to great civilization, regional cultures edified from an ethical and mythical nucleus,⁷ cultures built by institutions that are not universal but rather particular:

L'humanité ne s'est pas constituée dans un seul style culturel, mais a pris dans de figures historiques cohérentes, closes⁸: les cultures.⁹

Cultures that cannot recreate are unable to develop, and thus, die.¹⁰ Today those cultures that cannot adapt to "scientific rationalization" and to the secularization of nature will not be able to survive. It seems, then, as if Ricœur believed that the westernization of the world is inexorable, since only a few cultures (the great cultures not withstanding) will be able to resist the affront of the Western and Christian culture that had produced a notion of westernization based on scientific rationalization and secularization:

Il faut d'une part se réenraciner dans son passé, se refaire une âme nationale [...] Mais il faut en même temps, pour entrer dans la civilisation moderne, entrer dans la rationalité scientifique, technique, politique qui exige bien souvent l'abandon pur et simple de tout un passé culturel.¹¹

At any rate the question remains open for a move towards communication attempt that is similar to the Ethics of Discourse:

Au syncrétismes¹² il faut opposer la communication, c'est-à-dire une relation dramatique dans laquelle tour à tour je m'affirme dans mon origine et je me livre à l'imagination d'autrui selon son autre civilisation.¹³

However, the aporia remains unresolved: on the one hand, there is a civilization as a universal System – predicated upon instrumental reason, essentially at the level of scientific and technical abstract structure and also predicated upon the process of modern rationalization – and on the other hand, there are some other cultures (the great cultures) that are ultimately incommunicated, cultures that are particular rather than universal, cultures that ought to mutually communicate but for which it remains to be seen how this communication is to be achieved.

One could conclude that there is universality at the instrumental level and particularity at the material level (in relation to the ethical and mythical nucleus) of each culture.

In Latin America, Leopoldo Zea in 1957, in his book *América en la historia*¹⁴ identified a similar problem to the one delineated above. On his part, the Caribbean Latin American Franz Fanon, confronted this very same problem in 1961 from the perspective of the oppressed colonials in *Les damnés de la terre*¹⁵; these questions were discussed at the time of my return to Latin America – after ten years in Europe.¹⁶ In 1973, I would write in my work: *Para un ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, a philosophical and critical statement expressed from the periphery of the World System:

El europeo, y por ello su filosofía, ha universalizado su posición de dominador, conquistador, metropolí imperial, y ha logrado, por una pedagogía prácticamente infalible, que las élites ilustradas sean, en las colonias, los subopresores que mantienen a los oprimidos en una cultura del silencio, cultura que no sabe decir su palabra, y que sólo escucha – por sus élites ilustradas, por sus filósofos europizados – una palabra que los aliena: los hace otros que sí mismos.¹⁷

Also, some time after 1977, the same issue is being debated over in Africa through philosophical works of authors such as Eboussi Boulaga and Paulin Hontodji,¹⁸ debates that fertilized the thought on particularism and universalism. This debates led to the multicultural trend of Postcoloniality, a trend that since 1986 has found a point of reference in *Decolonizing the mind the politics language in African Literature*¹⁹ by Kenyan author NguNgu wa Thiong'o. In 1978, Edward Said published *Orientalism*,²⁰ a text which allowed for the discussion about anti-eurocentric theses.

The philosophical theme is always centered on the dialectics of universalism (of a modern civilization) and the notion of particularity (of the great traditional cultures of the colonial world). The question remains open to discussion; it is currently debated with fervor leading decidedly towards the prolematics of "culture."²¹ Charles Taylor writes advocating a multicultural yet non globalizing politics:

But merely, on the human level, one could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that a culture that have provided the horizon of meaning of large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time – that

have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable – are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject.²²

§ 2. TOWARDS A HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION

Immanuel Wallerstein, had already since 1974²³ advanced the notion of a "World System." Departing from this thesis Andre Gunder Frank asserts that the "World System"²⁴ does not originate in Capitalism but it has existed for at least 5000 years.²⁵ Similarly, Jim Blaut is of the opinion that Modernity does not exactly begin with Capitalism but rather with the European "invasion" of America in 1492.²⁶ I believe that this question is both complex and needs to be differentiated. Before entering this debate, and as a preamble, I would like to outline a certain historical perspective which will allow us to place the discussion within a different horizon (neither a Eurocentric, nor a Hegelian²⁷ one).

Many of the instances of the system that is nowadays globalized have an old history.²⁸ In our interpretation the "World System" has certain stages that we would like to briefly recall here.²⁹

a. Stage I. Mesopotamia and Egypt. Of the six regions of what is considered the high Neolithic³⁰ culture (Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, pre Aryan China, Mesoamerica and the Inca region) only Egypt and Mesopotamia participate in an exchange of civilizing experiences that took place constantly since the IV. millennium B.C. At this juncture, a "system" that is now globalized begins to take shape historically, according to the plausible thesis of A.G. Frank.³¹ In a non-eurocentric conception of history it is necessary to remember that Egypt has an originary Bantu component coming from the black African South.³² Thus, in the Bantu culture the dead is buried with the instruments used while still alive (This can be observed both in a present day tomb in Ghana as well as in the pyramid of the Pharaoh Tutankamon whose hundreds of utensils can be seen at the Museum of Cairo). Similarly, the Osiris' myth of the resurrection of the dead (a myth which required a culture of Pyramids and mausoleums) arrives to Europe and America, via the Judeo Christian thought, where one can find cemeteries³³ like in the whole Muslim world, from Morocco to the Philippines. Normative enunciations such as "I fed bread to the hungry, gave water to thirsty,

thirsty, clothed the naked one"³⁴ or "that the powerful do not oppress the poor in order to do justice to the orphaned and the widow"³⁵ are today critical principles still in use in Western Culture and which come from the first stage of the "inter-regional system."

b. Stage II. The Culture of the Horse and Iron. Due to the use of the horse³⁶ and the use of iron,³⁷ specially in the manufacturing of weapons for the wars of the great invaders, the "inter-regional system" becomes connected. These peoples, inappropriately called "Indo-Europeans," have also been referred to as invaders even though their "invasions" cannot really be labeled as such. The "system" expands by becoming connected to China, and thus initiating what will be known as the "Route of Silk"; by reaching India and thus incorporating the "Aryans" of Rig Veda and by including the following civilizations: the Persians and Medes of Mesopotamia; the Hitites from Turkey, the Greek and Latins of the Mediterranean and the Germans in Northern Europe. The "system" that becomes now globalized owes so much of its configuration of its "institutions" to the peoples from the Iron and Horse stage that it is frequently held that Modernity is the sole inheritor of the II stage of the Inter-Regional Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean System; conversely, it is frequently forgotten that China, India and most of the Muslim world are just as authentic inheritors of this system as the previous ones. The unilinear syllogism Grece-Rome -Europe is false. Baghdad is an earlier and more relevant continuation of Athens than Paris or Köln – the first is more of an inheritor of Greek thought than the seconds. One should not forget either that Athens was a colony of the Egyptian Sais (its masters in economics, science and religion: the Neith, goddess of Sais is the Palas Atheneas, and Plato correctly asserted that the Egyptian Thoth had taught Greeks the numbers, calculus, geometry and astronomy)³⁸. The armed riders of the Iron stage organized, then, the first political institutions and occupied vast territories, thus dominating many peoples that paid taxes and were frequently reduced to slavery. The Inter-regional system expanded from the Hitite Empire, whose capital was Hattusa, through the Persian Empire, the Indian kingdoms and the Chinese Empire, to the expansion of the Hellenistic world which founded Seleucia in the heart of Mesopotamia (capital of Seleucid Hellenes), city that was the "center" of the connections that sprang from China to Hispania. This primitive globalization was already intercontinental: from the Pacific to the Atlantic where an exchange of numerous techniques and findings related to astronomy, agriculture,

economics and politics took place, an exchange that will persist in the present World System.

c. Stage III. From Byzantium to Baghdad. It would seem that the domination of the Iron era produced endless oppression in the great empires. It would also seem, as Max Weber affirms, that, in the shackles of the slaves and the exploited ones, a critical ethics on the universalistic rebellion of the victims was propagated. The sage's critical formulations, exchanged with Egypt and Mesopotamia, were expressed in sacred books that, once re-read in situations of extreme material scarcity, produced as if by an explosion, the third stage of the "Inter-Regional System." This stage comprises the following cultures and territories: first of all, the Christian Byzantine culture; the Muslim culture (which will reach to Morocco in the Atlantic, to Poitiers in the north in 732 A.C., to the south of the Sahara, to the plateau via the golden Horde of the Mongols in what is now Russia, to Delhi, or Angra; and to the Mindanao in the Philippines in the fifteenth century through Malacca in the Pacific), and finally the Latin and Germanic cultures. The "System" will have as a central region from Samarkand and Bukhara (to the south of the present day Russia) up to Kabul around Baghdad (founded in 762 and destroyed by the Mongols in 1258) which was the model of the "civilized" and "modern" for five hundred years.³⁹ The falasifa (philosophy in Arabic) acquires a classical splendor in the ninth century when Al Kindi (who dies in Kufic, Syria in 873 A.D.) initiates the first process of modern secularization in philosophy, thus making philosophy different from the Koran and using it as a rational hermenutical method for its own commentary. Ibn Sina (Avicena, who dies in 1037 A.D.) who lived in Bukhara (now to the south of Russia), rediscovered and impeccably elaborated on Aristotle's logic. The Muslim Culture is the first great heir to Greek culture.⁴⁰ Europe, the Germanic Europe, was a peripheral region of the Mediterranean, a "remote" corner which was never central (not even during the Roman Empire) to the "Inter-Regional System" which encompassed China. The poorly labelled "Middle Ages"⁴¹ were nothing but the European perception of its own darkness and its dependency on a "central" culture: the "Muslim culture." The first prominent European novel, though there are some others before, *Don Quixote*, "the knight of the sad figure," (who fought against windmills)⁴² is attributed according to his author to an Arab writer. Could a "barbarian" European write a "literary masterpiece" of such innovative style? It was more plausible to attribute it to

those thought as "cultivated", undoubtedly the Arabs who were centenarian writers of subtle "stories" (protonovels), such as the *Arabian Nights*.

All of the elements, or at least most of them, that Weber identifies in the European Middle Ages and Renaissance as "internally" constitutive of Modernity, have been thoroughly realized in the Muslim World centuries before⁴³.

d. Stage IV. The "World System": Europe as "center". Up until the "invasion" of the American Continent in 1492, the Baltic Sea (the industrial "Northern Europe" of Hegel) and the Sea of Japan, were the most remote regions from the "center" (at that moment Baghdad and India).

The unexpected "invasion" of the Amerindian cultures (i.e.: Mexico from 1519 and Peru from 1529) will give to peripheral Europe a "vantage point" when compared to China – more populated and at least at the same level of technological development as Renaissance Europe. The first Modernity,⁴⁴ in its humanistic and imperial sense will be advanced by Spain as a result of the unity of the Hispanic nation brought about by Castille and Aragon in 1476 through the Port of Seville; this unification (new center) will be the predecessor of what eventually will become the first (and only) "World System." The experience and wealth of Genoa and other Renaissance Italian cities was not pertinent to the lands where the Reformation occurred⁴⁵. Such experience, along with that of the ancient Arab emirates (from the Caliphate of Cordoba) was rather directed towards the Atlantic – an "ocean," up to that moment, devoid of culture –, a horizon that will extend to the Caribbean (the new Mediterranean) in the imminence of Capitalism.

Northern Europe, up to that moment always dependent and peripheral of the Latin Mediterranean world (with the relative exception of the Vikings and the Hansa Confederation, though these themselves were dependent on the Mediterranean) is now directly connected to the "center", as embodied by the Atlantic.⁴⁶ The emancipation of Holland from Spain (at the beginning of the seventeenth century) and its mighty fleet, transformed Amsterdam, since 1630, into the heir of Seville.⁴⁷ We are now in the second Modernity, the properly bourgeois modernity of a mercantile "system" that will progressively replace the imperial Iberian superpowers. Since the "invasion" of Latin America in 1492, the "decentralization" in the sixteenth century of the "ancient system" that gravitated around Baghdad, produces a shattering revolution of the scientific paradigm of the peripheral Medieval Europe. The sixteenth century is nothing but the period of this revolution –

when in 1520 Magellan (El Cano) returns from "circling" the world, there begins, "empirically," a new phase of the world's astronomic cosmology. The new scientific paradigm is only "expressed" at the beginnings of the seventeenth century (as a result of the previous Hispanic revolution) with Galilee (condemned in 1616), Descartes (disciple of the Spanish Jesuits, devoted to the practice of the "examination of conscience," which in turn was the origin of the cogito and who writes in Amsterdam in 1636 *Le Discourse de la méthode*), etc. The rest is already known. However, we would like to gather a few conclusion pertinent to our topic.

The "World System" that reaches a new stage of globalization at the end of the twentieth century is already five hundred years old – the Stage III, organized around Baghdad, was also five hundred years old –. This System is that of Modernity, of mercantile Capitalism (first under Spanish and then under Dutch domination) of industrial capitalism (under British domination) and transnational Capitalism (under North American domination since 1945, end of the so-called Second World War). This "System" is not merely an instrumental one as Paul Ricœur and others indicated; it also contains material cultural moments (symbols, myths, values and traditions). It is rather ambiguously a technological system (based on instrumental reason), but it displays also many material instances (such as the ones mentioned above) and discursive instances (i.e. political institutions), etc. Furthermore, for the first time a World System confronts all the other cultures which in the Asian and Mediterranean region (obviously from China to India up to the Middle East and Northern Africa) had been fertilized internally by ancient moments of the very same "system" (Stages II and III). China, for instance, is perfectly reticent to the modernity of the World System, because for thirty centuries it has lived with such system (from its Stages II and III); therefore, it has an internal capacity to assimilate and adapt. India, as a victim of colonialism is the exception. The Muslim reality, given its comprehension of the world, draws from internal resources, originating in its first philosophical and Aristotelian Enlightenment since the ninth century, in order to encompass the secularized world (fundamentalism notwithstanding, given that it is a non-essential epi-phenomenon). Latin America was the first assimilated and co-opted modern periphery (Latin America is the originary "barbarian" required by Modernity for its own definition). With the exception of few ethnicities, still today resisting the invasion, destruction and assimilation, the destruction of the great majority of Amerindian cultures were the origin of "mestizaje." This is not the

case with the Bantu world or any other "non-universal" indigenous culture, cultures whose process of "assimilation" is more complex.

At any rate, concomitantly with the globalization of modernity, the almost absolute exteriority of other sophisticated cultures has progressively diminished. But, suddenly, the capacity for expansion is halted and thus a process of exclusion begins, out of the internal crisis within this very World System. Let us consider, then, the processes of inclusion and exclusion that are both violent and mortal.

§ 3. THE ASYMMETRICAL INCLUSION OF THE VICTIMS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM

From the fifteenth century onwards, Europe as a secondary and peripheral culture, dialectically expands its horizons and includes (subsumes) first and foremost Amerindia (from Mexico to Peru) the richest area in metal and whose urban centers were the most densely populated. For three centuries Europe will accumulate wealth and military technology, will monopolize power and will lead in the management of the World System's centrality (not anymore in the sense meant by Wallerstein, but incorporating many of the aspects of the autopoiesis of the "system" in the sense meant by Luhmann)⁴⁸ in order to territorially occupy certain regions of Asia and, since the Berlin Congress (in 1885, just a century ago), to prepare for the "invasion" of Africa. It was only since the fifteenth century that the purported "superiority" of Europe was exerted on the Amerindian cultures; these cultures did not know iron, gun powder and the horse. Such was not the case with Africa which resisted until the times of the Industrial Revolution, thus proving that until the fifteenth century the so called European superiority was ineffectual. The "colonial world" is the victim; it is a denied and divided world, an excluded world. In relation to this Franz Fanon wrote:

Como es una negación sistemática del Otro, una decisión furiosa de privar al Otro de todo atributo de humanidad, el colonialismo empuja al pueblo dominado a plantearse constantemente la pregunta: ¿Quién soy en realidad⁴⁹?⁵⁰.

The point here is to locate historically, empirically and concretely this "negation of the Other."⁵¹ The ethic of discourse indicates that if there is asymmetry among the participants concerned in the argumentative com-

munity, the justified decision is invalid. We will show how a radical invalidity blurs any present decision in the modern World System.

a. The Irrationality of Violence as Origin. From the fifteenth century onwards, the modern World System will always expand itself by means of an initial violence which constitutes the relation among systems, nations, cultures and people. Modern Europe, since the "invasion" of Amerindia in 1492, never initiated the process of "inclusion" of the other culture (The Caribbean Indians were exterminated in the course of one century; so, only the Mexican Conquest can be construed as the originary "inclusion" in reference to the whole process of inclusion carried out by Europe).⁵² The invasion of America originates the propagation of "modern subjectivity" in a practical sense: the ego conquiro (I conquer) precedes the ego cogito. Neither Europe (Spain, Portugal, England, France, etc.) nor the United States⁵³ ever initiated their relation with peripheral cultures (in Latin America since the sixteenth century and in Asia since the eighteenth century)⁵⁴ with a peaceful proposition based on rational arguments.⁵⁵ This relation was always and solely carried out by the violence of weaponry. Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and North American armies occupied strategic territories. These nations defeated their opponents on the basis of military technological superiority, unconditionally subjugating them to their domination. This is the "other face of Modernity", a face that has been ignored since Kant, a face which is constitutive of modernity's "being" and of the World System whose most recent globalization is herewith being considered (in the era of the transnationals and after the so-called⁵⁶ Second World War). These are but a few instances of Modernity's violent irrationality: The colonial conquest in Latin America by Spaniards and Portuguese,⁵⁷ in North America by Anglo Saxons (who still celebrate at Thanksgiving the Native American offering so that the colonials would not starve, colonials who as a gesture of gratitude, initiated a fierce battle that did not spare a single Native American. This battle is still praised today in the American Western film where it meets with the universal complicity of audiences) in French Canada, in the enslaved Africa,⁵⁸ in the filibustering⁵⁹ of the Caribbean, in the opium war of China or in the violent occupation of India-murdering all those who would "compete" with the British textile industry, thus destroying the centenarian production of silk.

b. Economic exploitation as structure. The despotic dominance over the bodies of the new colonial servants was structured on the basis of an eco-

conomic system which was founded not even on an unequal exchange, but on the simple extraction, pillaging or illegal appropriation of all resources that could be exploited through military dominance. Indians were sent by means of the system of *encomiendas* – a system characterized by gratuitous labor – to work in the fields; later to work in the *haciendas*, (farms) receiving fictitious salaries; they were sent to the mines where they labored their lives away in the *mita*; Africans were commodified as slaves, used and slaughtered like animals (treated as pure merchandise deprived of fundamental rights such as marriage, paternity or any other right known to humans; their bodies could be used sexually or economically by the slave "masters" who had full rights over their lives, including their sadistic torture and their extermination). The mining wealth (gold and silver) was simply possessed by the colonials who had to pay taxes to the Crown; the rest of the colonials' revenues would then be funneled into the European world market in Europe (the first true world market whose first currency was coined with the silver extracted by the indigenous contingent in Mexico and Peru, or by the African slaves later in Minas Gerais, Brazil) This is the "originary accumulation" of colonial extraction.⁶⁰

When the mercantilism promoted by the extraction of metals and tropical products was transformed into Industrial Capitalism (circa 1750), the World System in its very center will commence the accumulation of a surplus (*sensus strictus*). In Europe, such system would restructure the colonial contract under British economy, thus initiating an uneven exchange with the textile industry. Around 1870 the accumulation of wealth and technology allows for the expansion of imperialism, territorially opening railroad lines and crossing the oceans with steamships. Great areas (Argentina, Canada, Australia, etc.) are incorporated in the World System by means of the gigantic extraction of agricultural and mining products. The periphery will always remain in an asymmetric position.

The present stage of transnational capitalism now focuses on the periphery; its capital is now invested in industries of less relevance. By doing so, capitalism absorbs the low salary of miserable external proletariat (in Asia or Latin America). The Asymmetric relation is incontestable. The Great Seven (the group of the seven, G7) decide the destiny of the rest of humanity. The concentration of wealth in the hands of the United States, Japan and Europe (whose population does not reach 15% of the total world's population) controls, uses, consumes and destroys irresponsibly up to 80% of the non renewable resources of the world.

c. The Metropolitan Political Domination: We are not addressing the structure of inter-state politics. We are not addressing either the structure of national politics. Rather, we are referring to the political structure of the World System which has been around for five hundred years. The metropolitan system (in a *de jure* assumption) was organized on the basis of violence, a political system which was termed, for instance, in Latin America, the state of the Indies (Spanish America) or the state of Brazil: the state without rights. The colonies (or ultramarine provinces) were totally subaltern to the power of the European Kings (Spanish, English, French, etc.) to their courts, councils and other political organisms.

The political status of the inhabitants of the colonies was near to zero; these inhabitants had virtually no rights vis-à-vis the European power. In the World System the periphery was politically meaningless. The anti-colonial process of national emancipation (from the beginnings of the nineteenth century in Latin America and during the second half of the twentieth century in Africa and Asia) showed from its beginning the neo-colonial traces of the colonial period. The elites that led the emancipation process profited from the structural economic exploitation, from the military domination and specially from the cultural domestication. The neocolonial situation is nothing but the continuation of the political and colonial dominance (included the military sense in which the Pentagon has replaced the military power of the old European metropolis, a power which is exerted via an incontestable computarized technology as it was witnessed in the Gulf War, where the dominance of the center gave a clear example to the peripheral nations as to their possible destiny were they to oppose the New World Order, an Order triumphantly proclaimed by President George Bush).⁶¹

d. Cultural Hegemony of the World System. In the fifteenth century begins the cultural penetration into territories that, up to that juncture remained peripheral. Europe as the center of the World System culturally penetrates these peripheries; this system is not merely an instrumental institution (as it could be suggested by Ricœur), but also, and rather ambiguously, a value-ridden cultural development in the sense of the *Lebenswelt* of a particular culture with pretensions of universality⁶² (European culture).⁶³ Over the centuries cultural transmission was implemented by an educational system that move from generation to generation (elementary and high school, higher and ecclesiastical, etc.; by means of books, newspapers etc.; by

means of poetry, novels and theater, etc.). The metropolis was in charge of consolidating a colonial elite that was loyal to the incumbent empire. Violent repression warned against the possibility of a much desired emancipation. In the neocolonial stage, on the most part, though with a few exceptions, the neocolonial elite was in many ways co-opted by the incumbent culture, a modern and hegemonic culture. Mimeticism in the cultivated avant-gardes was a sad reality.

In the present times, the postmodern phenomenon,⁶⁴ has taken again this problem, since the cultural means of expansion have been revolutionized. The repercussion of this revolution, carried out by mass-media industries such as the radio, the cinema and television, amounts to a radical change of the structure that underlies the constitution and consumption of cultural objects; therefore, the problem of exchange has been also altered as has been altered the cultural penetration of the peripheries carried out by the World System. These peripheries specifically referred to particular cultures affected by the process of globalization in the post colonial age.

e. The paradox of exclusion in globalization. But the mechanisms of inclusion in the World System, far from diminishing, have actually augmented peripheral heterogeneity, given that the aggressive actions of domination have not destroyed their exteriority but rather have pushed this exteriority to its limits via a non intentional politics of exclusion. Indeed, after five hundred years of the inauguration, development and global culmination of the World System, identified with transnational Capitalism at the economic level, two critical and absolute limits emerge to close upon the whole structure of the World System. The first, the ecological destruction, a non-intentional and irreversible process, the consequence of a devastating technology which springs from the following short-term selection criteria: the increment of the rate of profit⁶⁵ (the essence of capital as valorization of value). But, in relation to his previous idea, the second, embodied by the impoverishment of most of humanity located in the postcolonial peripheral horizon of late capitalism; this, in many cases, is the beginning of the end (hunger, AIDS, etc., like in Africa, Bangladesh, Haiti, etc.); this is the possible extinction of the Homo species (more due to ecological effects than due to the nuclear holocaust). Therefore, the extinction of life on earth is the last limit of the World System. We are then addressing the plight of the victims of such System.

§ 4. ETHICAL CRITICISM OF GLOBALIZATION AS EXCLUSION

Ethics as practical philosophy, in order to be critical needs of a certain diagnoses; it requires the explanatory and interpretative mediation of the critical human and social sciences. We have seen the manner by which the third criterion of demarcation allows for the discernment between the mere functional social sciences and the critical ones.⁶⁶ A moral that is purely procedural like the one characteristic of the ethics of Discourse, an ethics which presupposes the impossibility of an empirical perfect symmetry among the participants involved in the argumentative community, does not have the possibility to use this third criterion of demarcation because it has abandoned the material ethic. This abandonment is based on the opinion that such ethic is particular, linked to selfish impulses, to a "good life" or to cultural values exempted from universalists assumptions. Morality only offers the rules for the discussion on the fundamentation of practical norms, but it cannot offer material instructions to the very same discussion; rather, it leaves the discussion of topics under the responsibility of the "experts." But are these experts critical enough? Can discursive morality offer a criteria in order to discern which scientific experts are really functional and which are critical in relation to the system (a system that unintentionally excludes the ones who do not participate, despite their being affected by it)? None of this can be pondered by the ethics of Discourse. Let's then consider how can we approach the problem.

a. The Need of Criticism from the Symmetric and Anti-Hegemonic Community of Victims. The discursive reason whose intersubjective praxis reaches validity in a communication community could carry out its grounding and hegemonic praxis from the incumbent system⁶⁷ (in keeping with our topic, from the center of the World-System which begins to be globalized since the Conquest of Mexico in 1519) or from a "community of victims." The latter could be exemplified by a group of women which become conscious of "machismo", a group of African Americans who struggle against racial discrimination, a group of marginalized subjects who struggle against urban exclusion...or the challenge of peripheral cultures and nations to a World System that becomes increasingly globalized. The ethic of Discourse has not yet imagined this perspective: the participants of an affected community of victims that in the hegemonic community are excluded or

who are in an asymmetrical position, can conversely acquire symmetrical participation when they are "among themselves". At the "bottom of history", as a person excluded from the process of globalization (as a woman, as a peasant, as an Indian and as a Guatemalan), a privileged victim reminds us:

Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú. Tengo veintitrés años. Quisiera dar este testimonio vivo que no he aprendido en un libro y que tampoco he aprendido sola a que todo esto lo he aprendido con mi pueblo⁶⁸ y es algo que quiero enfocar [...] ⁶⁹

The discursive reason itself can be functional to the incumbent system or it can be intersubjectively critical. I think we have taken a step forward. We have departed from the strong and critical (negative and material) position of the first Frankfurt School; and, now, we also include, within the linguistic and discursive paradigm of the second Frankfurt School, such a "criticism." The criticism we are referring to has little to do with the theoretical "critical thinking" of someone like Stephen Toulmin and Hans Albert, neither does it have much to do with the Habermasian emancipation (Emancipation) as discursive Enlightenment (Aufklärung). The problem is really about an ethical criticism which departs from the notion of taking side, empirically and intersubjectively, with the victim, considering thus its material negativity (with "a" in German). When the supportive scientist (Gramsci's "organic intellectual") has adopted this intersubjective, practical and discursive perspective, and proceeds to project a program of scientific investigation which in turn seeks to explain – according to the best available scientific resources – the cause of the victims negativity, we come across with the position from which critical social sciences develop (and also Liberation Philosophy and its corresponding ethics which functions as its necessary introduction).⁷⁰ So, when Marx writes:

Del hecho de que la ganancia pueda estar por debajo del plusvalor o sea de que el capital pueda intercambiarse por una ganancia pero sin valorarse en sentido estricto, se desprende que no sólo los capitalistas individuales, sino las naciones pueden intercambiar continuamente entre sí [...] sin que por ello hayan de obtener ganancias iguales. Uno puede apropiarse constantemente de una parte del plustrabajo de la otra, por el que nada a cambio, sólo que en este caso, ello no ocurre en la misma medida que entre el capitalista y el obrero.⁷¹

Surely, Marx was not specially interested, mainly during his life time, in the competition of capital (and the national global capital) in the World Market. This, however, does interest me, since it has to do with the problem of the globalization of the productive capital and the globalization of the market. The surplus relation between the capitalist and the worker is intricately related to the "essence" of capital – which is what, historically, interested Marx and what was ethically presented to the English workers, in order to explain the cause of their material negativity: the misery of the working class. My interest in the problem of competition among national capital has to do with the misery of peripheral nations (with its peoples, ethnicities, groups, working class, etc.), as national capital is transferred as surplus from one nation to the other. Globalization has not yet advanced to the point of erasing national borders.⁷²

The intersubjective consensus that claims validity and that is reached in the community of victims, a consensus that also integrates critical and scientific "explanations" is, however, inimical to the valid consensus of the "hegemonic community." For instance, the consensus of North American and European popular opinion about peripheral countries, an opinion which asserts that peoples from these countries do not work, that they are racially and rationally inferior, that they deserve their misery for their lack of a competitive edge, etc. All this accounts for a growing xenophobia as was ostensible in California during the debate around proposition 187, or in South Africa, or in the former socialist Eastern Europe. All this can be positively explained from the stand point of the social sciences used by the dominant system. It is not merely a coincidence that these sciences are formulated in Harvard, London or Frankfurt, or that the neo-classical economy, the economic neo-liberalism or the liberal "minimal" state came from Chicago. All these social scientific theories elaborated in the North, along with the recent geopolitical and military theories that buttress the fight against drugs, are nothing but an effective cover up for the actual occupation of the countries in the South.

Ethics has much to reflect and much to say in this sense. The little work by Kant *The Perpetual Peace* was an attempt during his time to propose a universal principle on international relations. This proposition is stated as follows:

Las acciones referidas al derecho de otros seres humanos cuya máxima no admiten publicidad (Publizität) son injustas.⁷³

That a maxim ought to be articulated publicly has to do with a formal and procedural principle. But once again we are riddled by uncertainties as we ponder our contemporary reality; so, can the international organisms begin to dialogue and discuss in a public manner, without taking into account a procedural requirement which amounts to a minimum of symmetry among the participants? Is there not power to veto in the United Nations? Is not there an asymmetrical dominance exerted by the "Group of Seven" (G7)⁷⁴ over decisions of economic and political world relevance? (a group which, as I write this lines today July 1, 1996, is gathering in Lyon).⁷⁵ Furthermore, what is the criteria that guide this discussions? Is it not true that the valorization of value, of capital, the possibility to overcome the crisis and to increase the profits of transnational corporations, of banks constitute (International Monetary Fund, Inter American Bank of Development, etc.) the criteria that guide this conversations? What does ethics have to say, apart from the establishment of certain rules, in order to determine the symmetrical participation of the affected ones, in order to reach a sense of fairness by establishing norms ...whose possible conditions are, beforehand, known to be empirically inexistent? Apel in his talk on the dialogue East-West says with optimism in reference to "Towards a Macroethics of Humanity"⁷⁶:

Actualmente vivimos, por primera vez en la historia, en una civilización planetaria [...] la unidad de la historia humana se ha realizado hoy en un sentido [...] como una unidad éticamente deseable, y en parte existente, de cooperación respecto a la formación, preservación y reforma de las condiciones comunes de la civilización del mundo actual.⁷⁷

After foregrounding the content of the universal ethical principle that makes itself present in those moral institutions, a principle that is advanced by the non-contingent propositions belonging to the institution (or philosophical meta – institutions – of argumentative discourse), he concludes again rather optimistically:

Esta fundamentación aparentemente esotérica está, en cierto sentido, bien confirmada hoy [...] junto con aquellas declaraciones públicas que acompañan a los cientos de diálogos y reuniones sobre asuntos de importancia vital para la humanidad [...] pues estas reuniones y diálogos, en la mayoría de los casos, intentan al menos ser algo semejante a los discursos prác-

ticos, luchando por soluciones aceptables para todos los seres humanos afectados.⁷⁸

All impoverished peripheral countries, the oppressed classes of the center and the periphery, the Afro Americans and Hispanics in the USA, women all over the world, the homeless children from Bogotá or São Paulo, the elderly in miserable retirement homes, the millions of marginalized people, and the millions of immigrant who flee their countries for economic, political and racial reasons; all these victims attest to the fact that Apel's optimism is misplaced due to the enormous asymmetry that characterizes all those meetings and dialogues where the affected ones are on the most part absent and the decisions taken are not "acceptable" by the great majority of humanity.

b. From the Ethical Duties of the Production, Reproduction and Development of Life of Each One of the Community Human Beings. It seems apparent that the universal and discursive principle is by definition the last rational instance. However such is not the case. Wallerstein writes:

We can assert, if we wish, that the principle of universalism both on a world-wide scale and within each of the sovereign states that constitute the interstate system is hypocritical. But it is precisely because there is in reality a hierarchy of states within the interstate system and a hierarchy of citizens within each sovereign state that the ideology of universalism matters.⁷⁹

The domination among states, cultures and individuals can be measured by the quality of life, by the chance that life offers each of the affected parties to the full realization of his/her life. Nonetheless, for this realization to occur, human life must be one of the criterion also (not only as a discursive and public intersubjectivity); it must be a positive, universal criterion of practical truth (of the ethical and material reason), a criterion from which an ethical, material, universal and positive principle can be grounded, point of departure of the negative or critical principle (of the commitment to avoid the death of humanity).

As we have written, we propose the following initial description of the material universal principle of ethics, the principle of corporeality as sensibility, containing a pulsional order, a principle that functions as a cultural and valorative (hermeneutical and symbolic) point of reference for every norm, action, institution or ethical system, a principle whose point of departure is

the universality of human life. He who acts ethically⁸⁰ ought to be (as an obligation or ethical inclination towards the good) reproduce and develop in a responsible manner the life of each and every other human being, having as a rule the normative enunciations with a truth claims in a life community. The point of departure, in cultural and historical terms,⁸¹ ought to be a "worthy life" that is shared in solidarity with humanity and having humanity as an ultimate reference point, thus showing universalizing claims⁸² (a "worthy life" with a manner to interpret happiness and with a sort of reference to the values implicit in the understanding of human beings).

This material principle of ethics includes the point of departure and contains the "matter" (Inhalt) of all the forthcoming moments (formal, procedural, factual, critical or of liberation). This moment constitutes the ethical content of all praxis and of all future projects of development: under any circumstances can it be denied nor can it be overcome or ignored. It is the room (place?) from which the facticity of the quotidian and ethical world as such is established. It is not merely a pathological or particular horizon that can be discarded in order to reach an a priori horizon of transcendental principles – as in the case of Kant or Apel –. Neither does it consist exclusively of the cultural horizon – as in the case with the communitarians – or the incommensurable horizon – as in the case of the postmodern –. But, furthermore, although such is the necessary departure point which is always presupposed in any moral system or ethics, it should not be forgotten that such is not a sufficient horizon, since in order for the validity, factibility or ethical critique, one must resort to other principles of co-determination.

But this very same positive principle is transformed in a negative critical principle. Ethical principles grounded from sets of criteria; now passing from "to be a life" to "ought to be" a life they must live. The following example can clarify the question:

1. This is a hungry victim; therefore his/her life is in danger (it is a factual judgment or a descriptive enunciation).
2. I am re-sponsible⁸³ for the hunger of this victim. Ergo (a normative enunciation is founded).
3. I ought (this is an ethical obligation) first of all, *to criticize* the norm, action, institution or ethical system partially or thoroughly, since those are the cause of this negativity of victim. Also and furthermore:

4. I ought *to transform* the norm, action, institution or structures that are responsible for such negation of the victim.

The point is then to negatively judge the system (norm, action, etc.) as the mediation that causes victims. This is the *Krisis par excellence*. This is the final judgment (in the manner of Benjamin's description of Paul Klee's work) carried out by the Court (from the standpoint of the victims) of History (kriterion) which measures all norms, actions, institution or ethical system in accordance to its goodness (or evil). To judge the system with a negative "no" is preambled by the intention of "not" producing victims (if this victims did not exist, this critique would not be necessary). Therefore, the reason why the oldest and most venerable imperatives of humanity were always negative ones can be comprehended. Here one may place Wellmer's proposal⁸⁴ on the strength of the universal imperative as a prohibition of a non generalizable maxim.

The ethical and critical principle in its negative moments is, first and foremost, negative as a judgement related to the non-reproduction of the life of each human being; and, positive, as a demand for the development of the life of each human being. This principle can take approximately the following form: whoever acts ethically and critically has recognized that the victims of any norm, action, institution or ethical system etc. have been denied the possibility to live (in totality or in partial moments). Therefore, one is obliged, in the first place, to deny the "goodness" of the "cause" of such a victim; that is to say to criticize the "non-truth" (the *Unwahrheit* of Adorno) of the moment that causes the victim (which from this moment onwards appears as the dominant one). Secondly, to create in common solidarity the means in order to transform this situation.

This material and critical universal principles make it possible to orientate abstractly and fundamentally the political organizations, conferences, forums and debates praised by the Ethics of Discourse, gatherings that take place in reference to the process of globalization. However, this material and universal principle (the asymmetry must always recall) and from such interpretation the victims ought to become aware of their situation; they should be moved to struggle for their recognition and for their rights, so that the impact of their acquired awareness move beyond the restricted space of these gatherings; and, thus, become useful in their daily lives. Liberation Ethics, then, quite beyond its formal principles will also articulate a material principle which can be exerted negatively as a critique of the

World System that, due to its contents, becomes increasingly globalized at these levels: economic, ecological, pulsional etc.

c. The Philosophical Importance of North-South and South-South Discursive Dialogue. Philosophy, in its ethical dimension, has a responsibility, then, in this "orientation." It must promote a discussion between philosophers from the North and those from the South. In the promotion of this dialogue it is deserving of mention the asymmetry that characterizes these two regions: the philosophers from the North who enjoy an hegemony of material power in the form of universities and other educational structures, publishing houses, journals, research centers, funds, scholarships and grants, alliance with diverse areas: intelligence, the military and transnationals, etc. Conversely, philosophers in the South must develop a genuine discourse that springs from its underdeveloped situation, from its oppressive and marginalized reality, and even from its exclusion. This dialogue would endow philosophers from the South a recognition amongst their peers and a recognition within the civil society. From this recognition, philosophers in the South can then proceed to elaborate a critique of the peripheral systems that work in complicity with a globalization that excludes and destroys the cultural identities of the subjugated nations.

But, furthermore, it becomes necessary for the South to count with the aid of the North in order to initiate South to South philosophical dialogues; i.e.: dialogues among Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this manner the acute problems, elicited non-intentionally from the process of globalization, could be dealt with solely from the demands characteristic of the South, thus dispensing with the tampering mediation (usually acritical and influential) of structures from the North. Along with Prof. Odera Oduka,⁸⁵ I organized an international committee for the South-South philosophical dialogue in December 1994, in Cairo. He was scheduled to participate in a panel organized by the APA in April of 1995, in Seattle, Washington; but he was assassinated in 1995 by one of those dictatorial governments in the peripheral world that are fearful of critical philosophers. His death amounts to a testimony of loyalty to criticism, to peripheral African philosophy, a truly "universal" and nascent philosophy.

§ 5. CONCLUSION: THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERATION IN GLOBALIZATION'S EXCLUSIONS.

These are nothing but a few words for a future discussion. Given that globalization produces non-intentional devastating effects in at least two thousand million humans and in countless cultures, cultures and peoples known as the victims of such process of globalization, Liberation Ethics must still forewarn that the function of ethics in relation to globalization does not end in the provision of discursive regulations needed to reach a consensus from which specific measures can be implemented. Its function does not end either in offering abstract guidelines (no matter how sufficient they might be) for the principle of reproducing and helping to develop the life of any human subject – a principle that is universal and from which the discursive principle functions as its moral mediation of application –. Liberation Ethics, must still take into consideration the factibility of the decisions to which it arrives based upon the fulfillment of the two principles already discussed: the material and the formal principles.

Indeed, in the peripheral countries the factibility of the best decisions, the ones that are praiseworthy and meritorious, fix absolute limits: what is possible (from a technical, economic, political etc. point of view) determines a third area of the action and makes that a decision reached by consensus, a mediation of human life, become effective and actually possible. There is, then, an ethical principle of factibility that subsumes instrumental reason within the evaluation of the goals (from the material principle of life and the moral discursive principle: the principle of factibility should be nothing but a mediation for life decided rationally and symmetrically by the affected ones). What is thus done is then "good". So, the process of globalization is "good" for the following instances: for certain countries, certain cultures, for corporations, political parties and some scientific and philosophical communities. But for the victims, as Adorno would say, the truthful becomes untruthful; and concerning the reproduction of life and their symmetric participation the "efficient" becomes inefficient. The ethical factibility for the reproduction and development of the life of the members of impoverished and peripheral countries and devastated cultures, consists of halting such process of globalization, a globalization whose only criteria is the "efficient competition" in the market place (a principle of formal and instrumental factibility devoid of any ethical criterion or principle). This criteria solely tied to the "valorization of value" is responsible for the ecological destruction and ultimately for the destruction of life on earth and the concrete life of most of humanity. It is then at this juncture that an Ethics that founds the motivation of historical subjects (the victims in the process

of concientization) becomes necessary, not only for the purpose of serving as a background to forums, conferences and debates, that seek to establish rational and ethical limitations to the "efficiency of the Total Market" in the midst of globalization, but also to materially found the norms, actions, institutions and ethical systems that the daily plight of the victims begins to organize in countless ways and as part of the so-called "new social movements" (feminist and ecological movements, poor nations, oppressed social classes, indigenous ethnicities, marginal urban populations, immigrants, political refugees, anti-racial groups, homeless children, the unprotected elderly and so many other "liberation fronts"). The forging of a critical liberal Ethics, must occur in the interior of these new historical subjects to justify their goals, programs and decisions.⁸⁶

Notes

¹ See my *Ética de la Liberación*, 1998.

² See Ricœur, 1964.

³ For our philosophers science is exclusively Greek and European, from Galilee, to Descartes and Newton (Ibid., pp. 274-275) They forget, for instance, the scientific legacy of the Arabs and the Chinese (See Needham, 1954), etc.

⁴ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 278-279.

⁶ Ibid., p. 280. At its moment, we carried out a reflection that was applied to the Latin American reality (See Dussel, 1966 and 1996). It is important to note that over thirty years of the publication of Ricœur's article, a work with almost the same title has just been released: *National Culture and the New Global System* (Buell, 1994.)

⁷ Ibid., p. 282.

⁸ Here a sort of non-communicable incommensurability is suggested.

⁹ Ibid., p. 284.

¹⁰ "Telle est la loi tragique de la création d'une culture" (Ibid., p. 285).

