

# A World Beyond Global Disorder



# A World Beyond Global Disorder:

*The Courage to Hope*

Edited by

Fred Dallmayr and

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God is not the God of disorder but of peace.  
(1 Cor. 14:33)

It is not Paris we should pray for.  
It is the world. It is a world in which Beirut,  
reeling from bombings two days before Paris,  
is not covered in the press.  
A world in which a bomb goes off  
at a funeral in Baghdad  
and not one person's status update says "Baghdad,"  
because not one white person died in that fire.  
Pray for the world  
that blames a refugee crisis for a terrorist attack.  
That does not pause to differentiate between the attacker  
and the person running from the very same thing you are.  
Pray for a world  
where people walking across countries for months,  
their only belongings upon their backs  
are told they have no place to go.  
Say a prayer for Paris by all means,  
but pray more,  
for the world that does not have a prayer  
for those who no longer have a home to defend.  
For a world that is falling apart in all corners,  
and not simply in the towers and cafes we find so familiar.  
(Anonymous)



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## PREFACE

The motto of the Enlightenment was Horace's "*Sapere Aude!*"—"Dare to Know!" Or, as Kant translates it: "have courage to make use of your *own* understanding!"<sup>1</sup> It encouraged individuals to make use of their minds to work their way from dependence to independence, to become enlightened and active citizens, to realize their rights in a law-governed civil state and thus to be the masters of their own destiny. The public use of reason must always be free and it is concerned with what is true for all. It should not advance the interests of a particular individual, party, or nation. This implies a non-deterministic view of history as open, containing many potential alternatives, and it implies the moral responsibility of the people as subjects of historical-cultural creativity. These ideas in their contemporary developed form remain relevant as a source of inspiration in our twenty-first century, when individual freedom is threatened in many ways, along with escalating social and global problems.

On the eve of the twenty-first century, many hoped that humanity would at last embrace new opportunities for peaceful international relations and cooperation as the best approach to solving social and global problems. However, their hopes were dashed by the continuation of the status quo; traditional policies of exploitation of human and natural resources; and hegemonic politics seeking global control in a unipolar world.

Research publications, trying to assess the current situation in the world, provide a catalog of failures and dysfunctions in the areas of economy, security, and environment, and a gridlock in global governance—the breakdown of global cooperation at a time when we need it most. All these are symptoms of global disorder or, in a broader sense, of civilizational failure, already detected in critiques of Western civilization by philosophers since the late nineteenth century.

In the neoconservative and some neoliberal ideologies, the current situation is frequently described deterministically as the process emanating from globalization, presented either as the rosy picture of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," the grim view of Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations," or John G. Ikenberry's "liberal Leviathan."<sup>2</sup> All these in one way or the other underscore the defects of the status quo. It

ignores the role of peoples and other political actors in the transformation of society. In any case, at first blush, it would seem that we have no choice but to submit ourselves to the flow of events, relying on the “invisible hand” of the neoliberal economy or on the mercy of the “benevolent hegemon” as the world’s ruler.

But any such conclusion is fallacious; in truth, the emperor has no clothes. Researchers of American policy show a glaring discrepancy between declared ends and the forcible means used to achieve them. Traditional policies have not removed the root causes of the problems, but have made them even worse while also generating new problems. Such a pessimistic picture, however, should not obscure opportunities for a better future. Thus, new approaches and policies are both needed and possible.

Philosophy, as a tool by which to engage in critical thinking, can help us to shatter the ideological myths surrounding a policy of global hegemony, to see the root cause of the problems and their possible solutions. Visions of a new world order invoke a different philosophy, at the center of which is human freedom and the vital interests of humanity. This philosophy asserts that the transcendental task for the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy over any particular interests of nations or social groups. It promotes an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility. It is based on exploring the realities of today’s world, which is not unipolar, but multicentric and socio-culturally diverse, having a variety of political forces and actors in play, with different tendencies and vectors of development, and which is open to various potential scenarios ranging from the best to the worst possible.

The realization of one or the other possible scenarios ultimately depends on the people. It is high time for social transformation, and the realization of existing opportunities for the amelioration of society requires people to think, to be enlightened in order to make informed choices, and to be active as citizens of their states as well as citizens of the world. This also requires more dialogical and collaborative relationships among individuals, social groups, and nations to join efforts for the solution to prevailing social, economic, environmental and other global problems.

In reflecting on the cultural diversity of the interrelated humanity, philosophers pay special attention to the relationships among the different elements of the socially and culturally diverse world. Such relationships can be intolerant and violent (as self-fulfilled prophecies of “culture wars” or “clashes of civilizations” predict) or mutually respectful and oriented toward dialogue and collaboration.

Philosophy contributes to the grounding of the universal character of dialogue and the normative status of dialogism. Dialogic philosophy, championed by Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber among others,<sup>3</sup> and its contemporary development, provide us with a vision of human beings and society based on the principles of dialogue and communication on all levels—individual, intersubjective, social, cultural, international, and inter-civilizational. The implementation of these principles aims to transform the traditional world into the world of the “dialogue of civilizations” or a “dialogic civilization.”

A search for an alternative to the existing state of affairs can be conceived in terms of the contrast between the one-dimensional monologic world of stereotypes and authoritarian edicts versus the pluralistic dialogic world of creative thinking, recognition of others as equals, personal moral responsibility and shared co-existence, and an openness toward the cultural-historical creativity of individuals.

An obvious contrast to dialogue is monologic thinking, related to domination and authoritarian power. In the same vein are various forms of nationalism, supremacist exceptionalism, fundamentalism, and other forms of extremism, which are intolerant of differences and the other. Less evident, while also damaging, is the abuse of universalistic notions, such as dialogue, once they are downgraded to mere clichés in political demagoguery or pseudo-philosophical sophistry.<sup>4</sup>

In a conflicted world, for those striving for the progressive transformation of the world, organizations that serve as forums for promoting genuine dialogue in theory and practice are particularly important. Among these, the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations” (WPF) stands out. The WPF was established in 2002 by the initiative of representatives of civil society and members of non-governmental organizations from several countries as a practical realization of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, “Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations.”<sup>5</sup> Its founding President is Vladimir I. Yakunin. WPF held its fourteen annual sessions in Rhodes, Greece, attracting many participants from over 70 countries. Recently it has been transformed into Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute ([www.doc-research.org](http://www.doc-research.org)). It brings together many independent intellectuals, philosophers, political scientists, economists, and prominent public and religious figures from around the world to discuss the most pressing world problems that concern all human beings.

The contributors, from different countries, are united in search for the answer to the key interrelated questions: What are the underlying causes of the present world disorder? How can we overcome it? What are the

alternative visions and designs for a more peaceful, just and sustainable world order? These questions are at the crux of contemporary concerns and discussions among philosophers, political scientists, and the reasoning public in today's world about the present situation and the future of humanity. Featuring articles by noted international scholars, this book sheds new light on these questions by expanding them beyond the traditional, Eurocentric and West-centric theoretical canon into a creative global dialogue about the future of humanity.

The book offers not only an analytical picture of the current global disorder. Every so often, and sometimes unexpectedly, glimmers of hope break through the dark clouds hovering over our lives. What is important to note at this point is that these rays must not only be passively received or enjoyed, but must generate hopeful dispositions which, in turn, translate into practical conduct designed to promote peace and justice and thus to honor the "better angels" of humanity. Such conduct demands the cultivation of a courage which, without turning away from present calamities, marshals as remedies the resources of civic virtue and public responsibility crucially demanded in our time. The book's Introduction invokes the reflections of the great theologian Paul Tillich who, in some famous texts, celebrated the importance of the "courage to be" and also the corollary disposition of the "courage to hope."

Despite all the challenges posed by our current global disorder, we persist in believing that genuine global dialogue in the world through international forums and publications will help people to develop a global consciousness, and strengthen the courage to think, hope, and act in order to make our world a better place to live. We trust that this book will help the reader see that meaningful choices remain, for all of us, as peoples, nations, and individuals.

Edward Demenchonok

## Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question, 'What is Enlightenment?'" in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, 11-22 (1784; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); John G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

3. See Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992); Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970); first published in 1937 as *Ich and du*.
4. An example of this is idle talk about "universal dialogue" as feigned by a parochial group controlling the notorious "International Society for Universal Dialogue" (ISUD). Their pretentious sophistry is conceptually flawed, lacking any clarification of the meaning of "universalism" and in which sense it is used, and it confuses those who may think that this may have theological connotations. Its members were disappointed that ISUD is neither international nor dialogical, but rather has degenerated into a pocket club of the dominating group from one country, which uses some members from the other countries merely for show, is interested in power and money, and is authoritarian and intolerant to others. Disappointed members demanded that the discredited organization be dissolved because it is misleading, unworthy of its name, and unable to carry out its purpose. Such a simulacrum disgraces the idea of dialogue.
5. UNGA Resolution 56/6 of 9 November 2001.



# INTRODUCTION

## THE COURAGE TO HOPE

FRED DALLMAYR

In hope he believed against hope.  
(Romans 4:18)

A title of this volume is a variation on the title of a book published by Paul Tillich in 1952, *The Courage to Be*. The variation is meant as a tribute to Tillich who, throughout his life, struggled with the issue of “hope,” and with the difficulty of maintaining the “courage to hope” in the midst of our violent, conflicted, and seemingly “hopeless” world. The difficulty reached a peak in the post-war era and the ensuing Cold War. As theologian Mark Taylor observes, at the time when Martin Luther King Jr. “struggled to the rhythms of ‘We shall overcome’, Tillich barely dared hope.”<sup>1</sup> According to his personal secretary at Harvard University, Grace Cali, Tillich during the early 1960s tried to inspire students to join movements against racism in South Africa and the United States, but he himself remained “despondent” about America’s capacity to counter the main threats of the time: “the racial trouble” and “the nuclear arms development” that together made up what he called the nation’s “awful sickness.” He said he could “feel this sickness” in all his speaking engagements throughout the country.<sup>2</sup>

His secretary recalls one particular exchange that she and some of his students had with him in 1961. Here is her account:

Student asking: ‘Is there any way of stopping it?’

He sighed heavily. ‘I hope and pray so. But I am afraid not. Today the self-destructive urges in man are so strong—individually and on the group level—that I doubt if they can be overcome.’

‘Isn’t there anything any of us can be doing to help reverse the trends?’ asked Victor intently.

His face filled with a deep sadness. ‘It is already too late. I feel it may be too far gone—especially the racial trouble.’

‘But Paulus!’ I protested. ‘Is there no hope?’

He sensed our plea. ‘There is only one way. Everywhere, in every way possible, we as individuals must fight against the forces of destruction. First, in ourselves, then on a group level. We must work for anything that will bring people together—but in encounters where love and justice become creatively one.’<sup>3</sup>

The present volume reflects this dilemma: while acknowledging the difficulty of hoping, it strongly affirms the “courage to hope.” But first some more words about the nature of hope. In March of 1965, shortly before his death, Tillich delivered a sermon at the Memorial Church of Harvard University; its title: “The Right to Hope.” In his sermon, the theologian stressed the human need for hope as a bulwark against despair; but he also distinguished carefully between genuine, well-grounded hope and foolish flights of fancy. “Nobody,” he said, “can live without hope, even if it were only for the smallest things which give some satisfaction even under the worst of conditions, in poverty, sickness, and social failure.” Without this bulwark we would sink into dark despair or deadly indifference. But the questions are: “Do we have a right to hope?” Do we have the right kind of hope? “Is there a justified hope for each of us, for nations and movements, for mankind and perhaps for all life, for the whole universe?”

The sermon cites episodes from biblical history where genuine hope is exemplified. There is the story of Abraham who—“hoping against hope”—trusted in the promise of becoming the father of a large nation. This faith was continued in Christianity where believers trust in the coming of “the new heaven and the new earth.” But in both cases, hope was severely tested and sometimes shattered by disappointment. In the Hebrew Bible, the book of Job laments about God’s power to “destroy the hope of man” (Job 14:19). In the Christian gospel, there is the dismay of the two disciples on the way to Galilee: “We had hoped that he was the one to redeem Israel” (Luke 24:21). This dismay has spread far and wide in modern times, and especially in the contemporary age when perhaps the majority of people are tormented by anxiety, hopelessness and despair. Here Tillich introduces his distinction: “Hope is easy for the fool but hard for the wise one. How then can we distinguish genuine from foolish hope?”<sup>4</sup>

The question raised by Tillich touches on some of the deepest and most complicated issues not only in theology but in philosophy and the human sciences: it is the issue of time and of the meaning of human life and history. For Tillich, hope is not a matter of scientific prediction or “futurology”; nor is it the result of human fabrication or artifice. In those cases, hope would be replaced by knowledge or will power. The question

is whether there is a ground—perhaps a grounding “unground”—which is not empirically verifiable or falsifiable; nor is it an empty daydream. Theologically speaking, the grounding has the character of a “promise” granted by a source which is trustworthy and reliable. In philosophical language, the grounding testifies to the primacy of potentiality over actuality, or at least of a certain excess of the former over the latter. In still different (postmodern) terminology, one can speak here of the interlinking of absence and presence, or else of an absent presence. In Tillich’s words:

Where there is genuine hope, there that for which we hope already has some presence. In some way, the hoped for is at the same time here and not here. . . . Thus, there is a beginning here and now; and this beginning drives toward an end.