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 280-281.

¹² In syncretism lies the possibility of an intercultural dialogue from which a world culture that is the result of a syncretic unity of all cultures will be born. Ricœur cannot accept a hybrid solution because of a Eurocentric a priori.

¹³ Ibid., p. 288. Citing Heidegger ("It is necessary to loose ourselves in our own origins"), Ricœur calls upon Europeans to return to their Greek, Hebrew and Christian origins, "pour avoir en face de soi un autre que soi, il faut avoir un soi" (Ibid., p. 287). These the basic topic of Ricœur's recent critical volume on Levinas: *Soi même come un autre* (Ricœur, 1990).

¹⁴ See Zea, 1957.

¹⁵ See Fanon, 1963.

¹⁶ See my works from that period: "Iberoamérica en la historia universal" (Dussel, 1966); y en "Cultura latinoamericana y cultura nacional (Dussel, 1968).

¹⁷ Dussel, 1973 # 19, v.1, p. 153. "Philosophy of Liberation " had already been born.

¹⁸ See Eboussi Boulaga, 1977 and Hontondji, 1977.

¹⁹ Ngûgû, 1986.

²⁰ See Said, 1978. See a revision of his thesis in Said, 1993.

²¹ In effect, Mike Featherstone (1993), is coordinating a work on *Global Culture* that begins with the question: Is there a global culture? (p. 1) a question that swiftly becomes: it might be possible to refer to the globalization of culture" (Ibid.). Robertson tells us that "during the second half of the 1980' s globalization (and its problematic variance, internationalization) became a commonly used term in intellectual, business, media and other circles-acquiring in the process a number of meaning, with varying degrees of precision" (Ibid., p. 19.) For Robertson globalization is a recent phenomenon through which "all is structured as the whole." (p. 20). Robertson's article implies that such a globalization begun to speed up since 1880 and that from 1960 it entered the "phase of uncertainty" (specially in 1990). ("Mapping the Global Condition", p. 27) Robertson himself, in his work *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture* (Robertson, 1994) describes the "global field" as a field with four poles:

National Societies 1	2 World System
Self-identities 4	3 Humankind.

This field determines sic different sets of relations: 1-2:Relativization of national society.; 2-3: Real politic-humanity problematic; 3-4: Relativization of self-identities; 4-1: Individual-society problematic; 1-3: Relativization of citizenship; 4-2: Relativization of societal reference (p. 27). This work is filled with suggestions to be taken into account. Frederick Buell (*National Culture and the New Global System*, 1994) makes an excellent description of debates in the USA about this problem, specially pertaining to the Post-colonial debate (pp. 217 ss) from within Marxist tradition (pp. 265 ss), as well as within the debater on Postmodernity and Globalization (pp. 325 ss).

²² Taylor, 1992, pp. 72-73.

²³ See Wallerstein 1974. Also Wallerstein, 1984-1995.

²⁴ See "The World System as Philosophical Problem" in Dussel, 1966 b, pp. 214 ss.

²⁵ Frank, 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1992b.

²⁶ See Blaut, 1992-1993.

²⁷ For Hegel "world history travels from East to West; therefore, Europe is the end of universal history" (Die Weltgeschichte geht von Osten nach Westen; denn Europa ist schlechthin das Ende der Weltgeschichte) in Hegel, 1955, p. 243). See my lectures at Goethe Universität in Frankfurt: Dussel, 1995. conf.1.

²⁸ It might appear trivial to allude to the following ordinary examples; however, they reveal a deeper implication: the seven-day week originates in Mesopotamia; the scale that symbolizes justice is actually that of Osiris, with which she could weigh the good deeds performed in life by the dead ones of Egypt; our current dressing codes, for instance, the use of trousers, nowadays also widespread in women, was introduced in Mongolia by the horsemen of the Euro-Asian plains, approximately 8000 years ago; paper and the printing press was well known in China during the VI century BC.

²⁹ For a more detailed discussion see work in progress *Liberation Ethics*, in the historical introduction section 1 and 2.

³⁰ The Neolithic revolution, contrary to Hegel's claims, travels from Mesopotamia and Egypt, right at the climax of the Paleolithic and without direct connections, towards the East: India, China and pre-Colombian cultures.

³¹ I will not refer to it as "World System" because of the exclusion of "Amerindia" extended up to the European "invasion" at the end of the fifteenth century. Rather, I will refer to it as a Afro-Asian "Inter-regional System at the stage I.

³² The Egyptian used to refer to himself as kmt which meant black, synonym of a civilized subject, while the white subject (in Egyptian language "red", a pejorative term) was the barbarian of the Mediterranean. It is, then, imperative to acknowledge a black-African component of Egyptian culture.

³³ The Greek, Indo-European tradition states the immortality of the soul; therefore, cremation of corpses is practiced since the body is the origin of all evil.

³⁴ Chapter 125, Egyptian *Book of the Dead*.

³⁵ From the Epilogue of the Babylonian Codex of Hammurabi.

³⁶ Horse as a means of transportation from Mongolia, China, through the deserts of Euro-Asian plains, to India, Persia and the Mediterranean, See Narr, 1965, pp. 578 ss.

³⁷ A metal that produces a technological revolution: from the introduction of harnesses, nails, horse-shoe, the ax, the shovel, pickax, to the improvement of agricultural plowing system, etc.

³⁸ Phaedrus, 274d.

³⁹ In every culture from Egypt to China, from the Aztecs to the Incas, that which is modern signals to the center from which the best information of the "system" is managed; from which the best and newest instruments (material as well as symbolic) are used; from which political and religious power, and economic wealth is administered; in short, the modern signals to the most developed. The rest are "barbarians", non-humans, those who are outside, the "periphery." The modern in each culture is valuable because of its ethnocentricity. The "modernity" of the World System claims validity for all the other cultures; and this is a novelty in world history.

⁴⁰ Its octagonal mosques resemble Greek-Byzantine art, unlike later Gothic churches built with a different spirit.

⁴¹ For world history, the label Middle Ages is an invalid historical category; it does not make any sense for the Muslim world, India, China or Amerindia. It only works for Europe.

⁴² The windmill is a symbol of technological modernity. But one must not forget that windmills actually come from the Muslim world because, since 947 BC. There were wind and water mills in Seistan, a town closed to Indo. Also in Basora, the Tigris' river flow was used to give motion to floating mill wheels. Modernity for Cervantes pays for the Armada with which Europeans, Spaniards, irrevocably defeat the Turks in the battle of Lepanto in 1571, a battle financed by the Latinoamerican silver extracted from the mines of Zacatecas and Potosí discovered in 1546.

⁴³ According to Braudel (1978) that because of a letter written by a merchant Jew from Cairo (1095-1099 A.C.) we know that Muslims knew all forms of credit and payment and all forms of commercial association; therefore, it was not in Italy that these commercial forms of transactions first emerged as it has been so readily accepted (p. 65). There was an extensive commercial network with currency instruments that allowed for the management of money among the nations of the Inter-regional system. Transactions of agricultural products developed the milling industry of cereals; for instance, 100

thousand camels were used exclusively for the commercialization of dates. Muslims caravans that connected India and China with the Mediterranean reached up to six thousand camels. This commercial network gave rise to multiple industries. Merchants began to make their calculations with Arabic numbers, which actually originated in India, and used the decimal system and the numeral zero, along with algebra, etc.

⁴⁴ See Wallerstein, 1974, vol. 1. Also see the eight volumes of Chaunu, 1955, *Séville et l'Atlantique*.

⁴⁵ For Hegel modernity covers a geography that, departing from the Renaissance (Italy) passing through the Reformation (Germany) the English parliament and the French Revolution reaches the Enlightenment (specifically, the German and French versions). As it can be gathered from this, there is nothing "modern" to Spain, Portugal and Latin America. We have referred to this vision as provincial and Eurocentric, since it sees Modernity as developing from within, as a result of an intrinsic European development which began in the Middle Ages. Such, however, is not the case. The fact that Southern Europe (the "Latin" one) the center of the World System makes of this region the departing point of Modernity. Latin America is the first periphery, a century before the Anglo-Saxon America (i.e. New Holland, colony of the Holland which at the time of settlement was a Spanish colony) becomes, in the seventeenth century, the New England of the thirteen original colonies.

⁴⁶ This explains that Luther's protest, which could have ended up as the rankings of one more heretic of Medieval Europe, could now "reach" the center of the System and thus could dispense away with the mediation of Mediterranean Rome, a Rome that along with the Mediterranean will become a peripheral culture of Atlantic Europe (thus inverting the ego-political situation). The Eurocentricity implicit in the so-called "discovery" of America thus explains the world scope of the Protestant Reformation.

⁴⁷ Wallerstein, 1974, vol. 2.

⁴⁸ See Luhmann, 1984.

⁴⁹ This reality is found in exteriority – to express it in Levinas' words – it is an extra-ontological and extra-linguistic reality that pertains to the languages of the World-System; it is a prius that precedes the "being" of the "comprehension of being" of the modern World-System.

⁵⁰ Chapter V: "Guerra colonial y trastornos mentales", en Fanon, 1963, p. 228.

⁵¹ In my work in progress *Liberation Ethics*, I devote the whole fourth chapter to analyze this "original negation", alienation as negation of alterity as I will architectonically refer to it in the future. This "originary negation" is the co-optation of the other in the dominant system; it implies an alienation of the other's alterity, a negation of the other's possibility to live, a negation to participate in the center's discourse; in short, the inability of the other to accomplish his/her goals (including the cultural ones). See Dussel, 1973, 1985.

⁵² See my book Dussel, 1995, conf. 3 (pp. 37 ss engl. ed).

⁵³ I am referring to the violent occupation of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines in 1888, approximately a century ago. The Philippines' courageous resistance against the North American "invasion" resulted in the loss of two hundred and fifty thousand lives.

⁵⁴ Before the Industrial revolution the "conquest in Africa and Asia was carried out solely in limited islands and territories (Because Portugal still had intentions of building a "World-Empire" – much in the manner of Charles V of Spain, who in the face of financial failure must abdicate in 1557 –, Angola and Mozambique were perhaps the ex-

ceptions to the pattern that characterized the conquest of Asia and Africa) Wallerstein makes it clear that the "World-System" does not have an imperial project (a project that would impose an official language, culture, religion; and political, military and economic organization). With a "Company of the West and East Indies", Amsterdam can commercially organize the system. There is, then, a simplification by negation of the quality in favor of quantity: only "black numbers" matter for book-keeping purposes.

⁵⁵ Bartolomé de las Casas in the midst of sixteenth century Latin America proposed in his work *De Unico Modo* that Europeans must rely on rational arguments and testimonies of morally virtuous life, rather than resorting to violence (see Dussel, 1955, confer. 5.3).

⁵⁶ I insist on the adjective "so-called", because it was not a "world" war, but actually an intra-capitalist war triggered by the hegemony of the World System. Germany and Japan attempted to participate in a market-economy monopolized by England, and to a lesser degree by France and other "traditional" Central European powers; the United States defeat of Germany and Japan wrested the hegemony of the United Kingdom. We are specifically referring to the North American hegemony that since 1945 allowed for the colonial emancipation of Africa and Asia. From 1989 such hegemony for the first time in the history of humanity rests in the hands of *one military super Austin Power*.

⁵⁷ Some fifteen million Indians died as a result of violence carried out with sophisticated arms, with dogs trained to kill Indians; this violence was also evident in the slavery and devastation of Indians in plantations and mines and as a consequence of diseases foreign to the indigenous population of the Americas...the conquest was the first process of globalization.

⁵⁸ The Christian nations of England, Portugal, Holland and France, stained their white hands with the blood of over thirteen million African peasants, sold as beast of burdens in the south of the thirteen colonies, in Cuba, in Cartagena de Indias, in North-Eastern Brazil. In face of a sensitive and global ethical consciousness, the complicity of these nations still awaits for its own "Nuremberg Trial".

⁵⁹ Bandits who, in the name of England and France, looted Spanish ships filled with the silver extracted from the mines in Zacatecas, Durango Guancavélica and Potosí, at the cost of Indians who rested lifeless at the bottom of these mines.

⁶⁰ See Dussel, 1988.

⁶¹ That so many European and North American philosophers based upon ad hoc arguments.

⁶² The World-System is "global" but the fundamental European culture in the center of the system is "particular". The European is prone to assume that his/her culture even the post-conventional one is the universal culture of the future (indeed, many Marxist from the center fell into this fetishism). The World-System has certainly cultural elements but is not a culture in the truest sense of the word, since the world system culture has been instrumentally expanded in an external fashion upon other cultures, other cultures that, in keeping with their capacity of resistance or creativity, either accepted or rejected the cultural values of the "World-System" (from eating in Burger King through drinking Coke, to wearing blue jeans). In these examples "goods" are also cultural material objects which are consumed in different fashions: when eats them ones drinks them and wears them.

⁶³ Latin America constituted the periphery as a dependent, alienated and repetitive culture. Latin America, due to its constitutive "mestizaje", was the fist to receive the "im-

pact" of the process of acculturation: the christianization of the Amerindian cultures, and the forthcoming colonization (and here colonization is not used in the metaphorical sense implied by Habermas but in its original and real sense).

⁶⁴ Postmodernity viewed as the inherent culture of present "late capitalism". See Jameson's excellent work, 1993. Also consider Aijaz Ahmad (1987). Ahmad will later criticize Said (Ahmad, 1992).

⁶⁵ Marx would have spoken of "surplus value". In real socialism the criterion, equally devastating, was that of the increase of the rate of production.

⁶⁶ It would seem that there is an awareness of this issue in writing: "Something different happens with the political economy that in the eighteenth century competes with the rational natural law [...] As Political Economy, the sciences of economy still keeps, in terms of theory of the crisis, a relation with the global society [...]. But, despite all this, it ends up destroying economy once it becomes a specialized science. [read it as functional] Today economic science treats economy as a sub-system of society and dispenses with questions of legitimacy" (Habermas, 1981, vol. 1, p. 19; p. 17). Economy would not be in this predicament were it practiced as a critical social science (as it is practiced by those who exercise the discipline as a critical economy, just as it was practiced by Marx in his time).

⁶⁷ It is definitely "hegemonic" if the third criterion of demarcation is not explicitly foregrounded. Yet it cannot be carried out because it is material (or the material has been abandoned at the beginning of its formal process).

⁶⁸ The "community of victims."

⁶⁹ Menchú, 1985, p. 21.

⁷⁰ The critical theory of Horkheimer formulated this question ambiguously, since it confused in a single program the critical social sciences and the ethical critical philosophy (a philosophy that I call "Liberation Ethics"). It is important to distinguish one from the other and to know how to articulate each one of them.

⁷¹ *Grundrisse*, Notebook VII; Marx, 1974, p. 755. See Hinkelammert's lecture "Die Marxsche Wertlehre und die Philosophie der Befreiung" (Hinkelammert, 1995). In addition see my article "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the 'Concept' of Dependency" (Dussel, 1990).

⁷² If this were to happen, the so-called transnational corporation would disappear, corporations that operate with the average difference of *national global capitals* in relation to their organic composition: they invest productive capital of high technological development in countries with low salaries; this, in turn, gives transnational corporation an advantage when competing with the capitals from the nation where the transnational headquarters are (absorbing high salaries); they also have an advantage over the capitals in the nations where the transnational operates (nations with a technological disadvantage). This setting allows them to transfer value (surplus value) from the periphery to the center. The transfer of surplus value is achieved by means of diverse mechanisms among which we will mention the following: the expiration of parts and whole products, collection of royalties, or simply profiting from high interests of phantom international credits. Only Marx has a theoretical categorical framework (of critical economy or of critique of the economy) that serves to "unveil" and "explain" these "facts", facts that are invisible to the "functional" economy (neo-classical, Keynesian, neo-liberal, etc.). The massive poverty of peripheral nations is a non-intentional effect of the globalization of the productive, commercial and financial capital, a fundamental material structure of

the World-System. Since, as we have said, products (merchandise) are symbolic and cultural objects of consumption and thus such a system is also a cultural system: Coca-Cola is beheld "in its beauty", one can feel its "cool softness", one can taste its "bubbly flavor".... it displaces traditional drinks (and really nourishing), it creates new needs and finally it must be purchased...thus transferring values to the "center" (vital human work that is objectivized). A country becomes richer while another becomes poorer; this is the contradiction that the Ricardian economist could not see in England and that we cannot see at the global level.

⁷³ *Zum ewigen Frieden*, B 99, A 93; Kant, 1968, Vol. 9, p. 245. A maxim which cannot be published without provoking the failure of its very purposes, that must remain secret in order to achieve the desired success, that cannot be publicly proclaimed without causing the resentment in all towards my intentions [...] This maxim will never be based on nothing but injustice" (Ibid., B 100, A 94). It would be good to relay this to Admiral Canarys against Hitler, or to the heroes that died under Pinochet and Somoza's hands. Kant's law is applicable to a metropolitan "civil state" how would Kant have thought had he had been an Afro-Caribbean slave in Jamaica during the eighteenth century? Would he have made public his plan to flee the sugar plantation in order to reach the Central American Atlantic coast, thus reaching freedom?

⁷⁴ In the United Nations there are over one hundred and fifty nations represented, are these seven nations more human, and do they have more of a right and dignity than the rest? Would not the reason be simply based on the fact that these seven nations are more powerful and richer. We have schematically shown historical aspects of the accumulation of this wealth.

⁷⁵ I read in *Cinco días* (Madrid), July 1, 1996: "The G-7 warns that globalization will increase unemployment and inequality" (p. 25).

⁷⁶ Apel, 1992.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷⁹ "Culture as the Ideological Battleground", in Featherstone, 1993, p. 43.

⁸⁰ To make explicit the "ethical" action is redundant, since to be ethical is to be human. But in this case the redundancy is not gratuitous because it emphasizes the intention of the enunciation.

⁸¹ Even in a non-conventional culture, where each individual must rationally justify his her decisions, and not only act by following the mores and conventions of tradition, the project of argumentative and intersubjective critique (by Apel or Habermas) are already a project of worthy and non-conventional life, a project that blooms in a historical culture and in a given moment, etc.

⁸² The claim of universality in every culture (from the Eskimo or Bantú to the Aztec Nahuatl or Modern European non-conventional cultures) indicates the presence of the universal material principle within every culture; this opposes ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism or cultural fundamentalism is the attempt to impose in other cultures the claim of universality inherent to my own (ours) culture, even before such claim was discursive or interculturally tested. Each culture serious claim to universality must be tested in a rational dialogue whenever there is a confrontation of cultures. And when cultures historically confront each other, the dialogue is only possible from the claim of universality that characterizes each one of these cultures; and materially, form the principle of content that has to do with the reproduction and development that underpins

each culture and all cultural subjects. This process allows for a material unveiling of real articulations, once the dialogue has been initiated on the manner in which a culture reproduces and develops, in a concrete fashion, human lives. The intersubjective and discursive moment is precisely the procedural moment which formally allows for such a dialogue without denying, however, the logic of the material content from which the participants must depart. All this was brought to failure by the Eurocentricism that Modernity implemented on peripheral cultures from the end of the fifteenth century until the present (See Dussel, 1993).

⁸³ In the irrevocable sense indicated by Levinas, but also if one considers all the necessary mediations, since any human, being a moment in the complex structure of human development cannot be declared as being absolutely innocent of anything, not even of non-intentional repercussions. There is always a sort of (direct, indirect, conscious or non-intentional) complicity in the victimization of the other, a complicity that binds us to all.

⁸⁴ See Wellmer, 1986, I: "El programa kantiano".

⁸⁵ Professor of the University of Nairobi (Kenya), President of the African Philosophical Association, personal friend of the author of these notes.

⁸⁶ In Chapter six of the already mentioned *Liberation Ethics* we have discussed what we have now termed as the "Principle-Liberation", not included in this lecture.

Carlos Cullen

6. The construction of an intercultural public space as an alternative to the asymmetry of cultures in the context of globalization. Latin American perspectives

Interaction and conflict of cultures in the context of globalization is the general subject which has congregated us in this meeting. Today expositions, with Latin American perspective, seem to focus in the subject of power and dialogue. On the side of hierarchy as with anatomy (if I understand the term), as with the plain exclusion, it seems to be suggested *that the space of globalization is more disymmetric*, than the economical and political inequalities, which seem to characterize it in the material and symbolic interaction among the different civilizations, hides, at the bottom, something like *a secularized monotheism*, culturally fundamentalist, which first commandment could be expressed like this: "you will not have another world to live in than this and it is useless any attempt to represent it, because it would imply the possibility of a cultural alternative, which is impossible".

In this context the cultural difference is thought *under the hypothesis of conflict*. To the already traditional way of legitimizing the domain by an unique thought¹, supported by a basically instrumental rationality and with a lot of naturalistic structuralism (the severe laws of market, for example), is associated, in the last years, a *subtle microphysics of the power*, which not only – as Foucault says – *discipline* singular individual (with a pastoral power or with state's reasons), but globalizes their claims, trying to regulate the life of the species². The operator that mediates between in the simple disciplinary process and the regulation is the insertion – still tolerant of the cultural polytheism – in a supposed *universal history*, with ethnocentric seal, because orientated by the progress of the unique reason, that generates necessary laws for the possible development. Globalization, in the actual

¹ Cfr. N. Chomsky: *Necessary Illusions. Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, South End Press, Cambridge M:A., 1989.

² Cfr. Ch. Foucault: *Power/Knowledge, selected interviews, and other writings*, ed. by C. Cordon, New York, Pantheon, 1984. Cfr. Foucault: *Lecons 1975-1976*, College de France, Paris.

context, seems to be not interested in the scenery of an universal history, where it still matters that all the civilizations are included (from a "representation" of evolution, of course). It is more interested in a global market, without even worrying about those who remain excluded.

The XX century, that "short" century which Hobsbawn³ talks about, reacts from a thought of the difference, from a criticism that emphasizes forgetfulness, repressions, absences, the orders of the discourse, the logo – and phallus centrisms . But, it is a *difference of the same* orientated perhaps by what Heidegger, in the tracks of Nietzsche, taught us to think: "the same is not the equal"⁴. The problem is that this criticism achieves to "deconstruct the history of metaphysics" to make a "genealogy of morality" and a "archaeology of knowledge", but it does it with the cost of situating itself ahead of any culture, in the borders or edges of "the" philosophy, where difference "happens", and not in the middle of "the cultures", where alterity appeals.

What I am trying to show in this essay is how we can think critically (that is to say, almost in an utopian way) a symmetric space for dialogue and interaction of cultures, which for the same reason, shall not be confused with a pre- o post-cultural space. My hypothesis is that only *an intercultural public space* guarantees this conditions, in a context of globalization, and it is the necessary reinsurance for the postulated reconstruction of the *social contract*, over normative basis of justice, or *the bet to a fairer social link*, from more creative singular subjectivities, indeed to generate an alternative globalization, without exclusions or turning into mass.

Therefore, to talk about an intercultural *public space* implies to make a distinction, related to other ways of giving adjectives to it, as it may be the *international*, as a space that "prescribes" national sovereignties related, for example, to the standing and/or violation of human rights, or as it may be the *reticular*, as a space that links in a hazardously way freer groupings. The idea we propose is to insist on the strength of a real public space (not fictitious, as the "contract", nor empty, as the "bet"), from where it is effectively possible to resist to the universalization of the private which is the global space simply *transnational*, as a space that "allows" the free circulation of financial capital, the virtual information, and the global policy.

³ Cfr. E. Hobsbawn: *Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century (1914,1991)*, London, Michael Joseph Ltd., 1994.

⁴ Cfr. M. Heidegger: *Identität und Differenz*, Tübingen, Günther Neske, 1957 (4ta).

The hypothesis we will sustain that it is a fallacy to point out as a condition of a possibility of public space (inter- or transnational, reticular or done hegemonic), the cultural discontextualization, as supposing that public space is, by definition, *transcultural*. This fallacy lies in an incorrect assimilation of the diversity of cultures to the diversity of private interests, operating a true *merchantilization*⁵ of the cultural interaction, or, misinterpreting the diversity of cultures as immeasurability of paradigms, postulating a true *formalization*⁶ of the cultural interaction, or as well confusing the diversity of cultures with the diverse rivalry forms of powers, operating a true discussion⁷ of the cultural interaction. The rich and the poor, the wise and the ignorant, the dominant and the dominated are the "cultural" differences, that a public space – supposedly *transcultural* – would allow to control, with economic efficacy, rational maturity and political firmness.

In certain sense we will try a genealogy of the concept of the public, tracing historicity of the supposed adherence of the concept to a necessary desculturation⁸. Anyway, the purpose of the text is not merely genealogical, but it tries to reconstruct a space, which may allow us to be responsible, ethic and politically, of what appeal us as "interaction and conflict of cultures in the context of globalization".

We shall start by discussing the diverse uses of the public, in an effort to show the trend towards reducing the cultural aspect, in the actual debate about the public. Secondly, we would like to point out, in that revision of the debate, the place of "reduction" of the other-culturally-dense, in the ap-

⁵ We understand by "merchantilization" of the cultural interaction the fetishistic reduction of cultural diversity to "consumption objects", or to simple circumstantial outfit for the major profit of "transnational" capitals.

⁶ We understand by "formalization" of the cultural interaction the illusory reduction of the varied symbolic horizons of the cultural diversity to "rests of irrationality" against a supposed axiomatic supposedly representant of universal reason.

⁷ We understand by "discussion" of the cultural interaction the sadistic reduction of the power of the cultural diversity to "focus of conflict", threatening of the hegemonies of status quo gained.

⁸ In certain sense the attempt is exactly the inverse of J. Habermas in his work: "Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität" (published in 1991) included in *Faktizität und Geltung*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1994, pp. 632-660, where he tries to show (for the modern European states) that the connection between national conscience and republican mentality is not "a conceptual connection", but only "psycho-social". Cfr. J. Habermas: *The Inclusion of The Other*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1998 and "*Jenseits des Nationalstaats: Bemerkungen zu Folgeproblemen der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung*", in Ulrich Beck (Ed.) *Politik der Globalisierung* (Suhrkamp, 1988) pp. 67-84. English: "*Beyond the Nation State?*", in *Peace Review* vol. 10 no. 2 (June 1998).

parently most related with progress forms of stating public space. Thirdly, we will try to deconstruct this point of views of the reductions of the other in the definition of public, liberating some critical categories, that allow us to define the intercultural public space, its conditions of possibility, and the alternatives that open its comprehension.

I. Diverse uses of the public

We could start our analysis with a description of diverse games of language, most of all of everyday language, where the same of the public appears tied to certain uses, that reveal certain life styles.

Then for example a very extend use relates a public space with that one which has not got restrictions for its *access* or to *transit it*, or as well, if there are restrictions regarding, they are simple results of an ordinance, precisely to guarantee *the free access or circulation*, in case of conflict. It is in this sense that it must be interpreted the strong idea of the public as a place for everybody, as *equality of opportunities*, precisely to access to social goods.

We could also search the references to the contrast between public and private, certainly very extended, since modern age, because of the trend towards confusing the public with the sphere of the state's coercive power (as political society), in opposition to *civil liberties* (as civil society). These frontiers are not easily to delimit nowadays. Among these liberties it is clear that those which are central are the one of thought and the one of beliefs.

Another sense line that reveals the use of word is that one which contrast the public as the manifest or exposed, to what remains as secret, not visible or in a way hidden. In this sense, the public links specifically with *free expression and the right to information*.

Yet, it would be interest to remark that use of word which denotes, most of all, that ensemble of individual or persons, the "public", that in certain events remain like different from what gives reference or identifies the event. Therefore, public is the ensemble of those who watch (spectators) or listen (auditors) or assist o visit, etc., something or somebody. In certain sense, lies under to this use of the public idea of the *free reunion*.

When this last sense advance over the mere passivity of being together, public acquires the sense of the space of participation, dialogue and, there-

fore, of the liberty to concur or disagree. It is in the line of what it is called as political liberties.

Our intention, however, is to trace the most philosophical use of the term, where what we find is, at least, two basic significations, that – in an analogy to the already known distinction from Constant – we will call the public space of the ancients and the public space of the modern.

a) *The public space of the ancients*

The relation of the public with the politic, seems to have its origin, wonderfully traced by Arendt⁹, in the Greek reflection about the proper characteristics of the citizen. In this political context, the public is seen as a *praxis* and *lexis* space, of the action properly said and the significant and argumentative discourse. That action, which defines the *citizen as virtuous*, and that discourse which defines the *citizen also reasonable*.

In fact, the public space's co-ordinates are the ones that outline the ambit of ethical virtues and reasoned discourses. The habitat or *ethos* of the public relates with an active form of "good life", as a way of *eudaimonia*. Because eudaimonia, as an ideal of "good" active life, demands a deliberation and election space, which is a projection of the public to the bosom of the constitution of the individual provided with reason, which is also defined as "political", that is to say: provided of political knowledge. The other two forms of eudaimonia, enjoyment and theory, are not, properly, ways of "active" life, and, in this sense, do not constitute public space.

In this sense, what contrast with the public is everything that do not let act, in strict sense, or take the word, also in strict sense. The public links with freedom (and therefore it differences itself from necessity spaces, what Arendt calls the labour and work) and with communication (and therefore it differences itself from the spaces of mere contemplation). It is interesting to point out that commerce and education are mediating spaces between the "private" (labour and work) and the natural ambit of free and rational action.

That is to say, it is not public all that that would be defined as pure suffering (or obey) without being able previously to deliberate or choose, or as pure feel and moving, answer to stimulus, without being able to give autonomously meanings. That is to say, that what contrast with the public

⁹ Cfr. H. Arendt: *The Human Condition*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, mostly chapter II.

is, aristotetically said, the mere generic animal condition, without giving the possibility for difference to happen. Then rationality, the *logos*, that allows *praxis* and *lexis*.

Yet this political context of the public leads us another important conclusion. The action and the significant-argumentative discourse, in fact, are distinguished in the bosom of common. This means that for *political* animals (or active-discursive) the natural *habitat* is a *public* space, that generates a link among the individual of the "species", that can not be nothing but intersubjective, that is to say, among singulars that act and talk (which is not necessary, not for the care of life, domestic labours, nor for the procurement of the sustenance, economical labours, nor for the supreme contemplation). The hedonistic bios, certainly human, is similar to the instinctive enjoyment of animals. The theoretical bios, certainly human, is similar to the supreme enjoyment of gods. *The political bios is human*, only human, beyond animal necessities and ahead of the divine autarchy.

There are, however, two paradoxes in *the public distinguishable*: virtue is a habit, and it does not exist private language. Saying that virtue is a habit is to say, it is true, that it is neither a passion nor a faculty, but is also means that it is a *culturally situated* disposition. Saying that language is not private means that it is not mere genetic code nor mere individual delirium, it is a social structure, a life style, which condenses, and makes possible shared interactions and meanings that is to say: *culturally patrimony*.

Interpreting this sense of political participation, does not seem distant for me to this point of view Habermas' effort to define public space by the argumentative community, in the relation with the problems that affect to the participants of the decisions. It is not casual that the theory is of the "communicative action", that is to say, political. What it is strange is that this action depends, finally, on a transcendental pragmatism and not on a dialogue or cultural interaction.

b) *The public space of the "moderns"*

A second use of the public, that we will call juridical-epistemic, puts it in relation with *the rational*, as space of science or the valid knowledge. There are no doubts that the central referent, here, can be traced in *the modern illustration* and, very particularly, in it kantian version.

The public is a way of using reason, which consists basically in doing it with freedom (related to any form of censorship), for itself (and not follow-

ers tutors), and obeying only to the laws of the natural reason in its pure use (and not to dogmatic or prejudiced presupposed)¹⁰.

The reference is not, now, to the action and the discourse, to the politics, but only and principally to science, the reason legitimately used, because it has done a previous criticism of its jurisdiction, and if it receives the signification of "public" is because of its natural destination: *the great public* of the doctos (or illustrated, or equally disciplined in a legitimate use of reason). It is neither the action nor the discourse those which generate the public space, it is the process of discipline of the reason, the critical method, which is an appeal to the scientific lectors. The public space is the world that opens the written text of the scientific communication. This space is occupied only by scientists, those who have been set free, not only from "labour" and "work", but also from "prejudices" and "illusions", that is to say: of the dogmatic, the vulgar men, those who merely think as society, and in this sense they have been also set free from "politics", or from the *active vita*, as H. Arendt would say. This public space "illustrated", is not necessarily the one of the citizenship as a belonging of the polis, it is the "yeomanry", as civil society, that generates the state's legitimacy. Citizenship is not defined by the action and the discourse, it is only defined by the *rights* that provides the "free" ingress to the social contract.

There is a clear fault of the political sense of the public to a sense that we can call *juridical-epistemic*. The public is now, not the ambit opposite to the "domestic" as to the "Olympic", but just simply the opposite, in first grade, to the state of nature as *state of right*, and, in second grade, the opposite to the "traditions" and "beliefs", as *republic of illustrated*.

This strong sense of the public use of the reason can be defined, in the last instance, as the capacity to legislate for itself, that is to say, as Rousseau expresses himself, for the supreme autolegislation, and, in the well-known expression by Kant, for the autonomy. The political public space will be a consequence of the legislative act, subordinated to it, and it is manifested most of all, in two questions: *the public opinion*, or free expression, and *the republic*, or free participation. In fact, both of them are political ways to understand the public, dependent, however, of a juridical schism, almost definitive, between the ambit of the private (where social relations of free

¹⁰ It is obvious the reference to the article of Kant: What is illustration?. Original: *Beantwortung der Frage Was ist die Aufklärung?*, in *Berliner Monatsschrift*, Dez.1784, pp. 481-494.

men happen) and the ambit of the *re-republican* (where these free men submit themselves as equal – citizens – to a common legislation – that turns them into subjects).

My hypothesis is that it has not been studied enough this slides that establish the public (political) as guarantee of the private (social). This slide comes with a tension between public use of the reason (science) and mere public opinion, on one side, and, on the other side, between the moral intention (as representation of the unconditioned law) and the materialism of the actions (that follow natural o social laws, which are determinist and/or conditioned).

There are two contexts in this reduction of the public to the rational use, epistemically legitimate: the distance between the political and the social thing, and the distance between the duty and the desire. This complex situation consummates, in the end, the separation of the ethics and the politics.

Now it is neither the action nor the discourse those that define the public space and constitute the citizenship. It is the citizenship, as the right of free and equal individual, the one that expresses in the political representation and in the public opinion, leaving virtue in the field of moral intentions, and the valid argumentation in the materialism of scientific pieces writing.

It is not about understanding the public as the space that liberates from the necessities of labour and work, but as the space that represents and takes care of the survival interests and of each individual property, and that postulates a moral kingdom with its own finalities and a corporation of illustrated who use freely their reason, as a bet for a perpetual peace and a universal history, cosmopolitically orientated, that is to say, as a great public space that first *disciplines* the subjectivities and finally *regulates* the life of the species.

Decidedly, the social contract must guarantee peace and commerce, not to get involved with the life ideals of every one, and, most of all, not to hinder the production and circulation of the scientific knowledge, that know about its possibilities and limits, because it is critical and not dogmatic.

What we would like to remark is that in this way of establishing the public space what subtly starts to devalue is the relation of the public with culture. The public space is not cultural, is juridical-scientific. The public space can not be constituted from interactions with common horizons of values and senses: it must be constituted from moral intentions, formally possible to make universal. The public space is not the place of others' discourses, of

conversations and meetings, it is that place of everyone's expressions, that may constitute public opinion.

It implies, without any doubt, an advance, demanded perhaps by the growing substitution of the public space for the global market, the attempts to revalue an universal space governed by principles of the justice as equity, and where it is possible to try the consensus of the affected, or at least, a superimposed consensus. And it is particularly interesting to notice that this theoretic effort to reconstruct normative basis for the coexistence and the dialogue have been generating a gap, clearer in time inside the hegemonic Nordic culture, where the "modern" is reborn as a domestic critical instance.

It is not casual, in this modern-illustrated tradition, for Habermas to make an attempt to recuperate the ethical dimension of politics (with his theory of the communicative action and the attempt to formulate a normative theory of democracy), and for Rawls to make an attempt to support a justice theory merely political, not tied to any commitment with "comprehensive doctrines" consuming strongly the abyss between the normative and evaluative¹¹.

The insistence in a procedural rationality and in a reflexive balance, are attempts to sustain the criticism and the alternative inside the dominant world, the rational and democratic tradition, of "well-organized" societies and with a material basis enough to be able to establish the primacy of a distributive justice, as a limit for the wild neoliberalism.

But let us not be deceived. One thing is the criticism of the reconstructiveness, of kantian inspiration, to the utilitarianism and to the pragmatism (considered "prodigal" sons of the illustrated modernity), as struggle for the hegemony in rich nations, another thing is to listen to the excluded from a factual project of planetary globalization, that is sustained alternatively with illustrated, utilitarian or pragmatic reasons.

Even more. We also find a significant advance the critical attempts that emerge more from a genealogy or deconstruction, that have remarked that

¹¹ The references to Habermas y Rawls would deserve to appeal to various of there respective works. A particular attention deserves the debate of both: J. Habermas-J. Rawls. The Habermas' article originally published in English: "*Reconciliation through the public use of reasons: remarks on John Rawls political liberalism*" with the reply of J. Rawls: *Reply to Habermas*, both in *The Journal of Philosophy*, XCII, (3) March 1995. The German edition of Habermas' text is in J. Habermas: *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1997.

beyond the "diverse in the identity" it is important to think *the difference*. That is to say, a horizon different from the "modern" of critical interrogation. In this sense, to denounce "forgetfulness", "subjection", "restrictions" helps the occidental rationality (ancient or modern, in other words, historical) to revise its own suppositions, to understand its tricks, to dare to talk with its "ghosts"¹².

But neither here let us make a mistake: one thing is the criticism of deconstructivism, of nietzschean or heideggerian inspiration, to the equation between knowledge and power, or between representation and domain, which is also seen in rich nations, an another thing is to let oneself be appealed by the other, radically other, which is not merely, the diverse in the identical, but that does not let it to be reduced only to the different of the same. The public is not that which is generated when it comes out from nature's state, and it is not what happens – as "clearing in the forest" – shaking something like the culture's state.

II. The public space as supposed "reduction" of the other culturally dense

We have tried to revise the most two relevant critical lines in the actual debate around the not desired effects of the actual context of globalization.

What we have condensed as *reconstructive position of the normative aspects of the social pact* (Habermas, Rawls, among others), are, in some way, willing to discharge or stitch the opened wound by the modern criticism to the public space of the ancients, recovering that of telling the history from the cosmopolitan point of view, but trying it now from a "republican patriotism", disengaged *from* and almost stoically indifferent *to* the culturally "evaluative" adherences of the individual and the societies. The missing subject of modernity, as a still not done project, consists precisely in reconciling the ancient's freedom and the modern's freedom. It is necessary, for this, to revalue the public space, by accepting the postulates of a political conception and not metaphysical of the justice, by founding contractually the rationality of a communicative action pragmatically normative, that leads to understand democracy in strictly ethical terms, and not of instrumental rationality. The possibility that we want to design is to control, from principles of justice and in a democratic way, that is to say: politic

¹² In this line we make continuous references to Foucault, Derrida, and also to Laclau.

and rationally, the excesses of the neoliberal economic model, in what deals with the inequitable distribution of the goods, the antidemocratic exclusion in the decisions, and the irrational destruction of the environment. Decidedly, the "political liberalism" and the "normative democracy" have their best arguments orientated to defend from fundamentalisms, both political and economical: it should be not confused the pluralism, desirable in a complex society, not with the wild competitiveness (not governed by principles of justice), nor with the indifferent individualism to the public thing (not controlled by the explained political participation). As N. Bobbio would say the problem is the difficult balance between "freedom" and "equality"¹³.

On the other side, what we have condensed as *deconstructive position of the holding monism of the thought, of the creativity of the singularity*, making a *bet* on the difference and the event (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida), are, in some way, willing to deepen democracy and criticism, betting on a *coming public space*, defined more by the absence than by the presence, more by the fidelity to what happens than by the commitment with the given. This is not about filling in a work (of the logos, of the reason, of the freedom). It is about liberating other silenced alternatives, about "talking to the ghosts", about not being caught not by the presences nor by the subjections, about talking without the epistemological constriction, about recognizing those nets that are formed from the reduction of cruelty¹⁴, from the care of itself¹⁵, from what unhinge the alive present¹⁶.

The lucidest arguments are exposed here against the totalitarisms and authoritarianisms, the massiveness and the consumerism, the routines and the manipulating programs. It is not being postulated that economy should subordinate itself to the politics, under principles of justice as equity or

¹³ Cfr. N. Bobbio: "Equaglianza" and "Libertà", articles published in *Enciclopedia del Novecento* (vol. II, pp. 355-364 y vol. III, pp. 994-1004, respectively).

¹⁴ Cfr. R. Rorty: *Contingency, irony and solidarity*, New York, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991.

¹⁵ Cfr. M. Foucault: *Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, Amherst, the University of Massachusetts Press, 1988, and *Omnes et singulatim: Toward a Criticism of Political Reasons*, in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1981, II.*, Salt Lake City, Univ. of Utah Press, 1981.

¹⁶ Cfr. J. Derrida: *Specters of Marx, the state of the debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International*, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Routledge 1994. The original: *Spectres de Marx. L'État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale*, Paris, Édit. Galilée, 1993.

from a more rational democratic participation, but it is attentive at the essence of the political dimension: what happens, precisely in the borders or edges of what it is established. It is about being able to "take the word" putting subjectivity in the singularity that happens, and not in the synthesizing and legislative logical function. This critical instance in the bosom of the same, the opening to the difference gives priority, in the end, the little report about the argumentation, and, most of all, do not trust in the fallacy of great reports where it is always hidden the monotheist argument disguised with any of its attributes: the logocentrism, the ethnocentrism, the phallus-centrism.

What interests, in the context of this exposition, is what there is in common between these two great critical streams of contemporary thought, that look, certainly, for alternatives for the hegemonic model of the neoliberal globalization. What they have in common is the distrust to the recognition of the other culturally dense, or more directly, of the other like other.

It is in this point where we want to propose our thesis. It is not the same the equality (that reduces the alterity to the mere diversity in the bosom of the same), that the alterity itself, which is where the ethic question as justice emerges. It is not the same to understand the public space as a beyond or in a near point of the cultures, than to understand it as the *space of the inter-cultural*.

To be clearer. The "political liberalism" (to use Rawls' expression) is a good reinsurance for the pluralism and the distributive justice, in the bosom of a supposedly "well-organized" society, and can help as critical instance in the interior of each culture, threatened by the utilitarianism and the individual well being. The "essence of the political" (as Badiou¹⁷ expresses) is a good reinsurance for the creativity and care of itself, in the bosom of a supposedly "too well-organized" society, and it can help as critical instance in the bosom of each culture, threatened by the unique thought and the singular discomfort. In the actual context of globalization these threatens exist and it is good to have critical instruments to conjure them. The "welfare state" and the "discomfort state" are, without doubt, the most insistent ghosts of the critical thought in the Nordic and the rich countries of the planet, in the actual stage of the capitalist development.

In this sense, the postulated public space misses the loss of the welfare culture (social security) and it tries to face the discomfort in culture (social

¹⁷ Cfr. A. Badiou: *Peut-on penser la politique?*, Paris, Du Seuil, 1985.

violence). But it does not open, properly, to the cultural interaction or the dialogue of cultures. Questions like the "responsible paternalism", that appeared clearly when the discussion about the legitimacy of the NATO's intervention in Kosovo, or the politics of "selective immigration" and control of hazardous migrations, would be revealing a serious difficulty to globalize this way of understanding the "public space".

I insist. What I consider more significant in this previous considerations is the clear revelation that hegemonic culture has been able to develop particularly important elements. The actual forms of the fact, and of the aesthetic deconstruction of subjections, seem to us like more than relevant cultural contribution for the intercultural dialogue, but in its own historicity, showing that is definitely fallacious the argument of the necessary desculturation for a social organization over fair basis, or for a singular creativity in the borders or edges of injustice.

And it is a fallacy, in first place, because it does not face the same movements that were presented and are presented, in the universalization of these principles, supposedly transcultural or precultural.

So far, this supposition operated with a logic of "*or conversion o submission*" and *non datur tertium*. However, in the conquer and colonization processes is clear that it was resistance and, even, what R. Kusch called "*fagocitación*"¹⁸.

More even subtly, this suppositions quickly added a second logic, "*or modernization or exclusion*", and *non datur tertium*. However in the first capitalist imperialism process, as in the actual of globalization, there were and there are various movements of resistance, that we can put in the category – with a sign of the seventies – *of the liberation*, not only the struggles for the liberation of the dependency, but also the emergence and strengthness of a wide thought that had its first expressions in the pedagogy of the liberation, the philosophy of the liberation.

In the traces of *resistance and liberation*, it gets today particularly significant, in the context of the globalization, to mediate in the hegemonic conception of the public space, strongly polarized, as a critical alternative to the unequity and to the subjection, between the contract and the bet, the possibility of an *intercultural public space*, as condition, for the "virtuous action", and the "argumentative discourse", for the "free use of reason" and

¹⁸ Litteraly: action of eat, devour. Cfr. R. Kusch: *América Profunda*, Buenos Aires, Bonum, 1975.

"the political participation", "for the care of itself" and "to deepen the democracy". This is our last conclusive part about.

In the traces of E. Lévinas¹⁹ we dare to say that the problem of this tradition of the "desculturalized" public space consists in that it does not accept to recognize itself as "vulnerable", that is to say, opened to the questioning of the other. In this sense, the ethics precedes to the ontology, even the one of the supposedly well organized society, or supposedly too well organized society. Both the public space of the contract, and the one of the bet, are still totalities illusively including and effectively excluding of all exteriority. Appealing to an "a priori" (as dialogical as it may be thought) like appealing to an "emptiness" (as dynamic as it may be thought), are still ways of avoiding the approach of the meeting or interaction of cultures. Finally, the fallacy is to suppose that the contract or the bet are the possible *horizons* for among cultures. Actually, perhaps, the problem is – one more time in occident – in the metaphor of horizon.

III. Towards an intellectual public space

As the actual globalization needs "cultural version", it is still a conquer, the public space of the "republicanisms" (contractual or dialogical) ends to be a dispositive to "watch over" and "punish", in the interaction and conflict of cultures. That is to say, it does not allow the other to question it, because – in the end – it choose the game rules.

As the actual globalization needs "cultural modernization", it is still an empire, and the public space of the "liberalisms" (political or multicultural) ends being, in the interaction and conflict of cultures, a market operator for the wild and excluding competitiveness. That is to say, it does not accept "exteriority", because in the end it does not criticize the essential of the model.

As actual globalization needs "cultural weaknessness", it is still monotheism, and the public space of the "radicalism" (political or linguistic) ends being, in the interaction and conflicts of cultures, a withdrawal of the word, in G. Steiner²⁰ expression, highly functional for the dispersion of the resis-

¹⁹ We feel particularly in debt to the thought of Lévinas, although – since long time ago – we tried a "situated" lecture. In particular, E. Lévinas: *Totalité et Infin – Essai sur l'Extériorité*, La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971 (4eme édition).

²⁰ It is an obsessively thought subject by G. Steiner, cfr.: Original: *No Passion Spent*, 1996.

tance and the struggle for the hegemony, because it helps with the alliances in search of major consensus to the exercise of the transnational economic power. In other words, it does not accept the "face" of the other, because in the end legitimate the logic of the centre and borders.

Here appears the necessity to think of an intercultural public space. The intercultural public space shows a relation that is not, the obligation of individual, supposedly already constituted, to submit themselves to the same rules or principles (independent of if this rule is thought as categorical imperative or as mere convenience of interests), and it is neither the hazardous link generated in the borders of these individual supposedly already constituted, for a fidelity to what happens, dislocating the previous constitutions. The intercultural public space shows *a relation without relation*, that questions, both the will to *cooperate reasonably*, and the *care of itself*, without being constituted as that. It is not a contract nor a bet, it is a *responsibility*. Let me transcript a text from Lévinas:

"From the responsibility always more antique than the conatus of substance, more antique than the beginning and the start, from the anarchic, the I turned to itself, responsible of the Other – that is hostage of everyone – that is substitute of everyone for its own not interchangeability hostage of all the others that precisely others do not belong to the same genre than the I, because I am responsible of them without worrying about their responsibility with regards to me because, even of it, I am, in the end and from the beginning, responsible – the I, I am a man who tolerates the universe, "full of all the things"²¹.

In the actual context of globalization, clearly unfair and unique thought, that is to say evil secularization of a pseudo-monotheism, it is necessary to rethink the contracts and the bets. We agree with the possibility to advance in the possibility of a "consensus about principles of justice as equity, superimposed to disensus in the forms and ideals of life". In others words, we like the idea of a public space of international cosmopolitan space, as a possibility of criticism to the injustice of the model, and most all, to its impunity. We also agree with the possibility to advance in critical thought opened to the difference and what dislocating the certainties and the securi-

²¹ Own English translation. Original: E. Lévinas: *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1972. The work appeared as an article in 1968, in the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*.

ties of the representations. That is to say, we like the idea of a public space linking nets of not tied individual or social movements or collective learning processes, that generate consensus in a true struggle contrahegemonic²². However, and for the same reason that makes us try to reconstruct normative basis for the social contract and deconstruct illusory fixation for the bet on better future, for these same reasons we criticize the supposed desculturation of the public space. On the contrary, only mediating an intercultural public space it is possible to prioritize justice, in strong sense, over the mere contractual equity or the mere fidelity to the event.

It is the intercultural public space the possible ambit to not remain forced to an ontology of the nature or of the history, each time we think of the recognition and mutual learning. In the end, the human condition, to go back H. Arendt's expression, is not well defined by the alternatives of an hedonist, or active, or contemplative life, if previously we do not understand that, "*we are, merely, we are*" (R. Kusch), elbow to elbow with the others, rehearsing in different ways to answer to the questioning of the Other, with gestures and symbols "*that go from bread to divinity*".

The problem, in the end, is that it is not enough to think just in terms of identity or of difference, or both, it is necessary to think the alterity, feeling the questioning of the Other in the vulnerability itself. Then it is possible to talk about contracts and bets, because previously we know ourselves as responsible.

The paradox is that only the asymmetry of the curve space of ethics, as questioning of the Other allows, in the end, justice to preside the interaction of the cultures, and, therefore that we can think another social contract and make a bet to other future.

Resistance, insistence and vulnerability are the ones that define the cultural diversity as "mere being, no more". From here it is possible to construct an intercultural *public* space, that makes from rationability, argumentation, recognition and care, forms and strategies of justice.

²² From eclectically used sources the subject is well developed in E. Laclau-Ch. Mouffe: *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Toward a Radical Democratic Politics*, New York, Verso, 1985.

Dina V. Picotti

7. Dialogue and power in the Latin American culture: the intercultural challenge

In the context of the globalisation process in which we find ourselves and which is leading to the spread throughout of the world of the philosophic-scientific and technological culture, or in other words to the spread of an increasingly rationalizing and objectivizing attitude which in turn has led to a particular kind of politics and economics and to a homogenizing lifestyle in general, we are witnessing the emergence in contemporary societies of diverse identities, in the field of culture amongst others, that claim their own rights. To respond appropriately to such claims demands a different way of thinking that will incorporate through an interlogic approach different dimensions of intelligibility and rationality that have arisen and must be acknowledged. Amongst other things it will involve the meaning of power and its exercise moving away from its current meaning of dominance towards a more originary one based on the force and potentiality that everything that exists possess. There are numerous examples to illustrate this of which only a few will be mentioned here.

Time of globalisation: social power of the "identities"

The subject of "identity" has always been an essential question from the ontological and historical point of view. From the ontological perspective because it deals with the tendency that each entity has to be something in particular and different to other beings, to subsist and be seen as such, because of its essence, its existence and its intelligibility. From the historical perspective because if everything that exists "happens" according to a basic and universal experience, each identity gradually takes shape and continues in a constantly renewed synthesis of its different components, with the inevitable cycle of sedimentation and innovation.

But it has acquired particular relevance in our time, since we experience amongst other things a growing confrontation between an ever encroaching globalisation process and a universe full of symbolism of many cultures and subjectivities that seek to be recognized; between the trend to homogenisation and the evidence of an uncontrollable explosion of plurality, dif-

ference and change that disrupts it both in the theoretical and practical side; between a world of total systematisation and the concrete beings that resist being ignored and manipulated.

The communal and personal identities, can only survive against marginalization of every kind but as well by avoiding the risk of closing themselves in and so becoming the poorer for it by submitting to their particular inclination towards integration or synthesis, consolidating and affirming themselves through interacting with others. This would require a deep insight in the midst of the current increasingly abstract and alien rationality and the corresponding political and institutional backing to make them viable.

The thinking task

Let's then point out some of the important features in the concept of identity that have been recognized throughout the history of philosophy and other traditions that have shaped us as well as those that have their origin in our contemporary experience.

If the identity of every being as such rests on the spacio-temporal unity of his internal diversity and on his differentiation from others, in the case of human beings we must add the deliberate protagonism of such an identifying construction, that allow us to talk of "narrative identity" as P. Ricoeur¹ has suggested. Our subjectivity isn't an incoherent series of events, nor an immutable substantiality, but rather like in a story "a concordance of the discordant" in its different components, that reveals intelligibility in the very structure of action and passion, as we can see in the linguistic expressions that refer to them with an implicit symbolism and a system of signs, rules and norms; so that it is possible to attribute to the human experience a pre-narrative quality, as it has been observed by the same author and as far as it is a temporal structure that lends itself to be narrated we talk about the history of a life, in a different way to how we talk about other non-thinking forms of being or about the mere physical movement.

Such narrative configuration is also a temporal synthesis in several ways: since the narrative happens on the one hand as a discrete, open and indefinite series of incidents and on the other of integration, culmination and conclusion. This same temporality, in its permanence in the process of becoming, is expressed by the "extension of the soul" of Agustin, in Husserl's

¹ P. Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris 1990 and *Temps et récit*, Tome III, Paris 1985.

synthesis of the acts of conscience as well in each particular act, in Heidegger's reunion in the "being there" of the three ecstasies past-present-future, as possibility, actualisation and projection. This temporal feature of the identities bases its historical construction as is the case for the becoming of every reality as the materialization in the present of what was a possibility in the space of experience of the past, and of the horizon of expectative that reaches out into the future, sedimenting on the one hand, innovating on the other. However this triple relationship due to its historical construction undergoes a crisis when its past dimension, memory or its future horizon, hope, is narrowed down. As it has already been pointed out the gradual reduction that takes place, at least in one aspect of the globalising process, from beings to object, instrument or merchandise it manifests itself too in a reduction of the density of time to a mere present moment, that can be registered and measured but not recognized as the instant in which a decision was made.

The configuration of, identities takes place too in relation to other persons, groups and beings in general, as members of a community and inhabitants of the cosmos. This forces us to an ethical perspective that Ricœur called "the odyssey of freedom" because we are dealing here with the difficult acknowledgement (difficult in the sense that has got to overcome all sorts of denials) of oneself and others, of a right political system and a dwelling in the world as opposed to dominion of the world.

This characterization of the identities leads to, as it has been pointed out, to a corresponding way of thinking, that will allow them to be recognized with their own characteristics, and to follow them up in their development, contingencies and challenges. This will require to accept the eventual nature of (our) existing and the configurative nature of truth, by adopting a "long and slow process of hermeneutics, that by undergoing different identities, not only personal and plural but cultural too, will have to take an interlogic approach, that is to say to adapt itself in its relationship with the identities themselves and their own logics, by learning from them their intelligibility and rationality. We will be dealing with an approach to thinking whose source will be the experience gathered in traditions that have accumulated ways of behaving and resources, and it will be shaped by new events and expectations of different times, it will try to respond to its demands from the possibilities open by "what has gone before" and the horizon of the future.

This tentative response to the new challenges is not limited to a mere theoretical question but it will have to throw light and in turn adapt itself to the institutional challenges, that is to say, the political task of reshaping the institutions, so as to make them into appropriate vehicles for the current needs of all the community, for its daily living together, for its continuity and development as a unity within the diversity.

It is necessary too to examine the notion of power, often reduced to one of its derivative meanings, and not precisely the most important from our point of view: the power of dominion. What we call power, in its ordinary meaning rests in the force that shows and is capable of manifesting every thing that exists in its particular way of being and its relationship with other beings. To try to elucidate the essential dimension not only of the notion of identity but that of power too it means to have recourse to a logic of the being as a happening, a gift that requires from man an acceptance of all that a being has to offer for the mere fact of being something and being there and an adequate response as opposed to the objectivizing logic based on the relationship object-subject. It is necessary to have this in mind in order not concentrate in a situation or particular aspect of a situation, nor to be dazzled by reality no matter how overwhelming the facts may be, but to be able to discover the ineffability and infinite potentiality of things and in the different voices of society so many other realizations and possibilities of the human experience. If something has been achieved by the pacifist movements it is above all to appeal to a logic beyond that of dominance and violence, that of love, rooted in life itself and of all type of reality as intercommunication between the individuals, a communion required for its subsistence and the development from within of the unity and diversity of the cosmos. Nietzsche's thinking on the "will to power" as a superseding of metaphysics and its animal rationale has a similar meaning. As well Heidegger's idea of the happening nature of being, as an opening of a temporal playing field, in which beings exist, their truth being based on the human being as the "there" (where) of what exists, who then has to exercise his freedom in acceptance and response. The unanimous testimony of the old cultures proves the same thing, for example amongst us the common indigenous notion of the multiple faces of things and the corresponding human response, or the plurimetry or pluririthmy of black cultures that are reflected in their music and dance, the cross of vital forces in the improvisation that characterizes its constant recreation etc.

In this way the progress towards non-violence seems to state the sense of history for politics, as used to say Eric Weil² having in mind the ambivalence of the State in its character of form and force; what, for example, would be expressed in the resolution and not the denial of conflicts, the listening to and the gathering of social forces, from dialogue and not as a mere instrument but as the proper means of interaction in the life of the community, the construction of public affairs by the contribution and consensus of the different voices, promoting the responsibility not only of the State but of the citizen on this matter.

The political task

Contemporary societies not only in Latin America but in the whole world, are experiencing the above mentioned dissociation between a globalising trend that is leading to the most total, abstract and excluding systematisation and a plurality of identities, and historical centers, ways of life that reclaim their own rights.

As it has been observed by social scientists, the deep changes that affect the global order led to the re-structuration of the social relationships and the loosening up of the frameworks of collective regulation developed in previous times, its damaging effects are noticed particularly in peripheral societies, in which the means of public control and the mechanisms of social regulation are deficient and the margins of political action smaller. The subjects find themselves then in a situation of growing unpredictability, contingency and uncertainty that leads in turn on the one hand to a gradual emancipation with regard to the structures and on the other it makes more evident the insufficiency of the old collective props, which in turn makes it necessary a new reappraisal of the outside world in order to establish a new way of relating to it. In contemporary Argentina as it has been pointed out by several authors,³ a process of social polarization is happening, with a high concentration of wealth and life opportunities in the high ranks and a growing fragmentation of the middle classes, a noticeable impoverishment and reduction in numbers of the working classes and a great increase of the marginalized. In many cases the social frameworks that guided the behaviour and the acts of the people involved have disappeared almost entirely

² Eric Weil, *La philosophie politique*, Paris 1967.

³ For example M. Svampa compil, *Desde abajo – la transformación de las identidades sociales*, (From below the transformation of social identities), Buenos Aires 2000.

and the subjects have been forced to reappraise the new experience to confront their situation of impoverishment and social exclusion. In others the emerging frameworks are shaping new, more fragile and volatile social identities. Others based in religious beliefs may perhaps have led to more unifying social experiences. On the other hand, the transformations take place as a result of long term processes as is the case with nepotism and certain forms of authoritarian political representation that end up by changing the role of traditional values and hierarchical political styles within a democratic political framework.

The challenge of our times seems to be then that of a necessary reconciliation of the two processes: that of globalization and that of the emergence of identities, with their corresponding transformation, in order to avoid the already very real danger of an abstract rationalization, a loss of meaning on the part of the former and a closing in into themselves, a battling reaction on the part of the latter, when life on the contrary in all its spheres requires intercommunication.

The lifestyle that we should aim for demands as well as the right way of thinking and attitude the backing of the organisms through which the historical communities respond to these demands, that is the institutions as "the work of all"⁴. This means their permanent reorganization. In the contemporary situation, it is evident that the notion of the universal citizenship that arose with the French Revolution to safeguard everyman's freedom against the aristocracy is not adequate anymore for the current needs because it ignores the particularities; neither the modern State that represented bourgeoisie freedom is; neither the mere Anglo-Saxon tolerance to defend private rights and their lifestyle, because it leaves them free to be isolated; neither the mere assimilation of what is different: autochthonous, mestizo, criolle, immigrant etc, practiced for example in our countries, because it means to absorb it by devouring it when trying to make it fit into a certain model considered as prescriptive: nor the mere negotiation between opposing forces that is what governments have come to do nowadays, because it leaves them to their own fate. On the contrary they should be the promoters of the social "we" through an inter-logic interaction in which everybody's patrimony is made available for everyone else and in turn it is transformed

⁴ With the same meaning that Hegel gave it when discussing in modern times the origin of the State, as mediators between the individuals and the former. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lecciones de Filosofía del Derecho*, Buenos Aires 1959.

by its interaction with others.

There are reasons and practical examples that support this proposal. Amongst the main reasons obviously is the fact that everything that is human is built by the community of man that is to say by each man, each group of people, in a very distinct and irreplaceable way.

Amongst the practical examples we can mention a negative one: the disarray that affects our institutions that has been happening from the start in our countries since the time of their creation following adopted patterns, that hadn't arisen nor were suited to the way and needs of the community and which explains the underlying reason for their failure. Our institutions were inspired by the democratic models in vogue in central Europe and North America without adapting them to our own particular needs that were made to comply with the civilizing model: in fact by considering this model obligatory they weren't understood from within themselves, nor accepted in a way that would allow their potentialities to blossom, as the new entity that was America; large parts of the population, in some cases the majority are marginalized, treated like an object and not a subject of politics, and they are still treated so. Chiapas is in this context an appealing model, as well as all movements such as – the landless, the homeless, women, children, the young, the old age pensioners, the unemployed, the immigrants etc- not only among us but in all contemporary societies as a whole, in which a growing need is felt to unite all diversity, by means that can't but be institutional.

There are however positive examples of organisms with a social-utopic slant that have managed to operate within the current system, as is the case of the Pauper's bank in India that has managed to put into practice its objective of support for them because it doesn't aim to accumulate⁵, the alternative economic system of bartering that is spreading more and more throughout all countries⁶, the social group of companies in Colombia that gives back any profit to their employees⁷ the initiatives of solidary action

⁵ Amartya Sen, *Desarrollo y libertad*, Buenos Aires 2000.

⁶ *Trueque magazine*, Buenos Aires, from 1998.

⁷ The *Fundación social* has created in Colombia a series of economic and financial companies with specific and far reaching social aims, trying to harmonize the economic rationality with the social, by means of a model of social intervention integrated by the companies, the social programs, the macro-influence and thought production. Its preferential option participation and for the poor didn't stop it from reaching top ranking amongst the economic and financial groups of the country. G. Remolina, *Racionalidad social vs. racionalidad económica-la viabilidad económica de "utopías" ético-sociales*

that get diversified and proliferate in our country showing an enormous support for the people⁸, various initiatives by the most deprived population to help themselves to provide for their basic needs, different approaches of those who sensitized to the social demands are thinking of different models⁹. Another type of positive example is offered historically by intercultural accomplishments that have taken place in spite of the current power or through the chinks in it, in different forms of "mestizaje" in various aspects of life. Let's take language for example, that always is a manifestation of the others. The Spanish language arrived in America through the conquest and colonization, that is to say not through freedom but by enforcement; however those who accepted it inevitably transformed it according to their own culture and those who brought it transformed it too by the exchange. In a similar way the indigenous and African languages that had arrived by force, through slavery, transformed themselves without stopping being themselves, to the point of not being considered by linguists as varieties of the Spanish. Portuguese, French, English and Dutch but as Neo-African languages¹⁰.

In the present situation of a growing exclusion in contemporary societies, the identities in a way or the other are making themselves heard constituting a growing power of the minorities and majorities, this power can't be ignored if we want to "live together" as opposed to the alternatives already tried and proved unsatisfactory by the hard lessons provided by the experience itself, such as fundamentalism, totalitarianism, revolutionary or repressive violence and anarchy. Some representative scholars of politics talk about the need of a new invention in politics, of the construction of a new form of democracy, of a new deal, but inclusive of all social groups¹¹, the

("social rationality versus economic rationality- the economic viability of Ethico-social utopias") in J.C. Scannone-G. Remolina compilation, *Ética y Economía* (Ethics and Economy), Buenos Aires 1998.

⁸ Such as it appears publicly announced and inviting people to join in daily papers, magazines, posters, radio, television, internet etc.

⁹ For ex. J.L. Coraggio, *Economía Urbana-la perspectiva popular* (urban economy the popular perspective), Quito 1998, and later publications by the same author and his team.

¹⁰ Amongst the copious bibliography on this matter, M.L. Portilla, *La filosofía Nahuatl* (Nahuatl Philosophy), Mexico 1979; J. Jahn, *Muntu: Las culturas de la negritud*, (Muntu: the cultures of black people), Madrid 1970.

¹¹ Ulrich Beck, *La invención de lo político* (The invention of politics), Buenos Aires 1999.

source for a reformation of all institutions, precisely as the work of everybody.

The intercultural challenge

Not only in the case of contemporary societies as a whole but in the case of Latin America in particular, and in the non-European continents too, the challenge that confronts us in this globalised and postmodern period seems to lay in the relationship between "civilization" and "cultures". If on the one hand the globalising trend extended to everybody the benefits of objectivizing rationality, it spread too the limitations inherent to it, as its own post-modern awareness admits, recognizing the collapse of criteria, categories, and metaphysical interpretations or at least the need for their fundamental transformation. With this aim in mind I have tried to look with more or less success at some of the trends of contemporary philosophical thinking, such as "the theory of the communicative community" via the means of language proposed by the school of Frankfurt; the proposal by P. Ricœur of a long and slow process of hermeneutics; the "paralogic" legitimization by F. Lyotard faced with the different paradigms and play on words of language; the assumption by G. Vattimo, following in the steps of Heidegger and Nietzsche of the eventual nature of the experience of being and truth, in order to be able to be in communication with our times; the "localization" of Heidegger that places the initiative on the being and requires that thinking be examined in relation to the place where it takes place, and so becoming both reception and response.

All this, in this time when we are witnessing the decline of metaphysics, which means too the dawn of a world of total systematization, where beings are undergoing increasing degrees of manipulation and determination, leads us on the one hand to the need to aim for a more originary way of thinking¹², in order to be able to accept what comes to us from the dimension of its source as being as it has been suggested regarding the notions of identity and power. On the other hand, only from this perspective it is possible to acknowledge the differences, amongst them the identities, by means of a way of thinking that by originating from the being learns from them as far as so many places and forms of happening, so many other lo-

¹² It is the proposal by Heidegger of jumping from the concept of being to the more originary meaning of being itself as something that "happens", particularly *Beiträge zur Philosophie-Vom Ereignis*, Frankfurt 1989.

gos, configuring itself logically.

It isn't any other thing that the indispensable intercommunication between beings.

For this challenge with which we are dealing it is a must to identify, evaluate in their different ways and limitations, as so many different manifestations of the human experience not only the objectivising reality of globalization but as well other ways of understanding and racionalising that are found in the different cultures or in identities as a whole, In this way the globalising process would become ecumenical, as far as it would become an interaction of forces, a dialogue of subjectivities and peoples.

If this has always happened up to a certain extent, even in the most negative examples of dominance, because a minimal intercommunication is inevitable, since in our time we are experiencing the "malaise of civilization in the way of extreme forms of reduction and disregard for other cultures, it is necessary from this decline to aim for the dawn of a new way of thinking. That, which had been clearly been pointed out by the romantic poets when reflecting on the historical destiny of the West, "the sunset country", affects us all since it has spread everywhere, but in the case of other historical centers it means also to have recourse to their own traditions, to their experience and view of reality, in order to be able to establish a dialogue of life needed more than ever in the present circumstances.

Josef Estermann

8. "Anatopism" as cultural alienation. Dominant and dominated cultures in the Andean region of Latin America

1. Introduction: From the *Chino* to the *Cholo*

The recent presidential elections in Peru – following the debacle of former president Alberto Fujimori – gave us a lesson in evaluating cultures and the symbolism transmitting their values and anti-values. Until 1990 the Peruvian political class had consisted almost exclusively of persons with white faces and European characteristics, except for a few *mestizos* who were able to enter the political scene. Economically speaking, the political elite represented to a very large extent the upper and the upper middle classes, in spite of the "socialist" or "social-democratic" political program of the leading party. But in reality, the population represented – in both ethnic and economic terms – amounted to less than ten percent of the population as a whole.

After the politics of bankruptcy of President Alan García in the final years of the decade of the eighties, the Peruvian population withdrew more and more from the "political clique" and from the traditional political parties. Notwithstanding that, the masses had not been looking for a mestizo (*misti*)¹ or even an indigenous representative, but elected a representative of the Nippon minority (of Japanese origin) by a huge majority: the *Chino*, Alberto Fujimori.² This act (together with constantly high support for him, even when the signs of corruption were already quite manifest) revealed one thing very clearly: Despite the fact that the Europeanised (or Westernised) way had been blocked by the disaster of Alan García, the people did not place their trust in an indigenous (or even *mestizo*) representative, but rather in a person who represents by his physiognomy and professional ca-

¹ This is the Quechua name for the Spanish "mestizo". The *mistis* generally have some occupation in commerce and business; many are also employees at public and private companies. Normally, they are bilingual, but the transmission of the native languages Quechua or Aymara to the future generations is going to be lost. It is the class which has aspirations to become *criollos* as fast as possible.

² Because of his Japanese origin and East-Asian physiognomy, Fujimori is known among his citizens as the "Chinaman" (*el chino*).

reer (Fujimori was an agronomic engineer) the Asiatic worker, the "tigers" of the Far East that are supposed to have crossed the threshold to Western modernity.

This subtle but at the same time very overt racism (1. white – 2. yellow – 3. brown) returned also in the campaigns for the presidential elections in 2001. The very promising "Asiatic way" has been made impassable by the incredible manœuvres of Fujimori and his personal advisor Vladimiro Montesinos to such an extent that the former admiration of the Japanese people has turned into deception and even enmity. It is part of the irony of history that Alan García, who had been wanted by Interpol until the beginning of 2001 because of bad administration of funds and corruption, rose like a Phoenix from the ashes and presented himself as the man who would save the country from the long arms of the *Fujimontesinista* mafia.

In the end, the *cholo* Alejandro Toledo³, descendent of an indigenous family and with very clear Andean physiognomy, won the elections in the second round only 3 percent ahead of García. What has happened? Has the cultural and ethnic "value" of the indigenous world suddenly experienced a paradigmatic revolution? Can we speak of the result of a process of conscientisation among the indigenous and mestizo majority?

Without getting into further details, we have to take into account the following points. First, the final result of the elections does not demonstrate popular sympathy for the *cholo* Toledo, as much as antipathy for the "bourgeois" García. It was a negative election. Next, we should not underestimate the fact that Toledo has had – in economic and cultural terms – quite an "orthodox" career: he graduated in economics in the United States and was a student at prestigious Harvard University. He is married to a Belgian anthropologist. I think that he has not been elected because he is a *cholo* and a representative of the indigenous population, but because of his capacity to link himself and – as a future president – the whole country to the globalising economic and cultural "center" of the United States. Concerning the symbolism of his presentation it has to be said that he tries to "dance at two weddings at the same time" (to use a Peruvian expression). On the one hand, he makes the foreign investors and the national *criollo* elite believe in his capabilities as an economist; and on the other, he nour-

³ *Cholo* has a positive as well as a more pejorative meaning; a *cholo* is considered to be one of the people, a comrade and companion, but one can also be called *cholo* to manifest that he/she is an uncivilized, rude, backward and non educated person.

ishes among the indigenous and mestizo population the hope that he will identify himself in political practice with the common people.

What do I want to explain with this very contextual, passing anecdote? What does it have to do with the issue of "the asymmetry and interaction of cultures in the context of globalisation"? And finally, what has it to do with philosophy? I am convinced that this event has to do with all these things. Through it, the cultural problematic of neoliberal globalisation in relation to indigenous cultures like the Andean one can be expressed *in nuce* in a very clear and meaningful way.

2. Anatopism of academic philosophy

For the purpose of my exposition I have chosen a pair of analytical concepts which have been elaborated by two Peruvian philosophers, in order to describe the situation of the cultures in general, and philosophy in particular, in the Latin American context. Víctor Andrés Belaúnde (1889-1966) coined in his *Peruvian Meditations* the notion of "anatopism" to stress the de-contextualised character of Latin American thought, which simply "transplants" Western philosophy onto American soil (*topos*) without taking into consideration the proper reality and the specific context of Latin America. Augusto Salazar Bondy (1925-1974) spoke about a deep "cultural alienation" of the Latin American elites, in the sense of an inauthenticity of their thinking.

Hegel's phrase about Latin America, especially about the philosophical thinking of the continent, is supposedly well known: "What is happening here up to this moment, is only the echo from the Old World and the expression of a foreign vitality..."⁴ The two concepts mentioned above seem to prove the Hegelian verdict that Latin American philosophy is characterised by a strong mimetism and the internalisation of an Eurocentric position. Salazar Bondy talked about a "culture of domination"⁵ which seems to mark intellectual life in many parts of Latin America.

Although it is true that since the 1960s huge efforts have been made by a group of philosophers and intellectuals to overcome this situation of alienation and anatopism in Latin America, the character of the official aca-

⁴ "Was bis jetzt sich hier ereignet, ist nur der Wiederhall der Alten Welt und der Ausdruck fremder Lebendigkeit..."; Hegel 1979, 114.

⁵ Salazar Bondy 1969, 27.

democratic philosophy at most universities and seminaries on the continent has not really changed. And the same should be – *mutatis mutandis* – the case also in other parts of the so called Third World.⁶ The occidental conception of philosophy is still dominating philosophical thinking in the periphery, and this is the reason why Western philosophy is still the dominant kind of thinking, even – or above all – in non-Western cultures.

The concept of "anatomism" reflects to a certain extent the situation of a colonised country: a minority of allochthonous (or ectopic) people dominates a large autochthonous (or entopic) majority.⁷ The coloniser builds up in foreign territory an enclave, a place (*topos*) or space which is culturally and economically different from the surrounding area. Thanks to military and economic power, this minoritarian and ectopic (foreign, anatomic) culture becomes the dominant culture; it has as its main objective to penetrate and "pollute" the autochthonous cultures in all their aspects. This cultural imperialism did not come to a halt with political independence, but continued to become even stronger, as the dominant culture is able to extend its power to the areas of education, communication and cultural production. The colonising elite has been replaced by a colonised elite, without changing the ideological framework of the dominant ideas.

In the era of neoliberal and cybernetic globalisation, national intellectual elites are no longer exclusively dominant; on the contrary, they are at the same time dominated. The cultural domination very faithfully accompanying the different strategies of capitalist globalisation makes use of the Westernised (North-Americanised or Europeanised) *avant-garde* in most parts of the non-Western world, in order to bring to the "barbarian" cultures the "gospel" of individualism, hedonism and (neo-)liberalism. The intellectual elites of many so called Third World countries have the function and duty to be multipliers and transmitters of foreign ideas, values and customs.

⁶ See the results of a world wide opinion poll on the situation of philosophy in different regional and cultural contexts, together with the answers of 103 women and men philosophers, in: Fernet-Betancourt 1999.

⁷ The terminology refers to the native land (*autos chthon*), respectively to the place (*topos*) of the most important contextualisation of persons and groups. It is worth mentioning that the strict distinction between autochthonous and allochthonous becomes more and more obsolete to the degree that there are more and more migratory movements. In the context of the colony, the colonizer was the allochthonous (or ectopic) group which has been replaced during the process of independisation by a legally autochthonous political and economical class (in other words: a national one), but which culturally and ethnically still remained allochthonous.

Via the educational institutions (or institutions of knowledge) – high schools, universities, institutes or seminaries – the former political and economical colonisation is going on by other means. As a result, a kind of cultural schizophrenia has emerged: A schizophrenia between the silent masses of those who do not have access to the temples of knowledge and skills – often referred to as "brutes", "ignorants", "pre-modern" and "superstitious" – on the one hand, and a national elite which has the ability to follow the latest post-modern and cybernetic cry of the West, on the other hand.⁸

The classical scheme of socio-economic analysis by liberation theologians and philosophers – the model of centre and periphery and dependence theory – has been displaced from the world-wide scale to the national economies and to the relationship between the dominating culture and the dominated cultures. Taking the example of the Andean area, it is obvious that both economic power and the production of knowledge are concentrated in the capitals and the most economically active places. This situation becomes even more critical because of a strong political centralism typical for most (and not only the Andean) Latin American states. Educational politics, the contents of most of the mass media, the study plans and programs for all levels and disciplines, the type of cultural production and even the manner of clothing and eating are decided in Bogotá, Quito, Lima, La Paz and Santa Cruz. One of the most conspicuous example are the commercials on television (including the famous soap operas), because people with white skin, European characteristics, a cultivated use of language and North-American customs bombard the majority having dark skin, indigenous characteristics, native languages and local customs, with the bounties and virtues of Western culture. In this way, the national "centers" continue strongly colonising the various economic, social and cultural "peripheries" of their territories.⁹

⁸ The psychological mechanism by which one feels superior to the other has not changed at all: lowering the other with pejorative titles ("barbarians", "pagans", "underdeveloped" etc.), one can define oneself as superior and with the (natural) right to dominate, just as a father has the authority to dominate his children.

⁹ In most of the so called Third World countries, the world wide bias between the economic and cultural "centres" and the "peripheries" is repeated. In the "globalised" centres, one can find wealth and Western lifestyles, technology and science; in the marginalized peripheries, poverty and struggle for survival determine the life of the people. The positive effects of capitalist globalisation only "trickle down" to some islands

The majority of the more influential intellectuals have received their academic and professional formation abroad, preferably in Europe and North America; Alejandro Toledo is not an exception. This is even true of the first and second generation of liberation theologians (almost all men).¹⁰ The West no longer needs to send ambassadors of its culture in order to be sure about the global propagation of its values; it has its faithful representatives already on the spot. These "multipliers" or "spokespersons" have often become more orthodox than their European or North American mentors, in such a way that the most "orthodox" and "authentic" European philosophy and theology can nowadays be studied, ironically, at universities in the so called Third World. One can debate in Lima, Nairobi or Beijing with internationally recognised experts on Hegel, Ricœur or Heidegger, who often turn out to be more experienced and learned than their colleagues at European universities.

The anatomic situation of wide sectors of intellectual life in Latin America – but also and in Africa, Asia and Oceania – is a faithful echo of the globalising strategies of a dominant transnational "culture" upon autochthonous cultures. It is not essentially different from the situation in colonial times; what has changed are the means of domination, the overcoming of natural and political borders and the velocity of penetration and transculturation.¹¹ Although this anatopism (which is a certain kind of cultural alienation) turns out to be most perfect and complete among the national intellectual *avant-garde*, it has reached the most humble homes in the rural areas, too. Hedonist individualism which is preached as part of the neoliberal campaign to open new markets, has already weakened greatly the traditional order of trans-generational and communitarian solidarity. Children refuse in many families to talk their native language of Quechua or Aymara be-

within a sea of excluded human beings; once more, the benefits are privatised, the damages and errors socialized.

¹⁰ J.M. Bonino studied in the United States, J.L. Segundo in Louvain, J.P. Miranda in Frankfurt and Rome, G. Gutiérrez in Louvain and Lyon, E. Dussel in Paris and Münster, H. Assmann taught in Münster.

¹¹ The West only very rarely resorts today to military force or economic sanctions (as in Iraq or Afghanistan). The means of domination are more subtle and do not violate formal political sovereignty. Electronic interconnection – which could also be an instrument of solidarity and dialogue – has contributed very strongly to the penetration of non-occidental cultures with the media's "idolatry" of the West. For financial capital, speculation on the stock markets, mass media and digitalized communication and information, there are no more political borders or natural limitations (except the speed of light).

cause they think it to be backward and an obstacle to Western style progress.

Concerning (academic) philosophy, the general situation is not very different. Of course, there have been a good number of initiatives and intents to foster and promote an authentic Latin American philosophy during the last 40 years. Since Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) spoke in 1842 for the first time of an "American philosophy" and called for it to be made evident,¹² various generations of philosophers (women philosophers only appeared in the second half of the 20th century) have made efforts to "normalise" philosophical life in Latin America, to compete with European standards and to lay the foundation for authentic philosophising from the perspective of the continent. In the second half of the last century, there were some valuable proposals to escape from the anatomic constitution, eurocentrism and occidental character of the philosophy produced and taught in Latin America. The different currents of liberation philosophy are the proof of such efforts, together with some very initial attempts to rehabilitate the indigenous philosophical thought of *Abya Yala* (the native name for America).¹³

In spite of this, philosophical life at many Latin American universities is still dominated by the contents and methods of European and North American philosophies, or at best by the legacy of its own reception of these cur-

¹² In his work "Ideas para un curso de filosofía contemporánea", published in 1842, Alberdi suggests that an "American philosophy" has to be in its topics "political and social", in its engagement "ardent and prophetic", and in its method "synthetic and organic" (Alberdi 1978, 12).

¹³ Parallel to Liberation Theology, in the 1960s emerged in Latin America a Marxist oriented "Liberation Philosophy" the most distinguished representative of which is Enrique Dussel (cf. Dussel 1980; Dussel 1977-1980). In the 1980s, a "Philosophy of Popular Wisdom" (Sage Philosophy) began to be elaborated, an ethico-cultural current of "Liberation Philosophy", which pretends to rehabilitate the autochthonous thinking of Latin America. The principal representatives of this current are R. Kusch, C. Cullen and J.C. Scannone. See Kusch 1962; Kusch 1970; Cullen 1978; Cullen 1986-87; Scannone 1982; Scannone 1990a; Scannone 1990b.

I prefer the native expression *Abya Yala* (which means in the language of the Kuna in Panama "the land where we live") instead of "America" which is a result of the desire of the Italian conqueror Amerigo Vespucci to immortalize himself. Normally, contemporary authors make a distinction between "Ibero America" or "Latin America" on the one hand, that is; the culture and society under Spanish and Portuguese influence; and "Amerindia" or "Abya Yala" on the other hand, that is; the original native culture and society, the so called "Profound America" (Kusch).

rents, like krausism, Latin American positivism and marxism.¹⁴ But even more "anatomic" seems the situation of philosophical training of future Catholic priests at the seminaries. The type of philosophy taught at these study centres is a dogmatic (neo-)thomism, totally isolated from the individual and social situation of the students. The modern (and post-modern) European currents become integrated parts of the curriculum only insofar as it is necessary to know them in order to combat them; no thought is given to the idea of teaching an authentic Latin American philosophy. Fortunately, there are some outstanding exceptions which seem to prove the rule.

Although the majority of the aspirants for philosophical and theological studies in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia are young indigenous (mostly Quechua or Aymara) men and (just a few) women, the curricular contents do not at all reflect this cultural background. In order to become a Catholic priest, seminarians not only have to make the Catholic doctrine in Roman garb their own, but they have to undergo a "Hellenistic circumcision"¹⁵, an occidental brainwashing, a very subtle and efficient process of "de-indigenisation". As the erroneously labeled "Indians"¹⁶ were unable to be priests for centuries because of their dark skin and speaking Quechua, Aymara or Guaraní, Latin American indigenous young men (and *mutatis mutandis* those in other parts of the world) could and still can only become

¹⁴ There are some initiatives in different countries to found and build up indigenous seminaries (Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia) that lead on the other hand to powerful resistance by representatives of Roman centralism.

¹⁵ This (polemical) expression refers to the surrender of Saint Paul in the face of the philosophies of Hellenism, after he had been successful in his struggle against "Judaic circumcision", in his debate with Saint Peter. It is part of the tragedy of the history of Christianity, that the proclaimed "internal circumcision" in the Spirit (Rom 2,29) which should lead us to freedom in Christ, has slowly become an intellectual subordination to the philosophical paradigm of Hellenism. Tangible consequences of this intellectual "circumcision" are a strong metaphysical and anthropological dualism, devaluation of sensitivity, the body and worldliness, the different forms of sexism and racism, and a latent theological determinism (among others).

¹⁶ The term "*indio*" or "Indian" can be used only with a clarifying note. As a result of an historical error (Columbus thought he had arrived in India), the term was an exogenous determination for the autochthonous population of *Abya Yala* and very soon became a pejorative and racist expression. A person who is called "*indio*" by the others, would never call himself or herself this, but, in the Quechua area for example, as *runa* (human being). Regrettably, there is no common and useful name which would be neutral (such as "indigenous, autochthonous, native person"). Concerning this problematic see Estermann 1998, 53-56.

priests if they manage to make the principal schemes of the Hellenistic-occidental thinking their own.