This absent presence makes all the difference: “Where such a beginning of what is hoped for is lacking, hope is foolishness.” On a metaphorical level, he adds, we are all familiar with genuine hope. Thus, “in the seed of a tree, stem and leaves are already present, and this gives us the right to sow the seed in hope for the fruit.” A similar situation prevails in the case of children and our hope of seeing them reach maturity and adulthood. This leads to a religious-spiritual parallel. It may be that, in the heart of human beings, some seeds have been planted which eventually will lead humanity toward the land of promise, “in the fullness of time.”<sup>5</sup>

Given the recalcitrance of promise to prediction and manipulation, the question arises regarding human practice and its limits. In line with sage religious and philosophical teachings, Tillich stresses the need for waiting, for lying in wait or expectation. “Hoping,” he states, “often implies waiting”—and waiting “demands patience” which in turn demands “stillness in one’s self.” But there are two kinds of waiting: “the passive waiting in laziness, and the receptive waiting in openness.” Those who wait passively in laziness “prevent the coming of what they are waiting for”; while those waiting openly and receptively “work for its coming.” As he continues: “Waiting in inner stillness, with poised tension and openness toward what we can only receive . . . is highest activity; it is the driving force which leads us toward the growth of something new in us.”<sup>6</sup> Such patience or active waiting is difficult for individuals and for societies or peoples. Small wonder there is often a tendency to “hurry things up” and to manipulate developments to reach outcomes quickly. The tendency is evident in the modern (Western) ideology of “progress,” the trust in the accelerated, humanly manufactured fulfillment of social goals. In a still more detrimental form, hopeful waiting is foiled when societal fulfillment is linked with the striving for national glory, power and domination. This

derailment can happen even in countries where a higher promise has been implanted. As Tillich observes in a striking passage:

There was and is in Israel, as in every nation, much foolish hope: national arrogance, will to power, ignorance about other nations, hate and fear of them, the use of God and his promises for the nation's own glory. Such hopes, present also in our own [American] nation, are foolish hopes. They do not come out of what we truly are and cannot, therefore, become reality in history, but they are illusions about our own goodness and distortions of the image of others.<sup>7</sup>

Although acknowledging the fact of horrible derailments and destructive foolishness, Tillich never abandoned genuine hope, both for individuals and for societies and people. Just as individuals, through hope, may "*become*" what they truly "*are*", so there is also the "fulfillment of historical hopes" of humanity, however limited or fragmentary it may be. Tillich in this context refers to the spreading of democracy or the "democratic form of life" which is actually the fulfillment of "old ideas about the equal dignity of human beings before God and under law." The ideas matured over time because there were social groups concretely inhabited by democratic hopes. In a similar manner, the social or "socialist" principle is a partial fulfillment of the age-old dreams of the poor that they may participate in the good life (and the goods of life). In the period of decolonization and globalization, the ancient belief in the "original unity" of humanity is also being resuscitated, inspiring a "genuine hope for reunion" in previously marginalized populations. The most enduring and profound hope, however, is the longing not just for unity, but for reunion in justice and peace. In the language of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, this is the longing for "the coming of the Kingdom of God." For Tillich, this Kingdom does not come "in one dramatic event." Rather, it is arriving "here and now in every act of love, in every manifestation of truth, in every experience of the holy." The hope sustaining this belief is justified (and not foolish), because there is already "a presence and a beginning" of what is hoped for.<sup>8</sup>

As previously indicated, the present volume is located at the cusp of hopelessness and hope. All the assembled papers are fully aware of the grimness of our global situation, of the enormous danger of wholesale destruction, of the fact that things may have already gone "too far." Yet, all of them are inhabited by certain stubbornness: a stubborn refusal to accept things as they are (the present "global disorder"); a determination to hope and work for a better condition of the world. This determination, we are convinced, is not a "foolish" hope, not the result of empty daydreams.

Rather, it is anchored in concrete reality—more specifically, in concrete everyday human experience. In every breath we take, we affirm the value and goodness of life; we affirm a belief or hope in the future, and ultimately the prevalence of life over death and destruction. Thus, every breath is a testimony to the genuine (not foolish) character of our expectation. Thus also, the deeper promise we affirm is anchored in every breathing moment—in Tillich’s language, “in every act of love, in every manifestation of truth, in every experience of the holy.” This experience may not completely shield us from doubt and despair; but it enables us ever so often to recover the “courage to hope.”

The first Part of the volume focuses on the reigning “global disorder,” evident in unipolar hegemony together with some challenges to this disorder. The opening chapter is by Richard Falk, the renowned expert on international politics and law. Titled “A New Geopolitical Realm for the Twenty-first Century,” the essay contrasts an older geopolitical order (or disorder)—still largely dominant today—with a newer paradigm hopefully emerging in our time. According to Falk, the older system was based entirely on “hard power,” on the ability of states to wage war for the protection of their security. The system arose after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which enshrined the primacy of territorial states as the sole basis of membership in international society. In ensuing centuries, the system extended its reach from Europe to the rest of the world through colonization. The paradigm was challenged after World War I and World War II by the establishment of international bodies, the success of anti-colonial movements, and the spreading motto of the self-determination of peoples. These developments gave rise embryonically to a new geopolitical framework whose main features are outlined in Falk’s paper. The problem is that the old system is still deeply entrenched and shows no willingness to surrender its privileges to newer horizons. Falk in this situation calls for a “concrete utopia,” a hope for a future which is neither empirically predictable nor readily defeated by cynicism and despair.

The tension present in hope is tightened into conflict in the second chapter by the distinguished philosopher Akeel Bilgrami. Titled “World Order, Islam, and the West,” the chapter presents the geopolitical system born in the modern West as a constellation of territorial states wedded purely to the pursuit of political power and with little or no interest in cultural or civilizational issues. To this extent, the phrase “world order” is actually an oxymoron or euphemism hiding “global disorder,” namely the reality of domination and subjection. Together with Falk, Bilgrami sees the modern Western paradigm as the engine fueling the West’s global ascendance, that is, the extension of its system through colonialism or

imperialism to the “second and third worlds” (where the second also includes socialist countries). Given the location of most of the “developing” societies in the global South, the modern system translates into a North-South confrontation, with the North basically vying for the natural (not cultural) resources of the South. With regard to the relation between Islam and the West, this scenario means that “world order” does not stand opposed to Islam (or any other religion) as such, but only to Muslim countries unwilling to settle for subjection. For Bilgrami, the main issue today is possible “resistance” to global (dis)order. In his view, such resistance cannot simply rely on good intentions or dialogue alone; because “one cannot have a dialogue with a master.” Nor is violence the answer, because the latter—apart from being “intrinsically immoral”—usually brings just “further domination.” Hence, the need today is for goodwill backed up by principled action or praxis, pretty much along the lines of Gandhian “truth or justice-force” (*satyagraha*).

The theme of tension and conflict is continued in the chapter by global studies professor Walter Mignolo. Like Falk and Bilgrami, Mignolo views Western modernity as a paradigmatic system composed of interlocking structures and layers. A crucial feature of this system is what he calls its “coloniality of power” consolidated in a “colonial matrix of power” (CMP) stretching into all areas of social life: political, economic, religious, ethnic-racial, and cultural. Importantly, coloniality in his view is not only a brute engine of domination but a cognitive-epistemic (knowledge-power) framework constructed on the premise of a distinct form of “subjectivity” or subjective agency: not so much the Cartesian *ego cogito* but the instrumental *ego conquiro* (as will to power). In the process of the ongoing globalization, the Western system is expanded into an increasingly pervasive global coloniality endowed with the possibility of near-total surveillance and control. Alarmingly, this expansion transforms even aspects of international law (seen in the sense of Carl Schmitt’s “second *nomos*”). What is required in our situation, for Mignolo, is not only a partial or piecemeal decolonization, but a change of paradigm, what he calls “decoloniality” connected with “dewesternization.” This shift can draw inspiration from earlier liberation theology and “dependency theory,” but has to be more comprehensive relying on new forms of knowledge, discourse, and conversation. With this shift, the old “colonial matrix” would give way to multiple possibilities and “pluriversal horizons” of global life.

A major example of global disorder today is the nearly random, extra-judicial killing of people throughout the world through the use of drones. Conducted without warning, such killings cut through all territorial

boundaries, obliterating traditional sovereignty and the distinction in international law between war and peace. Italian international politics expert Daniele Archibugi examines the recent proliferation of the practice and its impact on the “community of nations.” The author sees three major problems in drone killings. The first concerns the status and rights of the target: is s/he an enemy combatant, a non-combatant, a defendant? If a combatant, a soldier in war has the right to surrender. If a non-combatant: the target should have the right to a fair trial, with due process, legal counsel and defense. The second problem is the authority for the killings. Although drone killings in foreign countries are acts of war, decisions to kill are usually made by intelligence agencies or secret bureaucratic bodies far removed from public scrutiny and accountability. The third problem has to do with “collateral damage” whose high percentage defeats the vaunted claims of drone precision. For Archibugi, drone killings are clearly war crimes fueled by sheer will to power (motto: “we kill because we can”); they also represent the triumph of technology over humanity. His counter-proposals are again three: first, to launch an information campaign exposing drone killings as criminal acts; next, to promote greater judicial intervention to combat extra-judicial methods; and finally to institute Public Opinion Tribunals seeking to expose those guilty of war crimes, leading to the eventual banning of drone killings in the world.

In his study on Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger once noted that modern Western culture was increasingly giving pride of place to the *brutalitas* of human *animalitas*. Drawing on a broad range of experiences, the chapter by Indian psychological theorist Ashis Nandy offers a grim picture of the ongoing “brutalization” of human and social life in our time. Without denying the important achievements of modern science, Nandy notes that, in its triumphalist mode, modernity has also engendered such brutalized phenomena as “dispassionate, scientized, assembly-line violence,” “new concepts of disposable humans and infra-humans,” finding expression in genocide, ethnic cleansing, and total warfare. As an expert psychologist, Nandy taps into the psychic undercurrents of disorder, such as “drug-dependent escapism” and “manic violence” nurtured by totalized ideologies. He draws attention to the twisted “psychological pleasures” of carpet bombing and to the present orgy of media violence: “the meaningless, random violence without any genuine depth of feeling backing it”—what Orwell had called “surplus violence.” For Nandy, all these phenomena signal a dreadful plunge into “de-civilization” and de-humanization. Despite this grim portrayal, however, his paper is not entirely devoid of hope. As an antidote to the dominant malignancy, Nandy points to “new global heroes,” all “votaries of non-violence” and

heirs of the Mahatma Gandhi: Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Aung Sang Su Kyi, and others. Importantly, these heroes (in his view) are not just isolated dreamers but are backed up by grassroots movements still wedded to the hope of re-humanization.

The second Part of the volume turns to efforts or strategies designed to correct or mitigate the disorder prevailing in the present global system. In his chapter “Reflections on Multipolarity, Regionalism, and Peace,” distinguished international-relations scholar Fabio Petito invokes the idea of the “dialogue of civilizations” to challenge (once again) Samuel Huntington’s work—this time not directly his thesis of a looming “clash” of civilizations but his proposal for a “multipolar system” organized along civilizational lines as a corrective to the clash. While accepting the value of multipolarity in general, Petito finds that Huntington’s model of self-enclosed civilizational blocs still follows the logic of clash, at least in the absence of a cross-cultural dialogue and interaction oriented toward the *telos* of peace. As he acknowledges, some proposals for softening the conflict between competing blocs have been advanced by Huntington himself and also by “neo-regionalist” scholars like Chantal Mouffe and Daniel Zolo. However, in Huntington’s case, the proposal does not go beyond a “minimalist ethics” of non-interference, while regionalist scholars seem satisfied with encouraging a purely pragmatic balance of power. For Petito, without a genuine dialogue of civilizations as an overarching framework, there is a risk that a multipolar and multi-civilizational world order still leaves us with “a worrying system of forces,” and a structure of “macro-regional great powers” (*Grossraum Politik*) ready for macro-collisions. His own preference is for “multiculturally and dialogically constituted processes of regional integration” within the horizon of a global peace agenda. Thus his “alternative model” accepts multipolarity as a spatial/geopolitical reality but rejects “culturalist enclosure” as a refusal of dialogue.