This *forced* "Hellenistic circumcision" which takes place within a centralised and authoritarian institution like the Catholic Church, is also accepted *voluntarily* by most "profane" educational institutions like secondary schools, professional institutes and universities. When I was reviewing the textbooks for teaching philosophy on the high school level in the Andean area, I was astonished to discover that the Latin American context was absolutely non-existent. If there is mention – in the most progressive case – of one or another Latin American author, he or she has merely been inserted as a representative of a European or North American philosophical current; that is to say, they are considered to be the outstretched arm of occidental thinking. To consider the foreign and "ectopic" as one's own and authentic, is an expression of a very deep cultural alienation.

The situation at most universities is not substantially different from this panorama. Although it is true that there is more stress on the thinking originated in Latin America, many texts of the history of Latin American philosophy, for instance, still begin the philosophical development on the continent with Fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz' book *Recognitio Summularum*, published in 1554 in Mexico.¹⁷ Concerning philosophy, *Abya Yala* is considered virgin soil or a *tabula rasa* vis-à-vis philosophy which was introduced as part of European civilisation. For the majority of philosophers at the universities in Latin America, talking about a pre-Columbian philosophical tradition turns out to be a *contradictio in terminis*, and mentioning contemporary indigenous philosophies (Andean, Mayan, Guaraní etc.) an antiquated romanticism.

3. The irruption of the indigenous

The "Toledo phenomenon" in Peru – with all its ambiguities – is neither an isolated fact, nor an accident, but the political expression of an evolution in the very heart of many Latin American nations that has barely been perceived. One has only to recall the uprising in Chiapas as an indigenous reaction to the neoliberal project of NAFTA (Free Trade Agreement) be-

¹⁷ This work is the oldest philosophical treatise written and edited in Latin America, but it reflects by no means the context of the continent; instead it simply continues the tradition of renaissance Spanish scholastics which had arrived just some decades before in the New World. Cf. Bernabé 1984, 29-38.

tween Canada, United States and Mexico, the different waves of indigenous protest in Ecuador, or the continuing struggle of the coca peasants in Bolivia. After the "irruption of the poor" in the 1970s and 1980s – which took form in numerous popular and grassroots organisations and which has been expressed intellectually in liberation theologies and philosophies –, and the "irruption of women" in the contextual theologies and philosophies since the 1980s, we are now observing an "irruption of indigenous peoples" in the spheres of public life.¹⁸

Trying to liberate itself from a latent or even open eurocentrism and anatopism, Latin American philosophy relied in a first moment on so called "cultural mixing" (*mestizaje cultural*)¹⁹ as a very specific characteristic of a supposedly Latin American identity. But this concept turned out to be quite ambiguous and conflictive, and can be applied only to one part of the population in Latin America, in some regions only to a minority. Something similar – in cultural and ethnic terms – has happened with liberation theology. The theological subject has been defined in a first phase almost exclusively in terms of economic poverty, as the lower social class ("the poor"), independent of characteristics related to ethnicity, gender, language and religion. In reality, the implicit cultural background (of the theological subject) has been the very same "cultural *mestizaje*" which had become the godfather for an incipient "authentic" Latin American philosophy.²⁰

¹⁸ The different "irruptions" are reflected, for example, in the evolution of EATWOT (Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians). The theological encounter in 1981 in New Delhi had as its title "Irruption of the Third World. Challenge to Theology". Already at that meeting (General Assembly), but above all with the foundation of the "Women's Commission" of EATWOT in 1983, the voice of women theologians – and with them the question of "gender" – came to be heard more and more strongly. Mercy Amba Oduyoye speaks in this context of an "irruption within the irruption" (Oduyoye 1983, 220). In the General Assembly of 2001 in Quito, the final statement spoke explicitly of the "irruption of indigenous peoples" and the challenge of "indigenous theologies".

¹⁹ Cf. Benedetti 1967; Zea 1985; Miró Quesada 1985.

²⁰ This does not mean that the questions of sexism and racism were not taken into account by the liberation theology of the first decades. But they were not yet considered as a proper *locus theologicus* for theological production. In recent times, there have been some proposals to include a theology of religions in a truly intercultural Liberation Theology in Latin America, taking into consideration that there is a religious pluralism on the continent which has not been included in the first phase of Liberation Theology. Cf. Knitter 1987.

With the "rediscovering" or "irruption" of the indigenous²¹ as a challenge for theology as well as for philosophy in Latin America, the panorama begins to change radically, even on the methodological level. The native population of *Abya Yala* makes its voice heard and refuses to be celebrated as "discovered" 500 years ago. The general concept of "cultural *mestizaje*" turns out to be more and more problematic, as the consciousness of the feminisation and indigenisation of poverty, and of cultural and religious diversity, increase.²² Many Latin American intellectuals thought that it was possible to take up and tackle the challenge of postmodernism and globalisation by defending some kind of cultural pluralism emancipated from the old occidental monoculturalism, without realising the danger that a globalised postmodernism or a post-modern globalisation could be nothing more than a very subtle recreation of the former occidentalcentrism.²³

Only the irruption of the "other" (and not his/her "discovery") in the forms of protests, resistance and acts of civil disobedience showed that the indigenous discourse could neither be easily incorporated into (nor absorbed by) the "grand narrative" of post-modern aesthetic cultural pluralism, nor into the authentic "*mestizo*" philosophies of the continent (which notwithstanding are still very Europeanising). This irruption not only questions the dominant Westernised culture of academic theologies and philosophies, but even more radically the very conceptions of what "theology" and "philosophy" are.

²¹ As landmarks, we can mention the resistance of the population of *Abya Yala* to participate in the celebration of the Quincentennial of the so called "discovery" of America by Columbus (1992), the International Year of Indigenous Peoples declared by the United Nations, the Nobel Prize for Peace awarded to Rigoberta Menchú Tum, the Zapatist uprising in Chiapas-Mexico, and the indigenous movement with its political repercussion in Ecuador. In the field of theology, we can mention the continental meetings and workshops of Indigenous Theologies (*Teologías Indias*) in 1989 in Mexico, 1993 in Panamá, 1997 in Cochabamba and 2002 in Asunción (planned).

²² In the 1980s, the classical paradigm of social classes and reference to the poverty to a certain class has been corrected, in the sense that parameters of gender and race have to be included in the analysis of poverty and social discrimination. As a consequence, people became more aware of the fact that women and persons of dark skin are significantly more victimized by poverty and exclusion. This is called a process of "feminisation" and "indigenisation" of poverty.

²³ Concerning the Euro- or Hellenocentrism of postmodernism see: Estermann 1998, 23-29. On the critical debate about postmodernism from a Latin American perspective see: Betancur 1998; Sánchez 1998; Barrera 1998; Robles 1998; Galeano 1998. The debate between Liberation Theology and (Euro-American) postmodernism seems particularly interesting; on this see: de Schrijver 1998; Widl 1998.

This means that in the very definition of what is and ought to be "philosophy", there is already an element of domination and exclusion. In its extreme form, it leads to the consequence that any form of non-occidental thinking (with the possible exception of Indian and Chinese philosophies) is supposed to lack the necessary criteria to be a philosophical expression of humankind. Until now, for many philosophers – men and women – in different cultural and geographical contexts, the notion of "Western philosophy" is still considered a tautology, and "non-occidental philosophy" therefore a *non datur*.

Some of the theoreticians of the *Conquista* legitimised the conqueror's domination of the indigenous people by relying on their definition of what is to be considered "human". As those wrongly called "*indios*" could not meet some of the essential requirements of such a definition, they fell outside the category of humanity and could be treated without religious or ethical scruples as "soulless animals".²⁴ A very similar ideological strategy can be noticed among the defenders of patriarchy and different forms of racism: The others do not meet the self determined criteria of "culture", "rationality" or "universality" of the human, and are therefore inferior.

Although the consequences of such a philosophical syllogism no longer lead to physical extinction, forced slavery or formal exclusion from human rights, the strategies of academic philosophy against the irruption of the indigenous into philosophical thinking do not differ in principle from the arguments of the first conquerors. Intercultural philosophy, which defends methodologically an ex-centric or poly-centric position,²⁵ questions any intent to define "philosophy" from one determined tradition as ideology. But what is "philosophy" is not analytically (or *a priori*) given, but takes

²⁴ Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1489/90-1573) in particular defended – on the base of a Christian Aristotelism – the natural inequality of human beings and particularly the inferiority of the "*indios*". Consult, above all, Sepúlveda 1984, 34ff.

²⁵ This does not mean that Intercultural Philosophy takes a position above the particular cultural contexts (supraculturality), nor that it is located in the cultural vacuum between the cultures. Intercultural Philosophy is also contextual insofar as it poses the manifold relations and transformations between different traditions of human wisdom from points of view which methodologically change (*Perspektivenwechsel*). The "excentricity" means that the problem of cultural centrism is explicitly formulated and that the preferential optics and option is not from the "centre", but from the philosophical peripheries. The "polycentricity" means that Intercultural Philosophy only achieves its purpose insofar as it is involved and engaged in a multiple and permanent dialogue between persons of very different cultural contexts.

shape synthetically through an intercultural dialogue²⁶ and exchange. For this reason, the criticism of indigenous thinking expressed by (Westernised) academic philosophy has to be eclipsed by a meta-criticism from the intercultural point of view.²⁷

As in many other similar contexts, the situation of philosophy in Latin America reflects certain relations of power and domination. The academic philosophy produced by a minority of specialists in what the West defines as "philosophy" serves (conscious or unconsciously) a national minority with economic and political power in launching a project of neoliberal globalisation which has predominantly Western cultural characteristics and values. Even the kind of philosophy taught and produced in the seminaries contributes to guaranteeing the cultural control of the West in the field of theology and religion, and therefore impedes a real inculturation of Christian faith – which is more than just a superficial (liturgical) acculturation. This "de-contextualisation" of philosophy and theology²⁸ is the very foundation for their anatomic character: We are dealing with a foreign system of ideas in a land (*ana-topos*), only seeming to reflect its social and cultural reality.

²⁶ The concept of "dialogue" could be understood in an Occidental way as a rational discourse between *logoi* but this would not conform to the intention of Intercultural Philosophy to overcome Occidental logocentrism. It is difficult to find a word which reflects this non-centric and open relation between different cultural traditions; the term "polylogue" which has been suggested by some scholars does not overcome the principal dilemma either. The Germanic equivalent "Zwiegespräch" ("gespräk", "talking") at least has no "logical" connotation.

²⁷ This meta-criticism is not grounded in a certain rationality or a determined philosophical culture, but intends to question any kind of philosophising which pretends to define itself as a norm for other ways of understanding reality. In this sense, the criticism of indigenous philosophy by some representatives of presumably "orthodox" Western philosophy turns out to be "ideology" in the sense of an Eurocentric conception of "philosophy". The methodological basis of such a meta-criticism is permanent and open intercultural dialogue.

²⁸ In the strict sense, there cannot be a thoroughly "de-contextualised" theology or philosophy. Any product of human culture comes out of a very particular context and can be recognized by the characteristics typical of this context. Western theology and philosophy often present themselves as "de-contextualised" or "universal", "absolute" and "supracultural", but are in fact as contextualised as the so called "contextual" theologies and philosophies. Every "de-contextualisation" is *de facto* a "re-contextualisation"; the anatomic situation means that the "re-contextualisation" has as its point of reference a foreign and abstract context, and not the proper one belonging to theological or philosophical subjects.

The resurrection of truly indigenous thinking is considered by a Westernised elite as a threat to their cultural domination and to the vague concept of "cultural *mestizaje*" which serves as an ideological base for a supposedly homogenous Latin American culture. With the upsurge of some totally dissonant voices, the *intra*-cultural Latin American debate is becoming more and more *inter*-cultural.²⁹ On the level of theology it can be observed that the *intra*-religious debate in Latin America – because of the upsurge of indigenous theologies – is becoming more and more *inter*-religious, something considered thus far as specific to Asia and parts of Africa. It is not by chance that the nervous attitude of the Roman "Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith" has as its main targets both indigenous theologies (*teologías indias*) in Latin America, and the new christologies in Asia; both question the Hellenocentric (and *a fortiori* Eurocentric) basis of official Catholic theology.

In the Andean area, the dominant ideas – as projected by the mass media – are almost always the ideas of a dominant culture, represented by a white and (partly) *mestizo* minority. The ideas of the (partly) *mestizo* and indigenous majority has no great impact on the cultural agenda of the principal mass media, except for folkloric, exotic and esoteric purposes. Although one gets the impression of cultural diversity and pluralism (according to the post-modern trend), the relations of power and domination have not really changed. I think they won't change either in Peru with a *cholo* President who assumes office at the Inca sanctuary of Machu Picchu and declares himself an "*indio*" and *Pachakutiq*, the Inca king who is said to have shaken the earth.³⁰ Not only the philosophical, political and social elite, but also many indigenous men and women have internalised dominant Western

²⁹ Until very recently, philosophical historiography in Latin America considered Ibero American philosophy as a monolithic bloc which had as its main ideological support the concept of "cultural mixing" (*mestizaje cultural*). Arguing from the "explosion of the philosophical plurality within Ibero American philosophy" (58) and the "polyphony in Ibero American philosophy" (57), Raúl Fornet-Betancourt calls for a radical change of the way of thinking, from *intra*-culturality to *inter*-culturality, in order to overcome a false Latin American monoculturality (Fornet-Betancourt 1994).

³⁰ The choreography and symbolism on the occasion of Toledo's takeover on July, 28 of 2001 in Machu Picchu contain many elements of the old indigenism: Cusco (or Qosqo) as the capital of the Tawantinsuyu (the ancient Inca empire); the Inca Pachakutiq as the emperor of national unity; Machu Picchu (the Inca city never found by the Spaniards) as a symbol for resistance against Westernisation. Toledo, however, refused to dress as a *cholo* (with *poncho* and *ch'ullu*), not to mention Fujimori's abuse of the symbolic value of these clothes.

ideas, denying their own cultural richness and dreaming instead of a destiny like that of Toledo who emerged from being an Indian shoeshine boy to become a Harvard economist.

4. Strategies of philosophical domination

The reactions of established academic Western philosophy³¹ to the resurrection of indigenous philosophies in different parts of the world have revealed its "will to power" more than its "love of wisdom".

The first strategy consists simply in the negation of "contextual philosophies", recurring to the supposed universality of (Western) philosophy. This conception takes philosophy as a supra-cultural essence, a certain number of truths which are supposed to transcend cultures, spaces and times (*philosophia perennis*). But this conception does not turn out to be totally free of cultural and contingent connotations, because it reflects a culturally determined model namely a Platonic-Aristotelian dualism – which has no reason to be universal.³² After all, a philosophy declared "universal" or even "absolute" (Hegel) by definition is in fact as contextual and culturally determined as any indigenous philosophy of *Abya Yala*.

In this (universalistic) argumentation, there is a strong ideological element: a certain conception of "philosophy" is universalised or absolutised in order to legitimate its explanatory power as the dominant paradigm. The plausibility of this *ideal* universal paradigm (ideal universality) gets stronger insofar as it imposes its *reality* on the whole world (transcultural universality). In this way, it disqualifies any attempt to interpret the world in a man-

³¹ Not only on the part of the representatives in Europe and North America (if they have taken note of the irruption of the indigenous), but also the "anatomic centres" in the non-Occidental countries. The awareness concerning the existence of indigenous philosophies in different parts of the world is still totally absent or at best just rising; in this sense, the most frequent "strategy" is simply to ignore the existence of such voices.

³² A paradigm which presupposes a metaphysical and epistemological dualism between the "essential" and "accidental", the "individual" and "universal", the "necessary" and "contingent", has recourse directly or indirectly to some kind of Platonic dualism between the "ideal" (noetical) and "real" (aisthetical) and projects in this way a conception which has been rooted in ancient Greece as an universal, meta-temporal and meta-spatial position. Nevertheless, it is very difficult for an Occidental mind to understand that non-dualistic and multi-polar rationalities which are not based on an Occidental bifurcation of reality can exist.

ner incompatible with the dominant paradigm, as "non-philosophical".³³ This dynamic can be observed not only in the relationship of Western thinking with non-Western cultures, but also in the historical attitude of the West toward its own autochthonous cultures, which have been called "barbarian". The occidental synthesis of Hellenistic philosophy and Semitic (Judeo-Christian) wisdom in the Middle Ages, for example, allowed for the imposition of this dominant paradigm in a hegemonic way on the different indigenous symbolic universes (Teutons, Celts, Normans etc.), to the extreme case of total extermination. When the Spanish Renaissance scholastics arrived with the *Conquista* in the New World, the same strategy was applied again, with a more or less similar outcome.

Another strategy consists of insisting on the cultural exclusivity of the West concerning the production of "philosophy". If philosophy is essentially (etymologically, genealogically and culturally) "Greek" (Heidegger)³⁴, then any type of "philosophy" either has to submit to the occidental definition of what is "philosophy" or does not take part in this elitist enterprise. This means that any philosophical position or thought which has been produced in non-occidental contexts is to be considered "philosophy" only insofar as it is "occidental" or at least "occidentalizable". Taking this to its ultimate consequences, the categories "philosophy" and "occidental philosophy" are supposed to be equivalent, so the notion "occidental philosophy" turns out to be a tautology as I already argued.

In this argument, philosophy is supposed to be an immutable mono-cultural phenomenon which has its origin in a "superior" culture (the Occidental

³³ The present process of globalisation is contributing substantially to the "transcultural universality" (which is a kind of globalisation) of Western philosophy. The Hegelian program in which that (Western) spirit would penetrate all spheres of reality and turn back to itself in total universality (which is the absolutisation of Western thought), has met an unexpected ally in the financial, economic and cultural imperialism of capitalist neoliberalism. I merely note that we are confronting "false" universality, because it is the generalization of a particular culture; (neoliberal) globalisation and (intercultural and synthetic) universality are not one and the same thing.

³⁴ We can read in Hegel's writings: "...Philosophy does not begin until arriving in the Greek world... Philosophy begins in Greece. True philosophy begins in the West. It is here where for the first time this freedom of natural consciousness appears and gives wings to the spirit..." (Hegel 1955, 92, 95). And Heidegger repeated: "The expression 'Western-European philosophy' is Greek in its essence –, Greek means here: philosophy is in the origin of its essence in such a way that before all it was Hellenism and only Hellenism which philosophy demanded in order to develop itself." (Heidegger, 1960, 16-17).

one) which is predestined to have a protagonistic and monopolistic role in the global diffusion of philosophical thinking. This conception goes faithfully hand in hand with all the positions that defend the supremacy of the West over other cultures and which presuppose that 'science', 'modernity' and 'rationality' (just to mention the most important ones) are exclusive children of the Western world. The philosophical anachronism existing in many non-Western areas has its basis in this conviction. A Peruvian or Nigerian philosopher, for example, feels himself or herself really a "philosopher" insofar as he or she thinks occidentally and meets the standards defined by academic philosophies in Europe and North America. All his or her effort is directed at imitating the Western philosophical prototype (mimetism), submitting to the "Hellenistic circumcision" as an academic rite of initiation and de-contextualising his or her proper philosophising.

It should be clear that according to this conception, there is no place for the Oriental "philosophies" (Indian and Chinese mainly), nor for the indigenous wisdom of Africa, Oceania, Asia or *Abya Yala*. As they don't have Western birth certificate, they cannot aspire to be recognised as real "philosophies".³⁵

This takes us to a third and more subtle strategy to marginalise indigenous forms of wisdom. One makes a methodological distinction between what is "philosophy" on the one hand, and all that is considered to be "thinking", "cosmology", "myth", "narration" or "wisdom". Since Hountondji's criticism of Placide Tempels' "*philosophie bantou*"³⁶, there has been ready and frequent recourse to the notion of "ethno-philosophy" in order to (dis-)qualify any type of non-occidental philosophical thinking. The very concept of "ethno-philosophy", embraced openly by postmodernism, is very ambiguous and methodologically questionable. For which specific reason, "Bantu philosophy" is considered "ethno-philosophy" but not, for example, "German philosophy"? Are there certain manifestations of the human spirit which do not carry any (cultural) characteristic or trace of its origin, in

³⁵ To paraphrase syllogistically Hegel's verdict: "True philosophy begins in the West" (see note 34); "indigenous philosophies by definition do not begin in the West"; *ergo* "indigenous philosophies are not true philosophy".

³⁶ Tempels 1945; Hountondji 1983. Hountondji's verdict on Tempels can be read in the original version as follows: "In fact, it is an ethnological work with philosophical pretensions, or more simply, if I may coin the word, a work of 'ethnophilosophy'" (Hountondji 1983, 34).

spite of the fact that they have originated in a determined culture (namely the Western one)?

It should be clear that such a Manichean distinction is supported by the monocultural self-definition of what is "philosophy" by the representatives of the Occidental tradition. Some indispensable parts of such a definition (which is always a kind of "domination")³⁷ are for instance the existence of philosophical texts and therefore of the literacy of a certain culture, the individual authorship of philosophical production, an analytic-synthetic rationality, an institutionalised organisation of knowledge and a technical terminology that is to be used. There is no doubt about the fact that most of human wisdom is excluded from the philosophical enterprise by these very criteria. In the case of the indigenous philosophies in the Andean region, the cultures have remained unwritten until very recently;³⁸ the individual does not have the same weight and value as in the West, and wisdom is transmitted in a "subterranean" way by oral traditions and a collective network of rituals and ceremonies.

One could object to this criticism using the argument that the above mentioned distinction does not intend to discriminate against any form of thinking and wisdom but, on the contrary, to grant them their own rightful place. This (postmodern) argument presupposes that there is an "equivalence" between the different forms of "thinking" (as a generic term), and that "philosophy" (in the Western understanding) is just one of numerous elements. According to this (postmodern) position, the various forms of human wisdom can only be distinguished one from the other by aesthetic criteria, like different styles of paintings in art. We find mythical thinking, indigenous cosmovisions, archaic narrations, scientific narratives, religious beliefs and philosophical currents. They are supposedly presented one beside the other as if they were merchandise displayed in a supermarket; personal or collec-

³⁷ The "de-finition", tries by its very nature to "enclose" the meaning of something in a canonical framework and to "domesticate" it by this way. Through "classificatory mania" (Panikkar), the West has tried to conquer the world intellectually since the time of Socrates. Definitions include or exclude, according to the criteria of those who define.

³⁸ There are some indications that the Inca culture was not totally unwritten, but had a very sophisticated and highly codified graphological system. For an illustration see Burns 1981. According to the author, the Incas were able to use different mnemotechnical systems of writing which are not necessarily alphabetical, but pictographical, hieroglyphical and symbolic. Concerning the question of the orality of African cultures and its implication for philosophy see Weidtmann 1998.

tive preference for one rather than the other is due exclusively to aesthetic reasons.³⁹

This (postmodern) argument does not take into account the relations of power and domination which exist *de facto* between concrete cultures, and even within a single culture. In the dominant logic of neoliberal globalisation, the quechua cosmovision for example does not have the same value, nor the same globalising power as Western science. In the multimedia and cybernetic game of the dominant paradigm on a world scale – which is a mixture of liberal capitalism, postmodernism and Occidental heritage⁴⁰ –, a "philosophical" academic expression has more weight than any category of Andean wisdom ever can. The real relations of power have allowed a Western philosophical concept such as "being" (*esse; on*) to be widely accepted as a *terminus technicus*, while simultaneously impeding an Andean philosophical concept like *pacha*⁴¹ from being incorporated into the philosophical canon.

Declaring the non-Western forms of philosophising mere "thinking", "ethno-philosophy", "myth" or "belief" is, in the concrete circumstances of the process of globalisation, neither innocent nor "value-free" (Weber), but rather another act of domination. To tell a certain people (ethnia) or a determined culture that they don't have "philosophy", but just "thinking", is an act of exclusion and is the same as declaring that they do not count in the logic of the dominant paradigm. Today, there is a kind of postmodern tolerance which masks the real relations of power, even in the philosophical world.⁴²

³⁹ On the postmodern conception of "philosophy" and its criticism by Intercultural Philosophy see Estermann 1998: 23-41.

⁴⁰ In the mainstream of what determines the preferences of people today, there are many factors of quite different origin and type: Individualism of Judeo-Christian origin, postmodern hedonism, the Protestant ethic, technomorphical determinism, worldly evolutionist eschatology, non-pathetic ecological indifference and an attitude of the *fast and light* type.

⁴¹ Quechua has only one word for "time" and "space": *pacha*. This word refers in the first place to the "space of life" which is the earth and the globe, but also to time as present (there is no specific form for the future). So *pacha* means the "here-and-now", the spatio-temporal category of life. For the universe as a whole, the expression *teqsimuyu* ("round world"), or respectively *tukuy pacha* ("complete space") is used.

⁴² The postmodern current has disqualified as an ideological "meta-narrative" any philosophical intent to raise the question of 'power', 'domination', 'ideology' and 'interest'; that is, any ethical and political questions. Philosophy thus remains limited to merely describing – free of any value judgement – the sapiential mosaic of our planet.

5. An intercultural perspective

The difficulties which impede the indigenous traditions of the Andean area (and *mutatis mutandis* of other regions of the planet) from being heard and taken seriously by the dominant cultural current do not seem readily surmountable. Most of us know very well what is going on in Chiapas in Mexico. Some of us have also heard of the indigenous movement in Ecuador. But what on the political level already has some international public impact, is on the theological and philosophical level insufficiently taken into account of within its own context. Although it is true that the emergence of indigenous theologies (also called "indian theologies")⁴³ in *Abya Yala* has had some impact on Latin American liberation theology, it has been practically ignored by official academic theology. There are some attempts (by academic and ecclesiastic theologians and members of the Roman curia) to link such theologies to neo-pagan and animist tendencies – as happened in the "hot" days of liberation theology when it was denounced as "Marxist" – and via this strategy to degrade them in the eyes of so called "serious" theology.⁴⁴

With regard to philosophy, except in some small groups, the academic world has not yet taken notice of a pre-Columbian and even contemporary non-Western philosophy in Latin America. In the universities and seminaries of Latin America, the history of philosophy normally starts with Spanish scholasticism brought from Europe to the continent. Not the slightest mention is made of the rich pre-Columbian tradition of Inca, Nahua or Maya philosophies. If a course on "Latin American philosophy" is ever offered, it generally deals with philosophy made *in* Latin America, but not with an authentic Latin American philosophy. The curriculum in most departments in Latin America is simply a copy of the European classical model.

⁴³ The indigenous theologies in Latin America can be divided into those currents which take the Christian elements as genuine indigenised contributions (*teología india*) on the one hand, and those which try to reconstruct a non-Christian or pre-Christian indigenous theology (*teología india india*), on the other. See López 2000; Steffens 2001.

⁴⁴ The 4th "Encounter-workshop on *Indio* theology", scheduled to be held in Asunción in November 2001, had to be postponed because of the obstacles the Catholic Church has put in the way. CELAM (the Latin American Bishops' Conference) did not approve the proposals, so the organizers could not apply for funds vis-à-vis international agencies. It seems that after some lobbying, the CELAM officials did, however, reconsider their former decision; the event can probably take place in May, 2002.

The truly contextual contemporary currents of liberation philosophy – of either Marxist or more indigenised orientation – have resonance only among a very limited number of scholars.⁴⁵ Even more dramatic is the situation of the different indigenous traditions. In the Andean area, the academic worlds of Bogotá, Quito, Lima or La Paz do not even take note of the existence of such philosophies. And if by chance it happens, they are marginalised by means of the before-mentioned strategies. Within institutionalised academic philosophy, indigenous philosophies have practically no place; their subjects work and move mainly in non-academic circles (centres, NGOs, institutes, churches).

The optic of intercultural philosophy allows us to take a different position toward indigenous philosophies. In the first place, it is conscious of the relations of domination and power existing in the organisation of philosophical knowledge, such as it is played out currently in the academic world. The established scientific standards, the applied methodology, the existent curricula, the technical terminology, the textual body, the normative rationality and the individual identity of the philosophising subjects are all very determinate cultural presuppositions which cannot automatically be universalised.⁴⁶ The indigenous philosophies make use of other sources (oral tradition, rituals, collective subconsciousness, arts, symbolic organisation, etc.), have a non-rationalist rationality, use a narrative methodology and a

⁴⁵ Within Latin American liberation philosophy, one can distinguish four currents:

1. Philosophy of ontological tendency, cultivated by thinkers like Rodolfo Kusch, Marion Carlos Casalla and Amedia Podetti.
2. Analectic philosophy which has been represented originally by Juan Carlos Scanzone, Enrique Dussel and Oswaldo Ardiles.
3. Historicist philosophy sustained by Arturo Andrés Roig and Leopoldo Zea (after 1968).
4. A current which problematises philosophy as such, with thinkers like José Severino Croatto, Manuel Ignacio Santos and Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg.

As a fifth current, we could mention the very fresh attempts to elaborate contextual indigenous (Maya, Kuna, Quechua, Guaraní, Aymara) and Afro-American philosophies. I consider my work, mentioned earlier, as a contribution to this challenge (Estermann 1998).

⁴⁶ One of the critiques made by intercultural philosophy addresses the monocultural character of Western philosophy and its methodological and hermeneutical presuppositions. It does not deny the "universability" of philosophy, but takes it as a heuristic point of searching through intercultural dialogue and a synthetic process of inter-transculturation, not as a supra-cultural essence that is analytically given and accessible to only one cultural tradition.

symbolic language, construct their own terminology and organize themselves in a collective and communitarian way.

On the other hand, intercultural philosophy promotes intercultural dialogue between the (Latin Americanised) occidental tradition of Iberoamerica and the indigenous traditions of *Abya Yala*. In this dialogue, there should not be one normative position to judge the other position, nor a third "intermediate" position (*tertium mediationis*), because such a supra-cultural position is simply impossible.⁴⁷ Either of the partners can be questioned by the other, not in order to demonstrate mutual incompatibility, but rather to clarify the positions involved and the cultural presuppositions of both sides. Nor does this intercultural dialogue have as its objective to achieve a synthesis of the two paradigms. In many aspects, Andean philosophy and the dominant Western tradition do turn out to be incompatible.⁴⁸ What really should be achieved is mutual respect for the different human modes of representing the world and having an integral cosmovision.

We should not underestimate the problems involved in this kind of dialogue, however. Even when the attitude of degradation, negation and superiority – still common among the representatives of Western academic philosophy in Europe as well as in Latin America – is overcome, the problem remains how a dialogue between *de facto* unequals can take place in a *de iure* equal (or egalitarian) form. In this dialogue, the indigenous philosophies are from the very beginning in a position of disadvantage, because of a series of reasons: There are no well-defined subjects as in the case of Western philosophy (professors, teachers); there are practically no elaborated texts as a base for the dialogue; the (Western or Westernised) partners don't have sufficient knowledge of the native language (quechua, aymara, guaraní); there is no canonical philosophical terminology; and the indigenous philosophies do not practise the academically accepted rules of the "linguistic game". In other words, it is as if a group of university professors from San Marcos University in Lima were seated at a table with a delega-

⁴⁷ This is the crucial point that distinguishes intercultural philosophy from any kind of "comparative philosophy". Comparison always presupposes a prior (non-articulated) perspective from which it looks for similarities and differences. Intercultural philosophy rejects decisively the possibility of a *tertium mediationis*, because such a point of view coincides in fact with a supposedly superior or meta-cultural position, *de facto* culturally determined (namely the Western one).

⁴⁸ As representative examples, I mention the following crucial Andean conceptions: Cyclical understanding of time, symbolic representation of the universe, the principle of complementarity, relationality as non-substantiality, panzoism and non-duality.

tion of peasants, *paqos*⁴⁹, healers and wise men of the Peruvian altiplano and who speak only Quechua.

One specific problem in intercultural philosophical dialogue consists in the "translation" of concepts rather than terms or words. Raimon Panikkar has proposed a methodology which implies a diatopic hermeneutics, a process of mutual interpretation on the base of the connotations of certain concepts in the original context (*topos*) and their function within it. If we take, for example, the Western concept of "being" (*esse*) and the Andean concept of "*pacha*", these are not simply concepts which can be replaced one by the other, nor interchangeable translations, but "homeomorphic equivalents"⁵⁰. Among the many meanings of *esse* in occidental philosophy, its function as a *transcedentale* is very prominent, and therefore its opposition to particular beings (*entia*). *Pacha* has, in the Andean context, both spatial and temporal meaning, but by no means any function of abstraction or dualisation. Its *topos* (specific place and function) in Andean philosophy does not coincide with the *topos* which *esse* occupies in the Western *weltanschauung*.

Such a "diatopic hermeneutics" is much more complex than a simple translation of an expression, for which no equivalent exists in another language. As the "concept" is principally an occidental "creation" (by the Platonic Socrates), it is quite problematic to attempt to understand the most important categories of non-occidental philosophies via conceptualisation. On the other hand, a minimum of intercultural understanding is impossible without some conceptual and rational effort.⁵¹ A serious intercultural dialogue contributes to a demystification of established concepts, in the sense of their cultural (re-)contextualisation and reconstruction.

⁴⁹ The indigenous wise men of the quechua community who have functions as priests, healers, sages and spiritual leaders.

⁵⁰ Panikkar 1996, specially 17-19. "It is neither a conceptual nor a functional equivalent, but rather an analogy of a third level. One does not look for the same function (which has philosophy), but that function which is equivalent to the one the original notion had in the correspondent cosmovision" (18). Concerning the concept of "diatopic hermeneutics", see: Panikkar 1997, 46.

⁵¹ It is worth mentioning that the effective history of the terminology related to "concept" reveals a very important change: In the very radical of the word, there is an quite organic and even passive connotation (*concipere* as *concebir* [to get pregnant]; this means in German literally "to receive"); through the centuries, a metamorphosis takes place, with the result that the terminology has become in some languages even an aggressive, demiurgic and mechanical meaning (*be-greifen*; *Begriff*).

6. From *anatopia* to *polytopia*

In concluding, I'd like to return to the anecdote mentioned at the beginning in order to project the ideas set forth into a utopian future. In spite of being indigenous and a son of Quechua-speaking parents, Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo is apparently unable to speak Quechua or any other Peruvian native tongue. As a Harvard alumnus, he can of course express himself perfectly in English. His wife Eliane Karp, of Belgian nationality and Polish origin, seems to speak Quechua perfectly and as an anthropologist she knows the Andean cosmovision and its symbolism very well.

Toledo's is the normal case: Indigenous intellectuals are quite familiar with the Western "cosmovision", even to the extreme that they forget (or suppress) the symbolic universe of their origin. The knowledge of the dominant culture is the key to get oneself a dominant position as well. Toledo has demonstrated that one can achieve it, in spite of a dark complexion, but at the cost of "Occidental circumcision". The opposite happens very rarely and is quite atypical: white or *mestizo* intellectuals insert themselves into the indigenous world, learn the indigenous language and familiarize themselves with the Andean cosmovision. Regretfully, the overwhelming majority of these exceptions are foreigners who can afford the luxury of dedicating themselves to a dominated culture without being dominated themselves.

The majority of national intellectuals – Peruvians, Ecuadorians, Bolivians, Colombians – prefer *anatopia*, an exile in their own country, either through ignorance or simply because of professional aspirations. Very few identify themselves voluntarily with a dominated culture and philosophy (a kind of "option for the poor").⁵² Nonetheless, the number of diatopic identities and biographies is increasing every day, that is, women and men who move in two (or even more) different symbolic universes (bicultural identities).

In order to represent a multinational and multi-ethnic country like Peru, neither Toledo's nor Karp's formula would be able to unite all of its aspects. For a multiethnic country, it is necessary to construct a polytopic identity

⁵² Although the "(preferential) option for the poor" is in the first place a theological and pastoral position, it can be conceived as well as an hermeneutic principle for the social sciences and philosophy. In this sense, it has to be interpreted as a certain optic or perspective from which philosophical elaboration begins and develops. The "philosophical option for the poor" leads to ex-centricity and a decisive distantiation from occidental monoculturalism.

(*polytopia*), represented by a network (federation) of particular cultural identities, linked to one another by a manifold and creative, open and free dialogue (or polylogue). Such an identity belongs already to the realm of *utopia*, which could put an end to sort of intellectual and cultural anapitism.

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Fernando Aínsa

9. The destiny of Latin American utopia as interculturalism and hybridization

The incessant, single-minded critique of globalization, almost exclusively focussing on its financial and economic aspects, has left aside a number of aspects relating to the historical process of the globalization of culture and civilization which began with the modern period. Numerous *isms* converged during this immense process over the course of the centuries, and there occurred an intermingling of the universalist aspirations of Christian religion and civilisation, an internationalism of which the "socialist international" was perhaps the most striking example, and a political and humanistic "worldism" which led to the universal proclamation of human rights and to the creation of international bodies, non-Governmental organizations and different sorts of networks of solidarity.

The recovery of the positive aspects of this world-wide dimension of politics, of social and ecological problems and of what Leonard Boff called "planetary ethics" could represent one of the most effective ways of confronting, on its own ground, the global ideology imposed by the neo-liberal dictatorship of the market. A recovery that should also serve to distinguish between financial-economic globalization and the accelerated "techno-tronic" transformation interconnecting information and communication networks in real time, with which it tends to be confused.

This paper is based on the conviction that the current, polarized debate centred around globalism can only be resolved through the creation of strategies and alternatives that take into consideration the integrating, internationalist and universalist impulse consistently present in the history of the western world and in which Latin America has historically played a fundamental role. "If the 16th century of Iberian expansion were better known, it would prevent our considering globalization as a recent and hitherto unknown situation," Serge Gruzinski points out in *El pensamiento mestizo*¹, recalling how the shock of conquest and colonization was followed by the emergence in America of a new multicultural and hybrid reality and the

¹ Serge Gruzinski, *El pensamiento mestizo*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2000.

commencement of a reflection on the nature of "otherness" which marked the origin of today's international law.

A new American reality that – we might add – was also present at the origin of utopian thought. Alternative proposals, the subversive imagination, other possible ways of organizing reality emerged from this primary, traumatic experience. Reconsidering them and assimilating the lessons they have to teach may now become a fascinating undertaking, at a moment when it is essential to escape from the dead end that the debate on globalization has come to. It is a question of contributing to the formulation of proposals that "are christened with a name that declares what one believes in: that another world is possible."²

It is with this orientation that the present essay has been written.

The globalization of the spirit

We should perhaps begin by recalling that the word "global" is derived from the Latin *globus*, a term that served, in military language, to designate the circular formation in which the Roman legion was deployed when surrounded by the enemy. The Emperor Caracalla adopted the form of the *globus* as a symbol of the Roman Empire. Taken up again by the Visigothic kings, the Christian princes added a cross to it, forming the image of the sphere crowned by a cross which appears in religious imagery of subsequent centuries, particularly in the hand of the child Jesus. The first globe known as a representation of the earth returned, in the 15th century, to the idea of Christian universality, the identification of globalism with spaciousness and with the incarnation of the power that Philip II boasted of when he claimed that the sun never set on his empire.

An analysis of modern globalization should be seen in this perspective, perceived at the same time as both a break and a continuation of the expansion initiated in the 16th century, when humanity became aware of the existence of a New World, an awareness and reflection to be found, by no coincidence, in the *Utopia* of Thomas More, published in 1516. A utopia made up of recognition of the other and of a proposal of otherness, in which the nostalgia for the unity of the world before the Tower of Babel in

² José Vidal Beneyto, "Otro mundo es posible", *El País*, Madrid, 12 April, 2001. See also Vidal Beneyto, "Los nuevos actores de la no violencia", *El País*, Madrid, 10 March, 2001.

the Bible story and Plato's vision of a universally valid Republic serve as justification and explanation of the utopias that were to appear from then on. At that time the signs of modernity of which the Western World was the standard bearer were being rejected. The closing of borders and the autarkic isolation of 18th century Japan was one of the most evident examples, as were the Indo-Christian, utopian proposals in America of Bartolomé de las Casas in Verapaz, of Bishop Vasco de Quiroga in Michoacán and of the Jesuit missions in Paraguay. Models of alternative societies emerging on the periphery of an empire, they challenged the forces in power and their centralist ideology.

That globalization, though initially one of commerce, was also one of culture (Do we not speak of world literature when we are basically referring to European classics?) and of the Christian religion, which had been debating the "controversy concerning universals" since the Middle Ages. The humanistic values of Western culture included in this category of universals were not left behind during this expansion. In spite of those bellicose nationalisms that have opposed its spread, radical expressions of which still exist, this discourse went on to win more and more of the geographical territory which it still controls even now.

America, since its "discovery", has been a field for experiment in this process, the important repercussions of which cannot be ignored today. The Spanish Empire, initially based in a self-sufficient, not to say autistic, territorial kingdom, was forced to give way to a universal vision founded on the temporal and spiritual unity of the City of God of a world whose borders had expanded beyond the *ecumene*. Within this framework, Francisco de Vitoria and Grotius traced the first lines of an international law that was to go beyond the law of the nation-states. For Vitoria, this was a question of law for movement and immigration, a law of international commerce, a "natural order" which is the basis of relations of communication and mutual interdependence among nations. For Grotius, freedom of movement and the freedom of the seas (*Mare liberum*) give the world its truly "global" dimension. The same occurs with rivers and the laws which govern their navigation. In the period leading to the generation of the cosmopolitan spirit, the Age of Enlightenment went that much further, affirming that it is free exchange that creates values. The notion of individual freedom is complemented with the right to travel, communicate and market freely. Among the travellers, scientists, with their characteristic curiosity and universalizing attitude of mind, constructed the first networks of information and inter-

change of ideas through publications devoted to making a naturalistic inventory of the New World they were exploring.

Nor should it be forgotten that, beginning with the Age of Enlightenment there has been a kind of globalization based on a blind faith in the infinite progress of humanity, which has practically come down to our time. Bursting with enthusiasm, McLuhan still maintained at the moment of the Sputnik launching in 1957 an unqualified faith in progress, in which electricity was the network that brought together over great distances all parts into a single whole, a web that in its extension would allow for a decentralization of the benefits that it provided. "The diffusion of electricity does not centralize but rather decentralizes," he claimed, with total conviction.

The international bodies that took up Kant's philosophical proposition of "perpetual peace" initially proposed "globalism" as a movement in the direction of the unification of human societies. Known as *worldism*, the project of "the United States of the World" took form in the League of Nations that President Wilson, citing the legacy of Kant, promoted in the early 20th century.