A similar agenda of global-regional equilibrium can be found in the “Bandung Spirit” originating in the alliance of non-aligned African and Asian countries established at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at the height of the Cold War. Brazilian social theorist Beatriz Bissio invokes this legacy in her chapter titled “The ‘Bandung Spirit’ as an Alternative to the Present Chaos.” Taking her point of departure from the ills of the present system, Bissio recounts the string of political disasters in our century, from September 11 to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the intervention in Libya in 2011 to the ongoing mayhem in Syria and to the present-day flood of refugees from the Middle East to Europe and the rest of the world. As she observes, this

unfolding tragedy—the direct or indirect result of the interventions—makes a farce of the notion “world order” (unless the phrase is used satirically). She also quotes CIA veteran Paul Pillar to the effect that “political change cannot be imposed by an outside power, much less by means of gunfire.” These observations lead Bissio directly to the recollection of the “Bandung Spirit” and the tradition of the “non-aligned movement.” In this context, she remembers the basic “Ten Principles” articulated in Bandung, especially the principles of respect for territorial integrity and of “non-intervention and non-interference” in the internal affairs of other countries and regions. To be sure, the geopolitical situation has changed dramatically since the Cold War and so have the meaning and reach of “world order”; accordingly, possibilities of resistance have to be reformatted and readjusted. In our time, one such readjustment is evident in the role of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the world. As Bissio notes hopefully, today “BRICS can move forward with the gradual substitution of the Bretton Woods framework, due to their own weight in the world economy.”

Another possible alternative to global disorder is emerging today in Asia in the form of the “Silk Road” projects. Chinese philosopher and public intellectual Peinim Ni discusses some of these projects in his essay titled “‘Silk Road World Order’: Underlying Philosophy and Impact.” As Ni points out, in its intent the Chinese initiative of “One Belt and One Road” presents a blueprint for a future geopolitical scenario. The chapter digs first into some of the historical background undergirding the Chinese initiative, while also sketching the vast dimensions of the Silk Road projects. Ni immediately raises a crucial question: is the projected new scenario just a variation of the old, Western-style “world order”? “Will it be just a changing of the guard or will it be new or different in substance?” Ni opts for the latter alternative, citing Yuri Tavrosky to the effect that the emerging scenario will be “not vertical, but horizontal” in terms of geopolitical organization and power. In support of this option, he cites some recent political and economic policies enacted by China. More important, however, is the different ethical and philosophical spirit permeating the projects. The chapter here points to the great tradition of Confucian ethics and the still older legacy of “all under heaven” (*tianxia*), a legacy rephrased by philosopher Tu Weiming as an “anthropocosmic vision.” As Ni realizes, a beneficial outcome cannot be predicted with certainty. However, “we can take as basis of our hope” exhortations by the Chinese leadership “to work together to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and create a community of shared future for humankind.”

The praxis of resisting global disorder is only in part a matter of restructuring the global geopolitical scenario; in large measure, it involves the effort to change human perceptions, orientations and dispositions, that is, to uplift the ethical fiber of people. This later effort is at the heart of the work of political activist and public intellectual Cynthia McKinney as captured in her chapter “*Ubuntu: Beyond Domestic and Global Disorder.*” The chapter starts by remembering a speech President Kennedy delivered in 1963 at the American University where he urged America to be a peaceful nation living justly with other countries in a global commonwealth: “Not a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war; nor the peace of the grave or the security of the slave,” but “a genuine peace.” Having spent some years in the US Congress, McKinney learned through hard experience that Kennedy’s vision was for all practical purposes extinguished with his assassination. Her paper recounts her difficult struggles as a Congress-woman when she fought against domestic racial divisions while also resisting the powerful bent of many national leaders to wage incessant war abroad. As she writes: “Drastic corrective action is urgently needed.” The ideals which should guide such action, she notes, are egalitarianism, anti-racism, and “post-capitalism” (at least in the sense of an opposition to “vulture capitalism” and support for a “sharing economy”). She also finds inspiration in the ideas and practices of many “second and third world” countries, especially the practice of *ujamaa* or *ubuntu*, meaning brotherhood and social solidarity among all people.

In the concluding chapter of Part II, Russian philosopher Marietta Stepanyants draws attention to the urgent need for educational changes, especially on the primary and secondary levels in our globalizing world. As she points out, one of the extremely disturbing features of the reigning “global disorder” is the widespread involvement of children in violent conflicts and wars, as a spin-off of the hatreds and animosities among adults. Her chapter gives the example of the Russian Federation where, due to the multicultural and multi-ethnic character of society and its reflection in school systems, tensions and conflicts can easily arise among school children and in classrooms. The main issue in such conflicts is usually the precarious and contested “identity” of the competing ethnic and religious groups. Conflicts and animosities about identity usually operate on a subliminal and purely emotional level, without any real understanding of existing differences and their reasons. Moreover, in a democratic setting, there is the problem of somehow reconciling group identities with a shared national identity. To tackle these issues, Marietta Stepanyants argues strongly in favor of the introduction of intercultural education for young people, both in Russia and elsewhere. Such education,

in her view, serves two crucial purposes: to reduce violence among school children, and to prepare young people for the task of cross-cultural dialogue on the global level. Stepanyants herself has been a pioneer in this field: under the auspices partly of UNESCO and the World Public Forum, she has designed a model curriculum which can serve as an exemplar of global intercultural education.

The third Part of the volume invokes religious, spiritual and ethical resources for global renewal. Much inspiration for resisting disorder can be derived from the great world religions and also from prominent philosophical and wisdom traditions around the world. In his chapter, “Herald of Glad Tidings: Pope Francis as Teacher of Global Politics,” Fred Dallmayr shows how genuine Christian faith can serve as a bulwark against global chaos and as a beacon of hope for the future. The chapter starts by recalling some of the pontiff’s statements at the War Memorial in Redipuglia, Italy, in 2014 where he denounced war as utter “madness” and also pointed to some of the motivating causes or origins of devastation: “Greed, intolerance, the lust for power . . . these motives underlie the decision to go to war.” These motives, he added, powerfully persist in our present time, unleashing new wars “fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, wanton destruction.” In some of his writings and speeches of the last two years (especially *The Joy of the Gospel* and *The Church of Mercy*), Francis strongly attacked a whole host of the crises and “diseases” in today’s world: the growing intolerance between countries, races, and creeds; the massive political and economic inequality between rich and poor, powerful and powerless; the rise of a new idolatry of the “God of money”; the spreading “culture” of consumption and waste; and above all the glorification of violence turning the whole world into a battle field. In the face of this battery of derailments, miseries, and dangers, the pontiff urges his readers and listeners to step back from the brink of the abyss and undergo a radical turning or “*metanoia*”: “I ask each of you, indeed all of you, to have a conversion of heart.” Only such a turning, he stresses, can lead to genuine social and political renewal—which in turn, is a precondition and corollary of the proclamation of “glad tidings”: the approach of the promised “Kingdom of God.”

Given this strong papal exhortation, the question arises whether religion can be a sufficient or plausible antidote to violence and destruction. As is well known, in the eyes of many agnostics or non-believers, religion of any kind is part of the problem, not part of the solution. In her chapter, “Finding Peace in Authentic Religion,” philosopher Paola Bernardini candidly tackles this issue by introducing the distinction between genuine or authentic and debased or inauthentic religious faith; only the latter, she

argues, serves as a seedbed for violence and destruction. To test or validate this distinction, Bernardini relies on four main criteria: philosophical, etymological, ethical, and hermeneutical. On the strictly philosophical level, a religious faith can be called authentic in as much as it makes sense of questions regarding the ultimate meaning of life. This test was used by Pope Benedict when he explained the conversion of the ancient tribes to monotheism as an attempt to make rational sense of the cosmic order. A similar argument was used by philosopher Hermann Cohen to show the coincidence of rational order and faith. The practical implication is that rational order is conducive to peace (not violence or war). In terms of etymology, one can show that “*religio*” authentically means to bind or reconnect (not to sever or divide). The closeness of the Arabic terms “Islam” (submission) and *al-salam* (peace) has often been noted; and according to some Jewish authorities “*torah*” basically signifies a shared way or shared practices of life. On the ethical level, God and “goodness” are virtually interchangeable, especially as religious conduct means following the Golden Rule. Finally, hermeneutics is crucial because scriptural passages seemingly departing from the Golden Rule must be interpreted narrowly in a given context. All of these arguments combined support Bernardini’s claim that “authentic” religion promotes justice and peace.

In her paper, Bernardini points to Mahatma Gandhi as an authentic Hindu believer; she also holds up the example of the Muslim follower of Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, as a genuine representative of his faith (and a counterfoil to extremist *jihadism*). To validate further her conception of authenticity, the next chapter turns to the prominent Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, widely known for his effort to connect (or reconnect) Islamic faith and rational insight. In his chapter “High Time for a Change of Mind,” Soroush offers five main points designed to reorient current debates. His first point takes up the sensitive issue of freedom of speech, especially the claimed “right” to insult Islam and the Prophet. Without denying the “right,” he finds the exercise deficient on two grounds: it does not increase cognitive understanding and violates basic standards of ethical conduct. “What goodness is there in causing heartache and senseless torment?” While thus shielding “authentic” faith, Soroush in his second point freely admits the practice of rational criticism and debate, arguing that in all religions there is a “rational imperative of analytical, ethical and historical critique” in order to keep faith free from perversions. In his third point, he admonishes Muslims everywhere to stay on the “high ground,” by not participating in ongoing geopolitical struggles for power, in arms sales, and competition for nuclear weapons. On the positive side,

this means cultivating ethical standards and practicing the norms of genuine faith. The fourth point counsels strongly against shortcuts or derailments which are unfortunately too widespread today: especially reactionary modes of anti-Westernism and celebrations of a primeval “purism” upholding a spurious Islamic “identity” neglectful of rational faith. In his fifth and last point, Soroush offers sage advice to fellow-Muslims: they

should heal believers and direct their passions upward, use their knowledge to interpret the principles of religion, temper law with ethics, separate what is essential to religion from what is accidental, and expand the reach of economic and political justice.

The issue of the relation between faith and ethical standards of conduct is further examined by Islamic scholar Ebrahim Moosa in his chapter “Muslim Ethics in an Era of Globalism: Reconciliation in an Age of Empire.” By comparison with Abdolkarim Soroush’s more irenic text, Ebrahim Moosa pays more attention to the violent derailments of religious loyalties. As he acknowledges, the notion of a “Muslim ethics” is placed under siege today from two sides: on the one hand, the actions of violent, fanatical movements like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram; and on the other, the operation of a “post-modern” imperialism, that is, the spreading of complex transnational political and economic networks seemingly without central purpose (sometimes called “cellular globalization”). The two factors are not unrelated: Western imperial ventures have entailed “a bitter harvest and an unstoppable afterlife of violence in regions they attempted to reshape by force.” For Moosa, a crucial remedy for the prevailing disorder is global justice, especially the “equitable sharing of the world’s resources in a peaceful and non-hegemonic manner.” Spelling out more clearly the requisites of global peace and reconciliation, he lists these major needs (all parts of a genuine Muslim ethics): fostering an ethics of “accountability and responsibility” beginning with self-critique; transcending nation-state structures by nurturing “an ethos of cosmopolitan citizenship based on people-to-people relations”; and promoting an “inclusive ethical content” in the global order that goes beyond “liberal ethics.” In the end, at least in the context of the Abrahamic religions, global peace cannot just be contractual but has to reflect a new “covenant” - involving a “re-covenanting” of beliefs and practices that will “turn reconciliation into meaningful life forms.”

From the Middle Eastern and West Asian contexts the volume turns to East Asia and its spiritual-philosophical traditions, chiefly the legacy of Confucianism. In his chapter “Spiritual Humanism: An Emerging Global

Discourse,” renowned Chinese scholar Tu Weiming explores the relevance of the Confucian tradition for the task of overcoming global disorder in our time. In his view, the main contribution resides in the fostering of a “spiritual humanism” combining and renewing the best ethical teachings of the past on a cross-cultural level. Such a humanism, he notes, stands opposed to a one-sided “Enlightenment mentality” stressing rationalism, materialism, and utilitarianism; more specifically, it offers an antidote to some of the negative consequences of modernity, such as aggressive anthropocentrism, imperialism, possessive individualism, and secular nationalism. In line with older Chinese teachings, spiritual humanism for Tu Weiming upholds the “unity of heaven and humanity” and just peace for “All under Heaven.” Central ingredients of this outlook are reverence for the divine or sublime; cultivation of the “human” (*ren*); the nurturing of nature; and the practice of reciprocity or the Golden Rule in its various forms. Although cosmopolitan in its implications, spiritual humanism does not aim at global uniformity or synthetic sameness; rather, in its opposition to imperial hegemony, it cherishes the plurality of cultures and religions—although not a “clashing” plurality but one of harmonious cross-fertilization. Tu Weiming concludes: “The emergence of an ecumenical and cosmopolitan spirit is the precondition for us to envision a truly authentic global culture of peace.”