The universalist ideal of universal reconciliation and the brotherhood of nations informs other utopian projects of worldwide integration that have marked the history of the expansion of the West: Condorcet and his proposal of a universal republic of the sciences; the positive reorganization of the world through Saint Simon's universal association of industrialists; and, more recently, organic thought in its biomorphic representation of the world as a vast organism in which all the parts function in solidarity with one another.

The "planetization" and the responsibility in "mass of Humanity" in that immanent "cosmic totality" that Teilhard de Chardin prophesied in his *Le Phénomène humain* made it possible to affirm that the world had become a theatre without an audience, in which everyone was an actor. This idea is repeated in Buckminster Fuller's metaphor of "spaceship earth". The earth is a planet free to meet its own destiny within the infinity of the universe, where all human beings are part of the crew and not just passengers. A planet that is "everyone's home".

The characteristics of the "second" globalization

In spite of these precedents, the economic and technological globalization of today has at this point still not generated political, social, cultural or

ethical change on the same worldwide scale. Nonetheless, although we cannot yet speak of a globalization of the spirit, there is a notion of the world which is clearly different from the concept of ideological globalism, all of which is evidence of the complex interdependence of the world today.

In fact, today's demographic, economic and technological problems are global by their very nature and can only be faced on the level of the entire planet. The great ecological questions of the environment – pollution, recycling, global warming, holes in the ozone layer, deforestation and the progressive disappearance of terrestrial and marine species – along with the scarcity and difficult administration of water and other non-renewable resources on the planet and the problems relating to the quality of urban and rural life, can only be dealt with from a global perspective. All of these form a part of our concerns about the fate of the planet and are the subjects of conferences, statements, statistics, charters and agreements which aspire to attain universal validity. Among these were the 1992 Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, now questioned by the US administration of President Bush.

Since the Chernobyl catastrophe showed, in the midst of the Cold War, how borders and walls built between countries with different political systems could be blown away by a wind charged with nuclear menace sweeping freely over Europe, the world is aware that we live on an overcrowded planet with limited natural resources and an environment that is more and more impoverished. To avoid catastrophe in the near future rules for coexistence must be established and spaces held in common must be protected: oceans, seas and coasts, the atmosphere, mountains, forests and jungles. This consciousness of the global nature of terrestrial phenomena and of the interdependence of the components of the biosphere have led to a growing transdisciplinary approach to fields of knowledge that were formerly compartmentalized in disciplines that were completely isolated from one another.

Out of the resulting hybridization of knowledge new disciplines have emerged, the common grounds of which do not meet with the approval of the retainers of compartmentalized knowledge. For thinkers like Edgar Morin it seems evident that economic globalization is being extended day by day to include what can be called a "second globalization", in this case of knowledge, the components of which are not just economic, but involve civilization, culture and citizenship, the immediate result of which should

be to centre, halt and reorient those oligopolistic and mercantilizing processes affecting all aspects of life today.

In the face of the diversity of the problems of the planet we should speak, in reality, not just of a process of economic globalization but of processes of globalization in the plural, with political (processes of integration and regionalization) and cultural expressions that have come to create a consciousness of common problems, such as those of the environment or overpopulation. Among others, there are problems relating to drug traffic, international crime (organized crime, networks of pederasts, prostitution, etc.), organizations for illegal immigration, and sects with transnational ramifications that have organized in the heart of world finance, using its most sophisticated technological resources.

Part of this plural globalization and the instruments that it announces is the renewed significance of human rights and the influence of a universalizing ethic that the first Declaration of Human Rights brought with it in the context of the French Revolution. The so-called "second generation" of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of which in 1946 provided the principles embodied in the first declaration with a legal instrument, has led to a sense of social sensibility and collective responsibility. A genuine awareness of world citizenship, including the claims for "the rights of peoples", has worked to complete the declaration of individual human rights and to forge a citizenship of the future that involves greater interdependence and solidarity, but should not, for that reason, be any less free.

In this context we find not only the moral outrage prompted by problems such as torture, disappearances, the genocide of peoples and ethnic and religious wars but also the efforts to internationalize processes for their repression and condemnation and to assure the effectiveness and application of these processes. The creation of the World Court, a body of worldwide scope established by 120 states in Rome in 1998, confirmed a growing sensibility that has been widely publicized in such event as Pinochet's arrest in London, the applications for extradition of war criminals of the Southern Cone made by Judge Baltasar Garzón and the trial now taking place against Milosevic. The world is changing – it is recognized – since human rights, which until now had a back seat in the process of globalization that is now taking place, has begun to take a leading role.

Utopia as alternative and break with the past

According to expectations, the 21st century will discover new structures coordinated and agreed upon on an international level for most of the world's problems. This means a redefining of the autarkic, isolationist vision of classical utopia which is virtually unimaginable today in the context of the internationalization of the political, economic and ecological problems of the world. The forecast is thus for a complex and essentially interdisciplinary area on which the future utopia will have to act, particularly in a region like Latin America whose culture is essentially hybrid and whose utopian tradition is unquestionable.³

It is in this direction – utopia as alternative and break with the past – which has been in great part that of the history of utopia in Latin America, that the proposals that we outline below can be expected to work, though first it will be necessary to emphasize that the differing paths of utopia, its varieties and variations, make it impossible to deal with its aspirations for a break with the past as variants of the same chimera. The invariable, immovable structure of utopia is no longer possible. Only the will to utopia remains unchanged, above and beyond the different models that give it shape. The utopias have their courses of action. The will to utopia supposes a capacity to detect the corrections that are necessary in a specific social order. It is not a question of "predicting" but rather of detecting. In terms of the reaction they produce, utopian projects are precarious and provisional, divergent and contradictory. The utopias act upon history as eruptive virtualities beneath a crust that is formed of a sediment of events, a latent subversion that stimulates and impels social reactions, utopian impulses that are the stuff of social change.

The utopia cannot be confined to a single type. In the experience of Latin America, it is the action of these utopian impulses that has marked its history, from the initial "encounter", discovery, conquest and colonization, down to our own time, through the thought of the Enlightenment and the winning of independence, so that any future utopia must take into account not only this historical legacy but also its experimental nature, intimately bound up with a political, social, artistic and literary evolution. More than

³ We have devoted a number of books and articles to this subject. Among the former we would point to Fernando Aínsa, *Necesidad de la utopía* (1990), *De la Edad de Oro a El Dorado* (1992), *Historia, utopía y ficción de la Ciudad de los Césares. Metamorfosis de un mito* (1992) and *La reconstrucción de la utopía* (1999-2000).

in any other region, utopia in Latin America has been and will be plurifunctional and interdependent, intercultural and hybrid.

This essentially mobilizing force that made utopia its horizon and the guide of Latin American historical praxis, the critical moment of the reality in power, capable of opening breaches in the established order, should serve not only to build alternative proposals to economic and financial globalization on the level of the region, but to be equally valid for the rest of the world.

But these ideas serve for nothing if they are not accompanied by a joint debate and reflection engaged in clarifying the path to be followed and formulating an adequate procedure to socialize ideas, build consensus and construct bridges between theoretical conceptions and specific actions.

The following cultural considerations are included within this perspective.

Intercultural dialogue and a plural opening-up to otherness

The great majority of the peoples of Latin America, like those of Africa and Asia, have their roots in cultures linked to particular geographic zones and to their own history, values and beliefs. For this reason, any conception of utopias that might be capable of organizing the complexity and globalization of the modern world, marking the ways to arrive at a sustainable future, cannot do without the cultural dimension of the specific and regional. At the same time, it is advisable to remember the great historical lesson of the 20th century. Cultural changes are far more complex and difficult than the policies proclaimed by triumphant revolutions have foreseen. In the initial enthusiasm of new political frameworks inaugurated with hope and expectation as part of the radical changes imposed by revolutionary governments, the fact that cultural transformations are intrinsically slow and complex has been ignored. Customs, habits, prejudices and traditions have practically paralyzed many changes legislated in a well-intentioned and absolute fashion.

The utopia, traditionally conceived as a political or social alternative, has neglected this necessary cultural dimension. Thus if the future utopia wishes to be possible, it should not force this reality excessively. At the most, it should "stretch it", should be the expression of a dissatisfaction that takes into account the rhythms of different social groups, their customs and beliefs. It cannot ignore the complex cultural realities threatened by eco-

conomic/financial globalization. In the final analysis, cultural changes are the only ones that can give permanence and consistency to political changes. This becomes even more important when, due to the disorientation occasioned by the destruction of an order that offered watchwords, points of reference, and simplified explanations for everything that happened, there are those who feel tempted to seek refuge in an idealized past or in closed and autarkic forms of thought. A legitimate Indigenism can thus be transformed into a kind of fundamentalism, with a simplistic discourse that is reductive, victimist and exclusive. Anti-ethnocentrism can lead to new forms of ethnocentrism – as Agnes Heller predicted – since favouring the differences of peripheral cultures falls into a "vindictive irrationalism in the opposite sense".

The search for and emphasis upon cultural diversity should neither imply a refusal to share global responsibility nor be synonymous with a closed, provincial spirit. This is obvious, because the modern world that is threatened by globalization was in the past neither more or less homogeneous or coherent than it is in the present. A similar process of contacts and influences has always occurred in every culture. Even the so-called "primitive cultures" which the apologists of the *cultural studies* promoted by the anthropology departments of United States universities present as pure archaic societies to be preserved at all cost, have important components of hybridization.

Everything seems to indicate that there will be more and more of these, so that the utopias of identity in which the discourse that questions the centrifugal logic of globalization takes refuge should open up to interculturalism, to the possible multiple allegiances of an identity that has lost part of its territorial points of reference. If the time of monolithic, unique and untransferable identities has given way to pluralism and to the varied intercultural expressions contemporary life offers us, similar paths must be opened up for utopian thought. In a world that, although it attempts to be freer, faces growing inequalities, this perspective is fundamental.

The dilemma is not an easy one, because the globalization process tends to oppose the exaltation of local identity, ethnic or linguistic nationalisms that demand borders that overflow the limits of states and religious or political fundamentalist concepts. Involved in these affirmations of local and community identity are the demands, often radical and sometimes violent, of collective identities that refuse to passively resign themselves to the process that is taking place. Taking part in this opposition are those who advo-

cate the preservation of the cultural diversity of indigenous peoples and communities in closed, airtight compartments away from all contact with outside influences, like archaic, exotic relics of a lost paradise. This perspective insists on peculiarities and differences, in detriment to the things that link each culture with other groups, both near and far away, and favours the rhetoric of otherness and multiculturalism which defends the co-existence of separate groups resolutely turned toward the past, who must be protected from meeting with others. Faced with these suppositions, we must be on guard against the risk of making fetishes of words like identity or culture, which tend to be turned into absolute categories, and must rather support the continuous and irreversible movement of cultural contacts and associations in which each new addition constitutes "a stage with no return" that "makes regression to origins impossible".

Thus there exists a risk. Some utopian projects that began as constructive and revolutionary forces have become conservative, limited to preserving diminished spheres of private happiness or proclaiming their isolation. The utopian task that many of the initially great projects have ended up with is dedicated to strategies of care, recovery and protection. This is evident in the conservatism of some environmentalists, in the Indigenism of many anthropologists and in the parcelling of cultural "differences". Nonetheless, there are many signs that, posed against interventionism and hymns of praise to the cultural purity of the "origins", America has to its credit several centuries of manifestations of multiculturalism that are integrated, not asymmetric, but integrated in the end, within a cultural framework made up of diversity. In Latin American thought there is a tradition of pluralism that has not only enriched it but that also makes it possible to imagine, in the syntheses that it has been and is capable of, the possibility of creating something that is its own and that would prevent a relapse into the atavism of the past. On the other hand, Latin America has been – beyond its specific problems – receptive to all sorts of intercultural relations. Its peoples, like its ideas, have been more open to the "other" than regions of the world dominated by closed civilisations. It is not a bad idea to emphasise this, at a moment when the temptation to withdraw into oneself is something many people are aware of.

One point must be insisted upon: Latin America has been and is an open and receptive continent. It cannot be forgotten that nations with a colonial past have been the first to participate in a fundamental way in the expansion of different types of freedom and culture and the first to defend by

force the right to sovereignty and self-determination. American countries have been pioneers in the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity and in the affirmation of their plurality and their particular values, with non-western roots. This is their finest heritage, to be emphatically reclaimed today, when it appears most threatened.

If the universalist tropisms of particular cultures are evident, globalization produces at the same time a world that is fragmented by sectors of interest or affinities that communicate among themselves. The classic utopian discourse that, in its ideal conception of modernity, strove for the triumph of reason over the passions and the different "subjective" collective traditions, must today reconcile the universal values of reason with the passions, with differences and fragmentation and with cultural diversity. At the same time it must take into account the increasingly important role played by immigration and the multicultural centres created in great cities on a multi- and inter-cultural basis. Because it is precisely from the rejection both of absolute cultural uniformity and of the multiplication of different cultures that are ignorant of one another, that the constant battle is drawn between the centripetal and centrifugal forces that operate within Latin American society and between it and other societies. One can only really speak of cultural wealth and polyvalence and of cultural identity starting with these movements, the genuine diastole and systole of American thought.

In this simultaneous double movement of integration and fragmentation, opening and closing, that characterises the modern world, the utopia should have an imaginative commitment to diversity and cultural peculiarities without failing at the same time to open itself up to the perspectives of an interculturalism on a worldwide scale. Universalizing does not mean expanding what is one's own without engaging in dialogue with other traditions, Raúl Fonet-Betancourt reminds us. In his proposals in favour of a regionally and historically contextualised intercultural philosophy, it is a question of getting to know better and learning to share in the polyphony of the world's cultures so as to "be able to reorganise on the basis of plurality the old idea of a genuine *ecumene* among all peoples".⁴

In reality it is a question, in accordance with the ideal of José Martí, of "grafting the world onto particular trunks", thus breaking the circular dialectic of the conflict between the "universal" and the "specific". "The par-

⁴ Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, *Transformación intercultural de la filosofía*, Madrid, Desclée, 2001, p. 14.

ticular trunks of each culture," – he tells us in essence – "are specific universals. There are not particularities and universality but rather historic universalities."⁵ Each cultural trunk should thus function as a platform from which a way of seeing the world is organised in order both to express what is one's own and to learn how to contrast it with other perceptions and ways of seeing. For this purpose it should put aside any "monocultural definition" and be prepared for a "learning to rethink" critically and from the point of view of the polyphony of American diversity. It is a matter, in short, of creating and multiplying the utopian zones of mediation and hybridization.

Creating utopian zones of mediation and hybridization

Beyond the initial excesses of any conquest, the inequalities and imbalance between conquerors and the conquered, the colonisation of America brought about innovative mixtures, unexpected adaptations and metamorphoses, thanks to which both players changed and created a polymorphic reality arising from new situations. Neither assimilated nor absorbed, but rather generators of hybrid cultures and forms of existence whose perpetuation and vitality depended on their own capacity to improvise in the midst of instability, there emerged a hybridization understood as an effort to re-compose a world that had shattered into fragments and at the same time as a local adaptation to the new frameworks imposed by the conquerors and by an initial relation of unmistakable domination characterised by disruption and imbalances. Both movements became inseparable. In spite of the "oppressed perspectives" that interpreted many of their expressions and of the universalism self-proclaimed by the Western world as part of the movement of extrapolation in which it subsumed the vanquished cultures, an inevitable intercultural dialogue began to emerge. This fascinating lesson of American history deserves to be recalled at a moment when the continent again faces the great challenges of globalism and its pretensions to domination.

It is evident that the term "mestizo" is charged with negative connotations. The hybrid is synonymous with impurity and the idea of the mestizo suggests promiscuity and contamination. Intellectual habit prefers monolithic sets to intermediate zones, those "areas of mediation" that colonization de-

⁵ Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, op.cit., p. 65.

veloped to transform two heritages, the Western and the Amerindian, into a new reality. The hybridization of people and cultures was initially rejected by both dominators and the dominated, "mutations" that – as Leopoldo Zea reminds us – were legitimised when they became the expression of Latin American identity.

The result of this first globalization was a culture that would exist in perpetual "unstable equilibrium" and where differing sensibilities were reconciled and processed. Multiple identities in continual mutation, of which the Caribbean region was to be a lavish expression, completed a rich panorama as varied as it was contradictory. The "copy" of styles, ideas and doctrines and their resulting American acculturation which from Mexico to Paraguay, through Peru and Bolivia, pervades almost all the areas of existence, was transformed into the original expression of American baroque. Paintings, frescos, sculpture, syncretic religious song and musical instruments of the polyphony of an entire continent that found its American expression following the shock of conquest, are the finest antecedent of a Latin America that on confronting the globalization of this new millennium, should take into account the extraordinary creative reaction that marked its traumatic entrance into Western modernity, in which the concept of utopia played a fundamental role.

The first American art following the conquest was based on copying of European models. Nonetheless, the reproduction done by the natives, although it seemed to be imitation, was a source of hybridization and invention. In the copy, there was deviation, modification or an incorporation of other elements of the culture being reproduced, leading to combinations, juxtapositions, amalgams, new and often unexpected encounters. The copy was never either faithful or exact. In the minor error it contained could be seen not only a difference but the characteristics, the seeds of what was to be the originality of the future. Contributing to this was the amazing American creativity, that imitative capacity of the natives to introduce subtle changes that new cultures would understand as something that could not simply be reduced to reproduction in defeat.

In all Latin America, without exception, the models were copied and freely interpreted, since there did not exist a genuine submission to the traditions, schools or criteria of Europe. Hence the proliferation of combinations and discoveries that characterized the variety of its cultures. In art there was a tremendously disordered, simultaneous mixture of Romanesque and Gothic

styles, of the neo-classical with the Hispano-Morisco, the Iberian with the Amerindian, leading to original expressions such as the American baroque. Something similar occurred in the world of ideas, in which aesthetic and literary fashions, like the different models of utopia, repeated the same pattern: the copy, the double, the reproduction and the imitation swiftly take on their own characteristics. In literature baroque and neo-classicism are blithely superimposed, followed by a romanticism with nationalistic overtones and the scientific pretensions typical of positivism. Fragments taken from beliefs cut off from their roots, from concepts deprived of their contexts and poorly assimilated, generate their own rich and originally American expressions. Fluctuations and insecurities that explain the complexity, diversity and emblematic syncretism in which this alternation of expansion and contraction takes shape.

Amerindian thought was capable of capturing everything that in European thought and sensibility tended toward the hybrid. From copies of clothing, musical instruments (vihuelas, flutes, harps, organs), pictorial and textile techniques, down to contemporary literature and including all types of artistic expression, particularly music, the history of Latin American culture is that of a continual, creative mixing, in which copies and influences are "cannibalized" with skill and ease. "I am a Tupi who strums a lute," wrote the poet Mario de Andrade to sum up this cheerful, Epicurean cannibalism that Brazil laid claim to as a movement and pronounced as an avant-garde aesthetic.

Mestizo creations thus acquired their own dynamic that freed them from the original intentions and aesthetic habits of their authors. The mixtures gave rise to obligations and virtualities, antagonisms and compatibilities that culminated in unexpected configurations. In the freedom of combination lay the source of innovation and creation. Thus there appeared technical inventions and stylistic discoveries that laid claim to the hybrid and extolled terms like mix, juxtapose, adapt, cross and merge, not to justify the transition from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous but rather to emphasise that any culture, even one that claims to be the purest of all, can be mixed, almost without limits.

While opposite elements of cultures in contact tend to mutually exclude, confront and oppose one another, they tend, at the same time, to interpenetrate, combine and identify with one another. This confrontation is what permitted the emergence of new cultural expressions in Latin American, arising out of the interpretation and combination of the opponents. This has

been the chief merit of that hybridization of which today's varied narrative literature has been one of the most successful and expressive results. As has been the magnificent utopian impulse that has produced multiple alternative projects under the slogan of one of the first American utopians, Alfonso de Valdés: "I would like to make a new world."

In view of the disturbingly pervasive pessimism that the overwhelming empire of today's globalism inspires, it is worthwhile to consider this unique and exclusive historical experience – that first brutal experience of globalization which was Spain's conquest and colonization of America – to project its fascinating result – the mestizo and the emergence of new cultures starting in the 16th century – into the present, imagining an intensified intercultural dialogue and new forms of hybridization. It is possible to retrace – as Serge Gruzinski does with a contagious optimism in *El pensamiento mestizo* – the signs of new types of hybridization and "corruptions" in the hybridization that is alive today in the artistic, literary and musical expressions in which many young people find themselves reflected and to connect it with the emblematic American universe of the 16th century. On cinema, television and computer screens, in literary genres with a renewed anthropological slant, in musical experimentation, in the reading of American roots in the plastic arts and in fields of knowledge that are more and more trans- and interdisciplinary, we are living a hybridization without limits because "the mestizo lands are immense and they invite us to new explorations (...) Hybridizations are never a panacea; they express combats which never have a winner and are always beginning again. But they offer the privilege of participating in various different worlds in a single life."⁶

An entire programme that Montaigne, one of the first Europeans to perceive the potential of the New World, summed up in the maxim: "A good man is a mixed man", a good intercultural mixture that seems to be the basis and support, from the Renaissance to today, of everything about our America. Among other things, this utopia, of varied and interwoven types, which has accompanied us down through history and which is now more necessary than ever.

⁶ Serge Gruzinski, op. cit., p 334.

Edward Demenchonok

10. Intercultural Dialogue and the Controversies of Globalization

Humanity enters into the new century under the banner of globalization. What we call "globalization" is a complex and controversial process of world-wide changes in economy, politics, and culture. There is a lot of confusion, misunderstanding, and ideological speculation around these processes. Globalization has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, among journalists and politicians, replacing the ideas of postindustrialism and postmodernism. The global and futuristic rhetoric ('globe talk') creates a euphoria about technologically determined economic growth as a panacea for all social problems, and the triumph of the Western model of development.

In contrast, the globalization phenomenon is criticized by many intellectuals both in the West and the Third World, including Latin America. They indicate that the globalization processes are not only positive, opening up new opportunities for communication and growth, but also negative, being accompanied by the homogenization of culture, aggravating ecological crisis, the widening gap between North and South, and the whole problem of underdevelopment in many regions of the World.

In the debate about the meanings of the term "globalization" there are efforts to avoid its ambiguity. The twofold process of globality as a fact of the emergence of the world society and the globalization as the constituencies of this process is distinguished from the globalism as its interpretation of the ideology of neoliberalism.¹

In this essay, I would like to analyze the impact of globalization on culture and the role of the interculturality as an alternative to the homogenizing effects of globalization. At the beginning, I will survey the current debate over the term "globalization." Two main trends of interpretation will be analyzed: one is an economy-centered technocratic version; the other revolves around culture. However, an adequate understanding of globaliza-

¹ See Beck, U. *Was ist Globalisierung?*, Frankfurt 1997; Amoroso, B. *Della globalizzazione*, Molifetta 1996; Robertson, R. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London 1992.

tion requires a multidimensional, integrated approach to its study, since it is a complex and controversial process of world-wide change in economy, politics, and culture. The phenomenon of *interculturality* will be analyzed. The second half of this essay will focus on controversies of globalization as viewed from the Latin American perspective. Subsequently, the contribution of the Latin American Philosophy to the North-South dialogue and to the development of intercultural philosophy will be examined. The analysis shows the important role of the interculturality as an alternative to the homogenizing effects of globalization.

THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

A Brave New World of Global Marketplace?

The concept of globalization is endorsed in international politics, economics, and cultural studies. The increasing flow of literature about globalization expresses a broad spectrum of views, approaches, and theoretical positions. The predominant tendency is the progressivist technocratic interpretation of globalization. This type of theoretical work on the topic is economy-centered and based on the thesis of rapid economic globalization. It describes globalization as primarily an economy driven process, secured by technology, which finally determines the political and cultural spheres of society.

The advocates of globalization assert that the global economy has emerged or is emerging, that it is dominated by transnational corporations, and that nation states, national economies, and cultures are dissolving. Richard Barnett and John Cavanagh see the "imperial corporation" taking supreme control over webs of planetary commercial activity, on which the new world economy rests: the Global Cultural Bazaar, the Global Shopping Mall, the Global Workplace, and the Global Financial Network. The newest of these global webs, the Global Cultural Bazaar, uses advanced communication technologies in the production and dissemination of mass culture ("global dreams"). For some regions globalization brings unprecedented prosperity, while others experience poverty. The homogenizing effects of the commercial "global machine" results in the devaluation of original cultures and the disappearance of traditional communities. For many people who have been uprooted from their land and traditions, globalization is a threat. The authors notice, as a reaction against corporate globalism, the counter-tendency towards localism in all its forms, the "deglobalization" of world

politics, and the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflicts (as evidenced in the Balkans) (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1993: 421).

The prognosis of a brave new world of global marketplace, heralded for example, in Kenichi Ohmae's bestseller *The End of the Nation State*, is perceived with skepticism by other more broad-minded researchers, who show that changes in the international economy are much more complex and ambiguous than the champions of corporate globalization imagine. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in their book *Globalization in Question*, critically analyze the processes of international economy and the evidence for and against the process of globalization and infer that "globalization, as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth" (Hirst and Thompson 4).

In recent publications regarding globalization, dissatisfaction is expressed with a merely economic analysis and there is a search for a more broader and comprehensive approach. John Wiseman argues in favor of "a more integrated approach, which illuminates the overall landscape of economic, social, cultural, environmental and political relationships" (Wiseman 15). The most disturbing aspect of globalization is the process of polarization between rich and poor nations and within advanced countries, between a privileged minority and growing marginal social groups. The author notes the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, of global warming and other problems, which increase fears of environmental catastrophe (16-17).

Developing Counties: The Losers in the Globalization Game?

The controversies of globalization are manifested in relations between the industrially developed and underdeveloped countries. Globalization is an uneven process, and its polarizing effect concentrates the disadvantages on the side of the underdeveloped South. Poor countries are more vulnerable and more affected by globalization. What from the Western perspective looks like a spread of techno-economic know-how from the "center" to the rest of the world leading to a global triumph of this "model," for the Third World countries resulted in an additional challenge complicating even more their economic and social-cultural situation. They are forced by the twister of globalization to be involved more and more into the processes which are out of their control. Economic policy and rules of the game are settled by "imperial corporations" and world financial centers, and the peripheral countries are disadvantaged in the global market competition. Contrary to the progressivist projects of accelerated development and integration into

the world economy, sponsored by state elites and technocrats, the gap between advanced and developing countries is widening, which creates additional problems. Summarizing their analysis of the impact of globalization on North-South relations, Hurrell and Woods write: "Existing inequalities make it more likely that globalization will lead to an increasingly sharp division between 'core' states, which share in the values and benefits of a global world economy and polity, and 'marginalized' states, some of which are already branded 'failed' states" (qtd. in Grugel and Hout 5).

The processes of globalization in economy, in financial network, and in production of mass culture and its dissemination through the mass media, challenge the nation state, undermining the national economy and the unity of cultural lifeworlds. Analyzing this trend, R. Barnett and J. Cavanagh conclude that it creates an escalating conflict between the forces of globalization and the "territorially-based forces of local resistance seeking to preserve and to redefine community" (Barnett and Cavanagh, 1993: 171).

This dramatic conflict is also detected and analyzed by other researchers. For example, the authors of a collective book, *Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State Strategies and Globalization*, examine the impact of globalization on developing countries. They argue that structured inequalities and historical patterns of subordination remain at the heart of North-South relations. Jean Grugel and Hout analyze emerging regionalism, for example the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in Latin America, as a defensive reaction of the states confronting the challenges of globalization. (Grugel and Hout 5-6).

Homogenization vs. Plurality of Cultures

There are theorists who see globalization as more than just a question of economy or politics and they point out the importance of culture. Roland Robertson indicates that globalization began with modernity and is driven by cultural or social imperatives. Malcolm Waters emphasizes the crucial role of the universalized culture in the globalization of economy and polity. He sees globalization as the culturalization of global symbolic exchanges or what he calls "global idealization" (*Globalization* 9).

Globalization involves the problem of the universal and its relation to the particular, different, and local.² The interpretation of this theme during the last decades was influenced by the trend towards homogenization and, as a reaction to it, the growing interest in personal identity, cultural originality, and racial and ethnic differences. An emphasis on individuality and cultural

specificity, and the necessity to protect them from the standardizing pressure of power structures and ideological manipulation overshadows the topic of universality.

In some interpretations, universality is sharply opposed to particularity. Examples of this are found in the works of Arjun Appadurai about cultural aspects of globalization. He develops the theory of "break," or dramatic changes in culture, caused during the last two decades by the electronic mass-media and mass migration (Appadurai 8). Appadurai points on the tension between cultural homogenization and heterogenization, and on the fragmentation and disjunctive "scapes" – mediascapes, ideoscapes, ethnoscapes, etc. Their relations at the global level are described in terms of "chaos theory." The author denies the unity of culture. He describes culture as contrast-centered and boundary maintaining, therefore ignoring the unifying role of culture as a source of values which are shared by people, thus consolidating them ethnically, socially, nationally, and internationally.

In contrast to the relativist negation of universality, there is a strong voice of those who claim the validity of universalistic concepts and their increasing importance for understanding of today's world and its humanization. The leitmotif of many publications is the idea of the world as a whole, increasing the growing involvement of individuals and societies in the globalization process, and consequently, the urgent need for "universal references." They allow for both particular and universal, focusing on their interrelation. Roland Robertson views contemporary development as a "two-fold process involving the interpretation of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism" (Robertson 10). Today's world represents diversity and unity. This twofold process is reflected in Robertson's analysis of recent cultural trends. The author shows that diversity, multiculturalism, and polyethnicity do not exclude forms of cultural unity, but rather change them. He indicates the tendency towards an "increasing global thematization of ethnicity-*within*-humankind" (104). An interaction among national societies resulted in the creation of a global culture.

Robertson addresses the epistemological problem of combining both uniqueness and wholeness, discontinuity and continuity. He develops a multifaceted model of the global whole, which involves an interaction within a "global field" of four axes: individual selves; national societies; the world system of societies; and humankind. The author insists that individuals are an important part of the globalization process (25). Indeed, the

human being is ultimately an actor of social-cultural creativity, and the human-centered approach in the understanding of globalization is heuristically fruitful. Robertson mentions problems of multiculturalism and gender among the factors which stimulated the search for fundamentals. An increasing number of individuals, interested in the questions of human existence, are forming movements concerned with "the meaning of the world as a whole." He analyzes the issue of fundamentals as a feature of globalization, and at the same time as an aspect of global culture.

The efforts of abovementioned authors to understand the globalization processes in a broad cultural perspective, is valuable. In such respect, it must be taken into consideration a special role of culture as the realm of human creativity and values which counterpoise the "instrumental rationality" of economy. Culture gives knowledge of both the means and the ultimate ends, and it establishes the human criteria of using techno-economic power for the best, not for the worst.

The Imperative of Dialogue

The processes of globalization make nations and people more interrelated and interdependent. They bring a new opportunities to share information and advantages of technology, economy, and education. At the same time, the ecological crisis, the thermonuclear weapon, and the underdevelopment of the Third World became the global problems, threatening the survival and future prosperity of humanity.

These global problems can be managed only before they reach a critical point (for instance, if the ecological system becomes unbalanced, it will be impossible to fix it). The aggravation of these problems can be prevented only by the joint efforts of all nations. What has been done until now has been too little and too late, mainly "lip service." There is a growing understanding of the nature and world wide danger of these problems, related to the vital interest of millions of people and even to survival of the human race. We are a part of the human race, interrelated and universally bound on planet Earth, and we will survive or perish together. Humanity needs to make a joint effort to find a solution for existing global problems. Dialogue is a way of communication and a means of searching for an agreement and for a solution to problems.

The historical tragedies of the past century show the vital necessity as well as the difficulty of dialogue, whether social, cultural, political, and international. Humanity has reached the point when, in its vital interests, it is nec-

essary to break a traditional pattern – a vicious circle of relations based on force and dominance, on "monological" authoritarian dictum and exploitation, and to break through towards a dialogue and partnership as equals. In summation, dialogue has become a vital necessity for humanity, an imperative for survival and for enhancing the quality of life. Today, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and dismantling of social, racial, and many other barriers to human communication, people discover a great advantage of dialogue and explore the many opportunities which it brings to all the participants – in economy, social development, and culture. This positive motivation for dialogue, related to human interests in life enhancement and prosperity, makes it more attractive to people. It is a driving force for the implementation of the idea of dialogue in social consciousness, and then into the practice of human interaction.

Humanity has just started to discovering a dialogical nature of human consciousness, language, culture, and social relations. For example, the great success of the Mikhail Bakhtin's philosophy of dialogue is remarkable. At the center of his philosophy is the problem of man and his relations toward the world, specifically the human world. Bakhtin celebrates the idea of human individuality. His definition of the individual – in terms of his uniqueness, duty, responsibility, and deed – is opposed to the idea of social-historical determination (Hegel's "now-being," Marxist's "objective laws of history," vulgar sociological "being-from-society," or technological determinism). From this perspective he focuses on subject-subject relations ("I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other") (*Toward* 54) The main category to describe intersubjective relations is "dialogue." It is supported by concept pairs such as self-other, dialogic-monologic, borderzone- out-sidedness, etc. I see myself in the Other as a mirror, for whom I am also a mirror. Dialogic relations with the other are the necessary condition of language, meaning, thought, culture, and even existence. For Bakhtin, language (word) is a living dialogical discourse. The dialogic nature of language manifests itself in the dialogic character of literature. Bakhtin used his philosophy as the basis for developing a new aesthetics and theory of culture.

Dialogic discourse is also a basis for democratic social relation. The opposite, i.e. monologic discourse, is related to a narrow, unilateral way of thinking and authoritarian power. Bakhtin's view of dealing with differences and conflict resolution is also "dialogical" in the sense of respect for each individual's view and interests, the intention to understand and find a

reasonable agreement, and the continuing interaction without the suppression of the other. Bakhtin's works were written in "Aesopian language" in protest against Stalinist "monological" authoritarian power, but they remain relevant in opposition against any kind of authoritarianism – in politics, social relations, or culture. His criticism of monologic discourse, rooted in Modernity, pioneered the postmodern thinking. Bakhtin's works were re-discovered in the West in the 1980's as a philosophical basis for the movements on behalf of equal rights and reforms in education and other spheres of society.

The road to dialogue was paved by ideas of other contemporary philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger's advocacy of the individual existence (*Dasein*) in contrast to anonymous deterministic history, José Ortega y Gasset's theory of "perspectivism," and Emmanuel Levinas' concept of the Other. More recently, it is being developed by Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action and by Karl-Otto Apel's Discourse Ethics. Substantial contribution to the ideas of dialogism was made by Latin American philosophy.

A deeper understanding of the problem of dialogue requires a new, more adequate concepts and approaches. Yet the problems of dialogue are not only theoretical but also practical. A dialogue, as a principle of human relations challenges obsolete, but still predominant, traditional social relations and structures, behavior patterns and stereotypical thinking. The movement from monological "centrism" (whether egocentrism or Eurocentrism) towards dialogical "polyphonic" relations (comparable to the Copernican revolution) is for many frightening and painful. This step faces cynicism and obstruction from the powers that be whose interests are based on control, manipulation, and exploitation: they are not interested in dialogical democratic relations, simply because they do not want to share their monopoly of power and privileges with others. We are presently in an interim situation "between two ages," when traditional "monological" structures are getting obsolete and dysfunctional but still remain predominant, and while a new, dialogical type of relations is embryonic and in process of formation.

Intercultural philosophy

The concept of dialogue is a key word to better understanding of culture in today's globalized world. Cultures historically developed in ethnic and national locations, but at the same time in interrelation with each other. To

believe in the purity of different cultures or in a static identity is an illusion: the interrelations between cultures have traditionally been a source of their mutual enrichment and development (the multiethnic cultures of Russia, Spain, Latin America or India are examples of that).

In the last decades we have witnessed a fundamental change in the ways in which different cultures interrelate, creating a global cultural context with an inevitable reciprocity. Today the recognition of diversity in gender, race, ethnicity and plurality of cultures is expressed in the idea of *multiculturalism*. Frequently, however, merely lip service is given to multiculturalism: the other's "right to exist" is acknowledged, while considering one's own culture or truth superior or absolute. One can also simply ignore the other culture, and, in this case, different cultures are perceived as merely isolated and juxtaposed entities. The higher level of relations to others and their cultures implies an impartial view, accepting pluralism as a norm of life and recognizing others as equals, and a reciprocal understanding, rapprochement, and collaboration. This level of relations is characterized as *interculturality*.

The term *interculturality* indicates the real phenomenon of existing intercultural relations, as well as a certain understanding and attitude towards it. Ram Adhar Mall, for example, defined it as "a mental and moral category," an "attitude" towards others, or a "spirit" which approves the values of pluralism, diversity, and difference (Mall 15). *Intercultural*, as an adjective, is used to characterize culture, philosophy, theology, politics, pedagogy, etc. The subject of interculturality is discussed within several academic disciplines, which explore the theory of the origin of cultures and their mutual relationships, problems of multicultural societies, etc.

The recently emerged term *intercultural philosophy* means a view of philosophy from an intercultural perspective. This has become a new orientation which is attracting the attention of researchers and is now being explored in a growing number of publications. Intercultural philosophy raises questions about philosophy itself, and involves the revision of the whole concept of philosophy. The recent discussion about intercultural philosophy revolves around issues such as: May philosophical concepts, which are intended to be universally valid, be in actuality culturally bound? Is the occidental philosophical heritage superior? How can the cultural horizon of the historiography of philosophy be extended?

Intercultural philosophy reflects on the impact of the cultural framework on philosophy as such, exploring the "fundamental differences of cultural

coinages in the forms of thinking itself" (Wimmer 1). It brings to the forefront the problem of the interrelations between the cultural-specific and the universal in philosophy. For some philosophers, the notion *intercultural* seems to be incompatible with philosophy as universal knowledge. However, the adherents of interculturality develop a broader and more pluralistic concept of philosophy, viewed as embedded in certain cultural and philosophical traditions while dealing with perennial questions and aiming to give universally valid answers. In the expressions *European philosophy*, *Indian philosophy* or *Latin American philosophy* "the adjectival differences are illuminating: they may be complementary, but they never deny or even undermine the universal unity of philosophical thinking" (Mall XII).

The term "inter-cultural," when applied to philosophy, is insightful, expressing some important ideas: 1) philosophy originates in a particular cultural context; therefore the cultural variety of the world presupposes different types of philosophizing; 2) the "*inter-*" in this term means not merely the recognition of the plurality of philosophical cultures (and therefore the justification of philosophies varying from the Western mainstream), but also their interrelations and interactions, including their dialogue; 3) the "*-cultural*" in this term indicates culture as a common ground for such interrelations and dialogue, since culture not only includes national/regional originality but also (as generic human culture) represents the fundamental unity of humanity. Stripped down to its essentials, culture expresses universal human values, such as the unconditional value of human life, freedom, and dignity, which constitute the common ground for a dialogue between people as well as between philosophies. This commonality is especially relevant to philosophy which, by its very nature, transcends particular views and interests and takes a universal perspective of humanity.

Intercultural philosophy responds to the current "philosophy crisis," trying to diagnose its causes and find solutions. As Franz Wimmer states: "Intercultural philosophy is dealing with the question of whether it is possible and necessary to develop new ways of philosophizing because of the present condition of humankind. We are living in a global world, while we are still thinking in frameworks conditioned by regionally bound cultural traditions" (1). He emphasizes that philosophers have to search for an alternative to traditional monological thinking through interrelations between various traditions (not only dia-logical between two, but poly-logical among many), and that "problems of philosophy can and ought to be made clear by way of *interculturally orientated polylogues*" (1).

Philosophers from various countries and continents contribute to the development of intercultural philosophy. Their works represent various perspectives and theoretical positions, in many respects overlapping or complementing each other and forming a polyphonic interaction of creativity.² Existing theories of Intercultural Philosophy are already a subject of research. The classification by Diana de Vallescar, who defended her doctorate dissertation at the Complutense University in Madrid, is noteworthy in that it distinguishes between two models of Intercultural Philosophy: one is Raimundo Panikkar's "interreligious-intercultural" paradigm, the other is Raúl Fornet-Betancourt's "liberational-intercultural" paradigm. In this polyphony, the voice of the Latin American philosophers stands out. Latin American Philosophy, in the process of its development, forged many groundbreaking ideas which paved the way for interculturality.

LATIN AMERICA IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Philosophy of Liberation, Postcoloniality and Interculturality

The controversies of globalization affect Latin America and they are the theme of reflection of economists, sociologists, historians, and philosophers. Latin American Philosophy of Liberation develops a critique of globalization from historical, cultural, and ethical perspectives. This theme is presented in debates about "a philosophy of the Latin American history" (Leopoldo Zea), "civilization and barbarism" (Arturo Roig), and "dependence and liberation" (Enrique Dussel, Juan Carlos Scannone, Osvaldo Ardiles, Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt). They show that globalization is carrying out the main assumptions of Eurocentrism and

² D'Souza, Gregory, ed. *Interculturality of Philosophy and Religion*. Bangalore: National Biblical Catechetical and Liturgical Centre, 1996. Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl. *Transformación intercultural de la filosofía. Ejercicios teóricos y prácticos de filosofía intercultural desde Latinoamérica en el contexto de la globalización*. Bilbao: Editorial Desclée de Brouwer, 2001. Kimmerle, Heinz. *Das Multiversum der Kulturen*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996. Mall, Ram Adhar. *Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Interkulturelle Philosophie – eine neue Orientierung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995. Panikkar, Raimundo. *Interreligious dialogue*. New York: Paulist Press, 1999. Schneider, Notker, ed. *Philosophie aus interkultureller Sicht. Philosophy from an Intercultural Perspective*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997. Tiemersma, D., ed. *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*. Studies in Intercultural Philosophie. Series, No 4. Amsterdam – Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996. Wimmer, Franz Martin. *Vorlesungen zu Theorie und Methode der Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen*. Bremen: Studien-gang Philosophie, 1997.

Western cultural and economic hegemony. Analyzing the economy-centered technocratic concept of globalization, they reveal its ideological function as a justification of neo-liberal policy. As Franz Hinkelammert notes, the current globalization is essentially the result of an uncontrolled expansion of political and economic neoliberalism which is aiming to homogenize the planet according to the free-market requirements.⁵ Enrique Dussel indicates that globalization is not just our century's phenomenon, but rather a historical process which started with colonization and modernity (*Underside* 51-53).

Latin American philosophers develop their critique of globalization from two theoretical perspectives: *postcoloniality* and *interculturality*. These two approaches are interrelated and complement each other. While postcolonial theories, authored by the intellectuals from the Third World countries, expand the postmodern critique of the Modernity and of Eurocentrism from the colonial difference, the ideas of interculturality, developed by the theorists from both First and Third worlds, are focused more on cultures and their possibilities to serve as the basis for creating an alternative to the homogenizing globalization.