In his concluding chapter titled “World in Transition: From a Hegemonic Disorder toward a Cosmopolitan Order,” Edward Demenchonok reviews the ongoing changes and transformations of the global scenario, particularly the decline of the older Westphalian system of competing sovereignties, the flirtation with a unipolar hegemonic order (or rather disorder), and the ongoing emergence of a new multilateral paradigm held together by global norms, intercultural dialogue, and ecumenical and cosmopolitan interaction or symbiosis. As Demenchonok makes clear, the world is presently hovering on the cusp between hope and hopelessness, between optimism and despair, between a decaying world disorder, and a precariously emerging cosmopolitan horizon. Since we cannot be neutral in this struggle, our task is to be soberly and courageously engaged in hope for the future of our world.

## Notes

1. Mark Lewis Taylor, “Tillich’s Ethics: Between Politics and Ontology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Tillich*, ed. Russell R. Manning (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 190.

2. Grace Cali, *Paul Tillich First Hand: A Memoir of the Harvard Years* (Chicago, IL: Exploration Press, 1996), 92.
3. Grace Cali, *Paul Tillich First Hand*, 92-93.
4. Paul Tillich, "The Right to Hope," in *Theology of Peace*, ed. Ronald H. Stone (Louisville, KY: Westminster/Knox Press, 1990), 182-184. In support of his argument, Tillich invokes "the humanist and Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch [who] became famous through a two-volume work about hope" (182). See Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope* (1959), trans. Neville Plaice et al., 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986); also my "Bloch's Principle of Hope," in my *Margins of Political Discourse* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 158-182.
5. Paul Tillich, "The Right to Hope," 185-186. In these speculations one can probably see the influence of Friedrich Schelling to whom Tillich was attracted throughout his life.
6. *Ibid.*, 186. The formulations are reminiscent of the Chinese Taoist notion of "*wu wei*" (effortless action) and also of Heidegger's notion of "letting be" (seen as primordial praxis).
7. *Ibid.*, 187-188. In Tillich's terminology, debasing hope to the desire for glory and power means a surrender to the "demonic forces" of history. Regarding progress, he states: "The goal of humankind is not progress toward a final stage of perfection; it is the creation of what is possible in each particular state of history; and it is the struggle against the forces of evil, old ones and new ones, which arise in each period in a different way" (188).
8. *Ibid.*, 187-189.



**PART I.**

**GEOPOLITICAL HEGEMONY  
AND DECOLONIALITY**



# CHAPTER ONE

## A NEW GEOPOLITICAL REALISM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

RICHARD FALK

### *Statism and Geopolitics*

The most challenging “world order” issue of our time is to close the gap between the territoriality of *political* life, and the non-territoriality of globalized technology, economics, and ecology together with the localized denial of the right of self-determination in Syria, Palestine, Kashmir, and elsewhere. A state-centric world order has shown its inability to find sustainable solutions for nuclear weapons and climate change at the global end of the spectrum and address severe and prolonged situations of criminal injustice in Syria, Palestine, etc. In effect, territorial sovereignty fails in responding to the fundamental challenges to human wellbeing that possess a global scope, and global solidarity often proves helpless when it comes to preventing genocidal violence and crimes against humanity. When statism is combined with geopolitics, as in the administration of global security and the world economy, the result is the entrenchment of special corporate and financial interests and the globalization of ecologically unsustainable inequalities within a setting of multiple forms of scarcity.

The old geopolitical realism was premised on the idea that hard power, especially the outcome of major wars, remains the principal agency of historical change, and that the security of states is based on their access to direct and indirect (that is, via alliances) military power. That is, both prospects for change and for stability, the essential elements of what passes for “peace” in a state-centric world order are dependent on the sufficiency of hard power assets. From such a perspective law, morality, and above all, people, are irrelevant or worse to establishing rational forms of global governance.

This geopolitical realism is patently inconsistent with the juridical foundations of political legitimacy that inform the modern world order, which is premised on the equality of all sovereign states. This juridical foundation of world order developed in seventeenth century Europe, and conveniently associated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 acknowledged the primacy of the territorial sovereign states as the exclusive basis of membership in international society. As this system evolved, it extended its geographical reach to much of the rest of the world through the mechanism of colonization that added a *vertical* dimension legally validating the European empires as well as the outcome of wars, however aggressive in character.

### *Challenges to Traditional Geopolitics*

This conception of world order began to be challenged after World War I, especially by positing the idea that recourse to war was unlawful, and accompanied by the idea that force could only be legally used in self-defense. This quasi-pacifist norm was solemnized in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris in 1928, but ignored in the actual diplomacy of states. The second transformative idea that emerged at the time involved endowing people with a right of self-determination embodied in rival Wilsonian and Leninist formulations. This proposed norm was also largely abandoned in the practice of states. European colonialism retained its grip on the non-Western world, including even the Middle East through the medium of the Mandates system, which was a confusing compromise between acknowledging an ultimate right of self-determination and accepting the realities of colonial rule.

In the period after World War II this old form of geopolitical realism was more seriously challenged by three principal sets of forces. First, the United Nations was established, and incorporated both the horizontal idea of sovereign equality of territorial states and a vertical innovation in the form of permanent membership and a right of veto in the Security Council given only to the five principal states on the winning side of the war. This geopolitical acknowledgement of hard power, in effect, exempted these leading states and their friends from accountability, thereby undermining UN authority in relation to the most important political actors on the global stage.

The second development was the legalistic incorporation of the renunciation of aggressive war in the UN Charter (Articles 2(4), 51) along lines specified by the Pact of Paris. Such legalism was little more than a

gesture given the right of veto and the related primacy of geopolitics in shaping the behavior of most states.

The third post-1945 development resulted from the success of anti-colonial movements in challenging the colonial system by means of struggle. India led the way with its extraordinary nonviolent movement that dislodged the British Empire from its “crown jewel”; but there followed a series of armed struggles, sometimes called “wars of national liberation”, that in many cases led to political independence. Given these victories, the right of self-determination was gradually recognized as superseding and even invalidating colonial claims of rulership. What is notable from the perspective of geopolitical realism is that the weaker side, as measured by hard power balances, consistently prevailed in these anti-colonial wars generating alternative conceptions about how change occurs and legitimacy established within a global setting dominated by sovereign states. The war system persists, but the capacity of militarily strong states to prevail over a mobilized population in a militarily weaker state, at least in contexts of foreign occupation and intervention, has been deeply eroded, if not altogether undermined.

### *Toward a New Geopolitics*

The political leadership of the world continues to treat old geopolitical realism as the basis of rational behavior. Governments connect their security with military capabilities and alliances, and regard military intervention as the core response to threatening hostile behavior. This persistence of old geopolitical realism has never been “realistic” since the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, and the avoidance of World War III during the Cold War, although best understood as a kind of political miracle, was also a warning. A second warning should have come to major political actors on the global political stage by their defeats in such major anti-colonial wars as the Vietnam War, and the first Afghanistan War. In these instances, hard power dominance lost out, but in the process inflicted great suffering and extensive devastation on the victimized-territorial society.

This old geopolitical realism is also state-centric in its main approach to problem-solving via voluntary agreements. The climate change negotiations up to this point have illustrated the dangerous incapacity of governments, serving national and special interests, to protect global interests by sensibly and fairly restricting greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with safety levels endorsed by an overwhelming consensus of climate scientists. The Paris Agreement in 2015 pushed multilateralism to

its limits, but even if implemented falls short of what is needed. Even with this fundamental challenge to human wellbeing, the best that can be hoped to be achieved is a series of voluntary arrangements depending on the participation and good faith of very diversely situated sovereign states and falling menacingly short of what scientists insist is minimally necessary.

In summary, the old forms of geopolitical realism are deficient in several basic respects, given the circumstances of the early twenty-first century:

- An outmoded reliance on war, arms sales, and hard power to achieve stability, security, and change;
- An ideological posture that gives national interests a paramount influence, especially in war/peace contexts, marginalizing the relevance of international law, morality, and prudence in most conflict situations;
- A structural reliance on state-centrism that has precluded the fulfillment of global interests with respect to nuclear weaponry, climate change, and economic globalization due to political fragmentation;
- An ideological orientation toward capital efficiency, economic growth, and consumerism that sidelines considerations of equity, sustainability, and ecological prudence.

Against this background, the contours of a new geopolitical realism become clear:

- A realization that war and militarism can no longer generate security and stability even for the most powerful political actors, and that species vulnerability has become the signature reality of this historical period;
- The need to enact structural reforms that entrust solutions for issues of global scope to mechanisms that are geared to serve the promotion of global and human interests;
- The formulation of ideological visions that emphasize normative dimensions of development and sustainability, and fulfill the promise of human rights by an emphasis on the “human”;
- The development of political will to regulate the world economy by reference to these values with a particular emphasis on justice, sustainability, self-determination, and ethical and ecological consciousness.

### ***Continuing Problems—Prospects of Disaster***

The challenge is not a matter of where to go, but how to get there! In my view the obstacles and resistances are so great that only a “politics of impossibility” can realize the sort of “necessary utopia” that achieves the reorientation required to bring the new geopolitical realism into being. And time is not on the side of such a transition, but neither is skepticism. There are many disturbing signs that the West is creating conditions in the Middle East and Asia that could produce a wider war, most likely a new Cold War, while posing menacing risks of World War III. The reckless confrontation with Russia along its borders, reinforced by provocative weapons deployments in several NATO countries and the promotion of governing regimes hostile to Russia in such countries as Ukraine and Georgia seems to exhibit Cold War nostalgia, and is certainly not the way to preserve peace.

Add to this the increasingly belligerent approach recently taken by the United States’ naval officers and defense officials to China with respect to island disputes and navigational rights in the South China Seas. Such posturing has all the ingredients needed for intensifying international conflict, giving a militarist signature to Obama’s “pivot to Asia.”

Such moves encourage the adoption of an even more militaristic approach to foreign challenges that seem aimed at American and Israeli interests by ISIS, Iran, and China. Where this kind of warmongering will lead is unknowable, but what is frighteningly clear is that this dangerous geopolitical bravado is likely to become even more strident in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential elections in the United States under the leadership of Donald J. Trump.

### ***Historical Deep Roots***

It has taken almost a century for the breakup of the Ottoman Empire to reap the colonialist harvest that was sown in the peace diplomacy that followed World War I. In the notorious Sykes-Picot Agreement diplomats of England and France in 1916 secretly negotiated arrangements that would divide the Middle East into a series of artificially delimited territorial states to be administered as colonies by the respective European governments.

Among other wrongs, this devious undertaking represented a betrayal of promises made to Arab leaders that Britain, in particular, would support true independence for Arab peoples in exchange for joining the anti-Ottoman and anti-German alliance formed to fight World War I. Such a

division of the Ottoman spoils not only betrayed wartime promises of political independence to Arab leaders, but also undermined the efforts of Woodrow Wilson to apply the principle of ethnic self-determination to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the reconstruction of regional order in the Middle East.

As a result of diplomatic maneuvers, the compromise reached at Versailles in 1919 was to accept the Sykes-Picot borders that were drawn to satisfy colonial ambitions for trade routes and spheres of influence, but to disguise slightly its colonialist character, by creating an international system of mandates for the Middle East in which London and Paris would administer the territories, accepting a vague commitment to lead the various societies to eventual political independence at some unspecified future time. These Sykes-Picot “states” were artificial political communities that never overcame the indigenous primacy of ethnic, tribal, and religious affinities, and could be maintained as coherent political realities only by creating oppressive state structures. If World War II had not sapped European colonial will and capabilities, it is easy to imagine that the peoples of the Middle East would have remained subjugated under mandate banners, especially considering how oil reserves became a prime strategic concern of the West.

### *After World War II*

Is it any wonder, then, that the region has been extremely beset by various forms of authoritarian rule ever since the countries of the Middle East gained their independence after the end of the Second World War? Whether in the form of dynastic monarchies or secular governments, the stability that was achieved in the region depended on the denial of human rights, including rights of democratic participation, as well as the build-up of small privileged and exploitative elites that linked national markets and resources to the global economic order. And as oil became the prime strategic resource, the dominance of the region became absolutely vital for the West led by the United States.

From these perspectives, the stable authoritarianism of the region was quite congenial with the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union that was premised upon securing strategic and economic partnerships reflecting ideological rivalries, while being indifferent to whether or not the people were being victimized by abusive and brutal governments.

The American commitment to this status quo in the Middle East was most vividly expressed in 1980 after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

and the Iranian Revolution of the prior year by the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine. President Carter in his State of the Union Address was warning the Soviet Union by a strong diplomatic signal that the United States was ready to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf by force, which because of supposed Soviet superiority in ground warfare was understood at the time as making an implied threat to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

### *After the Cold War*

When the Cold War ended, the United States unthinkingly promoted the spread of capitalist style constitutional democracy wherever it could, including in the Middle East. The Clinton presidency (1992-2000) talked about the “enlargement” of the community of democratic states, implying that any other political option lacked legitimacy (unless of course it was a friendly oil producer or strategic ally).

The presidency of George W. Bush (2000-2008) with its interventionist bent invoked “democracy promotion” as a principal goal, and became clear in its official formulation of U.S. national security doctrine in 2002 that only capitalist democracies were legitimate Westphalian states whose sovereign rights were entitled to respect.

This kind of strident militarism reached a new climax after 9/11. The White House apparently hoped to embark on a series of regime-changing interventions in the Middle East and Asia with the expectation of producing at minimal cost shining examples of liberation and democratization, as well as securing the Gulf oil reserves and establishing a network of military bases to undergird its regional ambitions.

The attacks on Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, were the most notorious applications of this misguided approach. Instead of “democracy” (Washington’s code word for integration into its version of neoliberal globalization), what emerged was strife and chaos, and the collapse of stable internal governance. The strong state that preceded the intervention gave way to localized militias and resurgent tribal, clan, and religious rivalries leading domestic populations to wish for a return to the relative stability of the preceding authoritarian arrangements, despite their brutality and corruption.

And even in Washington one encounters whispered admissions that Iraq was better off, after all, under Saddam Hussein than under the kind of sectarian and divisive leaders that have governed the country since the American occupation began in 2003, and now threaten Iraq with an implosion that could in coming years lead to three states (Kurdish, Sunni,

and Shi'ia) replacing the shattered Iraqi state that existed prior to the American-led attack in 2003 on Iraq.

### *The Arab Spring*

Then came the Arab Spring in 2011 creating an awkward tension between the professed wish in Washington for democracy in the Arab world and the overriding American commitment to upholding its strategic interests throughout the Middle East. At first, the West reacted ambivalently to the Arab uprisings, not knowing whether to welcome, and then try to tame, these anti-authoritarian movements of the Arab masses or to lament the risks posed by these new elites that were likely to turn away from neoliberal capitalism and strategic partnerships, and worst of all, might be more inclined to challenge Israel. What happened in the years that followed removed the ambiguity, confirming that material and ideological interests took precedence over visionary endorsements of Arab democracy.

The reality that emerged indicated that neither the domestic setting nor the international context was compatible with the existence of democratic forms of governance. What unsurprisingly followed was a series of further military interventions and strategic confrontations either via NATO as in Libya or by way of its regional partners, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates as in Iran, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.

With few tears shed in Washington, the authentic and promising democratic beginnings in Egypt that excited the world in the aftermath of the 2011 Tahrir Square uprising were crushed two years later by a populist military coup that restored Mubarak Era authoritarianism, accentuating its worst features. What amounted to the revenge of the urban secular elites in Cairo included a genuine bonding between a new majority of the Egyptian people and its armed forces in a bloody struggle to challenge and destroy the Muslim Brotherhood that had taken control of the government by winning a series of elections.

Despite its supposed liberalism the Obama leadership did not challenge these anti-democratic developments. It even accommodated the new Sisi-led leadership by avoiding the term "coup" to describe its seizure of the reins of government, overlooking the extent to which the military takeover in Cairo was followed by a bloody crackdown on Egypt's elected leadership and civil society activists.

### *Between Tyranny and Chaos*

The folk wisdom of the Arab world gives an insight into the counter-revolutionary backlash that has crushed the populist hopes of 2011: “People prefer 100 years of tyranny to a single year of chaos.” And this kind of priority is shared by most of those who make and manage American foreign policy. Just as clearly as the Arab masses, the Pentagon planners prefer the stability of authoritarianism to the anarchistic uncertainties of ethnic and tribal strife, militia forms of governance that so often come in the wake of the collapse of both dictatorial rule and democratic governance.

And the masters of business and finance, aside from the lure of post-conflict markets for the reconstruction of what has been destroyed militarily, prefer to work with dependable and familiar national elites that welcome foreign capital on lucrative terms that benefit insiders and outsiders alike, while keeping the masses in conditions of impoverished thralldom.

In many respects, Syria and Iraq illustrate the terrible human tragedies that have been visited on the peoples of these two countries. In Syria a popular uprising in 2011 was brutally crushed by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus, leading to a series of disastrous interventions on both sides of the internal war that erupted, with Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in a proxy war on Syrian soil while Israel used its diplomatic leverage to ensure that the unresolved war would last as long as possible as Tel Aviv wanted neither the regime nor its opponents to win a clear victory.

During this strife, Russia, Turkey, and the United States were intervening with a bewildering blend of common and contradictory goals ranging from pro-government stabilization to a variety of regime-changing scenarios. These external actors held conflicting views of the Kurdish fighters as either coveted allies or dangerous adversaries. In the process several hundred thousand Syrians have lost their lives, almost half of the population have become refugees and internally displaced persons, much of the country and its ancient heritage sites are devastated, and no real end to the violence and devastation is in sight.

The Iraq experience is only marginally better. After a dozen years of punitive sanctions following the 1991 ceasefire that exacted a heavy toll on the civilian population and the “shock and awe” of the US/UK attacks of 2003, an occupation began that rid the country of its cruel and oppressive leader, Saddam Hussein, and his entourage.

What followed politically became over time deeply disillusioning, and actually worse than the overthrown regime, which had been hardly

imaginable when the American-led occupation began. The Iraqi state was being reconstructed along sectarian lines, purging the Sunni minority elites from the Baghdad bureaucracy and armed forces, thereby generating a widespread internal violent opposition against foreign occupation and a resistance movement against the Iraqi leadership that had gained power with the help of the American presence.

This combination of insurgency and resistance also gave rise to widespread feelings of humiliation and alienation, which proved to be conducive to the rise of jihadi extremism, first in the form of al-Qaeda in Iraq and later as ISIS.

### *Toxic Geopolitics*

It is impossible to understand and explain such a disastrous failure of military interventionism without considering the effects of two toxic “special relationships” formed by the United States, with Israel and Saudi Arabia. The basic feature of such special relationships is an unconditional partnership in which the Israelis and Saudis can do whatever they wish, including pursuing policies antagonistic to US interests without encountering any meaningful opposition from either Washington (or Europe).

This zone of discretion has allowed Israel to keep Palestinians from achieving self-determination while pursuing its own territorial ambitions via constantly expanding settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, fueling grassroots anti-Western sentiment throughout the Arab world because of this persisting reliance on a cruel settler colonialist approach to block for seven decades the Palestinian struggle for fundamental and minimal national rights.

The special relationship with Saudi Arabia is even more astonishing until one considers the primacy of economic strategic priorities, especially the importance of oil supplied to the West at affordable prices coupled with a lucrative market for expensive modern weaponry. Having by far the worst human rights record in the region, replete with judicially decreed beheadings and executions by stoning, the Riyadh leadership continues to be warmly courted in Western capitals as allies and friends. At the same time, equally theocratic Iran is hypocritically bashed and internationally punished in retaliation for its somewhat less oppressive governing abuses.

Of course, looking the other way is what is to be expected in the cynical conduct of opportunistic geopolitics, but to indulge the Saudi role in the worldwide promotion of jihadism while spending trillions on counter-terrorism is much more difficult to fathom until one shifts attention

from the cover story of counter-terrorism to the more illuminating narrative of petropolitics. Despite fracking and natural gas discoveries lessening Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the sharp drop in the price of oil, old capitalist habits persist long after their economic justifications have lapsed and this seems to be true for the Middle East even when such policies have become damaging in lives and financial burdens.

### *Finding Hope is Difficult*

In such circumstances, it is difficult to find much hope in the current cosmodrama of world politics. It is possible, although unlikely, that geopolitical sanity will prevail to the extent of finding a diplomatic formula to end the violence in Syria and Yemen, as well as to normalize relations with Iran, and restore order in Iraq and Libya, although such sensible adjustments face many obstacles, and may be years away.

The alternatives for the Middle East in the near future, barring the unlikely political occurrence of a much more revolutionary and emancipatory second Arab Spring, seem to be authoritarian stability or anarchic strife and chaos, which seem far more bearable if the alternative is the deep trauma associated with enduring further American military interventions.

If you happen to listen to American politicians giving their prescriptions for fixing the Middle East it comes down to “toughness,” including the scary recommendations of “carpet bombing” or “bombing the shit out of them” (Trump) and a greatly heightened American military presence. Even the more prudent commentaries advocate enhanced militarism, hoping to induce aligned Arab countries to put “the boots on the ground” with nary a worry about either igniting a regional war or the regressive imaginative outlook that can only contemplate war as the recipe for peace, again recalling the degree to which Orwellian satiric irony is increasingly relied upon to shape foreign policy prescriptions by ambitious politicians.

Imaginative diplomacy, talking and listening to the enemy, and engaging in self-scrutiny remain outside the cast iron cage of the military mentality that has long dominated most of the political space in American foreign policy debates with the conspicuous help of the passive aggressive mainstream media. In this respect, American democracy is a broken reality, and conscientious citizens must look elsewhere for inspiration. A prison break of the political imagination is long overdue and never more needed to stave off a catastrophic future.



## CHAPTER TWO

### WORLD ORDER, ISLAM, AND THE WEST

AKEEL BILGRAMI

The Chairman of the World Public Forum, Fred Dallmayr, has asked me to express my opinion about the relations between Islam and the West and consider this topic from the point of view of the framework of a “world order,” as well as to consider whether such a framework provides prospects for more peaceful solutions involving a *dialogue* between civilizations that seem to be at odds. I am not sure I can manage to bring these diverse topics together in an entirely coherent way in a few pages, but let me take an honorable stab at it.

“World Order” is an expression used primarily in the discipline of International Relations and, as such, it is mired in a whole range of doctrines that emerged in the Cold War to shape the social sciences as they are now practiced, at least in the English-speaking world. It has also more recently been extended from its initial moorings in IR theory and political science to include issues around the question of global governance in the wake of financial globalization. All these theoretical contexts come with a set of assumptions which are highly questionable for their ideological bias as well as their *selective* grounding in empirical data and all that affects both what the term “World Order” means and how it is deployed. They also come with a specialist jargon that strains to elevate perfectly straightforward concerns, as with most concerns in the social sciences, into a sort of hermetic secular priestcraft of professors advising the prince, and experts thinking in tanks. None of this should be allowed to intimidate us from coming to grips with issues that surround the term “World Order.” In fact, allow me to say—with only the merest polemical exaggeration—that unlike the physical sciences, a degree in the social sciences gives no-one any more qualification to speak about world order than anyone on the street outside this room. Lay people are fully equipped to think about and investigate these matters and may often in fact be more insightful than

those who wear the garb that degrees and jobs in the social sciences bestow on one.

Now, though the term “World Order” began to be deployed with the rise of IR theory in the Cold War, obviously the phenomenon that the term describes has a more longstanding history and conceptual background. But long though that history may be, it still falls distinctly within the modern period. It makes no sense to talk of there being a “world order” prior to modernity, when, for instance, Venice was, informally speaking, the capital of the Western world and when international or global relations were defined to a considerable extent by maritime trade rather than the relations between states that emerged in the modern period when, say, London replaced Venice as the capital for some centuries and then later New York and Washington may be said to have replaced London in turn. It is only since the rise of nations and centralized states which integrated the hitherto scattered locations of power in the period since the Westphalian Peace that the question of an *order* issuing from the distribution of power among them could be relevant. Yet the modern state, which came to be seen in hyphenated conjunction with the rise of nations in Europe since Westphalia, by itself, was not quite sufficient to oblige one to think of a world order, as we have come to do. What else was needed?

Let me take the theme of Islam, and religion more broadly, to bring out what other crucial element was needed, an element which still persists, even if in hidden forms, in all the talk of world order.

We speak much today of Islam and we speak of its relation to the West, and when we do, we do so in two quite different registers: first, by contrasting Islam with the liberal ideals of the West; and in this register there is much self-congratulation about these liberal ideals. We often then switch to a different register that is frequently critical of the West’s attitudes towards Islam, seeing in the former a hate-mongering phobia of Islam. I shall argue that if we understand the notion of a world order as the modern idea that it is and without any illusions about what it is, both these registers are highly misleading regarding what is really at stake.

Prior to modernity, the relations between Islam and the West were for centuries understood more simply as the relations between Islam and Christendom. And in those centuries, Islam and Christendom bore enmity towards each other in the most vilifying terms, both in word and in horrifically violent deed. But throughout these centuries, they each nevertheless displayed a respect for one another, trading in diverse material products, and engaged in a prolonged and fruitful mutual intellectual and artistic collaboration and influence—all of which when viewed from the thoroughly revised circumstances of modernity, can only

seem enviably robust and healthy. For those many hundreds of years, both cultures were feudal and pastoral and, despite local differences in religious doctrine, which were in large part the avowed ground of antagonism, there were shared intellectual premises that governed these differences. In fact, it is the shared element that was the *real* source of the hostility. The more ancient religions of the East, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, were not only more removed in space, but were intellectually too remote to be palpably threatening to Christianity, in the way that Islam with its many *shared* assumptions was. In fact, I think it is probably right to say that the crusades were fought against a form of *heresy* represented by Islamic civilization in Arabian lands rather than against some wholly alien presence there.