Latin American Philosophy and *postcolonial theories* are interrelated. Latin American thought has preeminence in developing the philosophical basis for a systematic critique of colonialism and Occidentalization. Postcolonial theories, developed by the authors from India, Arab world, and Africa added new dimensions in "decolonization" of history and culture. They criticized the Eurocentric pattern of Western historiography as well as anti-colonial narratives of the 1960-70s, based on the dichotomies "oppressor-oppressed," "imperialism-nationalism," "capitalism-socialism," which reproduced the homogenizing structures of the modern knowledge and represented the "other" as a counterpart of the European selfrepresentations. Latin American liberational thought of 1970 shared similar illusions of those times. In the 1990s, in a new historical situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Philosophy of Liberation strives for its own renovation. In this process, it creatively assimilates the ideas of postcoloniality and at the same time contributes to their further development.

The Latin American authors (in their own countries and those who immigrated in the US and Western Europe) see the postcolonial discourse as a critique of globalization from the "underside of globalization." They creatively develop the postcolonial ideas of Said, Bhabha, and Spivak, applying them to the Latin American experience, and combining them with their

own theoretical thought, which resulted in a new synthesis. Whereas post-coloniality unmasks the connections between the imperial system of power and the images of the colonies produced by its ideological agencies, the Latin-Americanist researchers extend their critique deeper into the areas of culture, showing indirect connections between the socio-economic system, power interests, and the manipulative use of mass-culture (including the colonization of language and memory). They contrast the metropolitan theorizing *about* Latin America with the culturally rooted reflection *from* Latin America itself.³ These authors see postcoloniality as a critical theory for an "age of globalization and exclusion." They bring postcoloniality to a new theoretical level, developing its philosophical basis. Following the series of "post-" nomenclature, I would identify the critique of the technocratic globe-doctrine and the search for an alternative as "post-globalism." Latin American thinkers made a unique contribution to the idea of *interculturality*. Not only did they long ago address the relevant issues related to multiculturalism, but they also created in practice a new, original type of culturally embedded thought – the Latin American Philosophy. Continuing this tradition, they currently developed the ideas of intercultural philosophy from the perspective of Latin America and other regions of the underdeveloped South, applying them to the philosophical dialogue North–South in search for a solution of global problems.

Latin American Philosophy was baptized by fire: a hot debate which ensued in the 1950's-60's regarding the question of the existence, or even the possibility, of such a philosophy. In the discussion regarding Latin American philosophy, the main stumbling block was the problem of the interrelationship between the cultural-specific and the universal in philosophy. For the positivist school, the definition "Latin American" seemed to be incompatible with philosophy as universal knowledge. Some Latin American authors exaggerated the cultural-specific as opposed to the universal. Other Latin American thinkers criticized such excesses of ethnocentrism as "tropicalism". They also criticized "abstract universalism". They explained

³ See Castro-Gómez, Santiago and Eduardo Mendieta, ed. *Teorías sin disciplina. Latinoamericanismo, poscolonialidad y globalización en debate*. México and San Francisco: Porrua; University of San Francisco, 1998; Alcoff, Linda and Eduardo Mendieta. *Thinking from the Underside of History. Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*. Lanham: Rowman, 2000; Mignolo, Walter D. "Philosophy and the Colonial Difference." *Philosophy Today*. Vol. 43. Supplement 1999. Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.)

that the term "Latin American" means the originality of philosophy in themes (national history and culture, liberation and social development) and the intent to explore universal topics of philosophy from the Latin American perspective. This "decentralized" the image of philosophy and paved the way to the development of African and Asian philosophical thought.

Latin American Philosophy of Liberation belongs to the critical-ethical humanistic thought. From this perspective, it criticized the technocratic theories of developmentalism (*desarrollismo*) and more recently technocratic neoliberal ideology of globalization. Latin American philosophers payed attention to the cultural heritage of the Latin American people (*cultura popular*) and developed an original philosophy of culture. Leopoldo Zea criticized the Eurocentric theories of culture and argued that the question of the culture of each nation is specific to its people and it should not presuppose any external criteria. Enrique Dussel, Arturo Roig, Juan Carlos Scannone, Carlos Cullen, Franz Hinkelammert, Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, among others, enhanced the culturally embedded Latin American Philosophy. They unmask the "underside" of globalization and address the problem of underdevelopment and the vital needs of the people in Latin America and other Third World regions. They contribute to the development of planetary macro-ethics and intercultural philosophy.

Philosophical Dialogue North–South

Since the late 80's Latin American philosophers have actively participated in the development of Intercultural Philosophy and in the North–South philosophical dialogue. In 1985, Raúl Fonet-Betancourt organized the *First German–Latin American Ethics Session* in Buenos Aires. It was the beginning of a series of seminars in response to the need for an intercultural dialogue in philosophy, which would help to overcome the traditional dominance of Eurocentric discourse. Two main ethical currents came to the forefront and were selected for further dialogue: Discourse Ethics and the Philosophy of Liberation, represented respectively by Karl-Otto Apel and Enrique Dussel.⁴

⁴ See Apel, Karl-Otto. *Selected Essays. Vol. 1. Towards a transcendental semiotics. Vol. 2. Ethics and the Theory of Rationality.* Ed. Eduardo Mendieta. New Jersey: Humanities, 1996. Dussel, Enrique. *Ética de la liberación en la Edad de la Globalización y la Exclusión.* Madrid: Trotta, 1998. *Proceedings of the seminar* were published in: Fonet-Betancourt, Raúl, Celina A. Lértora Mendoza, eds. *Ethik in Deutschland und*

The first seminar on the "Philosophy of Liberation: Foundations of Ethics in Germany and Latin America" took place on November 23-25, 1989, in the Catholic Academy of the Archdiocese of Freiburg.⁵ This seminar was a crucial step in the clarification of the strategy and the realization of the project of intercultural dialogue. Its novelty was that it was organized with the clear intention "to compare and confront" these two currents which represent two philosophical models, culturally different due to their origins. It was followed by seminars in a regular basis in both continents. Participating in the seminars were many philosophers from Latin America, United States, and Europe. The ten-year anniversary of the dialogue was celebrated during the eighth Seminar in Bremen, October 8-11, 2000. Its theme was "Groundings and Realizations of the Human Rights in the Context of Globalization. Dialogue North-South."

The dialogue is beneficial for both Latin American and European philosophies. It allows Latin American philosophy to have an international platform and to enter into closer contact with the philosophies of Europe and other regions of the world. On the other hand, European philosophy gains a new experience in this dialogue: it is challenged by forms of thinking different from its own, which do not imitate its style and forms of rationality, but rather are rooted in their own historical-cultural context and therefore offer different modes of interpretation. The dialogue is beneficial to philosophy in both the "intra-cultural" and the "inter-cultural" dimensions. In the first, the "intra-cultural" aspect, the dialogue stimulates the self-consciousness of each type of philosophy and its critical self-reflection about its cultural origins. Each philosophy in dialogue with the other is better able to see its own image, as in a mirror. The second dimension is "inter-cultural," which refers to the interrelations of culturally different philosophies. This helps to overcome the "centrist" view by becoming open towards a more balanced and broader view of today's world.

The necessity of giving full consideration to Intercultural Philosophy resulted in the creation of the International Congresses of Intercultural Philosophy. The First Congress took place March 6-10, 1995, in Mexico City.

Lateinamerika heute: Akte der Ersten German-Iberoamerikanischen Ethik-Tage. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1987.

⁵ The papers of the first seminar were published in: Fonet-Betancourt, Raúl, ed. *Ethik und Befreiung.* Aachen: Augustinus, 1990. Apel, Karl-Otto, Enrique Dussel, Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, eds. *Fundamentación de la ética y filosofía de la liberación.* México: Siglo XXI, 1992.

Philosophers from various continents participated in it. At the opening of the Congress, R. Fornet-Betancourt defined its purposes. He said, "This Congress starts a long-range program to promote the transformation of philosophy based on the contribution of the various cultural traditions of Humankind" (Introducción 13). This new approach aims to transform philosophy itself, from the intercultural perspective, and to develop a new type of philosophical thinking, which is able to respond to the variety of existing cultures. It could serve as a basis for orienting people in today's world and could aid in the search for solutions to global problems facing by Humanity.

The second International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy took place on April 6-11, 1997, in São Leopoldo, Brasil (UNISINOS - University del Vale do Rio dos Sinos). The third Congress took place on November 22-25, 1999, in Aachen, Germany. The growth of this program was demonstrated not only in the number of participants, but also in the variety of topics presented by intellectuals from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the US. Along with sessions devoted to various aspects of intercultural philosophy, there were special sections devoted to interculturality in Asian, African, Afro-American, Latin American, and European thought.⁶ The theme of the fourth Congress, September 16-21, 2001, Bangalore, India, is "Interaction and Asymmetry Between Cultures in the Context of Globalization."

The originality of the approach the Latin American philosophers took to Intercultural Philosophy (as expressed in publications and conferences) consists of connecting interculturality with liberation. They consider Latin American, African, and Asian cultures not merely as "objects" of research, but also as active subjects of the self-consciousness and cultural creativity. They challenge the static and essentialist concept of cultures as "accomplished" traditions with fixed identities. Instead they approach cultures historically and dialectically, viewing them as in the process of developing and interacting, and in the process of creation.⁷[^]

⁶ See the papers of the first and the second congresses: *Kulturen der Philosophie. Dokumentation des I. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie*. Aachen: Augustinus, 1996; *Unterwegs zur Interkulturellen Philosophie. Dokumentation des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Interkulturelle Philosophie. Denktraditionen im Dialog: Studien zur Befreiung und Interkulturalität*, Band 4. Frankfurt/M.: IKO, 1998.

⁷ A study of traditions in dialogue with other traditions as well as with themselves is reflected in the title of a series of books published by the Editorial IKO (Editorial for Intercultural Communication): "Traditions of Thought in Dialogue. Studies in Libera-

The Intercultural Transformation of Philosophy

Among the existing efforts to transform philosophy, intercultural philosophy represents an original approach, viewing philosophy as culturally embedded. This new avenue is explored by R. Fornet-Betancourt, who developed a project of the intercultural transformation of philosophy.

He argues that the transformation of philosophy has, as its immediate task, to liberate philosophy from dogmas and obsolete schemes, in order to pave the way for renovation. An important aspect of this transformation is related to the interdisciplinary approach. Another aspect of the transformation of philosophy is related to interculturality, or the dialogue of cultures. It claims the necessity of reviewing the Eurocentric philosophical historiography and, based on the reconstruction of the history of ideas in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, of creating a new view of the history of philosophy. A philosophy, accepting intercultural dialogue as a context of its reflection, enters inevitably into the process of large scale transformation, which requires it to reconstruct its history, its methods and forms of articulation. The transformation creates conditions so that a philosophy is able to reach a universality qualitatively different than that known before, because it is arising from shared communication between the different cultural universes.

The transformation of philosophy in the context of a dialogue of cultures also "includes the traditions of critical theory and of liberation philosophy" (Fornet-Betancourt *Interculturalidad* 83). In other words, its task is to broaden the horizon of the critique and of the liberation through the dialogue of the different philosophical cultures of Humanity. Finally, philosophy transformed in this way can achieve free range for its development and social role. It can be used in public discourses to address social and global problems.

Fornet-Betancourt applies the principles of intercultural philosophy to his analysis of the current situation of Latin American philosophy. He states, that it is still heavily influenced by eurocentrism and should pay more attention to the indigenous and Afro-American cultures. "For the practicing philosophy in Latin America," he writes, "it means, concretely, the necessity to open philosophy to the indigenous and Afro-American traditions, to

tion and Interculturality." Ten volumes were published in this series, including studies of African, Navajo, Andean, and Indo-Afro-Latin American traditions of thought.

their symbolic universes, their imaginaries, their memories and rituals; and this is not as mere object of studies, but as a living word of subjects with whom we have to learn and to study together" (76). The ideal for this transformation of philosophy in Latin America is that it would be "a home in which all the nations and cultures of the continent could articulate freely their memories and their word of the living subjects" (76).

The emerging intercultural philosophy draws our attention to the cultural embedding of philosophical thinking. The examining of its cultural contexts has serious implications. It introduces a new perspective in our understanding of what philosophy is, of the history of philosophy and of its present role in today's society. The transformation of philosophy, based on the intercultural dialogue, is so significant that Fernet-Betancourt considers it a new paradigm (Interview). Whether or not intercultural philosophy will become a new paradigm (in Thomas Kuhn's sense), only the future will tell. However, the term "paradigm" is useful as a working hypothesis, helping to express certain important ideas. First of all, it denotes the revolutionary changes in the theoretical framework for understanding philosophical questions, in light of the fundamental role of cultures in the development of philosophy. Second, it places intercultural philosophy as the next step in a sequence of paradigms, which represent the dialectics of tradition and innovation in the historical development of philosophy. Intercultural philosophy is situated above the rationalism and subjectivism of Modernity, above the limitations of analytical philosophy, and as an alternative to the nihilism of postmodern philosophers. It is in tune with the existing critique of scientism and the professionalization of philosophy, and with the call for a pluralistic, community-oriented and culturally rooted style of philosophizing. Intercultural philosophy is focused on the situation of culture and of its creator - the human being - in today's globalized world. Cultures are viewed as evolving and interrelated, and as being a product of human creativity. Concurrently, homogenization and other problems which cultures are facing in the process of globalization are epiphenomena of the drama of the human individual in a dehumanized world. Fernet-Betancourt, Dussel and other Latin American philosophers approach globalization as a philosophical problem, focusing on the human subject. They place man and human life in the center of his analysis as a criterion of judgement for the positive or negative effects of globalization. Assuming this position "from the human perspective," one can reflect on the meaning these processes have for human beings. This opens the possibility for the researcher to

make a diagnosis of the social, cultural and ecological effects of globalization on human life. They challenge the view of an individual as a passive object of the forces of globalization, and explores man's possibilities of influencing these processes and taking control over his future.

Fornet-Betancourt develops the concept of the subject as an alternative to postmodern "anti-humanism." The modern concept is obsolete. However, "the rumors about Man's death were greatly exaggerated," and he must be rediscovered and newly understood by a new philosophy. The author also criticizes the anthropological consequences of the universalization of the neoliberal economic system, its *inhumanity*. He considers the ideas of the critical-ethical humanistic philosophical tradition as the basis for developing a bold, new concept of the subject. He aims a philosophical understanding of a real human being, in his multidimensionality, historicity, and creativity. The new concept presents not an abstract incorporeal subject, reduced to a reflectivity, but rather includes as his essential dimensions materiality and contingency. This approach is rooted in the ideas of the living subjectivity, developed by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, and in the Hispanic philosophy by Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega y Gasset, and Xavier Zubiri. The author develops the concept of a free, conscious, and active subject, able to reason critically and to act in order to mold himself and transform society.

Fornet-Betancourt introduces the concept of "limit" which refers to the minimally necessary conditions – material, social, and spiritual – for human existence and shows "how in the actual conditions of globalization it is possible to continue the tendency of liberation based on the recovery of a memory of the living subject who never ceased to defend his rights, especially his right to live" (139). In such respect, his philosophy resonates with Dussel's life-enhancing material ethics. The reproduction and growth of human life is the main criterion of truth (theoretical and practical), since it is the absolute condition of the possibility of human existence. (Dussel *Ethica* 187, 323). This criterion is internal to each culture and allows it to establish a dialogue from the universality of the value of human life.

Interculturality as an Alternative to Globalization

The inhuman circumstances of globalization create "the necessity to liberate the vitality which is subdued by these circumstances." Globalization is aggravating the situation of underdeveloped countries, where almost 3/4 of world population are living, "of the suffering majority of humanity and of

wounded nature" (Fornet 136). Dussel warned of the potentially catastrophic consequences of an economic system in which the majority of humanity finds itself deep in poverty. This along with ecological crisis can result in "collective suicide" of Humanity (Dussel *Etica* 11). Philosophers of liberation point to the main problem: the controversies of globalization, which imposes the "neoliberal economic model" in the world.

Latin American philosophy contributes to the better understanding of globalization in a broader cultural context. Fornet-Betancourt shows the important role of culture in society. For him, culture is not just an artistic heritage or an issue of the inner life of an individual, rather it plays an extremely important public role as a sphere of social creativity and organization and as a center of a life-world. This essential social function of culture is undermined by the processes of globalization. An expansion of the neoliberal economic model results in the transformation of the world in its own image, in erasing the cultural and other differences, and in homogenizing the planet (the author calls it a "new crusade"). Humankind, with its cultures, is no longer a subject, but instead a mere object of this globalizing process: an object which suffers the uncontrolled expansion of an economical system which usurps the material base of the cultures. As result, the cultures of humankind are losing their materiality, or their own "territory" where they can proceed effectively in the modeling of society according to their own values and goals. Thus, cultures remain excluded from the areas in which they are practically forging the socio-economic, political, and ecological future of humanity.

Addressing controversies of globalization, philosophy wakes up people from a hypnotizing euphoria over technological progress, or from paralyzing fatalism. In contrast to techno-economic determinism, R. Fornet develops the concept of an open history, which is a result of the activity of social groups, movements, and other historical subjects, and contains potentially many possibilities. The neoliberal "model," while in our time predominant, is not necessarily the only possible nor the best one.⁶ In the variety of cultures R. Fornet sees a real basis for different life-worlds and historical alternatives. He develops the idea of interculturality (*la interculturalidad*) as an alternative to globalization.

The idea of intercultural dialogue is used by Fornet-Betancourt not only as a criterion for the critique of the negative consequences of globalization but also as a "regulative idea" in creating an alternative to it. Each culture has the right to the necessary material base for its free development. Thus, in-

tercultural dialogue becomes "an instrument of the cultures for their struggle to have their own worlds with their specific values and goals" (*Interculturalidad* 85). This intercultural dialogue creates a new framework for philosophical reflection. It breaks the image of world homogeneity and affirms the plurality of cultures which represent various visions of the world. It shows that the present historical world, shaped by globalization, is not limited by its formal, technical, and structural contextuality. It is challenged by intercultural dialogue as an alternative program for the communication of cultures. There is the homogeneous influence of globalization, but on the other hand, there is also the plurality of many cultural worlds in which the diversity of Humankind is reflected.

First of all, human beings have the right to their own cultures. While globalization is standardizing the world, cultures are maintaining the differences and plurality of world views. In contrast to globalization which promises "one world" imposed by the high price of the reduction and equalization of the different, interculturality implies a new understanding of universality as a dialogue of cultures. Culture is not only a realm for the cultivating of the plurality of world views and mutual respect among them. The plurality of cultures presupposes their interrelations and dialogue. Interculturality also serves as a guideline for the concrete realization of the plurality of the real worlds. It requires the reorganization of the world order in such a way that it will guarantee fair conditions for communication between cultures as world views which will materialize in the real worlds. Interculturality is seen by Fornet-Betancourt as a basis for a movement which will organize economically, politically, and socially an ecumenical union of nations and cultures. Such a movement will universalize tolerance and coexistence. The author calls it a "concrete universality," which is growing from grass roots, recognizing the particular, the Other, and uniting people in a common goal to make life possible for everybody. This universality presupposes the liberation and realization of all the cultural universes. Fornet-Betancourt summarizes the proposed alternative as: a renewal of the ideal of universality as the praxis of solidarity between cultures.

The philosophy of interculturality reminds people that history and the future are not predetermined and that they are the subjects who are forging the future. Culture can help people in liberating the world and history from the dictatorship of the currently predominant model. While globalization is standardizing the world and presents just one future, interculturality wants

to make possible a plurality of alternatives. Which of these futures will become more or less universalized is an issue that must be decided by means of intercultural dialogue. Cultures are realms of freedom, creativity, and realization of the human beings. This freedom is also presented as historical possibilities of innovation and transformation. Intercultural philosophy orients us in this search for an alternative, finding its inspiration in "a creative continuation of the tradition of critico-ethical humanism as an open tradition which transmits the *principle of subjectivity* as a driving force of the foundation of society which champions community and coexistence, and in which everybody lives in harmony at peace with their neighbor and with the nature" (Fornet *Interculturalidad* 115).

In conclusion, the intercultural philosophical dialogue initiated by the Latin American and European philosophers has become a real phenomenon in today's philosophical thought. It has stimulated the development of Intercultural Philosophy. This dialogue is also a good example of the practical implementation of the ideas of interculturality, whereby philosophers of different currents and cultural traditions participated in an open discussion regarding the problems of philosophy as a discipline. It contributes to the joint efforts of thinkers from various countries in search for a philosophy adequate to the quest for the solutions to contemporary problems. It has become a forum for interdisciplinary reflection on the social-cultural and global problems of today's world.

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Raphael O. Madu

11. African Culture and other Cultures in the Face of Globalization

Today we are experiencing a change in era instead of the usual era of change. Vatican II felt this deep alteration in human condition and talked of "a new age in human history."¹ We are living in a state of affairs in which the globe is the essential unit of operation of some human activities, and where this activity is ideally conducted in terms of single, universal, systems of thought, techniques and modes of communication. Concisely put therefore, we are in "a cultural, political and economic new-order supported by the Western neo-liberal capitalistic ideology envisioned in the logistics of market economy."² We are in a system "mandated by profit"³ and the "realization of global dreams by imperial cooperations"⁴ – the global casino economy, the global labour market, and the global shipping mall.

Since globalization is 'unavoidable' and the proliferating discourse of it project it as a new version of universal history and present irresistible commercial exigencies, the developing nations of Africa are compelled to join. Richard Harris and Melinda Seid in their recent critique of globalization and Neo-liberalism in developing countries observe that "nearly every major aspect of contemporary economic, political, social, and cultural life in the developing countries of the world has been affected by the accelerating integration of their economies into the expanding global capitalist system."⁵ Any one who is perceptive enough would infer that the world history written by the neo-liberal global system is only a writing by the West "about the 'West' and the 'rest' in a way that defined the latter by "clusters of absences" that turned out to be what the former possessed in abundance and exclusively,⁶ a rest described in terms of what they lack.

Richard Harris and Melinda Seid further note that "the 'globalization' or increasing integration of the developing countries into the contemporary global capitalist system has not propelled them into a new era of post-modernity. Many of their old problems and issues (analysed in the fifties, sixties and seventies) continue to be contemporary problems and issues. In fact, the contemporary effect of globalization, perhaps best defined as the global expansion of late, twentieth century capitalism or what has been

called 'turbo capitalism' have aggravated most of the chronic problems of the developing countries while adding new problems. Most of these problems are still best characterized by "the classical" or "modernist" concepts of corporate capitalism, economic exploitation, social inequality and social injustice."⁷ According to this same source, "the complex social reality of these societies is perhaps best thought of as a complex hybrid of "pre-modern", 'modern' and "post-modern" ideologies, practices, and conditions."⁸

The picture Ali Mazrui paints of contemporary Nigeria is true of most African nations: urbanization without industrialization, deep Western consumption patterns without Western productive techniques, unchecked Western tastes without Western skills, secularization without the scientific spirit,⁹ increasing poverty and steady corrosion of most post colonial developmental projects. "Through lack of planning, the outskirts or suburbs of every megalopolis are like ghettos. These are often huge agglomerations of people who are socially rootless, politically powerless, economically marginalized and culturally isolated."¹⁰ "The global expansion of capital integrates resources and people into a polarized system of great wealth accompanied by poverty and despoliation ... in the process, large hoards of people are forced into precarious conditions in rural areas or urban slums; ..."¹¹ The global system generates waste of both natural and human resources and hence imposes great burden on society.

Though unprecedented in degree, none of these phenomena is necessarily new. They have existed to some degree or another ever since the beginning of the modern period for "modernity is inherently globalizing."¹²

Characteristic of its dualism, globalization is not only economic but also cultural or at best an unholy fusing of both of them. Globalization as Americanization is the epitome of this mutation of the one into the other.¹³

Post-modernity, many critics have observed, is characterized by this economization of the cultural and the culturization of economy,¹⁴ an a-cultural attitude. However, still characteristic of the "new universale" is the paradox it generates as it results as much in the quest for cultural universalism as for particularism. "In other words, under globalization all societies must be both unique and individual, but they must be able to make universal claims about their uniqueness, particularity, and difference."¹⁵ It has also meant relativization of cultures and their views about life. Thus the optimism engendered by the numerous 'positive' trappings of globalization is tempered by the reality of conflicts all over the globe and the increasing

difficulty of maintaining solidarity among people of different cultures and civilizations. This paradox of globalization which carries with it a serious threat on culture is further lamented by Ali Mazrui:

One of the repercussions of globalization worldwide has been to arouse cultural insecurity and uncertainty about identities. Indeed the paradox of globalization is that it both promotes enlargement of economic scale and stimulates fragmentation of ethnic and cultural scale.¹⁶

John Naisbitt talks about global paradox. The paradox of the more universal we become the more tribal we act. This paradoxical coincidence of the propagation and realization of a world culture and a simultaneous diversification of cultures, though it appears enigmatic, belongs to the very logic of modernity.¹⁷ Van der Merwe in his elaboration of this paradox observed that, the logic of modernity thus presupposed a detachment of or emancipation from a particular cultural community or collectively shared horizon of significance. For this reason modernity could expand trans-culturally and develop into a global world culture. But for this very same reason and this is the resolution of the paradox – it cannot provide people with an attachment to those specific meanings and values for which they are dependent on cultural forms of life."¹⁸

In view of all these, our problem in this paper resembles the very one that has perplexed philosophy all through the ages: the problem of one and many. It is also the issue of unity in diversity, how the one can remain one and still be part of the one which is also many. It is the problem of cultural particularism and identity. It is the problem of cultural universalism (humanity) and particular histories.

Under this rubric, I gather the question of the relationship between African culture and globalization. Could we in fact see this as the issue of African nations and their efforts to globalize or simply see it as an inquiry into the possibility of African cultures surviving (in isolation) inspite of globalization and its trappings? Could we see this as Africa at the verge of exclusion from a group of cultures that pose to be one? Could it also be seen as the need for globalization to adjust to local African particularities, showing more tolerance and cooperation?

Even though African culture is an important sub-variety of world cultures, must it adjust to globalization or resist it and risk elimination? These are some of the issues that rear their heads in an inquiry like ours.

Perhaps no critic has more adequately described the African disposition in this new millennium faced with Westernization poor economy, interethnic wars and widespread poverty as the former Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, Cardinal Jozef Tomko, in his recent interview granted the Fides Agency Rome. According to him, Africa is searching for a path which will guarantee it equal dignity with other peoples while preserving the best in its cultures – the family, religious sentiments etc.¹⁹ He further noted with delight the ability of the African people to dialogue with the rest of the world while maintaining the dignity of their culture.²⁰

The purpose of this study therefore, is to explain the context, culture processes and trappings of globalization and their impact upon the weaker sectors of African societies. The survey will take a two-tier structure. One involves the history and processes of globalization as a socio-economic and political strategy. The second involves a cursory examination of culture albeit African culture, and a careful analysis of the operations and effects of globalization on it. This last scheme will delve into such culture-related areas as religion, ethics, environment, in fact, the very core elements of African *lebenswelt*.

Globalization:

As already observed, a profound restructuring of the world economy has taken place and as I earlier pointed out, "with the possible exception of nuclear weapons, capitalism is the most powerful of human inventions. As true an expression of the restless soul of European civilization as the urge to discover, create, and conquer, capitalism has now spread to every part of the world"²¹ breaking down all barriers standing on its way. Thus, the agents and forces of the system, the mega corporations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), all of them off shoot of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements, including the Geneva 1993 established World Trade Organization (WTO), have aggressively integrated all economies of the world into a single capitalist system, exposing the global order to gross mutual vulnerability. It is this process that is generally termed globalization. Even though the term is itself relatively new, the actual mechanism towards the integration of all economies into one and the emphases on global interdependence and exchange date back to centuries.²² Critics like Ali Mazrui date globalization back to the early expansions of Christianity and Islam.

Other globalizing phenomena, according to him, include the 18th century Industrial Revolution, the Trans Atlantic slave trade and the imperial expansion of Europe. Also global in scale were the two world wars and the cold war.

But from a purely economic perspective, some commentators think that the proper origin of globalization should be sought in the 1970s "double shock of sky-rocketing petroleum prices and the crisis of the international monetary system."²³ It was a period characterized by progressive saturation of demand for durable consumer goods and risk in purely speculative financial products.²⁴ The wave of deregulation which later opened consumer markets to large co-operations and foreign traders was also a key factor. It gave many co-operations more economic and political power than the countries across whose boarders they operate.

The final historical stage of globalization was "the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the brutal switch in the former communist countries to unbridled capitalism."²⁵ With this "really-existing capitalism" rather than "really-existing socialism" is erected as the only possible teleology at the end of history and market reductionism substitute for class-reductionism.²⁶ Thus globalization envisions the countries of the world as absorbed in a "unified planet within a single bloc"²⁷ and poses a "great deal of optimistic triumphal."²⁸

But not all that glitters is gold. As the process of globalization under the banners of neoliberalism advances, the proportion of those in the "other world" increases, so does the probability of human insecurity and mutual vulnerability.²⁹

Definition:

Today literature on globalization is quite extensive and the characterizations of it by critics are too numerous to exhaust: "turbo-capitalism,"³⁰ "Westernization,"³¹ "Americanization,"³² "gangsterization,"³³ "new-internationale,"³⁴ "neo-colonialism," "Thatcherism,"³⁵ "Reagonomics,"³⁶ McWorld,³⁷ "the golden straight jacket,"³⁸ global surrender,³⁹ cosmocorporationalism, end of history, etc.

The proliferation of these discusses about globalization has reached such levels of complexity that it is essential to look at some definitions of it and to sketch the broader circumstances which facilitated its emergence and spread as a global ideology.

Anthony Kalliath defines globalization as "the intricate and tricky assertion of Western capitalism world wide through the market forces in the post-colonial era in which territorial colonisation is no more politically and culturally viable and acceptable."⁴⁰ For Philippe Englehard globalization is undoubtedly only the grand finale of the explosion of Western modernity.⁴¹ According to de Benoist, Alain: "Globalization is creating a reorganization characterized primarily by a generalized deterritorialization of capital. "Space of place" is being displaced by a "space of flux". In other words, territory is being replaced by network, which no longer corresponds to a particular territory but is inscribed within the world market, independent of any national political constraints. For the first time in history, economic and political space are no longer bound together. This is the deeper meaning of globalization."⁴² For Habermas, globalization is the extension of the entire globe of the highest achievements of the Enlightenment and critical modernity. To this extent, globalization appears to be an extension of modernity, if not its final denouement.⁴³ The World Bank defines it simply as the "ability of individuals and firms to transact business across national boundaries."⁴⁴

Ideology and Dynamics

The first dynamic in the entire process plan of globalization is its ability to homogenize and hegemonize at the same time. Globalization professes to unify and improve peoples, making them increasingly similar but paradoxically it also generates a dominant culture – a hegemonic centre.⁴⁵

It encompasses a theory of history, a political economy and a theory of world politics (complex interdependence).⁴⁶ This homogenization is seen in almost all the facets of human life – language, economy, music, dress, education etc., but the most triumphant culture (hegemonization) has been Europe and North America.

As globalization develops a universal culture, not necessarily of being but of having, it further develops a feeling of uprootedness, powerlessness and insecurity. Because of this, people "erect walls, even if fragile and laughable. Thus the more globalization grows the more societies try to reconstruct their particularities regrouping with aggressive ethnic and religious affirmations."⁴⁷ As De Benoist points out the outburst of conclusive indetritarianism that is the consequence of the attempts of globalization to create an "open society" is only normal. According to him, "too much openness inevitably leads to too much closure. The reinvention of tribalism, clanism

or ethnocentrism can thus be interpreted as desperate reaction against a threat of dispossession."⁴⁸

Economy and Politics

The transnational co-operations and Banks through unbridled competitiveness and unregulated markets have shaped the entire *lebenswelt* of developing Africa in the following ways;

- By making the G8 and the regulatory trade organizations compel developing Africa to eliminate most subsidies and trade tariffs that protected domestic industries against foreign competition and thus open their markets to foreign co-operations.
- By loan, patent controls and licenses, the mega corporations have gained ascendancy over the more important domestic economic sectors such as natural gas, petroleum, telecommunication and even production of basic consumer goods.
- Instead of enhancing domestic consumer goods, these mega corporations have forced local capitalists to become their partners in the promotion of export-oriented ventures.
- Mega companies like Shell, Chevron, Agip have extracted non renewable resources from Africa and diverted them to other countries. The extent of extraction had in most cases caused environmental disasters, by oil spills and unchecked deposition of toxic waste and even pollution of water and air as is often the case in Ogoni land, Nigeria.
- To maximize profit, these organizations maintain substandard working conditions and through bribery and "settlement" silence governments and legal systems who should be the mouth-piece of the masses.
- They also encourage "cash flight" by transferring the capital they have accumulated from Africa into their banks in more developed countries thus making the poor nations of Africa poorer.
- Beyond this political and economic philosophy of the mega – companies, the international financial and trade organizations have always supported this domination by the major capitalist countries and their "turbo – companies" by a set of interconnected policy conditionality which the developing countries of Africa must undertake or face economic excommunication. These include the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) unpopular fiscal Austerity Measures and Debt Reduction policies.

Thus to obtain IMF or World Bank loans, African nations are imposed with the following conditions.

- i. Elimination of all barriers to foreign investment, de-unionizing workers, elimination of price control tariff barriers, and currency control. The maxims here is that competitive and unregulated market is the key to development.
- ii. Cut down on direct taxation on income and wealth in order to increase disposable earning among the well-to-do. Conversely, increasing taxation on consumption in the form of value added or goods and services tax (VAT and GST).
- iii. Paying more attention on export-oriented goods in order to acquire enough foreign exchange to service foreign debts. This is why hunger is still an issue in Africa and most developing nations.
- iv. Drastic cut on public expenditure on education, health care, welfare assistance, unemployment insurance and pension, in order to check inflation and thus increase export goods and be able to service foreign loans.
- v. Deregulating the private sector in order to enhance competitiveness and free exporters and importers from government control, thus giving an unbridled control to market. This has generated the biggest controversy in Nigeria today – the issue of deregulating petroleum in the country.
- vi. Privatization of the public sector – banks, roads, industries, energy, water, communication and other utilities in order to maximize profit and increase ownership by foreign companies.
- vii. Devaluation of the local currency to increase the value of export-goods and enable the mega companies to transfer their profits into "hard currencies".
- viii The picture painted by these developed nations, the mega corporations and their allies, the financial organizations has been summarized thus, Privatization + Deregulation + Globalization = Turbo-capitalism = prosperity.⁴⁹

This new political economy gives prime place to the merchant at the detriment of government and people and generates an inequitable socio-economic order. Through conditional "financial support", the lending agencies and their allies are able to shape, control and even manipulate both the external and internal economic policies of Africa. Because most African nations have no "choice" than to belong to the globalizing process, they

join "not as equal players but as "captive markets" and the source of cheap human and natural resources for the transnational corporations."⁵⁰

The neo-liberal solution to undevelopment, according to Jorge Nef and Wilder Robles, "has been to limit the role of the state and to facilitate private accumulation, while reducing the scope and salience of popular participation and social policies, all this in the name of freedom."⁵¹

The economic policies sustained by the neo-liberal conditionality have been best suited for authoritarian and military governments. No wonder then the SAP and Austerity Measures and the accompanying IMF Loans and manipulations were initially introduced in most African countries in the 1970s by military dictatorships or authoritarian governments. But as these military juntas retreated into their barracks the new democracies that emerged are saddled with the sustenance or continuance of the "neo-liberal economic agenda", the effect of which is far-reaching today.

It has distracted governments from addressing the more prevalent issues of inequality and abject poverty of the majority of their people. And as some commentators rightly argue, "The continuance of these inequalities and disparities over the long run undermines popular support for political democracy and tends to undermine political stability in these societies⁵² and lead to more failed democracies and even wars in Africa."

Studies show that African Nations that have embarrassed serious globalization agendas have done so at great human costs. Countries like Ghana, Gabon Tunisia, Uganda, Morocco etc., with increased foreign investments, improved institutional investor ratings and increased exports have had to pay greatly for it. Some of them suffer from high unemployment rates, low wages, growth in informal economic sector – unrivalled number of street vendors, domestic servants, day labourers, prostitutes etc.⁵³ In short, the policies have generated more inequality and serious class distinction.

Eduardo Mendieta offering a concise evaluation of the predicament of the developing nations as they attempt to develop globalization agendas notes that in absolute numbers, developing nations are less likely to jump-start their economies into the kind of development that would allow them to meet even the most minimal standards of dignified human living.⁵⁴ In the light of these, it becomes all the more evident that both economically and politically, the Third World, is fast becoming a Fourth World.⁵⁵

Cultural Threat

As we earlier pointed out, globalization homogenizes local ethnic cultures but typical of its paradoxical nature, it also imposes a global pseudo-culture, a 'dominant' culture, a mono-culture a first world essentially secular, individualistic and materialistic that undermines the religious and moral values of other cultures. This "new culture" that claims to be a 'perfect model' of all cultures for other cultures to follow, the Euro-American culture, is making a terrible impact on the African collectivist and religious culture, an African culture that has never been so vulnerable. As Aylward Shorter fears, "there is also real danger that globalization may, if unchecked by small-scale economic and cultural alternatives, bring about a post-modern cultural wasteland."⁵⁶

There is a wonderful variety and complexity of cultures and thus a variety of peoples. Nietzsche was moved by an antipathy towards what is common to remark that the differences within humanity are greater than the differences between man and beast. This reinforces the suspicion that the unity of being human is more apparent than real, "for there is no one cultural type, at least not yet, and the differences of culture may be too great to be retained within a single super-culture."⁵⁷ Culture is an essential part of the human phenomenon. It is the sum total of what a people do in art, work, play, in language, religion and science, in what they have in values, monuments and achievements. Nothing escapes the purview of culture. It is a people's self-expression, the prism through which they perceive the whole of their experience, domestic, social, economic, political, religious and artistic. In short, culture is everything in everything about a people."⁵⁸

Culture offers people a configuration of meanings and behavioural norms, it controls their perception of reality, programmes their thinking and acting and bestows on the group a shared identity. However, it is not surprising that some elements in the definition of culture make even serious-minded people think of it as a re-living of the past, as something archaic, as ancient custom or ancestral heritage. But as Okere Theophilus observed,

...our culture is more than our past. It is also our present reality, including all the foreign elements in the process of assimilation. Culture is dynamic. It maintains its identity even while it is changing. Culture today in Africa as any time and anywhere means total historical experience without suppression or denial of either past or present, a dynamic unity of

ancient and modern. There is both a yesterday and a today of culture.⁵⁹

From all these, it becomes increasingly clear that cultures are whole systems, the integrity of which must be respected. They cannot be broken down into "elements" or "components" without doing violence to them. The right to culture is also a human right that any manipulation or domination of culture even in the bid to globalize, is an abuse. Thus globalization must take particular cultures seriously. As the Pontifical Council on Culture succinctly noted,

If the fact that they share a common nature makes all people members of one great family, but the historical character of the human condition means that they have a more intense sense of attachment to particular groups, from their family to their people or nation. The human condition is thus located between universality and particularity in a lively tension which can be remarkably fruitful if it is lived in a balanced and harmonious way.⁶⁰

The ambiguous struggle with cultural specificity and human universality and even the inclination to marginalize based on cultural differences is a common phenomenon. "Human beings too often have identified – and too often still identify "being human" (for at least, being "fully" human) with their own group and their own culture, and have accorded full rights only to those who are members of their group. For all that, the exclusive limitation against the stranger, the aborigine, the Jew, the Black or the Catholic, against women or against the very poor – has often betrayed an uneasy suspicion that the outcast is really one of us. An ancient Egyptian priest wrote of the foreign Hykos conquerors: "people who are not people are invading our country."⁶¹

Thus our culture is our vantage point from where we see other cultures. We inevitably learn other cultures as an extension of our own. And we can never empty ourselves of our own culture. Following the advice of Warren, therefore, "our first task in approaching another people, another culture, another religion is to 'take off our shoes, for the place we are approaching is holy.' But this is not the attitude of globalization."

Traditional African culture was family based, collectivistic and group-oriented. The extended family was a community of blood relatives and relations by marriage. It was more or less corporate both in decisions and activities. Africans had an unrivalled sense of the sacred. The ancestors

though spirits are much involved in the day-to-day life of the living and fear of punishment by the ancestors controlled excesses in all aspects of life. But with globalization and the influx of Euro-American mentality we are witnessing a redefinition of reality. Globalization does not sell just commodities and goods. There is a commodification of everything: signs, sounds, software and homogenization of life-styles: cultures, intellectual property, ethical values, religious sentiments are now commodities for the free trade mechanism. As De Benoist Alain notes.

"All things are now being transformed into currency. What enters the system as a living thing comes out as a commodity, a dead product."⁶²

Today, through a flood of print and electronic materials, Euro-America is able to promote their alien culture, perpetuate liberal ideas and hand on their sexual mores. In short modern communication has created a new culture, a global-pseudo culture that tends to subordinate religious and moral values to consumer materialism.

Most of the television programmes in Africa, except for the current home videos that are gradually coming up in some areas, are from Euro-America, and they tend to promote liberal pan sexist ideas. A recent survey on KTN's Show Business Today, claimed that sixty percent of programmes emanating from the United States contained allusions to homosexuality and lesbianism.⁶³ Thus sex in the global consumer culture has become a commodity for sale on same or similar footing with tobacco, alcohol, or coke. It is peddled by pornography in the mass media: In print media and radio but more especially in the "blue movies" which economic rationalism justifies its being shown even to under-age audiences. Today most human activities are characterized by *instantism* – instant coffee, instant tea, instant popcorn, fast foods, and of course instant sex.

This blatant hedonism is undermining the ethical teachings of traditional Africa regarding sex. Sexual activity in traditional Africa was the subject of much symbolism and ritual, essentially a dialogue with the future and a communication with the unborn.⁶⁴ All these have experienced the exterminating influence of globalization.