Napoleon's campaigns in Egypt and the British conquest of India, however, gradually gave rise to an era defined by a quite different tone of relations, a tone that reflected the relations of power which for the first time contained the rudiments of what we would now dress up with such terms as a "world order." Conflict was of course still *said* to be there, but it would be wrong to think that it was the *key* to future relations. It was the new tenor of colonial mastery and that mastery required attitudes of condescension and superiority; this was felt to be so by the subject people, breeding in them not so much a robust sense of conflict any more, but rather a sense of alienation and resentment. This new moral psychology that accompanied colonial relations was of course undergirded by an altering of the *material* relations that had held for centuries. It is those material relations that began to constitute the first semblances of a world order.

The growing mercantile and industrial forces of the most powerful Christian lands were, as we well know, steadily destroying the pastoral societies in their own terrain, but their effect on the lands and economies of the colonial subjects was altogether different. What feudal structures the West destroyed to recreate new and vibrant economies in its own midst, it left well alone in these other lands, taking only that which was necessary for its mercantile and industrial requirements. By transforming its own political economy while extracting surpluses but leaving its conquered lands structurally unchanged, European colonialism thereby laid the foundation for an abiding material differential, which would continue until today to be the underlying source of the ideological rhetoric of superior progress, not only material *but also civilizational*. The health of conflict between more or less equal foes had, by these material changes, deteriorated into the alienating effects of condescension and defensive resentment among increasingly unequal ones and this is precisely what

persists today in revised forms. It persists whether it is in whole national populations subject to embargoes and invasions or stateless fugitives fleeing the chaos and suffering what is either a direct, or an indirect, fallout of these embargoes and invasions. It is the increasing complexity that accompanies these material relations and the relations of power in our own time that have prompted social scientists to summon the term “world order” to describe a *patchwork* form of governance to be found in international bodies, whether they be international credit agencies, trade organizations, treaty and defense organizations, or the Security Council of the United Nations.

So one lesson to draw about religion from all this would be that the so-called “clash” or conflict between civilizations is not nearly as bad if it is a genuine clash as it was for centuries prior to modernity, rather than, as it has become in modernity, a *conquest* passed off in neutral terms as a “clash.” It is the sleight of hand, this neutral idiom of “clash” and “conflict” to describe a situation which should be rightly described as a *conquest* that is Huntington’s most insidious contribution of these issues.

The point of these potted historical remarks is to suggest that what the notion of “world order” describes is something that could not have had an application in those earlier centuries when Islam and Christendom fought the crusades, even as they influenced each other deeply in a wide range of spheres of mind and culture as equal foes and partners alike. A world order only emerged when these relations were transformed in the way I described above in the modern period; and the very much later coinage and deployment of the term “world order” are really just a complex form of updating these sets of relations of an earlier period that were preserved in a revised form after formal political decolonization in the aftermath of the Second World War.

If I were to shed my assigned focus on Islam and religion, I would simply describe these relations, as is often done now, as relations holding between the North and the South. That is the one constant since the colonial era began until now in all the renewals and transformations of the idea of a world order. To put it more elaborately: the fact of a world order existed in the early modern period in the form of colonial relations of power and dependency in the North’s relations to the South; but because of formal decolonization and more particularly because the Cold War intervened to complicate things, the term “world order” was coined to make it appear as if things were not a matter of such domination and dependency any more but rather a bipolar arrangement in which a complex form of deterrence existed between two different ideologies and visions of political economy and governance.

To some extent, of course, what happened during the Cold War is a departure from the colonial paradigm of North-South relations. Though there was talk of the “Soviet Empire,” this idea of empire did not have the familiar form to be found in the relations that Western Europe bore to the countries of the African, Asian, and Latin American continents; in fact, the Soviet Union, even though it maintained a tyrannical stranglehold over its satellites, often poured money into its satellites. But the real continuities with the colonial paradigm consist in the fact that prior to the drawing of the Iron Curtain, the various parts of the Soviet Empire used to have relations with the West that were subtle versions of the colonial relations that the West bore to the countries of the South.

And now with the passing of the Soviet Union, there is an increasing trend of returning to those relations of dependency, with the NATO powers pushing constantly on the frontiers where such dependencies have not yet returned. The entire theater of controversy around Ukraine cannot be understood without placing it in this framework of understanding. The motives are clear: Eastern Europe contains populations that provide a form of labor that had intolerably been undermined in the Western part of Europe due to the bargaining strength that organized labor had gained there in the post-World War II period—in other words a form of labor that was not indulgently possessed of high wages, wide-ranging benefits, truncated working hours, and the refusal of enforced mobility. . . . In short, Eastern Europe could now be viewed in the “world order” as a field of force where an Anglo-American capitalist ideal would emerge in Europe, so that corporations could resist taxation imposed on them and resist the social programs that had privileged the labor of their Western European counterpart. It was also the geopolitical field of force that would be much more pliant to the United States’ ambition to impede European moves towards an independent role in world affairs. That independence was something *both* the US *and* the Soviet Union worried about during the Cold War years. For the US, that anxiety still exists and now extends to countries such as China as well. Those are the aspirations of the post-Cold War “world order.”

Several questions remain: can one continue to speak of a world order that maintains the imperial relations of the past in disguised current forms when the elites of the South are so much more powerful now than they were in the past and are in alliance with the elites of the North and West? In other words is “imperialism” a relevant category of analysis in a period of *globalized financial capital*? This is a matter of lively debate at present, even among the political economists of the Left, and the outcome of the debate will have no small impact on how to understand the idea of a

“world order.” Another question is: how much does the increasing presence of China (its most current downturn apart) and its economic power in other countries of the South (most vivid in African countries), furnish the possibilities of a new reconfiguration of world order? If its presence (and perhaps even India’s) in the other regions of the South develops more intensely, might we see a future of inter-imperial rivalries of the form that defined the period prior to 1914? Should that happen, let us not forget that Lenin described inter-imperial rivalry as the cradle of radicalization that led to the Bolshevik revolution; but here I am prematurely speculating far beyond anything that the facts on the ground presently allow.

Let me conclude then, with a word about how what I have said about world order relates to the scope of “dialogue” between the West and the Islamist tendencies in West Asia. Suppose what I have said is right: that the very idea of a world order is a falsely bland descriptive as well as prescriptive label for longstanding colonial relations of power and dependence between the North and the South (relations that are evident to this day in the unequal representation of the South and its interests in what I described as the “patchwork form of governance” that comprises the world order in institutions such as international credit agencies, international trade organizations and the Security Council). Suppose I am right too that the very idea of a *clash* of civilizations, though it described the pre-modern period well, in the modern period is a misleadingly domesticating label for a centuries-long conquest of one civilization by another which continues in a revised but abiding form.

First of all, notice that if all this *is* right, then declaring grimly, as some critics of the North have done, that such a dialogue is preempted by the pervasive Islamophobia in the North is completely beside the point. Anyone with elementary powers of observation will notice that when it comes to a “world order,” the question is about power among states not about attitudes among populations and when it comes to states there is absolutely no Islamophobia. The United States government suffers from no such phobia. Indeed it supports to this day the most despised Islamic state in the world. The main point of world order is to have control of a region, its natural resources and its geopolitical advantage. It has nothing to do with attitudes towards religions and ethnicities which are all (not so) niceties that can be left to ordinary people so as to manipulate their fears for statist ends in the maintenance of world order as I have described it.

And if these relations of domination and control, and conquest not clash, are acknowledged to be what is really at stake, I would think that the very idea of a dialogue *simply lapses*. Why? Because one cannot have

dialogue with a master! Dialogues can only occur between relatively equal foes and that scenario of equality among foes has not existed basically, as I have said, since the crusades except for a brief and essentially illusory caesura of the Cold War. The point, by the very nature of the case, is this: one can only *resist* a master not colloque with him. One may of course have a dialogue *within* the framework of resistance. But resistance must be the prior and frameworking notion. Obviously, I do not mean violent resistance, not only because violence is intrinsically immoral, but because it has brought nothing but further domination and an endless cycle of self-perpetuating further violence. How to construct and develop a moral and effective resistance for our time in a world order governed by globalized finance remains the more pressing question of our time.



## CHAPTER THREE

# DECOLONIALITY AFTER DECOLONIZATION; DEWESTERNIZATION AFTER THE COLD WAR

WALTER D. MIGNOLO

### ***I. On Decolonial Politics***

Shortly after Francisco Carballo proposed a collection of the articles I have published over the past 20 years on the subject of *decolonial politics*, I received an invitation from Fred Dallmayr—co-chair of the World Public Forum (WPF)—to participate in a Plenary Panel called “The World Beyond Global Disorder.”

The invitees to the panel were asked to address a set of fundamental questions:

- What are the reasons or underlying causes of the prevailing chaos in today’s world disorder? What are the main contributing factors and what are the major social or political agents contributing to the disorder?
- How can we overcome the present disorder? Are there alternatives to the present chaos? How can we find pathways pointing in the direction of a more just and sustainable world order?

I knew immediately that both my preparation for the WPF panel and the preface to the collection of my work would address the questions asked above, questions that could be reworded even more simply: (1) how did the world get into the mess it is in today; and (2) what are the ways out? Both questions are political at their core. The first demands an analysis and a diagnosis, the second a treatment and a prognosis.

Needless to say, it would be naive to expect that any single diagnosis or prognosis would be sufficient for the almost 8 billion people on the planet. To think that way would simply continue the deadly march of the

*modern ego*. While it is true that examples of *ego conquiro* can be found throughout human history, the legacies of the *ego conquiro* that emerged in the sixteenth century (with the conquest and colonization of the Americas) are of an entirely different kind. It is precisely this “different kind of ego” that is at the core of the articles collected here, as well as at the core of my own research and concerns since the mid-1980s, when I began to suspect something that definitively emerged a decade later, and which I will expand upon below.

I became aware of the concept of *coloniality* after publishing my book *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and Colonization* (1995, 2003). At the time, I subscribed to the more or less general understanding of *colonialism* and *colonization*, in that they referred to the specific act of establishing colonies and/or one state (in the general sense of structures of governance, not in the specific sense of the modern-secular, bourgeois nation-state that emerged in the United States and Europe toward the end of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) that displaced, dismantled and overruled previously existing states. The Spanish and Portuguese conquest and colonization of the Americas consisted of precisely that: dismantling the Aztec and Inca states and replacing them with Spanish vice-royalties, for example, with consequences in every aspect of daily life for the indigenous population. I understood then that colonization’s cognitive frame and subjectivities were necessary to implement colonialism. Thus, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* explored the colonization of languages, memories and space.

I would argue that the underlying causes of the prevailing chaos are, on the one hand, the persistence of global coloniality and, on the other, the fact that since approximately the year 2000 we have been witnessing the economic and political re-emergence of cultures and civilizations that have historically been undermined by global coloniality.

The chapter is organized into four main parts. In Part I, I outline what I mean by “global coloniality.” In Part II, I explain how global coloniality has been challenged in recent years by a shift towards “dewesternization,” led mainly by Russia and China, and how the West has responded with a violent effort to reassert itself. In Part III, I consider possible pathways toward a more livable world order within the current clash between dewesternization and rewesternization. In Part IV, I discuss the importance of the decolonial project within this search for more just and sustainable ways of being in the world.

## **II. *The Colonial Matrix of Power: The Historical Foundation of Western Civilization***

I would like to make more explicit what I mean by “coloniality.” Coloniality is shorthand for the “coloniality of power,” and both are stand-ins for the “colonial matrix power,” or the CMP. The use of one term or the other depends on how much detail we want to invoke with the expression.

The colonial matrix of power (the CMP) is a complex structure of management and control composed of domains, levels and flows. Like “the unconscious” in Sigmund Freud or “surplus value” in Karl Marx, the CMP is a theoretical concept that helps make visible what is invisible to the naked (or rather the non-theoretical) eye. Unlike Freud’s unconscious or Marx’s surplus value, though, the CMP is a concept created in the Third World, in the South American Andes. That is, it is not a concept created in Europe or in the US academy. The concept was born out of theoretical-political struggles in South America, at the intersection between the academic and public spheres. Driven by local critics of development, the CMP bears the impulse of liberation theology and emerged out of the limits of dependency theory in the seventies. These, of course, were also the years of the struggle for decolonization in Asia and Africa.

In order to understand the CMP, it must first be understood that, for us,<sup>1</sup> coloniality is constitutive and not derivative of modernity. For this reason, we write “modernity/coloniality.” The slash (/) that divides and unites modernity with coloniality means that coloniality is constitutive of modernity: there is no modernity without coloniality. Highlighting “global coloniality” means that global modernity is only half of the story, the visible one. The other half—hidden—is global coloniality.<sup>2</sup>

Surrounding the idea of modernity (in the period 1500 to 2000) is a discourse that promises happiness and salvation through conversion, progress, civilization, modernization, development and market democracy. This discourse is tied up with the logic of coloniality, which circumscribes what it takes to advance modernity within all the *domains* used to categorize and classify the modern world: political, economic, religious, epistemic, aesthetic, ethnic/racial, and sexual/gender subjective.