The phenomenon becomes more paradoxical when one observes the ambivalence of even fundamentalist Africans who reject modern Western ideas in the bid to defend traditional African ideals but welcome all sorts of western technology and cultural products – listening to CNN and BBC, wearing Jeans, drinking Coca Cola, eating McDonald's, Pizza Hut and Mr. Biggs, smoking Marlboro etc., an unbridled exhibition of cosmopolitanism

or better still, westernization, a new consumerist culture which adversely affects lifestyles and food habits and alters the very content of indigenous culture. This means that "globalization achieves much more than cultural imperialism, it foregrounds cultures as an instrument of imperialism. In other words, culture acts both as a sword and a mask."⁶⁵ In an article in the Press Telegram, June 18, 2001 titled: *They hate us! They need us!* New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman, comments on Josef Joffe, a German Foreign Policy analyst's article in the National Interest Journal titled: *Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?* The latter argues that;

One reason no alliance has formed against America yet is that while resentment with America is rife, particularly among European elites, the attraction of America – its culture, universities, movies, food, clothing and technologies – is just as strong, and today no power in the world can balance it. For every European elitist who resents America for what it is, there are 10 Euro-kids who want what America is. America is both menace and seducer, both monster and model.⁶⁶

Globalization, Religion and Ethics

Globalization has also great influence on religion. Ours is a "world in which totalitarian state secularism as well as unbridled capitalism have hal- lowed out and destroyed many ethical and spiritual values."⁶⁷ Typical of its paradoxical mechanism globalization both "fosters" religion by the prolif- eration of TV preachers, Pentecostalism and mushroom churches, a typical American influence, and also through the media exhibit an anti-religious bias. In this regard it presents the church as anachronistic, conservative and irrelevant thus enhancing atheism and agnosticism or at best a lukewarm attitude towards religion. Even in cases where it encourages belief it tends to breed its own mode of religious expressions; separation of church from state and secularism. And as Hans Küng warned "Religion offered with much that was Para-religious and pseudo-religious as goods in the super- market of ideas, would be mixed arbitrarily into a syncretic cocktail for the convenient satisfaction of religious thirst."⁶⁸ Along similar lines, Ali Maz- rui talks about the effects of the Americanization of Religion. According to him, "...the impact of Americanization has probably been harmful to reli- gious values worldwide – whether intended or not. Americanized Hindu Youth, Americanized Buddhist teenagers or Americanized Muslim Young-

sters are far less likely to be devout to their faiths than non-Americanized ones."⁶⁹

Hans Küng is of the view that slowly even secular critics of the time are noting that *modernization* has been leading to the establishment not only of an unavoidable secularization but largely also by no means unavoidable ideological secularism, in which "anything that is transcendent, trans-empirical, authoritative and indeed normative, seems to have been banished from life. Each person is his or her own standard".

In this modern libertinistic ethic, where man is the measure of all things, it becomes difficult if not impossible to give standards to groups and individuals who are ahead of themselves. De Benoist laments the attempts of globalization to turn our planet into a "market religion whose theologians and high priests operate as if the only goals were profitability."⁷⁰

Furthermore, the economization of our world poses a great challenge to ethics and thus calls for some global ethic. And as the International Commission on Global Governance vividly remarked, without such global ethic the new wider civil society which is coming into being could "become unfocused and even unruly."⁷¹ This ethic should be incorporated into the developing fabric of international norms, and that "would help humanize the impersonal workings of bureaucracies and markets and constrain the competitive and self-serving instincts of individuals and groups."⁷² This global values should be the cornerstone of global governance.⁷³ Their formulation "must be inspired by the cultural resources, the insights, emotional experiences, historical memories and spiritual orientations of the peoples."⁷⁴ Commitment to pluralism and respect for the Golden Rule should be the bottom line – respect for life, freedom, justice, mutual respect and readiness to help the neighbour. It is here that the rather unheard cry for *globalization of inclusion* makes itself more audible.

Globalization of Inclusion

The current global culture has not taken serious cognizance of the African predicament and this many, including the Holy See, have lamented. At the intervention of the Holy See at the annual session of the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) in Geneva 2-27 July, 2001, Archbishop Martin in a document entitled "New African Initiative" argued that globalization "requires the realization that responding to the needs of the weakest is a long term investment for the good of all, including the strongest and most powerful"⁷⁵ Globalization, he said, has to be a process

of inclusion. Thus "we need forms of partnership which will render Africa a strong partner, on an equal footing with any part of the world, in our global endeavours. These partnerships must place poverty reduction at their centre, so that all human persons in Africa can be helped realize the God-given potential they possess."⁷⁶

The Holy See condemned domination and called for a new concept of global citizenship and global responsibility. It further warned that:

"It is potentially unfair to require the poorer countries to open their markets, while maintaining heavy protection on products in which they have comparative advantage. An open system based on free market and competition should be deeply concerned, even from within its own internal logic, when it sees that Africa's share of the world market is eroding". Still hammering on the need for globalization to include instead of exclude Africa, the document concludes, "We must invest in the people of Africa, and have confidence in the fact that they themselves are the first to desire peace, to desire a better and prosperous future for themselves and for the families. They are the ones who most desire a united and thriving continent."⁷⁷

It is this need for values for global neighbourhood, a neighbourhood policy that tends to carry every group and culture along that should constitute the basic problem of globalization. Any attempt to achieve economic interdependence and global security that neglects the issue of total inclusion and partnership of Africa and other developing nations as is most evident today, is doomed to fail.

What is called for therefore, is a culture of solidarity, a culture of just social order, a culture of "mutual respect and consideration", a globalization of inclusion since globalization itself is unavoidable today. It is this type of ethic that would help instill a sense of moderation and modesty instead of the current "unquenchable greed for money, prestige, and consumption."⁷⁸ Thus the need to emphasize and re-emphasize the primacy of ethics over economics and politics.

Globalization and the Rest of the World

Our discussion has the danger of giving the impression that only Africa and the developing cultures/nations suffer from the pangs of globalization. That is not true. It is like thinking or even saying that poverty, corruption etc exist only in the developing countries. The truth of the matter is that the cancerous social evils thrive in the developing countries and in the de-

veloped countries alike. Perhaps the difference lies more in degree than in anything else.

In fact, the sheer advance of globality produces an almost inevitable reaction against it, and in favour of the specific, the particular even in Europe and America. The rise of identity groups is part of such a reaction. No wonder then anti-globalization protests are per vase today.

Just last July at the G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, one protestor was killed. The level of anti-globalization protesters was so high that the World Bank had to cancel its meeting scheduled for Barcelona, Spain, June 25-27 and planned a developmental Conference over the internet, the first of its kind. What is more ravaging in the global culture is the way it is evading national particularities in Europe and escalating attitudinal paradox.

In fact "nothing is more paradoxical than the young militants of the nationalist right in Europe who boat up foreigners while dressed in the global uniform of their age-group-such as jeans and T-shirts – listening to the transnational music of their generation, rock and doing so at soccer matches which are the mass spectator sport in most countries of the world, irrespective of race, colour, creed and sexual orientation, though not of gender."⁷⁹

Conclusion

We have seen the imbalance in the present stage of transnational capitalism in which the Great Eight decide the destiny of the rest of humanity, a situation where less than 15% of the total World's population controls, uses, consumes and even destroys up to 80% of the non-renewable resources of the world. Perhaps more striking is that the global system currently in vogue is grossly exclusive. It does not consider the interests of the developing cultures whose natural resources and manpower suffer devastating blows from the current global strategy.

Thus in the face of the countless cultures and millions of underprivileged humans, the need for a culture of mutual respect, consideration and inclusion becomes more urgent. We must forewarn that the strategy here recommended is not to be guided by mere "sympathy" but rather by a commitment to pluralism, global neighbourhood and concern for our collective destiny.

Footnotes

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Gerd-Rüdiger Hoffmann

12. The balance of power in the dialogue between African and Western philosophy

I. Difficulties with the topic

Steps necessary for dealing with the topic

In my opinion, the following steps are necessary in order that the topic can be comprehensively dealt with.

First: Initially the varying balance of power in present societies has to be subject to comparative empirical analysis. It is precisely this, which proves to be a problem as soon as historical and cultural points of view have to be considered. For occasionally, even in scientific sources, power structures in African societies are considered almost exclusively to be an ethnological matter. In contrast, the balance of power in European and other societies, generally regarded as western, is researched by sociology and the political sciences. Subject and methods are thus not easily comparable, and hardly transferable to the other respective discipline.

Second: An overview has then to be formed of just how this varying balance of power is reflected in the different philosophical traditions of Africa and the so-called Western world. That would be a first metalevel. This task must then be understood "in the sense of an auto-transformation process for the sake of philosophy, which should acquire a higher quality" (FORNET-BETANCOURT 1999: 12). Moreover, a reorganization of philosophy would be necessary.

Third: It has to be assumed that a dialogue exists between African philosophy and Western philosophy, or alternatively, that a dialogue is possible, which relates to the varying balance of power in the world today. The task would therefore be to set these reflections in relationship to each other. This task – as it were, on a second metalevel – cannot be rated high enough, because the prevailing view in philosophy, as in the political sciences, perceives no dialogue in this context and does not judge it to be necessary.

Fourth: The organiser of this international conference here in Bangalore probably assumes, as I do, that this dialogue is necessary and useful for a socially just world-wide order, because it can help to ensure that – in the

words of Ernst Bloch – the "freedom and self-regarding" of individual societal actors, in Africa as well as in Europe, can contribute within the "multiversum of cultures" towards the promotion of peace, solidarity and dignity of the individual (cf. BLOCH 1985: 128f.). It is therefore a question of encouraging this dialogue by making the sense accessible to all participants.

A comparison of the four tasks outlined above with the present treatment of African history, politics and philosophy shows how complicated this topic is. A Euro-centred attitude towards Africa is widely experienced, which does little more than consider the ability of Africans to learn about democracy from Europeans. The discrimination of Africa – African sociology, politics, philosophy and historiography – is particularly evident. But other countries beyond Western civilization are treated similarly. The patronising attitude that Wolfgang Fikentscher adopts towards India can be regarded as typical. He writes in the short section on "Democracy in Hinduism" in his introduction to democracy: "India is a great democratic nation that – guided by Great Britain – has made amazing achievements since independence from British colonial power." (FIKENTSCHER 1993: 61f.). Apart from the fact that Fikentscher not once mentions Mahatma Gandhi, reducing India to Hinduism evidences a simple view of the world.

A possible approach to the subject

When I mention four tasks for dealing with the subject, I mean the following: A necessary change in viewpoint does not inevitably change the subject-matter itself.¹ To reflect upon African philosophy on an equal basis with western philosophy does not alter the fact that the balance of power, in international terms, is determined by the so-called western states and blocs. When the discussion is about Africa, it concerns objects of – mostly ethnological – research, or objects of powerful actors in their game of global capitalism. Participating *African* subjects in politics or science, including philosophy, rarely occur in power-political or philosophical thinking. This view is Euro-centred. And this has to be changed. For without a change in viewpoint there cannot be a change in the subject matter itself. A common materialistic interpretation of *being determines consciousness* does not and cannot help here at all. That would amount to an avowal of passivity with

¹ Cf. Karl Marx's materialistic credo in the "Philosophical and economic manuscripts from 1844". (MARX 1998: 736)

revolutionary phraseology. Substituting a dialogue concept (FORNET-BETANCOURT 1988) in place of "the clash of civilizations" (HUNTINGTON 1996), appears to me to be an important step in actually opening up a dialogue, in order then to change the subject matter itself. It still has to be emphasized, however, that in this context the existence of African philosophy must at long last be acknowledged institutionally. (cf. HOFFMANN 1986; 1998: 76ff.).

Motives for dealing with the topic

It is a question of assuming responsibility. It has to do with the proposition that philosophy as an institution, and philosophers as individuals, might be concerned with the dream, that "an association, in which the free development of each and every one is the condition for the free development of all" (MARX/ENGELS 1998: 2649) is possible, also under the conditions of worldwide order. But then it would have to concern the well-being of people throughout the world and not the grip of capital and finance on the whole world. It must concern the optimization of life and not profit maximization. This requires on the one hand, however, liberation from notions and actions that boil down to uniformity on the planet earth, and on the other hand, criticism of romantic conceptions that envisage an alternative to global capitalism in recourse to so-called traditional African cultures. This is how I understand the *philosophy of liberation*, a concept with which I sympathize.

The treatment of the terms of reference one to four must be a contribution of interdisciplinary research, so that this dream can be placed on a solid theoretical foundation. However, even excellent results would then still only be a small contribution to the yet failing proof, that history has not reached its end with the end of "raw communism" (MARX 1998: 699). Nonetheless, this theoretical work is a necessary condition for ensuring that "history continues" – also in Africa. This means that "philosophy would overcome the limits that have been imposed because of cultural and disciplinary boundaries; and so, philosophy could place itself in the global context of our historical world" (FORNET-BETANCOURT 1999: 12).

But then it is also clear, that one person will not solve this task in a lecture. For this reason, I would like to deal at least with a number of selected problems associated this large topic.

II. On the strained relationship between philosophy and politics

Primary considerations for the determination of policy through philosophy

One great difference between politics and philosophy is the following: Politics is directed at actions, which concern the conduct of public life, in particular that of the state. That is why political science is often defined as the science of power, even when it is conceded, that power is not only political. It can also be of an economic or unionistic nature. Serious philosophical dictionaries, even those designed for use at home, note under the word "politics", that politics cannot be reduced to the battle for power. Politics is also the outcome of ideologies, traditions and needs (cf. JULIA 1995). Politics is concerned with practicability and, time and again, with power.

Aristotle (384-322 BC) put his finger on the point in his *Nichomachian ethics*, where he observed that no citizen in Sparta thought about which constitution was the best for the Scythians. "For none of this could be brought about by us" (ARISTOTLE 1979: 50). Here no amount of consideration is useful. "We consider that, which is in our power and can be realized – for this alone is what remains." (ARISTOTLE 1979: 51). With that, in my opinion, a basis for the definition of politics was provided. What is interesting is that Aristotle, as one of the great figures of the world of philosophy, here pursues a highly provincial interpretation of politics. Aspects of Greek foreign policy towards India or North Africa do not fall within his field of vision. But also reverse influences upon Sparta's constitution are not worth mentioning. Not even Alexander's Persian campaign causes him, in this respect, to broaden his horizons to encompass the world. The strange and strict separation of domestic and foreign policy is found right up to the present time. But even Confucius (551-479 BC) offered consideration as to how power and intellect and personal and foreign could be regarded as a unified whole. Without question, Confucius can be described, on the one hand, as philosopher of the centre and as philosopher of diplomacy. This is true of his attitude not only towards rulers but also towards other peoples. On the other hand, in his writings the desire for change is perceptible. Even sympathy for rebellion is recognizable. On the question, whether it is not better to depart the world altogether, Confucius said: "Were the world in order, then I would not need to concern myself with changing it." (CONFUCIUS 1982: 133). It was Confucius, too, who wanted to introduce new guiding principles: Not strength in war, not courage in battle against for-

eign rulers and monsters, but rather humanity, justice, sense of duty and study should be the guiding principles for people. Through the power of good the noble becomes a polar star and all revolve around it. Throughout his life he found no success with his philosophy in the business of politics. Violence, authority and political power were rated more highly than wisdom and brotherly love.

An interesting detail in the life of Queen Azieb (Queen of Sheba)

In the Ethiopian version of the legend of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba there is an interesting detail, which also refers to the conflict between power and wisdom.

But first it has to be mentioned, that in Ethiopia the Queen of Sheba has another name, different to that in the bible. In Ethiopia she is called Azieb, and also Makeda. In the Ethiopian legend, not only does Azieb visit King Solomon's palace, Solomon also visits Azieb, where he sees for the first time their son Menelik.

But back to the detail, that, in my opinion, has an important connection to my theme. Azieb's father Agabos is revered as a hero, because he killed a dangerous snake that had tyrannised the Tigré people. In certain pictures Agabos carries a sword, but the snake was not killed in bloody battle, but through a trick that required knowledge. Agabos feeds the snake with a poisoned caterpillar. Then he sacrifices a goat to the snake, on which it then dies. "The citizens are amazed at Agabos' heroism," (HAAG; SÖLLE et al 1998: 196) is the laconic and perfectly correct comment on the picture of the event. In other cultures this deed would be attributed to feminine trickery, and perhaps gone down in history as the act of a cowardly man. But here a line of tradition is drawn, that more aptly reflects the guiding principles of Confucius. Nevertheless, there is no reason to use this legend to in any way romanticise African history or African wisdom (see also OLADIPE 1989).

Parallels between the ancient Greeks and the wise men of Africa

How both these sides – intellect and power, philosophy and politics – can come together, that was already a great problem in Plato's (427-347 BC) philosophy before Aristotle. In *Gorgias*, where Plato is concerned with criticism of sophistic rhetoric and egoistic morals from the general viewpoint of morality, Socrates and Polos debate how power and intelligence can form a unified whole. Whereas Socrates' partners in discourse generally

nearly always find the master's answers confirmed in Plato's writings, or put their questions in such a way that the philosopher's intended message is clearer, one finds here the following sentence from Polos following Socrates' comments on power and intelligence: "You say wretched things, and completely unrefined." (PLATO 1984: 41) Polos cannot understand that wise people are content to do only that, which serves their power or what the large majority expect of them, although rationality says us that more and, above all, better possibilities exist for society.

A similar motive is to be found with Djibril Tamsir Niane (born in 1932). In the famous Soundjata epos, which the Guinean scholar wrote down from the words of the Griot Mamadou Kouyaté, we have an excellent example on the theme of the strained relationship between power and intellect, politics and philosophy (cf. NIANE 1960; 1965; 1975). As with Aristotle, Plato and Confucius, so also with Max Weber, Paulin Hountondji, Kwame Nkrumah, Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin and Richard Rorty, as with all philosophers who also want to get involved in politics, the West Africa Griots are particularly affected by this strained relationship. Is it justified, however, to place Griots in a line with these philosophers? I believe that the topic, *The Balance of power in the dialogue between African and Western philosophy* actually demands that the wise men (sages) of Africa be heard.

Griots as the personified unity of power and intellect

What are Griots? Although there is a lot of speculation, even serious encyclopaedias make do with the information that the word "Griot" is of unknown origin. Interpretations of just what Griots (or Griottes) actually are, drift wide apart. It is said they are street singers, that they were in earlier times musicians, storytellers and court jesters, also well known as magicians. Nowadays one can buy their songs on CDs under world music. Without meeting any resistance, I have included two Griots in an anthology of philosophical texts from Africa.

Some Griots can fairly be described as street musicians, or simply as clowns. But here we are interested in those Griots who, as an alternative to written methods, taught history, morals and, in part law and diplomacy orally. Their influence depended not on their knowledge, but rather on the real power of the ruling houses that they served. For despite the fact, that in traditional society they at first had the possibility to express criticism of the prevalent view of the world, they were primarily committed to their rulers. The Griots formed a separate caste, to which one belonged on the one hand

through birth, and on the other hand through above-average talents in rhetoric, didactics and music. Their ambivalent place in society resulted among other things from the fact that, on the one hand, they were disseminators of news and political agitators for their rulers and enjoyed privileges in this respect, but on the other hand, they could be critics of society as well as reformers in religious matters. It is therefore no surprise, that in the Soundjata epos Islam and traditional religious elements appear to exist peacefully side-by-side. Religious dogmatism clearly did not interest the Griots. True is, what proves itself in practice. This credo can of course be directed against inherited norms. Abstract morals were foreign to the Griots – Birago Diop demonstrates this with the story heard from a Griot on *Delusion and Truth*. The Griots were regarded in some societies as outcasts, who, though needed because of their knowledge, were at the same time feared, because what they had to say was not always convenient, and not always in accordance with customs. With here and there "dialectics" nothing of course can be conclusively explained. One has always to expect a third, fourth or fifth variation in a well-rounded interpretation. For this reason, a summary of the functions of Griots in traditional society is a risky undertaking. Nevertheless, I would like to refer to three functions, that the Griots had to fulfil in traditional societies:

1. the communication of the history of the country, the people and the region; the elucidation of general "philosophical" associations from a practical (political) angle – the *educational function*;
2. the announcement (and implementation) of the ruler's opinion; the explanation of religious views and reforms, thus the communication of norms intended to guaranty the further functioning of society (including relationships of dependence and exploitation and relations with neighbours) – the *ideological function*²;
3. the entertainment value of Griot performances, the unification of rhetoric, poetics, music and dance – the *hedonistic function*.

Of course, these functions are not to be viewed in isolation to each other. And one should recall to mind: all of this occurred orally. Someone in the know, namely the West African academic, UNESCO diplomat and writer Amadou Hampâté Bâ (1900-1991) – himself a public figure with the dispo-

² "ideological" means here, that the interests of certain social groups are represented, which from an objective point of view are not always the interests of the whole community, but which are presented by rulers, with the help of the Griots, as common interests.

sition of a wise Griot – once said: "En Afrique, quand un vieillard meurt, c'est une bibliothèque qui brûle." (cf. BÂ: 1991) *Yes, when in Africa an old man dies, it's as if a library is burning.*

Whether there were (or are) under the Griots those who could be described as philosophers, cannot be clearly settled, on the one side because a "European" concept of philosophy is generally applied, and on the other side because the matter of sources is really complicated. Research into the history of philosophy would be poorer, however, if it ignored the Griots (including their real historic environment and the history of Griot thought).

Tasks of philosophical reflection at the beginning of the 21st century

In the worldwide survey *Quo vadis, Philosophie*, published in 1999, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt put the following question: "Which tasks do you think should be given priority in philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century?" (FORNET-BETANCOURT 1999: 14).

The answers naturally varied widely. They ranged from the demand for a new hermeneutic, which could better introduce traditional values into intercultural dialogue (cf. MADU 1999: 186), to emphasis of the entitlement to human rights, "that is appropriate to pluralism and the inherent sense of cultures" (SANDKÜHLER 1999: 281). In the opinion of Ryôsuke Ohashi (cf. OHASHI 1999: 221), priority must be given to the inter-cultural treatment of the conflict between non-European and European traditions of thought. With reference to Odera Oruka (Kenya), Bekele Gutema (Ethiopia) makes the point, that philosophy itself must answer the question, in which way it can be of use to society (GUTEMA 1999: 137). It is a recurring theme in the answers received, that Philosophy should continue to resist neo-liberal efforts to replace political action with market forces. F. Ochieng'-Odhiambo is of the opinion: "The political (power) imbalance cannot be detached from economics. The affluent countries of the North have continued to dictate the agenda and policies to be faithfully followed by the poor countries of the South." (OCHIENG'-ODHIAMBO 1999: 216). With reference to the strained relationship between politics and philosophy in the dialogue on the balance of power between African and Western philosophy, I agree with the viewpoint of Reinhard Mocek, which I will quote in full: "One can hardly add something original to the tasks most worthy of philosophical reflection in the coming years. If there is consensus at all among the world's masters of thought, then in this question: Everything directed at the manifold threatened survival of the human race must occupy

philosophy double and three-fold! But it doesn't help much, if time and again a new problem is made of this matter and appropriate stereotyped appeals repeated. Philosophy must once more reflect upon its synthetic possibilities and bring complex notions together. It has to want to set something in motion! But it is exactly this that resists the institutional philosophy of our time, that is directed at the history and syntax of the world of concepts, which, apart from a few heroic exceptions, has raised itself to an all-important object of research. One should concentrate applause on all those who time again and again visit the market place in search of discussion. But with whom? The citizen open to reason, will quickly communicate, in so far as he understands; and philosophy should reject the agitation of choice. And the powerful man of business? He will agree to everything that does not affect his calculations – and God knows, contemporary philosophy is free of such hazards. There remains the politician! But here the word 'discussion' is much too tender for my liking. The politician belongs before the tribunal of philosophy, if he has violated the principal of truthfulness and contributed to the situation, that the whole profession has fallen into disrepute. For not science, but only politics can solve crises; not science, but only politics is able to put insights into effect! Let's not deceive ourselves; there will be no milder tribunal than this one, for philosophy has itself experienced, how difficult it is to promote what is recognized to be good and true." (MOCEK 1999: 208f.).

III. Approach and solution lie in inter-cultural dialogue Overcoming bigotry and the claim to sole representation

It appears that the theme of the balance of power in the dialogue between African and Western philosophy basically concerns the following:

The strained relationship between philosophy and politics cannot be resolved by philosophy declaring a particular form to be the only practical balance of power for the constitutional state and at the same time the universally valid objective to be striven for by all societies. (cf. ROBERT 2001). Concepts for the explanation of individual freedom concurrent with democratic disciplining by the constitutional state, which are developed in theoretical polemics or in the practical fight against totalitarian forms of government, are themselves totalitarian at an international level, when they demand this approach of all others as the sole legitimate one. An equal dialogue is then not possible. That is then *Dialogue under the diktat of identi-*

ties (NTUMBA 1989). The same goes for the human rights problem (cf. SHIVJI 1993).

There are good reasons, however, why the constitutional state, human rights and also democracy are accepted more or less worldwide as common values and norms.

The first reason is very simple: In different traditions, these concepts are variedly defined. It is then easy to claim avowal of the constitutional state, of human rights and of democracy. The Western interpretation must not be intended. In addition, in the so-called West there also exists, for example, no uniform opinion as to what democracy is. Gail M. Presbey raises the question in her essay, whether the word democracy nowadays still represents what the ancient Greeks understood with it. Aristotle was of the view, that when men ruled on account of their riches, there was oligarchy, and when the poor ruled, there was democracy. Presbey brings the matter to a head with the observation, that according to some definitions the USA is not a democratic state (cf. PRESBEY 1998: 43).

The second reason has to do with the current balance of power in the world. As long as development aid or, in some cases, debt relief are made formally dependent on the issue of whether a multiparty system formally exists, avowal of western democracy is a question of survival. All considerations of whether there are traditions in Africa, which correspond to an extended concept of democracy, are therefore, according to conventional wisdom, counter-productive. In situations of crisis, even the cleverest minds of western philosophy and political science are in agreement, that the Western civilization be defended militarily. Jürgen Habermas and Dieter Senghaas, with their statements on the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, provide prominent examples (HABERMAS 1999: SENGHAAS 1999b). Here Norman Paech sees an example of how "one can be ground argumentatively between the millstones of law and morals, of constitutional state and a community based on values (PAECH 2001: 10f.).

The third reason is the real and relative model of success of western democracy. The collapse of real socialism in 1989/1990 confirms this impression. The Third World was also left with no choice but to undertake the attempt "to learn democracy" (FIKENTSCHER 1993: 56). That could however prove to be very disadvantageous for democracy from the point of view of world-order. For there are good reasons to think about the possible crisis in western democracy. The key words are political disinterest, apathy and indifference of a large part of the electorate, the lack of accommoda-

tion in traditional party systems for immigrant interests, a constantly diminishing platform for democratic articulation on the part of parties that question the system (they thereby become asocial and can also be pushed towards extremism or even terrorism), restricted room for manoeuvre for national democratic authorities through global capitalism, the tendency to burden coming generations with costs and the solution of problems (cf. SCHMIDT 2000).

Politics – roughly formulated – regards as hardly improbable what in the near future is unrealizable. Philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with the world as a whole, and occupies itself with the notion that the conceivable can also be regarded as feasible. Philosophy must have a rebellious effect on politics, and can therefore not be democratic.

What does that imply?

Hans-Eckart Wenzel writes in a song about his cat: "One can't train her! She's not democratic! That she's not interested in money, makes her very sympathetic..." (WENZEL 1998). Such dialectics in three sentences has its charm, but cannot replace comprehensive inter-disciplinary research, such is demanded by Dieter Senghaas in a contribution to the current debate on the ethics and democracy of consensus à la africaine (cf. SENGHAAS 1999a).

Dialogue becomes useful when problems should be solved that affect all participants in dialogue. Individual identity must of course not be given up. But a battle of identities and mere terminologizing must be renounced.

Western understanding of democracy

According to western dictionary understanding the following basic principles are essential characteristic features of a democracy:

- the principle of equality linked with participation of the whole people (that is, adults qualified to vote) as upholder of the sovereignty of the people;
- free and secret elections, so that governments can be voted in and out of office in a general election;
- the rule of law, which means that the actions of governments must conform with both constitution and laws;
- the majority principle, which means that the actions of governments must be based on the will of the majority;
- a high degree of freedom and diversification of opinion as well as the existence of an opposition (pluralism);

- the separation of powers, the existence of institutions of a constitutional state and the independence of the judiciary (cf. ENCARTA 2000).

In the context of my theme, the question arises of whether a dialogue should be directed at the universal introduction and validation of this democracy. For then the norms for a scientific (philosophical) discourse would be established. "It is hardly noticeable, that democracy is thus seen from the point of view of ruling or governing classes." (WAMBA-DIA-WAMBA 1989: 21). During a conference in October 1993 in Rotterdam on *Philosophy and democracy in an inter-cultural perspective*, one speaker from the USA said that the only concern could be the introduction of western democracy: *Whoever desired something else, should say that he wants to introduce Cuba and the Stasi*. Following that, a debate was hardly possible (cf. HOFFMANN 1993)³. The second variation would be, that notions of democracy from other cultures be somehow considered (also from the perspective that they could represent an enrichment of western democracy). Inter-cultural dialogue must begin with the possibility, that much is unknown and therefore, that quite different possibilities are conceivable and feasible. This dialogue is open. That must concern the embracing of new facts and knowledge. That affects also the outcome of the dialogue.

Debates on democratic traditions in Africa

From this point of view, it is useful to inquire into democratic traditions in Africa. This does not mean, however, to approach the subject matter uncritically.

The radical method adopted by Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka serves here as an example. He asks first, what does Europe owe Africa? And second, he is concerned as to what Africa owes itself.

The outcome is: Europe should make reparations. This "*unfinished matter* between Africa and Europe" (SOYINKA 2001: 134) must be settled:

"Justice must be made manifest either for all, or not at all.

We shall award the (albeit indicted) European humanities the last word in this charter of claims on behalf of memory. If we may appropriate Shakespeare's words in a context that, however inelegant, I am certain the Bard

³ Here similarities are to be found following the union of the GDR with the BRD. Cf. additionally the passionate contribution from Michael Brie, *Who set the norms of scientific discourse?*, now an authoritative representative of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (cf. BRIE 1993).

would approve of, we say of the blindfolded beauty that is Justice: 'Age cannot wither her. Nor custom / Stale her infinite variety.' Within that infinite variety, we may seek pragmatic answers for the modalities of marriage of the two contending tendencies that will produce a healing millennial trilogy: Truth, Reparations, and Reconciliation." (SOYINKA 2000: 91f.)

With this approach, which was reinforced in the German edition in a new capital, Wole Soyinka has made a radical contribution towards placing freedom through liberation on a material foundation. Similar efforts are to be found with Odera Oruka (cf. ODERA ORUKA 1991).

Julius Nyerere spoke of two essential traits of democracy: "First, is that everyone must be allowed to speak freely, and everyone must be listened to." (NYERERE 1974: 30). He also points out the formal character of democracy, which is decided not only on the basis of emotions. Nyerere emphasizes very strongly the role of minorities with reference to freedom of opinion. "And even after a decision has been made, free discussion about it should be allowed to continue." (NYERERE 1974: 31)

Several political scientists and philosophers are concerned with the question, whether there are democratic elements in traditional African societies (cf. e.g. WAMBA-DIA-WAMBA 1992). The philosophers Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye have also triggered off interesting debates recently. They reach beyond the ethnological questions of fifty years ago. Louis Dumont was at that time of the opinion, that societies are impossible without power and hierarchy (cf. DUMONT 1980). Others asserted the absence of hierarchy in Africa (cf. NADEL 1952; SIGRIST 1967). Kwame Nkrumah was one of those impressed by this either-or positioning, after his theory of *consciencism* degenerated to a state ideology. Initially he wanted the synthesis of traditional African, Islamic and Western elements for political and philosophical thought in Africa (cf. NKRUMAH 1980). In the end he sought the (theoretical) solution in revolutionary war (cf. NKRUMAH 1980 [1968]; see also HOFFMANN 1988 and 1989).

Gyekye assumes the existence of democratic order in pre-colonial Africa. Current societies should understand and adapt this to their advantage. He describes the Akan society, for instance, as democratic for two reasons: First, a public space was available that offered everyone the opportunity to talk about and to be listened to on political questions; second, the chiefs and queen mothers were elected representatives rather than "royal highnesses" (cf. GYEKYE 1992).

Wiredu not only rejects the multiparty system in general, he defends party-free politics. Africa consensus politics could be continued with today. A critical survey is however necessary (cf. WIREDU 1990; 1996; 1998).

On this basis there developed a very self-assured African debate on democracy. This was also a real challenge for European philosophers, (cf. for instance EBOK 1993; EZE 1997 and 1998; OLADIPO 1999; PRESBEY 1998; GRANESS 1998; LÖLKE 2001). What is decisive, is perhaps not who is right. The decisive point is, that modern political systems be established on the basis of the indigenous political balance of power. These would then be known as democratic, although they do not always correspond to the western canon. They don't have to do that. This fact has still to be acknowledged however. The West has a lot to learn in this respect.

Freedom and/or liberty

Preoccupation with power and democracy in Africa and Europe in the context of global capitalism, as in the striving for a solidarity-based world-order, cannot function without conflict. Dialogue, too, can also occasionally lead to controversy.

When in an article, for example, the statement is found, that in Africa the essential norms of modern states – to which a bureaucratic apparatus belongs – are undermined and perverted through the dominance of traditional norms and identities, then a field of conflict is described. For the question could also be raised as to whether democratic bureaucracy has not perverted highly effective Africa values. That has little to do practical politics for today. The question is, how a value system of solidarity and family bonds can be harmonized with the administration of public affairs. What is often described as corruption, has to do with the fact, that according to traditional values it goes without saying that proportionate to prosperity the family is taken care of. Political scientists speak in this context of an increasing privatization of the state in Africa (cf. HILLEBRAND 1994). Of course, in Africa, as throughout the world, traditional norms and values can also hinder decisions in keeping with the times. In contemporary literature and in African films this is often treated excellently and with a particular humour.

The approach to solving the problem here also lies in the intercultural sphere. The opening up of different cultures then stands in contrast to the uniformity derived from globalization.

For political philosophy this means the recognition of the effective plurality of democracy. For each philosophy this means, that the effective plurality of philosophies must be accepted. This further implies, that political philosophy does not aim at a universally valid view of the state or a universally valid balance of power as the culmination and conclusion of development. Norman Paech's criticism of Habermas, in his statement on NATO deployment in Kosovo in 1999, is therefore completely justified. Habermas attempts to legitimize this deployment in terms of non-existent international civil rights. With that, western stakes are set, and alternatives hardly find a place (cf. PAECH 2001: 11).

If for philosophy, globalization can mean the justification of the dominance of so-called western philosophy, then for the concept of intercultural systems, or the multiversum of cultures, this means qualifying ones own cultural tradition as well as one own hopes. The starting point is here not so important. My point is, in principle it doesn't matter, whether I discover intercultural matters from the perspective of a Western or from an African philosophical tradition. The only condition is that no tradition claims to be in possession of the sole explanation for the intercultural approach, which is valid for all others. In this context, intercultural does not mean that other philosophical traditions are merely taken notice of. It means opening up to other traditions, as well as critical reflection not only on foreign traditions but also on ones own tradition. Intercultural does not however mean that I have to deny my own philosophical tradition, that is restrict myself to intercultural philosophising, when, as a European, I become a specialist on African philosophy. It is a matter of questions, common to all, concerning a future in which "the solution of the conflict between man and nature, and also between man and man, appears to make possible a real solution of the dispute between existence and entity, between concretization and self-assertion, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species" (MARX 1998: 702f.). Common problems with different bases in tradition, influence and extraneous assessment of ones own culture, can form a firm link for intercultural dialogue, also on the balance of power. It is not however "the solved puzzle of history", and does not understand itself "to be this solution" (MARX 1998: 703) in the sense that all conflicts have been solved in an albeit commonly acquired intercultural political philosophy. In the precise spirit of Hannah Arendt, this means that there can be no end of conflicts. Only totalitarian societies strive for this. This view correlates with the views of Kenneth Kaunda, who once said, in so many words: *I*

don't understand the Europeans. They are constantly on the search for new problems, that they then want to solve. We Africans have learnt to live with the problems (KAUNDA 1966).

History is open. That cannot mean whatever one wants, or that everything remains as it is. Hannah Arendt's separation of violence and power could also provide an interesting intercultural contribution on the theme of reflection on the balance of power. Hannah Arendt pointed out that it is not violence but power that is the essence of government. Violence can destroy the old power, but it can never create the authority that legitimizes the new. Violence is therefore the poorest possible basis on which to build a government. "To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished but it is also paid by the victor." (ARENDR 1969: 53) Violence thus stands for mute power and for mere production and destruction. Violence is a dehumanized, technocratic matter. Power, on the other hand, in the words of Hannah Arendt, means communicated, shared and limited power (cf. ARENDR 1969).

This includes, *firstly*, the rescue of historical facts from transformation into simple viewpoints, and *secondly*, the rescue of historical and topical facts from untruth in politics. Its differentiation from work or production and action could be of importance to intercultural dialogue. According to Arendt, work means occupation in ends and means categories. Action, on the other hand, is the ability to start something new, to interrupt the familiar and to retain the proven. With Hannah Arendt, as with Kenneth Kaunda, the tension between work and action is decisive. It should not be eliminated. Her understanding of politics might still be stimulating today (cf. LAMBRECHT 1993: 14). It should come as no surprise when, for example, Gail M. Presbey repeatedly refers to Hannah Arendt in an article on the power of Akan chiefs and queen mothers in present-day Ghana (cf. PRESBEY 1998).

It's a question of freedom and justice. And it's about human dignity (cf. ARENDR 1951: 12). Contrary to Hannah Arendt, inter-cultural dialogue on the balance of power also means that the institutional conditions for freedom have to be more carefully observed than she has done. Her argumentation, as to why freedom is to be more highly valued than each social question, is sound. She by no means excludes the social question. The identical political freedom of all citizens is more important than social benefits, because it is the condition for allowing non-violent protest against discrimination, hunger and injustice as well as employment. The social-economic de-

pendence of justice cannot however be ignored. Her disapproving comments on the "Negro question" and on full employment are puzzling (cf. ARENDT/McCARTHY 1996: 340 and 345). To recommend the USA model of democracy to everyone as the ultimate sole true model, as Hannah Arendt does, will lead nowhere. There are beneficiaries and victims of global capitalism. For this reason, a philosophical dialogue on an equal footing between Africa and Europe on the balance of power must not only accept the themes put forward by Henry Odera Oruka and Wole Soyinka, but rather – also in the interests of the West – incorporate them as fundamental issues in a list of questions concerning the founding of freedom and justice. In his publication *Philosophy of liberty*, from 1991, Odera Oruka describes *six liberties*: economic, political, intellectual, cultural, religious and sexual liberty. For him it is particularly important not to define economic liberty as liberty of the market in a capitalistic sense. On the contrary, Odera Oruka wishes to interpret economic liberty in a socialist sense. Here, however, he means socialism in a very general interpretation. The state has the task, in the interests of the people, of providing economic equality, so that exploitation, one of the other, is no longer possible (cf. ORUKA 1991: 68): This thesis surprised me somewhat, because he produced no evidence, but with the claim that I advocated similar theses he called me an orthodox Marxist (cf. ORUKA 1990: 7f.) The *Philosophy of Liberation*, for him as for me, pursues open and conscious interests, but not those of rulers or established intellectuals, who, far removed from economic and political difficulties, can afford heady debates on liberty. The *Philosophy of Liberation* has to formulate the conditions for freedom, and equally the demand, that the actors of this philosophy are also actors in practical politics. When I asked him, why I of all people should be an orthodox Marxist, he embraced me and said, he wanted to talk to me about it "when everything is calm". After midnight he visited me, secretly as it were, in my hotel in Nairobi. He told me about his arrest, how terrible and humiliating prison was for him, that he never wanted to go to prison again, that he had the hope that after the end of real socialism, socialism would have a true chance, and he asked me if I too viewed the cause optimistically. I'll never forget this long discussion in a July night in 1991. After his death in 1995 (a truck had driven over him, and the police and secret service spoke of an accident), I agreed to write a contribution for a commemorative work – and was then in fact not able to write orderly sentences about Odera Oruka.

While some debate freedom, others are concerned with liberation. In this dialogue there can be no claim for leadership on the part of the West.

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Leela D'Souza

13. The Challenges of Globalization and the Emergence of Fundamental Movements

Summary

Globalization broadly refers to the condition of complex connectivity evident in the world today, seen in terms of both the compression of the world and the intensification of global consciousness. Some theorists hold that Globalization has been occurring throughout history, only its form has changed over the different historical periods. Sociologists of the classical period had identified globalizing solvents in terms of capitalist commodification (Marx), differentiation (Durkheim) and rationalization (Weber). In contemporary sociological theory Globalization is seen largely through the mediating category of Modernity (Robertson, Giddens, Wallerstein).

Religion has played a significant role in the process of Globalization, initially through the expansion of the world religions of Islam and Christianity, and later through the secularization processes in Protestantism. Recent developments are however challenging the secularization thesis. What is instead being observed is the resurgence of religion in terms of what are being generally called Fundamentalist movements. These Fundamentalist Movements can be categorized into (a) the emergence of New Religious Movements and (b) the wave of Religious Nationalist movements. Niklas Luhmann holds that the globalization of society, while structurally favouring privatization of religion, provides fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion. What is the future role of religion in society?

I.

Globalization.

Just as post-modernism was the concept of the 1980s, 'Globalization' could be called the concept of the 1990s. It had begun to replace terms like 'internationalization' and 'trans-nationalization' as a more suitable concept for describing the ever intensifying networks of cross-border human interaction (Hoogvelt,1997:114). Globalization referred to an empirical condition of the complex connectivity evident everywhere in the world in recent times. Complex connectivity involved overcoming cultural distances

through penetrating experiences provided through education, employment, consumer culture and the mass media and had been described as being more significant than technological advances and physical mobility (Tomlinson,1999:32). Held, McGrew and others were of the view that Globalization was neither a wholly novel, nor primarily a modern social phenomenon, only its form had changed over time and across the key domains of human interaction. However, although important continuities with previous phases of Globalization existed, contemporary patterns of Globalization constituted a distinctive historical form which was itself a product of a unique conjuncture of social, political, economic and technological forces. They had presented a fourfold periodization of Globalization: Pre-Modern, Early Modern, Modern and Contemporary.

In the Pre-Modern period (pre-1500 C.E.), the key agents of Globalization were three-fold: political and military empires, world religions and the migratory movements of nomadic groups, the steppe peoples and of farming societies. In this context Globalization was seen as inter-regional and inter-civilization encounters.

In the Early Modern period (1500 – 1800 C.E.), what had been called the rise of the West, in other words the historical process which produced the emergence and development of the key institutions of European modernity, the acquisition of technologies and power resources that had exceeded those available to any other civilization and the subsequent creation of European global empires, were regarded the key agents of Globalization.