Part of the significance of the CMP as a theoretical construct lies in its uncovering of the domains that the discourse of modernity has framed in order to advance its overall project. The rhetoric of modernity, for example, locates the historical foundation of political theory in Ancient Greece, though this foundation was revamped from Machiavelli onward. On the other hand, there is no discourse on economy for the imaginary of

modernity to be found in Greece. Instead, this discourse emerged at the confluence of European local histories and its American colonies. This much is clear in the long section that Adam Smith devoted to colonialism in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). Thus, the decolonial task consists of undraping the positivity of political theory and political economy, and showing that the positivity of both is mounted on the negative consequences of their implementation.

One of the presuppositions of the idea of modernity is that “modernity” is the present unfolding of universal history, and that it is the role of the modernizer to honor this inexorable fate of the world. This presupposition plays itself out through the theological designs of Western Christianity during the European Renaissance and through secular designs since the European Enlightenment.

All the domains used to classify the modern world are intrinsically interrelated: it is not possible to understand one domain (say the political or economic) without also understanding its relation to and consequences for all the others (religious, epistemic, racial, sexual, aesthetic and subjective). Similarly, understanding racism and sexism requires an understanding of their relationships with religion, epistemology and the economy. These relationships are kept hidden, though, like the unconscious that Sigmund Freud uncovered and the surplus value that Karl Marx made explicit. The coloniality of power is invisibilized for two main reasons: either the actors telling triumphal histories of their own doing and thinking really believe that their way is the only way and that people have to follow or submit to their mandates, or it is a matter of perversity—that is, of knowing what the consequences and costs of advancing modernity will be for many people, but hiding these consequences for their own benefit. There is a history to be told of the *ego conquiro*,<sup>3</sup> from the “conquest of America” before the Cartesian *ego* to its transformation and adaptation in the West during the Cold War (a transformation that elicited similar responses from antagonistic forces, incidentally). Westernization, in other words, means that the rules of the game throughout the world are established in all of the CMP’s domains, including, of course, the subject-formation of the ruling elite.

But the question now is: what holds all the domains of the CMP together? To answer this question, we need to introduce the *levels* of the CMP. Within each domain are different levels of management and control. The rhetoric of modernity is heavily utilized within these levels, in order to convince the population that such-and-such a decision or public policy is for the betterment (i.e. the happiness and salvation) of everyone. While theological principles and philosophical-scientific truths have historically

sustained the domains of the CMP, the mainstream media today plays an equally crucial role in disseminating the rhetoric of modernity and salvation in the face of ever-changing enemies.

The actors and institutions that create, pronounce and transform the ideals that drive the idea of modernity are the same actors and institutions that (intentionally or not) keep all the domains interrelated and also keep these interrelations invisible. It is within this context that we must understand the recent creation of the figure of the “expert,” who appears often in the mainstream media to explain this or that aspect of a news story, and who knows a great deal about one domain but is ignorant of the others and of how all the domains are connected.

Outside the domains and their levels of management and control is a broader level where the domains themselves are defined, and their interrelations legislated and authorized. We might call the domains themselves the “content” of the conversation, or that which is “enunciated.” Conversely, the broader level where the domains are defined and interrelated relates to the “terms” of the conversation, or “enunciation” proper.

This broader level is also the level of “knowledge” in the deep sense of the word. It is composed of actors, languages and institutions. The institutions involved are mainly colleges, universities, museums, research centers (think tanks), institutes, foundations, and religious organizations. At the same time, the enormous visibility of generous donors hides the fact that generosity is a fact of life for billions of people in the world, beyond the smaller areas of elite institutions and the actors that sustain them.

The actors involved are trained and experienced politicians, CEOs of banks and corporations, university presidents, museums directors, and so on. The actors that rule the institutions do not have a homogeneous view of the world and society, as we see today in the US, in the positions of Democrats and Republicans, or in Europe, where Poland and Hungary are seeing Europe through their own right-wing eyes. What is common, across the differences, is the content of the conversation between the so-called “right” (in different degrees) and the so-called “left” (in different shades).

As for the languages in which the content of the conversation has been established and maintained, these have been and still are the six modern European imperial languages: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese during the Renaissance; German, English and French since the Enlightenment. For Russia and China to enter the conversation, the conversation has to be in English, French or German. The reverse does not hold: leaders of the core European Union (of which Poland and Hungary are not part) can maintain their French, English or German without needing to learn Russian or Chinese.

The essential feature to take notice of within the CMP's domains is the domain of knowledge. Knowledge has a privileged position: it occupies the level of the enunciated, where the *content* of the conversation is established, and it occupies the level of the enunciation, which regulates the *terms* of the conversation. A pedagogical metaphor would help clarify the point I am making here. Think of a puppeteer. You do not see the puppeteer; you only see the puppets. You are drawn by the puppets, their movements and dialogues. What you see and hear is the content of the conversation. In order to "see" the terms of the conversation, you would have to disengage from the illusion and focus on the puppeteer behind the scenes who is regulating the *terms* of the conversation.

"Knowledge" in the CMP occupies two positions: knowledge is one of the puppets (the content of the conversation) and knowledge also denotes the *designs* that the puppeteer creates to enchant the audience. The decoloniality of knowledge involves changing the *terms* of the conversations: decoloniality aims at altering the principles and assumptions of knowledge creation, transformation and dissemination.<sup>4</sup> Dewesternization, by contrast, disputes the *content* of the conversation. The apparent paradox is that the *domains* of the CMP seem to be isolated and independent of one another. The CMP, then, needs "experts" within a given domain. These "experts" are unknowing not simply of other domains but of the logic (the *terms* of the conversation) that keeps all the domains interlinked.

Consequently, the CMP is held together by the *flows* that emanate from the enunciation (from the terms of the conversation, and the rhetoric of modernity). These flows interconnect all the domains and connect the domains with the actors and institutions, in the major languages of the European idea of modernity. Inevitably, the question of subjectivity and subject formation emerges: the CMP is involved in the creation of particular persons/subjects and institutions, but the CMP also takes on a life of its own, shaping and contorting the subjectivity (the reasoning and emotioning) of the person managing it. Because of coloniality, control of the terms of enunciation (that is, control of knowledge) is necessary for controlling the domains, and controlling the domains means managing the people whose lives are shaped by the domains.

### **III. Closing the Cycle of Western Hegemony**

Now that we have a general understanding of the promises announced by the rhetoric of modernity (the promises of salvation by conversion, progress, civilization, development, defeating terrorism, and ending the

drug economy in order to finally live in a developed and happy world) and the consequences of enacting what these salvation discourses promise, we can look at the present world (dis)order and speculate on the underlying causes of the prevailing chaos.

I have stated already that the underlying causes can be found within global coloniality. By “global coloniality” I mean that the specificities of the CMP that were put in place in the sixteenth century—through the appropriation of massive amounts of land in Anahuac, Tawantinsuyu, Mayab, Abya Yala, the Turtle Islands and other places, the arrival of non-invited Europeans, and their initiation of a massive slave trade—have now permeated most of the planet through the dominant form of governance (the modern nation-state), the type of economy (economic coloniality), universities and museums, the media and the entertainment industry.

To make short the very long story that connects the sixteenth century with the twenty-first: if we look closely at the European invasion of Tawantinsuyu (the name the Incas gave to their territory) from approximately 1532 to 1580, we find that the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 is almost an exact replica, carried out some 500 years later by the last imperial state in a long history of the consolidation of Western civilization and expansion. In short, these are two moments in the long history of the Westernization of the world.<sup>5</sup>

This “replication” is not happenstance. It is inscribed in the Salvationist logic of modernity and the irrepressible need of coloniality to enact the promises of modernity. In other words, the “replication” has to do with the persistence of the CMP, with its rhetoric of modernity as salvation and its legitimization of the logic of coloniality as domination, dispossession and oppression. The history of the CMP is not a linear one. On the contrary, it is a heterogeneous historic-structural set of nodes connecting different places and moments within the historical foundation of Western civilization and its trajectory of Westernization. It is a set of global designs (economic, religious, political, aesthetics, racial, sexual, epistemic, and subjective) for creating a homogeneous world order. It has failed, and it could not have been otherwise. The failure of Westernization is the major “reason and cause” of the world disorder we are living through.

This one example (and there are many more I could invoke)<sup>6</sup> illustrates what I mean when I say that the CMP was the overarching conceptual arrangement of the global order between 1500 and 2000, which was the cycle of the Westernization of the world.<sup>7</sup> The closing of this cycle in 2000 means that, for roughly 500 years, the CMP was put in place, transformed, controlled and managed by Western imperial states (from Spain and Portugal to the United States, via the Netherlands, France and England).

Around the year 2000, the West (meaning Western civilization, meaning the US and former Western Europe, which today forms the core of the European Union) began to lose managerial control of the CMP.

During this historical period, Western imperial states did practically whatever they pleased in the rest of the world, beginning, it is important to remember, with their historical foundation in the Atlantic in the sixteenth century. Western imperial states went through a series of conflicts and wars, fighting among themselves. First, England and France disputed the primacy of the Spanish empire; then there was the religious war that ended in the peace of Westphalia and the foundation of the modern secular bourgeois state; then came World War I, thirty years after the Berlin Treaty, where European states had distributed among themselves the entire African continent. The prelude to World War I witnessed two new contenders for the control of CMP: Japan, after victories over China (1905) and Russia (1905); and the US, after the final defeat of the old Spanish Empire in the Hispano-American War (1898-1901). The Hispano-American war was a signpost for the entry of the US into the global arena, and it saw the US claiming its rights to CMP globalism.

By globalism I mean something different from globalization.<sup>8</sup> The recent uses of globalization (in the last thirty or so years) are associated with the neoliberal doctrine and the fall of the Soviet Union. Globalization became a key term in the neoliberal version of the rhetoric of modernity. Globalization promoted a future of weaker states, no frontiers, and a new stage of development—no longer through industrialization (as in the 1950s and 1960s) but through the expansion of markets, consumerism and democracy. Above all, though, “globalization” was promoted as something that had just “happened” in history. Like “modernity,” it was sold, so to speak, as a chronological ontology and not as human design. Using “globalism” instead of “globalization,” I point to the rhetorical design of globalization and highlight it as yet another fiction, another domain, of the CMP.

In addition, and returning to my quest for the underlying causes of the current prevailing chaos, globalism as I use it here is a process that must again be traced back to the sixteenth century and that is inextricably tied up with the CMP. There are several sources I could draw on to illustrate this point. I will refer to just one: Carl Schmitt’s crucial notion of “global linear thinking.”<sup>9</sup> Schmitt connects global linear thinking with the emergence, in the sixteenth century, of international law, and the emergence of international law with his conception of the “second *nomos* of the earth.”

The second *nomos* means, for Schmitt, that since the sixteenth century the planet has been mapped by European actors and institutions aligned with European interests.<sup>10</sup> During the period in which the first *nomoi* predominated, there was no single *nomos* that interfered with the others or was imposed onto the others. By contrast, the second *nomos* was the first in the history of humanity that was implemented to manage and control other *nomoi*. This implementation began in the sixteenth century. Importantly, the second *nomos* of the earth manifested itself in the creation of international law.<sup>11</sup>

Accordingly, globalism is a set of imperial designs mounted on the complementarity of the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality (the CMP), disguised under the name of globalization. Globalization, as well as modernity, is not one ontological chapter in the universal unfolding of history but a set of fictional narratives that hide or legitimize the enactment of coloniality. From this claim, we can jump to the Berlin Congress, and from the Berlin Congress to the recent conflict in Ukraine, which centers on the question of who has the right to trace what line.

To be sure, the story here has to go through the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and Russia's re-emergence after a humiliating defeat. But it must also take into account the role of international law. The Berlin Congress was yet another chapter in the march of international law that emerged in the sixteenth century and went uncontested until recently.<sup>12</sup> Russia's reclaiming of the Crimea meant that the unfolding of Western imperial *nomos* could no longer be managed exclusively by Western institutions. Beyond the pros and cons of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, there is a history of the second *nomos* of the earth reaching its limits: the limits imposed by dewesternization. The current prevailing chaos seems to have its roots in globalism and the Euro-centered building of international law. Needless to say, international law is a crucial component of the CMP: it is the flow that connects the CMP with the actors and institutions involved in controlling land and trade regulations.