The Modern period (circa 1850-1945), witnessed an enormous acceleration in the spread and entrenchment of global networks and flows that had begun in the Early Modern Period. Exploiting these innovations, the reach of western global empires and thus of western economic power and cultural influence exploded. This era saw very extensive, intensive and socially significant patterns of globalization.

In the Contemporary period (from 1950 onwards) globalization was shaped profoundly by the structural consequences of the second world war, and the emergence of a world-wide system of nation states, overlaid by multi-lateral, regional and global systems of regulation and governance. This era also experienced extraordinary innovations in the infra-structures of transport and communication and an unparalleled density of institutions of global governance and regulation. This era not only quantitatively surpassed earlier periods, but had also displayed qualitative differences (Held,1999:414-430).

Towards a Definition of Globalization.

Globalization was best described as complex connectivity, i.e. the rapidly developing inter-connectedness and inter-dependencies that characterized modern social life. Giddens defined Globalization as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which links distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens,1990:64). This was a dialectical process because local happenings could move in an obverse direction, i.e. from the very distanced relations that shaped them. McGrew also spoke of Globalization as 'simply the intensification of global inter-connectedness' and stressed the multiplicity of linkages it implied – goods, capital, social-institutional relationships, technological developments, ideas, all readily flowed across territorial boundaries (see Tomlinson,1999:2). Dwelling on the complexity of the Globalization process, Robertson observed that globalization increasingly imposed constraints but it also differentially empowered. He defined Globalization as a concept that referred, 'both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson,1998:8). We look in greater detail at Robertson's definition of Globalization.

The first part of the definition, i.e. global compression, included arguments of theories of dependency and of world-systems. Compression led to proximity which could be seen in terms of the shrinking of distances through the dramatic reduction in time taken either physically (in travel) or representationally (through information technology) to cross distances. It also referred to spatial proximity via the idea of 'stretching' social relations across distances; the transformation of spatial experiences into temporal existence leading to simultaneous and instantaneous experiences. Global proximity resulted from a 'shrinking world' or in McLuhan's terms, the world was reduced to a 'global village'. The United Nations preferred the term 'Global Neighbourhood'. Phenomenologically, proximity was being described as a common conscious appearance of the world as more intimate and more compressed. Metaphorically it implied an increasing immediacy and consequentiality thereby reducing real distanced relations (Tomlinson,1999:3). Global compression which led to proximity also referred to an increasing level of interdependence between national systems by way of trade, military alliance, domination and cultural imperialism. While Wallerstein (1974) maintained that the globe had been undergoing social compression since the beginning of the 16th century, Robertson ar-

gued that its history was much longer (Waters,1995:41). Hoogvelt asserted that world compression was not a new idea. What made it a novelty in Robertson's work was that he argued that world compression intensified 'global consciousness' (Hoogvelt,1997:117).

The second component of the definition was more important, i.e. the idea of an intensification of global consciousness, which was a relatively new phenomenon. This implied that individual phenomenologies would be addressed to the entire world rather than to local or national sectors of it. Not only in matters of mass media and consumer preferences, but in all issues – military-political issues, economic issues, religious issues, issues of citizenship, environment, position of women and so on. For the first time in history, the globe was becoming a single social and cultural setting. Thus in all spheres of life, issues could no longer be looked at independently from a local perspective. Globalization had connected the world. Local was raised to the horizon of a 'single world'. There was both an increasing interaction and a simultaneity of frames of reference. Robertson clarified that this did not imply greater integration but greater unification or systematisation, where similar institutions and processes emerged say in banking, political governance or national expressions (national flag, museums, libraries); in other words there was more connectivity. Nor did Robertson imply more harmony; he was careful to state that while it was a single system, it was divided by conflict and there was no universal agreement on what shape the single system should take in the future. In fact conflicts could be more intractable than the previous disputes between nations. Neither did global unity imply a simplistic uniformity like a world culture. It did not imply wholeness and inclusiveness that was total and encompassing. Rather, it was a complex social and phenomenological condition in which different aspects of human life were brought into articulation with one another. It could lead to cultural differences becoming more accentuated precisely as it was identified in relation to the 'world as a whole'. In its peculiar twentieth century manifestation of a holistic consciousness, Globalization involved the relativization of individual and national reference points to general and supranational ones. It involved cultural, social and phenomenological linkages between the individual self, national society, international system of societies and humanity in general (Waters,1995:42).

Globalization – A Sociological Understanding

There was a requirement to understand and analyze Globalization multi-dimensionally in terms of the simultaneous and complexly related processes in the realms of economy, polity, culture, technology and so forth. Sociologists have been at the forefront in the effort to give Globalization a consistent and rigorous theoretical status (Hoogvelt,1997:116). Curiously Globalization, or a concept very much like it, had appeared early in the development of the social sciences. Saint-Simon noticed that industrialization was inducing commonalties of practices across the disparate cultures of Europe. Durkheim's legacy to Globalization was his theories of differentiation and culture. The state and the collective consciousness had progressively become more weak and abstract in order to encompass intra-society diversity. All this implied that industrialization tended to weaken collective commitments and to open the way for dismantling the boundaries between societies.

Just as Durkheim identified differentiation, Weber identified rationalization as the globalizing solvent. Weber's concern with the success of rationalization and with its spread from the seed-bed origins of Calvinistic Protestantism to infect all Western cultures implied a homogenization of cultures as well as reduced commitment to such values as patriotism and duty. But even this globalizing effect was restricted to Western Europe. Weber saw no prospect of the spread of rationalized cultural preferences to say India or China that he regarded as inevitably mired in religious traditionalism.

Of all the classical theorists, the one most explicitly committed to a Globalizing theory of modernization was Karl Marx. Globalization caused an enormous increase in the power of the capitalist class because it opened up new markets for it. The establishment of a 'world market' for modern industry gave a cosmopolitan character not only to production but also to consumption (Waters,1995:5-6; Robertson,1998:15-18).

In the contemporary period the development of the term 'Globalization' as a specifically sociological concept owed by far the greatest debt to Roland Robertson of the University of Pittsburg (Waters,1995:38). Robertson stressed that Globalization needed to be understood as involving contradictions, resistances and countervailing forces, as involving a dialectic of opposed principles and tendencies – local and global, particular and universal, integration and differentiation (Tomlinson,1999:16). According to Waters, Robertson's chief rival for the mantle of parent of the concept was Anthony Giddens (Waters,1995:47). In the contemporary sociological theory, one of

the theoretical debates of Globalization surrounded when it began. Two broad patterns were suggested. I. The emergence of a New Age. II. Through the powerful mediating category of Modernity (Waters,1995:4).

I. The Emergence of a New Age. Martin Albrow (1997:6) accepted Globalization on its own terms and in its own time. He spoke of 'The Global Age' that he argued had replaced 'The Modern Age'. The Modern Age had been supplanted and superceded by a new Global Age, with its own axial principles and specific cultural imaginary. The 'epochal shift' from pre-modern to modern to global lay in the axial principles that put communication, mobility and connectivity at the center of human lives (see Tomlinson,1999:38-48).

II. Through the mediating category of Modernity. Under this pattern, three possibilities could be specified:

i). *Globalization was seen in the historical context of Modernity.* Robertson was a strong proponent of this view. Only within the historical appearance of key modern institutions of capitalism, industrialism and urbanism, a developed nation-state system, mass communication and so on, could the complex network of social relations characteristic of Globalization arise. Thus Modernity, understood as the nexus of these institutions, was the essential historical context of Globalization. Prior to this period the socio-institutional conditions and the resources of cultural imagination enabling connectivity were simply not in place. Robertson did not subscribe to Giddens' (1990) view that modernity had led directly to Globalization (or Globality). Rather, Robertson insisted that Globalization of the contemporary type was set in motion long before modernity; in the economic sphere it predated even the rise of capitalism. He did not however deny that certain aspects of modernity had greatly amplified Globalization i.e. Modernization tended to accelerate the Globalization process (Hoogvelt,1997:116; Robertson,1998:170).

ii). *Globalization was seen as a Consequence of Modernity.* Giddens first (1981,1985) addressed the issue of the emergence of a global system in a general critique of Marxist theory in which he challenged the view that the development of the capitalist system alone determined the modern history of human societies. Giddens asserted that the development of the nation-states and their capacity to wage war on each other also determined the modern history of human societies. For Giddens, as also for Robertson, the

ascendancy of the nation state, which had become a universal political unit, was simultaneous with the development of Globalization. Each was impossible without the other. The world was seen as a network of national societies in a global system of international relations (see Waters,1995:47) Later, in his book 'The Consequences of Modernity' (1990), Giddens offered one of the most sophisticated analyses of Modernization and its inherently globalizing properties. Giddens' approach to Globalization was historically discontinuous in contrast to Robertson's approach that was historically continuous. Using the concepts of time-space distancing, disembedding and reflexivity, he explained how complex relationships developed between local activities and interaction took place across distances. He saw Globalization as the result of the inherently expansive characteristics of Modernity and listed four such institutional characteristics or 'organizational clusters'. a. A Capitalist system of commodity production (owners of private capital and labour). b. Industrialization (technology required a collective process of production). c. Administrative competence of the nation-state (a good surveillance system). d. Military order (for centralization of control within an industrialized society). He explained that his discussion of Globalization focused on modernity since he saw Globalization as a consequence of Modernity. Modernity implied universalizing tendencies that made possible global networks of relationships and more basically extended temporal-spatial distance of social relationships (Waters,1995:48-50). Giddens was critical of the undue reliance that sociologists placed on the idea of 'society' where this meant a bounded system. He was of the view that this should be replaced by starting points that concentrated on analyzing how social life was ordered across time and space (Giddens,1990:64).

iii). *Globalization was the result of the hegemony of Modernity.* Wallerstein saw Globalization in its strategic role of the maintenance of western cultural dominance and its universalizing and hegemonic tendencies. The concept of Globalization, he opined, was an obvious object for ideological suspicion, because like modernization, a predecessor and related concept, it was bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it had ramified through political and cultural arenas. It did not imply that every culture/society had to become westernized and capitalist, but it implied that they had to establish their position in relation to the capitalist West. Wallerstein concentrated on the emergence and evolution of the modern European world system, which he traced from its late medieval

origins of the 15th and 16th centuries to the present day. Capitalism functioned in relation to the long-term cyclical rhythms, the central one of which was the regular pattern of expansion and contraction of the whole economy, which over the years 'have transformed the capitalist world economy from a system located primarily in Europe to one that covers the entire globe' (see Waters,1995:23-26; Hoogvelt,1997:65-67).

II.

Globalization and Religion.

With this brief introduction to Globalization in the context of modernity, we now look at the response of religion to the Globalization process. How had the process of globalization effected religion? And how had religion responded? A global focus on religion had emerged because of a cluster of issues: i). the debate about whether societies were becoming more or less secularized, ii). the resurgence of religion (or the diffusion of religion as a category) and iii). the emergence in the 1970s and the 1980s of church-state and religion-politics confluences and tensions, commonly referred to as 'fundamentalisms', across much of the globe. But first we look at the role of religion in the emergence of Globalization (Robertson,1998:2).

Role of Religion in the Globalization Process.

Robertson who had been credited with first analyzing Globalization from a sociological perspective, had a dominant interest in trying to isolate the period during which contemporary Globalization reached a point when it was so well established that a particular pattern or form prevailed. According to Robertson, the expansion of the world religions of Islam and Christianity had an important role in this process.

The expansion of Islam took place with the expansion of the Arab and Ottoman Empires from the 12th to the 15th centuries. By the 18th century it had achieved a presence in diverse regions. Christianity had to wait for the military and colonial expansion of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries to acquire a global presence. Prior to this period the globalizing consequence was the incorporation of tribal peasants into large-scale political systems. These two universalistic religions of Christianity and Islam, both derivatives of the Abrahamic faith, became universalizing religions and most effective globalizers because of their claims that the world was created by a single God and that humanity was a common force of existence in relation to that God. It led to the argument that humanity constituted a single com-

munity that disvalued geographical localities and political territories, that there was a single value-reference for every person in the world and that this God proposed a single set of legal and moral laws.

By the 16th century, a newer and far more important globalizing religious force had emerged – Protestantism. Catholicism had blurred the relationship between State and Church so that a series of conflicts emerged between Kings and Popes. The Reformation resolved the dispute between State and Church by either subordinating the Church to the State (as in England), or by secularizing the State (as in U.S.A. and France). The State could now rely for its legitimization on the political process of nationalism rather than on religious legitimations. The power of the State thus grew and was itself a pre-requisite for globalization (Waters,1995:127-128), (as was seen earlier in the views expressed by both Giddens and Robertson that the development of the nation-state was a requirement for the development of Globalization. One was impossible without the other).

Religion in the Modern Period

In the modern period, since the 1960s, many sociologists had put forward the notion that religion in the contemporary Western world had become increasingly privatized. Most prominently T. Parsons (1966:134), P. Berger (1973:133f), T. Luckmann (1967:103) and R. Bellah (1970:43) interpreted secularization in the modern world to mean that traditional religion was now primarily the concern of the individual and had therefore lost much of its 'public' relevance. Privatization referred to the limitation of the relevance of religion to the private sphere of the individual's life, where in some cases the common universe of meaning was limited or fragmented only to the level of the nuclear family. This implied that the 'religious preference' could be as easily rejected as it was adopted (Berger,1973:137). Institutional differentiation (which Luhmann calls functionally differentiated societal sub-systems) and pluralistic individual identities were basic features of modern societies. Secularization was the consequence of the relative independence of these initial sub-systems of society from religious norms, values and justifications, i.e. religion now had a limited legitimizing role in a highly differentiated society; it suffered the fate of compartmentalization (Beyer,1999:373-374).

What did this imply for religion in general? For an answer, Beyer looked to Niklas Luhmann's (1982) thesis that he opined allowed a clear examination of the problems and potential of religion in contemporary global society.

The Luhmannian thesis held that the globalization of society, while structurally favouring privatization of religion, also provided fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion i.e. religion not only retreated from important aspects of local life, it also developed an institutionally specialized sub-system of its own. By public influence he meant that one or more religions could become the source of collective commitment; collective action in the name of specific religious norms now became legitimate (Beyer,1999:373).

In the Luhmannian scheme, the rise of the expert in modern society reflected a socio-structural situation in which professionals became the prime public representatives of societal sub-systems. Thus public importance of a system rose and fell with the public influence of its professional. The question that followed was under what circumstances would individual persons listen to religious leaders, to a new revelation or to a revival of the old beliefs? Religion needed to provide a service that not only supported and enhanced the religious faith of its adherents, but also by which it could impose itself by having far-reaching implications outside the strictly religious realm. It was in this context that contemporary religious movements were of particular interest (Beyer,1999:377-78). These religious movements are considered under the title 'Fundamentalist Movements'.

Fundamentalist Movements.

The contemporary religious movements that were challenging the secularization thesis could be observed in what was broadly and generally being called Fundamentalist Movements. Fundamentalism, as John Hawley explained, was an embattled term. It first arose in the United States in about 1920s as a term of self-reference adopted by a group of Protestant Christians who rallied behind a series of pamphlets called "The Fundamentals" (1910-1915). These writings deplored the evils of modernism – especially scientific rationalism, an 'uncritical' use of higher criticism of the Bible and perceived lapses in moral values. They favoured returning to 'the fundamentals' of Christian belief and practice, eternal pillars of an idealized past. In time the liberal Christians and modernists of a more secular hue began to use the term 'fundamentalist' in a rather broader sense, to designate groups they saw as naive enough to believe they could reverse the course of history in favour of a mythic, dogmatically and socially homogenous Christian past. (These positions were articulated by conservative Christian groups mainly evangelical Protestants) (Hawley,1999:3).

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 put the term 'fundamentalism' into wide use for the first time. It now referred to religious groups who took political action to reject Western secular modernism in its various forms (Hawley,1999:3). As Robertson explained, the term 'fundamentalism' was hardly used outside the USA till as recently as the late 1970s and then only on a limited scale. Only in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 did there arise the tendency to speak of a globe-wide Fundamentalism. Eventually this term was adopted by people and movements across the globe and came to represent atavism and a narrow rigid mentality. Some of the indigenous movements around the globe adopted and accepted some of the diagnosis that Fundamentalisms were fueled by basically religious and spiritual orientations (see Robertson,1998:169).

Today the term Fundamentalism was being applied to two different categories of religious movements: i), the emergence of what were termed New Religious Movements that were revitalizing old religions and ii), a wave of what were called Religious Nationalist movements expressing themselves as religio-political movements that were explicit attempts to create a public influence for religion. We look at each of these recent developments separately.

I. The New Religious Movements.

Social theorists observed that by the 1960s, contrary to the earlier secularization approach, religion was not receding unilaterally from man's life. However religion was not the same any more either (Hadden,1997:356). A new religious consciousness was resurfacing that was not simply a reassertion of traditional religiosity, instead there was a search for a 'new consciousness'; a search for new meanings that had a profound religious quality to it (Giri,1998:41). As Wilson explained, the New Religious Movements were the response of contemporary man to the contemporary social conditions, just as traditional religion had been the response of man to the social conditions of that time. The ideology of equality and democracy, the emphasis on youth, the new relativism in man's thinking, the search for renewal of self, were all characteristic of the New Religious Movements or the new religious consciousness that was emerging (Wilson,1982:121-130). The term New Religious Movements, explained Beckford, was first applied by social scientists to refer to a bewildering variety of spiritual enthusiasms that had emerged in the West after the 1960s (Beckford,1987:391). However it was today being used chronologically to refer to all religions that had es-

tablished themselves in Western Europe, North America, India and Japan since 1945 and in Africa since 1890s (Clarke, 1988:907). The term today had served as a somewhat arbitrary but generally useful term, an umbrella for a stunning diversity of phenomena ranging from cults, sects, spiritual groups or alternate belief systems to doctrinal deviations within world religions and major churches, to passing fads and spiritual enthusiasms of a questionable religious kind (Barker, 1987:405). The term had also included a spiritual renewal of self and millennial groups (Giri, 1998:25).

Some of the new religious movements in India included ISKON or International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Rajneeshism, Transcendental Meditation, Sai Baba Movement. Japan had an estimated two hundred indigenous or non-indigenous new religious movements. The more popular were Soka Gakkai or Value Creation Society, Tenrikyo or Heavenly Wisdom and Risshokoseikai. Africa had some twenty thousand movements, some with only twenty members, others with several thousand. Some of the larger ones were Godianism, Deima and Aladura. In America, the new religious movements were largely known as 'Jesus' Movements or Pentecostal movements (Wilson, 1982; Clarke, 1988).

Our contemporary society was thus experiencing both a crisis in religion and its global resurgence. This resurgence was taking place in all varieties of social systems – from the technologically most advanced to the traditional societies. This retreat from secularization and the revival of religion was taking place, according to social scientists, largely because science, technology and rationality were failing to give meaning in both the personal and occupational lives of individuals and had failed to resolve some of the institutional problems of modern society. It had also failed to provide a guide to man's quest for ultimate concern, accepting that man was by anthropological nature a religious animal. Individuals were realizing the infinite fragmentation that modern developments had caused in their lives and were striving to put these fragments back together again into a meaningful whole (Wilson, 1966, 1982, 1988; Beckford, 1986; Dawson, 1998; Giri, 1998).

II. Religious Nationalist Movements

In the 1990s, scholars sensitive to the problem of the emergence of religious groups who took political action leading even to national revolutions, had suggested a series of alternate terms to designate these conservative, neo-traditionalist and often militant religious groups. One such term favoured by writers such as Peter van der Veer and Mark Juergensmeyer was

'religious nationalism'. Juergensmeyer explained that when a religious perspective was fused with a political and social destiny of a nation, it was referred to as religious nationalism. Religious nationalists were not just religious fanatics. For the most part they were political activists who were seriously attempting to reformulate the 'modern' language of politics in order to provide a new basis for the nation state. They were concerned not so much about the political structure of the nation state as about the political ideology underlying it (Juergensmeyer,1994:xiii; D'Souza,2000:29). Nikkie Keddie who questioned whether nationalism was always the main focus of such efforts had proposed the term 'new religious politics' (see Hawley,1999:3).

Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby, in a famous Chicago study titled 'Fundamentalisms Observed' (1991), had elaborately developed the characteristics of Fundamentalism, (which we are here terming 'Religious Nationalism', see Note 1*). They explained Fundamentalism as a reaction against the invasive, intrusive and threatening features of modernity by the emerging nation-states of the non-western world. For example, Islamic Fundamentalism represented a delayed reaction to the hegemony of European colonial rule after they became an independent nation state. Religious identity was used as a protective shield against the onslaught of Globalization, which was marked by the entry of integrated 'market systems' which came along with a variety of commodities, values, beliefs and styles of being. The fear of extinction and the threat to survival both as a people and as a culture and the loss of distinctiveness in the rush to homogeneity resulted in the introduction of a comprehensive social system based upon religious principles that embraced law, policy, society, economy and culture. Thus Fundamentalism tended to be totalitarian in its practice and encompassed all areas of private and public life. Religion was declared not just a faith but also a way of life. Fundamentalism of this nature was not religious in the classical sense of the term, but was a variant of a secular faith couched in religious language.

Religious and nationalist movements, it was further observed, often invoked authenticity and 'authentic culture' as a weapon against what was foreign and alien. However this authenticity was questionable, as it became difficult to prove what was authentic and what was not. The invoking of certain traditions and the denying of others required a reconstruction of history, if not its destruction. Historians took pains to demonstrate that historically intercultural exchange, trade and conquest had rendered any notion of

authenticity highly problematic. Fundamentalist movements then relied a great deal on invented traditions (Marty and Appleby,1991:814-837). However, Fundamentalism was not a total rejection of the modern. Rather, it had been seen to draw selectively on both tradition and modernity and to employ every available method of modern science and technology to further its own ends of establishing a distinct identity. Tradition was invoked in areas of dress, treatment of women, family systems. In an edited book titled, 'Religious Fundamentalism and the Human Rights of Women', (1999), Hawley wrote that until recently it was insufficiently appreciated that issues of gender played a crucial role in the language of Fundamentalism. 'What is being championed is a divinely sanctioned vision of natural differences between the sexes that make it appropriate for women to live within boundaries and to live under men's protection, even surveillance' (Hawley,1999:3). Modernity was invoked in the form of modern technology and scientific developments, information technology, modern weaponry, arms, computers, Internet and mass public education. Fundamentalism itself had been supported by foreign capital while professing and propagating indigenization (a contradiction). Marty & Appleby observed that in its strategies and methods, fundamentalism displayed a closer affinity to modernism than to traditionalism. Thus while Fundamentalism resented or envied the powers and influence of modernity, it shrewdly exploited its processes and instrumentalities. It had sometimes used democratic processes to come to power (Marty and Appleby,1991:827). Lechner (1990a:95) contended that where the discontents of modernity were felt more keenly and defined more sharply, new and stronger Fundamentalist movements were likely to emerge (Robertson,1998:170).

Fundamentalism then was driven by the affinity-identity passions of ethnic communities and religious groups often thirsting for self-esteem and dignity. Fundamentalism as seen above was an effort to 'neutralize the other' and establish one's own identity. In other words, the question of 'cultural survival' was at the core of the issue of religious revivalism. This process could be observed in the East European countries that belonged to divergent cultural communities and ethnic groups after the demise of the Soviet Union. Their demand for economic autonomy and preservation of cultural identities resulted in the ethnic conflicts between majority Muslim and Christian minority Serbs in Bosnia, between minority Christian Serbs and majority Muslims of Albanian origin in the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia. This process can also be observed in parts of Indonesia today. In India

religious-cultural and ethnic clashes are being experienced in the efforts of those of the Hindutva ideology, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) or "Sangh Parivar", to create a communal divide between the Hindu majority and the Muslim and Christian minority communities in India.

In his initial understanding about the relationship of Globalization to Fundamentalism (seen more generally as the search for fundamentals), Robertson saw Fundamentalism as an attempt to express the identity of a society, a felt necessity to declare a social identity. This aspect saw Fundamentalism as a reaction to Globalization resulting from the compression of an inter-societal system. Fundamentalism was about differentiations and distinctions between the self and other (Robertson,1998:175).

In his recent attempts to grasp analytically the more general problem of Fundamentalism, Robertson saw Fundamentalism more as an aspect of or a creation of Globalization rather than a reaction to it. It was an assertion of a deep particularity, i.e. a global construction and dissemination of ideas concerning the value of particularism, a declaration of a particular identity. He saw it in the context of the apparent paradox of globality-locality. The idea of Fundamentalism as a reaction or resistance to Globalization was not discarded, only it was built into the general process of Globalization. He preferred to see Fundamentalism as a 'search for fundamentals' in the context of the compression of the world, which was a more respectful acknowledgement of peoples' real practices rather than the term 'extremism'. Fundamentalism thus constituted ways of finding a place within the world as a whole, ways that frequently involved attempts to enhance the power of the groups concerned. It was not necessarily anti-global. It actually involved a quest for community, for stable values and beliefs and was an assertion of power. Robertson explained it in terms of a two-fold process – particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. This idea of the right to identity, 'the struggle for recognition' as Fukuyama (1992) described it, was widespread. Fundamentalism then was a product of globality, and even though it took ostensibly anti-global forms, it tended to partake of the distinctive features of globality (Robertson,1998:175-178).

Conclusion

In conclusion we observe that the term Fundamentalism was being applied to two categories of religious movements. One, to New Religious Movements and spiritual enthusiasms that were seeking a 'return to fundamentals'

or were a new religious response to social conditions of contemporary society. And two, to Religious Nationalisms that were more political expressions by religious leaders seeking a political identity for a religious culture. As Beyer explained it, religion in the world seemed to be going on in both conservative and liberal directions, i.e. concentrating on ministering to private religious choices and entering the political and public arena (Beyer,1999:393). Lawrence explained it was today better to speak of global fundamentalisms rather than a single world-wide fundamentalist movement and to acknowledge the agenda of each as being discrete in its local setting (Lawrence,1999:98).

Looking at the future role of religion in society we observe that religion and politics had been separated in a post-Enlightenment period of the secular west, which may not have been viewed in this manner in a pre-Enlightenment period of western culture (King,1999:7-14). (In India such a separation may not have existed at all as held by T.N. Madan, 1983). Socio-cultural gaps of our uneven modern world would continue to evoke varied responses from both religious and secular ideologies. The first step in coping with Fundamentalisms was to appreciate the fundamentalist dilemma. The symbolic and emotive power of Fundamentalism was as authentically modern as it was persistently disruptive (Lawrence,1999:99). Understanding the present role of religion in a globalized society may then require a shift from the Enlightenment period paradigm, without a reductionist approach in either direction – religion, politics or culture.

Notes.

1. For the subsection subtitled 'Religious Nationalist Movements', the term 'Fundamentalism' refers to 'Religious Nationalism' as described by Juergensmeyer.

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Marina Jakobsen

14. Gender in the era of globalization

In last ten years we have been dealing with the issue of globalization in many aspects, mainly the economical, technological, social, cultural, military and of course migrations from the so called 3. to the 1. world. Perhaps we have no reason to surprised or amazed: but the gender issue has been almost as absent from this agenda.

But what is globalization? I will now shortly present the concept of globalization I am operating with in this discussion. I will also make an attempt to explain why I call it a discussion.

Globalization, as we are trying to understand it in the Western is at least a double process throughout the planet: an extension and expansion of the neo-liberal capitalistic system with its technological means and ideology, and the reduction of the (national) State power of decision and consequently the dismantling of democratic processes both at the locus of departure of this system – the USA and Europe, mainly, and in the places hit by it in special. As an implementation of a modality of the so called western civilization upon the rest of the planet, it is an active process towards which the globalized parts do not have much possibility left to resist. Globalization aims at the total market, free flow of capital, removal of barriers between states, of course accompanied by cultural transformation. And as such it ought to be considered a totalitarian system. Once Mahatma Gandhi was asked to reveal his opinion about the western civilization, his comments was: a good idea. I am not sure the Mahatma would say that today, if He was able to see what is going on. It is just too aggressive, Gandhi would probably consider it violent. We are coming back to this subject.

Now: how to talk about gender in this system and discern at least some implications? First and foremost we have to recall the banal distinction between the concepts of gender and sex. The concept of sex is based on the biological side of the specie, e.g. it is a biological factor, while gender involves cultural factors, what means that both the masculine and feminine

are socio-historical productions or better constructions¹. From Aristotle over Christianity, though modernity the feminine gender has been construct as something inferior, lacking dignity and therefore object of exclusion. The masculine gender has been construct over the archetype: form and spirit and the feminine: nature and matter.

But history, all histories, usually written by males has not done many sincere attempts to make up the injustice towards women, or to deconstruct it², a woman like Hypathia do not count many pages in the history of philosophy. Just a curiosity, I am going to mention that in the philosophy lexicon our students use, only four women are mentioned: Hypathia, 4 lines, Simone de Beauvoir 9 lines, Judith Stein 15 lines and Hannah Arendt, 22, and many words are about her muse/mentor relationship with Martin Heidegger, not about her own philosophy. This lexicon is from our globalized age.

Women participate in the history as spectre. Even a thinker like Karl Marx, who proclaimed from the housetops about the exploitation of the workers did not give credit to a woman from whom He drank the balsam of inspiration and of ideas: Flora Marcoso Tristán. A great woman history has tried to place in its dunghill, with so many attempts to discard her. She deserves a few words in the context. Because Flora Marcoso Tristán was not only a woman who became the mother of the idea of the necessity of the women's emancipation. But she was trans/intercultural in her origins and her praxis. She was half Spanish, half French, had her roots in Mexico, and even boosted of been in family with the azteque emperor, Moctezuma. She travelled often to Peru, where she was a discussion partner with the miners in Arequipa, who revolted against their exploitation by the British. From this experience in Peru she made the analogy and foresaw what would happen in Europe. Karl Marx, who was a permanent guest in her salons in Paris, listened to her. In London she observed how prostitution denigrated women, and she denounced it as one of the disgraces of the patriarchal sys-

¹ Simone de Beauvoir: *The Second Sex*, Jonathan Cape, Thirty Bedford Square, London; is one of the most well known women philosophers arguing for "*one is born, but rather becomes woman*".

² For instances: feministic research which pleads for the historical existence of Diotima are met with disregard as something almost ridiculous, males usually maintain that Diotima is a mythical creation. Perhaps because this would entail that the western philosophy has its roots in a woman's mind. Mary Ellen Waithe's: *A History of Women Philosophers*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, is very thought-provoking concerning matters related to the exclusion of women as from the cultural production.

tem. She was the one we also could call the mother of the Christian for socialism; she got her religious inspirations from the Teresa of Avila, also a woman who wanted to change the world. Flora Tristán, is almost forgotten in Europe today. We use less and less her concept of social indignation and use her concept of social exclusion without giving her the just credit. But in the same way she had made her preferential option for the poor – the workers in France, who she made a huge effort to organize them (workers get united!) grieved for 14 days when she died –, she still inspires, women in Some Places in Latin America in creation of NGO's aiming not only to denounce the inequalities the actual world (dis)order have been making almost as natural phenomena, but to aiming to transform disorder into to order. And this influence we could mane it as a spiritual, intellectual inheritance from a woman in history, not as a spectre. Flora Tristán was a real philosopher, who could bring theory and praxis in accordance, denouncing the misery in the world and announcing the possibilities of a better world free from gender and social injustices. Some believes that women, when it come to it or to the very core of a matter, have nothing to say, to show or to teach but this is obviously not true. Flora Tristán showed with her reflections and her praxis a modality of globalization from bellow, an appropriate synonymous of international solidarity, not only among exploited workers but certainly among the human race, which includes women. Unfortunately it is reasonable to remember as an utopist. Her denouncing women as the proletarians of the proletarians, even the most oppressed man, still act as if it is his natural right to reproduce the oppression He is a victim of by oppressing women. And this hasn't change much since Flora Tristán time³, if we are to believe the report from Amnesty International published on the occasion of women's international day, in March this year. It is much easier to be unpunished d for crimes against women then for protesting against the established order⁴. This may make self-evident that this civilization values goods more then women.

³ See the version of the Report from Amnesty International in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, *Violences impunies contre les femmes – corps brisés, volontés détruites*, mars 2001.

⁴ Here I am thinking about some young people being punished very hard for the protests against the Summit of the European Union in Gothenburg, in May this year. And how this protests are criminalized; see Ricardo Petrella: *Criminaliser la contestation*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, août 2001.

Civilization and gender

The omission of the masculine side of gender in this discussion is only hypothetical due to the fact that the globalization is a process in the very core of the patriarchal paradigm. When we have this subject on the table, we are talking mainly about the masculine gender. Even the great critique of globalization is made by intellectual males, Zygmunt Bauman, George Mombiot, Franz Hinkelammert, Noam Chomsky, just to name a few. The same could be said about the great delight, Anthony Giddens, John G. Ruggie, the ones arguing for the irreversibility of this process humanity is embarked on.

After have given up the search for the stuff in the libraries, I spent a half day surfing on net to find material about women and globalization: one post Women and Globalization: *The Failure and Postmodern Possibilities of International Law*.

This was rather annoying. Calling the faculties of economical and sociology studies, I found out that there was no female professors there. This may be one of the explanations why women are absent not only from the analyzes but also from the debates as well. Although globalization has a enormous impact on women. We will come back to this topic. Nødvendigt at rejse discussionen.

But before it would be appropriate to point to fact that this is a serious diagnosis on this model of civilization, actually it can not be categorized as civilized if we consider that civilization is a stadium categorized by the abolition of gender dominance, e.g. male dominance over female in all domains of life. A stadium where equality in the differences has been achieved, in other words when otherness can be a subject in its otherness. The measure of civilization can not be found else where. There and only there we will be a humanized humanity, global and united, with sensitivity to ideas, which means curiosity, adventure and continual change.

The concept of civilization that is mentioned here is directly drawn from a male feminist, a great philosopher who fought for the cause of women, namely Alfred North Whitehead⁵. For him the rule, the dominance of man over women is an established feature to be found in highly civilized societies, which survives as a hang-over, as barbarism. This dominance, accord-

⁵ His great work on history of ideas: *Adventures of Ideas*, The Syndics of the Cambridge University Press.

ing to him, is based upon physical superiority, has a damaging and demoralizing effects in civilization, understood as order, as balance.

The issue of gender does not only belong to the social field, but is a huge ethical and pedagogical task. Not to make a long digression, I will recall another female internationalist, Anne Marie Petersen⁶. For Anne Marie Petersen equality through differences was not an ideal, but a reality that could come into being by educational means. She came from Denmark to Porto Novo specially to work on the field of education with poor women, with whom edifying dialogues about women's dignity and worth was carried out along with the educational praxis. Women according to this praxis should have a place in history, and be a historical subject in the construction of a better, more human world. The ideal was also democracy and peace. Anne Marie Petersen was also very influenced by Mahatma Gandhi, and some biographers⁷ say that they influenced each other mutually, their commitment with the cause of freedom and democracy was a theme of their correspondence. Let me also remark that Anne Marie Petersen was Christian, e.g. protestant, but she had a great admiration for the Indian cultures and religion, spiritually she was also very closed to Rabindranath Tagore. In Porto Novo an intercultural, transreligious dialogue among women took form. Globalization from below and build upon ethics and pedagogic on with freedom and democracy at the its fundamental ground. This is an ideal for the times to come. So the pedagogical task as acts of conscientization is calling upon all of us in the 1. 2. or 3. Worlds, to globalize in solidarity. This demands education for life, empowerment of a social and historical subject. This line of thoughts are very similar to the Brazilian Paulo Freire: pedagogic of liberation or pedagogic of the oppressed.

Education of women in their own socio-cultural context, is the most efficient instrument of empowerment and creation of a non-violent world. It is among women problems concerning poverty are overwhelming. We can not call our world civilized as long as we have poverty and military complexes. Canalization of resources into production of war instruments hits women – and children – because it creates a situation of scarcity in societies.

⁶ Denmark * 1909 India + 1952. See <http://www.akademiet.fred.dk>, Holger Terp's texts.

⁷ Bent Smidt Hansen: *Afhængighed og identitet*, Aarhus Universitets Forlag, is an excellent book treating this issue, with the frame of the Indian liberation.

Lack necessity of discussion

The weakness in this presentation, as one could claim is the lack of specific contextualization, e.g. 1. versus 3. World. But as it was mentioned initially the aim of this paper was to raise a discussion on subject that has not had attention, namely gender and more specific the situation of women in the era of globalization.

Actually it is almost impossible to find data assessing the impact of globalization on women.

In the Europe, besides the differences of wages although they do the same work, unemployment hitting and marginalizing women first, competition, demands upon them to live up to same roles: the feminine and the masculine, loss of love, due to the fact that sexuality more and more comes under the lows of the market. Side by side with a tendency toward more civilization, there is also a brutalization or dehumanization going on, among others demand on her as competent consumer.

In the 3. World women's participation on others processes rather than the usual reproductive and home work, they play a very important role in the informal sector and the agriculture, and in the NGO's or grassroots movements as well.

Free trade zones, as for instances in Mexico, has created work for women in the industry, the "Maquiladoras" can be mentioned here, they have a long work day in bad conditions, without security and live usually in very bad conditions and have no labor rights, and are not organized. The wages are low. These women migrate from the countryside and have a very low educational level, when they are not illiterate. General for women both in South and North is that they have a heavy working burden: double work in the homes and outside.

One of the great advantages of globalization for women are the means of communication. There are far more communication now than for just 15 years ago. This promotes more conscientization, based on understanding. Dialogues between women from South and North, South and South, North and North has sharpened our attention to many important issues characterizing globalization: such as human rights – at least from the western perspective –, and the other issue is immigration, which is both very challenging and a source of conflict, for instances the right to bear veil, to decide over own body. Human rights is a revolutionary ideal, but the market democracy has been taking it up all times of the day in all situations it was

didn't feel comfortable, so any it is sound to scrutinize its reality and its rhetoric carefully.

One of the positive sides of globalization for women has been the new possibilities of mobilization, indeed they have been very active in the latest anti globalization movement and peace movement. And here they have been criticizing the chaotic currents of change, against fragmentation, disruption, discontinuity in the very fast moving system with its aggression causing damages on nature and on human beings, as Susan George calls it.

A group of women, that has been called the ethical reserve of Latin America are the mothers from La Plaza de Mayo, their mobilization became an international example followed in Israel and Serbia's women in Black who fascism and militarism.

But also the tristanists from Peru, the Wives from Colombia, las comadres from Central America, all making alternative, informal economies to survive in a disrupted social structure of war. We can also name the women from Senegal with their alternative communication, women in Bangladesh creating banks with her meager resources to make loans for investments in handmade, artisan and agricultural production. Although males criticize women for what they call a bizarre preference to succumb in a group rather than to win as an individual, in general they do not take this criticism very near. Specially the women in the South, perhaps because they have the experience the survival implies the fellow woman or man, the mutual keeping each other up. Will to power, to power, is not a path to conquer dignity, women may argue. And suspicion for lofty theorizing with out connection to reality is a signal of a healthy intuition toward reality. As the women are doing side by side in the cooperatives the Landless Peasants are doing in Brazil. Their praxis shows that to be is to be together, not being together is not to be.

Some visions to discuss – or how to make a better world for women

The constant calling upon human rights, is built upon their universality. And perhaps they are, if transformed to accord with a specific cultural context. But we have forgotten the social side of human rights. Amnesty International has head the "clamor from the gates" perhaps we could say ghettos of poverty and is pledging now for the full implementation of human rights. For women it is not enough to have the right not to be discriminated because of her gender, but the right to participate in the political, economic, social and cultural fields of our societies.

In the last two days, after the dread full disruption of our illusion on what security is, the reference is two the terror attack that shackled the world⁸, we heard iteratively in our media the concept of civilization, that our world is civilized, but this is a truth screaming for modifications. Both in the sense that our own situation can only be defined as tendency toward civilization and also in the sense that this claim contains a paradox: civilization produces barbarism, not only under the bridges in Rio de Janeiro, but also in our ever more journey towards kindliness.

And we could be egoistic and altruists avoiding the creation of monsters, because we run the risk to be caught in a fight with them.

⁸ September 11/01, in the World Trade Center, New York; The Pentagon and Ministry of Foreign affairs, Washington.

Annex

RESOLUTION

We, the 84 philosophers and other intellectuals from all over the world who have come together in Bangalore-India from the 17th to the 20th of September 2001 for the IV Congress on Intercultural Philosophy with the theme "Interaction and Asymmetry between Cultures in the Context of Globalization", want to express our feelings of sympathy with the victims of the heinous acts of terrorism in New York and Washington, as well as our sincere concern about the further fall out of these historically unprecedented acts. We therefore like to state and declare the following:

1. We condemn most strongly the terrorist acts against thousands of human lives and we share the suffering and grief of the families and friends of the victims.
2. We state that indiscriminate violence blinds one to the truth. This is true specially of the perpetrators of these terrible attacks. It can also blind those who are victims of violence and destruction. We deplore that these acts perpetrated by some fanatic individuals has led to increasing demonization of Islam and acts of vengeance against innocent Muslims and Sikhs in many parts of the world.
3. Although there is no excuse for what has happened and it cannot be compared with any terrorist attack so far, we want to remember at the same time that thousands of women and men are killed every day in different parts of the world, in Sudan, Indonesia, Palestine, Congo, India, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and elsewhere in undeclared and declared wars.
4. We fully agree that terrorism is not the way to resolve global problems of injustice, inequalities, neocolonialism and cultural imperialism. Hence terrorism in any form from anywhere is to be condemned. But the underlying problems will not be resolved by combating terrorism through military means.

5. We are conscious that the terrible events in New York and Washington with its unprecedented dimensions refer to an economic, political and cultural reality which the majority of the humankind is experiencing everyday. These are the undesirable consequences of a unipolar and economically biased process of globalization promoted by the decision makers in the North which benefit only an enriched minority to the exclusion of the poor majority.

6. We experience – not only here in India – that the present form of globalization causes millions of victims and leads to cultural and religious deterioration, acts of despair and a climate of hostility and conflict between cultures and religions.

7. We are convinced that the attacks of horror on the world's leading economic and political power should not be answered by arbitrary acts of violence of the same kind against innocent people. There is need for a radical reflection on the political and economic framework of today's capitalist globalization, as well as the firm will to engage intercultural and inter-religious dialogue.

8. As philosophers, we try to offer some elements of analysis and proposals concerning the asymmetry and interaction between cultures, as well as possibilities of real intercultural encounter and dialogue. We call all human beings of good will to join us in this way of dialogue, so that such terrible acts of violence and destruction will never occur again.

Bangalore, September 20, 2001

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