The story of globalism, as it manifests itself in Schmitt's theory of the second *nomos* of the earth and the example of Russia reclaiming the Crimea, takes us back to the closing of the 1500-2000 cycle, a cycle that saw the management and control of the CMP firmly in the hands of Western imperial states—or, if you wish, in the hands of the actors and institutions building, expanding and defending Western civilization. During this period, the challenges to the control of the CMP that the Soviet Union presented were intramural challenges. That is, they were confrontations between two ideologies that emerged out of the European

Enlightenment: liberal capitalism and state-managed capitalism under the name of socialism/communism.<sup>13</sup>

In relation to European history, Russia has occupied an ambiguous position since the reign of Ivan the Terrible and the Tsardom that ran until Peter and Catherine the Great, who became Emperor and Empress of the Russian Empire, while watching themselves in the European mirror. Moreover, when the Soviet Union adopted socialism, it adopted Europe's secular view of it, and the disenchantment of the world that secularism introduced. For these reasons, I can see a pattern of mirroring Europe, from the Russian Emperor and Empress to the Soviet Union's adopting of European socialism. Thus, we can say that Russia did not escape coloniality (and the effects of the CMP), even if it was never colonized. Similar observations, within a different history, could be made of China: although the country was never colonized, the Opium War was the moment when coloniality interfered in China.

Russia's re-emergence under Vladimir Putin changed the rules of the game and the content of the conversation. It disturbed the configuration of the domains. While Putin has carried out this disturbance mainly in the global political arena,<sup>14</sup> China, since Deng Xiaoping, has done the same in the economic arena. I am talking here of Russia and China's re-emergence rather than of their "imperialist" ambitions, even though imperialism is one of the leitmotifs surrounding these countries in the media of Western Europe and the US.<sup>15</sup>

The media's use of this leitmotif presupposes a different conceptual framework to the one I have been advancing here. Western mainstream media presupposes a uni-linear version of history, according to which Spain and Portugal were challenged by Holland, then England and France took over from Holland, and finally the US concluded and supplanted all previous hegemonies with its own. For the West, Russia and China, if not stopped, would be the next chapter in that uni-linear imperial history. From the decolonial perspective, conversely, the CMP's history is not uni-linear but structurally heterogeneous, for since 1500 the entire planet has, at one point or another, become entangled in the CMP. (Or, better yet, the global designs implemented through the CMP have entangled the rest of the planet.)

Uni-linear assumptions are common to (neo)liberal and (neo)Marxist worldviews. Giovanni Arrighi, a Marxist sociologist, surmised that China would be the next hegemon, based on Western imperial history since Spain. If, however, we take into account the complex, diffuse ways the CMP was formed, transformed and managed by overlapping Western empires, we would conclude that neither Russia nor China could be the

next hegemon, even if either country wanted to be, for the simple reason that such an outcome is not possible today, and will not be possible for a long time hence.

Why it is not possible? For two reasons, mainly. The first is that the former Western Europe (even if currently in disarray) and the United States (even if slowly moving away from consensus rule toward ruling by force, be it military, economic or political) have accumulated over their period of dominance both meaning and money: they control knowledge and the economy. This point is important. You do not rule because you have more money or a larger army; you rule because you have successfully convinced the people who support you that what you are doing is for the benefit of all—all except those who oppose the salvation, progress, development and happiness that modernity offers, of course. Such an accumulation of meaning cannot be overcome easily.

The second reason that China and Russia could not be the next hegemon even if they wanted to is that, before moving in that direction, they would have to overcome the efforts of the current hegemon to stop any political, economic and military advancement on their part. Although advances have been made, the stage we are in today within the global order is the same one outlined by Sun-yat Sen in Kobe, Japan, in 1924, in his well-known discourse on Pan-Asianism:

If we want to realize Pan-Asianism in this new world, what should be its foundation if not our ancient civilization and culture? Benevolence and virtue must be the foundations of Pan-Asianism. With this as a sound foundation we must then learn science from Europe for our industrial development and the improvement of our armaments, not, however, with a view to oppressing or destroying other countries and peoples as the Europeans have done, but purely for our self-defense. [...]

*But to rely on benevolence alone to influence the Europeans in Asia to relinquish the privileges they have acquired in China would be an impossible dream. If we want to regain our rights we must resort to force.*<sup>16</sup>

The italicized passage could easily be expanded to include Russia. In fact, this is the direction that history currently seems to be taking, with Russia and China cooperating on a number of initiatives, both economic and military, including their most recent collaboration on a project for global peace, with a focus on peace in West Asia. In brief, Russia and China are, for the moment, leading a process of political (state) and economic (industrial and financial) delinking from Western domination.<sup>17</sup> The two countries are delinking by different means, but mainly they are

doing so by appropriating the content of the CMP. That is, they are steering a kind of global political, economic and financial *dewesternization*. Of course, this new global direction is not convenient or acceptable to the US, and, since Barack Obama's inauguration as president in 2008, his goal in terms of international relations has been to start the process of *rewesternization*. President Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo was a clear sign that his foreign policy was redirecting Westernization after the world's disenchantment with the Bush-Cheney-Rice foreign policy legacy. Obama therefore initiated the discourse of rewesternization, claiming a "new beginning."<sup>18</sup> The second step of this discourse was Hillary Clinton's Secretary of State speech in Honolulu in November 2011, where she claimed that the twenty-first century would be the American Pacific Century.<sup>19</sup>

All of this is to say that, while the Westernization of the world was carried out without any major difficulties between 1500 and 2000 periodically changing the hegemons of the West, dewesternization has halted that immutable process and challenged the West's control and management of the CMP. Dewesternization means that the control and management of the CMP is now in dispute—and it is precisely this dispute that engenders not a new *unipolar* (where Russia and China are "dangerous," according to Western media, because they want to be the next hegemons) but the multipolar world order we are all witnessing. We see traces of this multipolarity in Ukraine and Syria, in the China Development Bank, in the establishment of the BRICS states and the BRICS bank, in China's building of a new Silk Road Economic Belt, and in other initiatives still in the making.<sup>20</sup>

#### ***IV. Dewesternization after the Cold War: Changing the Content of the Conversation***

I return now to my hypothesis. I have been arguing that the reason for the prevailing chaos is the persistence of global coloniality and the global conditions created in the advancement of Westernization, as well as the question mark that the Bandung Conference of 1955 inserted into the process and the halt that dewesternization is enacting. Since the second half of the twentieth century, the economic and political re-emergence of cultures and civilizations that were previously undermined by global coloniality has reached the point of no return. This point of no return leads my argument to the second set of questions: "How can we overcome the present disorder? Are there alternatives to the present chaos? How can we

find pathways pointing in the direction of a more just and sustainable world order?" In short: what are the ways out?

In response to the aggressive consolidation of Western civilization between 1500 and 2000, the project of *delinking* from Western domination has gained momentum, manifesting itself in the discrete efforts of dewesternization and decoloniality. Conversely, since it is difficult to let go of privileges, the US and former Western Europe (and NATO) are responding with a rewesternizing impetus, as a way to revamp—under new circumstances—the global designs that were successful for five hundred years. Undoubtedly, the obstacles that dewesternization and decoloniality present to the West and the West's counter-efforts to maintain the privileges it has acquired are at the core of the global chaos we are steeped in.

This brings me to the guesswork required by the second set of questions. I would say that any possible alternatives or solutions cannot come from Western countries, which are the builders and managers of the present chaos. There is enough evidence suggesting that Western designs (conversion, progress, democracy, disenchantment of the world, racism and sexism, and patriarchy) do not work, and I argue that they have failed because they are implicitly geared toward maintaining the world order created in the past five hundred years. Western cooperation will be necessary, but its leadership is simply not conducive to achieving a more just and sustainable world order. The solutions that the world needs cannot come from former Western Europe and the US.

It was possible for the US and former Western Europe to depose Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, but these were perhaps the last instances of unilateral action. Ukraine and Syria are clear examples that the West can no longer do what it pleases and that its peace-promises (part of the rhetoric of modernity) are loaded with the underlying intention of maintaining Western leadership. The situation in West Asia (substantially discussed during the 2015 World Public Forum) is a puzzle created by Western imperial efforts to maintain global leadership of the CMP and complicated by the halt of dewesternization. The halt in West Asia was started by Russia, as it was in Ukraine/Crimea. But, soon enough, China began to show signs of its support of Russian efforts. At the time of editing this essay, Xi Jinping was touring West Asia (the "Middle East" in Western media, after Alfred Thayer Mahan popularized the term in 1902).<sup>21</sup>

Syria has been the second site of confrontation between re- and dewesternization. Iraq and Libya were possibly the last opportunities for the West to expand the territorial lines of the second *nomos* of the earth

and enact the designs inscribed in the CMP. It was obvious to many (and certainly to Russia and China) that Syria and Ukraine had been targeted for the same purposes. Dewesternization placed a halt, politically and military. West Asia became a space where the West's attempts to implement its global designs encountered the strategies and force of people and states who do not want to be told what to do any more. Beyond the local ethnic and religious complexities of the region, the situation in West Asia has been shaped by the opening that dewesternization offers and the closing that rewesternization intends.

Notice that, looked at from the history of the CMP, the situation is far from a re-enactment of the Cold War. The Cold War was shaped by the clash between two Western ideologies, liberalism and socialism/communism. Dewesternization cannot be framed in socialist/communist terms, much less in neoliberal terms. Neoliberalism proposes the homogenization of the world and, to achieve this goal, the weakening of states. Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia know all too well that weakening the state means opening the door to neoliberalism for a free ride. Unlike socialism/communism, dewesternization is not an ideology but an orientation and a connector. It is an orientation that endorses the delinking of capitalism (economic coloniality) from Western domination, and it is a connector among a variety of local histories that are being revived by the delinking project of dewesternization. The diversity of local histories cannot be encapsulated in a common denominator—be it “socialism”, “communism” or “the Left”. These key terms were used to profile one of the contenders in the Cold War, but not one of them applies to dewesternization.

Serious answers to remedial questions must come from states engaged in dewesternization, and from the emerging global political society engaged in decoloniality. They cannot come from the makers and managers of the CMP, for the simple reason that the makers and managers of the CMP do not know what it means to have been interfered with, denigrated and humiliated by five hundred years of Western hegemony. The actors, institutions and languages whose subjectivities have been formed by the CMP cannot access and understand the sensibilities of those who have been degraded. And I am not talking here about “the people” of the West: I am talking about actors in state-institutional positions. It is true that corruption is part of dewesternization, but corruption (legal and illegal) has been and continues to be a fundamental component of Westernization, too. Corruption was ingrained in the very building of Western civilization, and it expanded simultaneously with the Westernization of the world.

It may be strange for the consumer of Western media to consider that China and Russia should take the lead in moving us toward a peaceful global order. Any suggestion to this effect may sound like yet another high-flown public statement issued by Chinese and Russian officials. We should pay attention to these statements, however. During the recent “70-Year Common Victory” conference in September 2015, held in Khabarovsk, Russia, to celebrate the defeat of fascism, Liu Qibao, a member of the Politburo of China, reminded the audience that China and Russia are both founding states of the United Nations. Qibao stressed “that this feature bestows upon both China and Russia the responsibility to play a leading role in ensuring global and regional peace, security and cooperation” and “spoke of China and Russia’s ‘common responsibility’ towards guaranteeing stability in the post-war international order.”<sup>22</sup> You may express your disbelief in such commitments. But, if you do, you should also suspect whether the US and former Western Europe are seriously engaged in bringing peace to West Asia or that the Mexican government and the CIA are seriously working to eliminate the drug cartels.

I do not know what those of us (scholars, intellectuals, activists, state representatives, and journalists) who are gathered at the World Public Forum, and to whom the second set of questions is addressed, can do to overcome the present situation. First of all, humility is needed. There is very little “we” can do to intervene in those spheres where inter-state political/military and trans-national financial/corporate decisions are being made. “We,” in general, are part of “the people,” and the people are of secondary importance in the domain of inter-state conflicts and relations. That “the people” or “the nation” is becoming increasingly irrelevant for the state (evidenced in the austerity of “the nation” to “save” the state and its economic institutions) is part of the global malaise. What “we” *can* do, however, is contribute toward changing the *terms* of the conversation, parallel to the changes in the content of the conversation being driven by de-westernization.

In order to change the terms of the conversation, we (“the people”) must start from the assumption that the West (the US, former Western Europe and their allies) can no longer offer solutions to the problems they themselves have created, through their establishment, management and control of the CMP. However, it could and should play a crucial role in global peace, by relinquishing the “need” to lead the world. The world today no longer needs one “leader,” and it is precisely this situation that is generating a domino effect in small states that still want to join the leader and in large states that do not want or need to be led any more.

Alternative visions of and pathways toward a multipolar and pluriversal horizon in the global order are emerging out of the local histories and sensibilities that have endured the humiliation and subjugation of the CMP—that is, of modernity/coloniality. Dewesternization is taking place in the spheres of the state (military included) and finance (the current currency war, for example). Decoloniality is marching forward in the emerging sphere of political society.<sup>23</sup>

It is precisely here that we (in the WPF) can cooperate: not, of course, by being scholars and journalists who “report on” the emerging global political society, but by conceiving of ourselves and acting as *part of* the global political society. Our weapon is knowledge that could and should be directed toward changing the terms of the conversation. We would need to displace the enunciation that controls the CMP by positing itself as “true” knowledge that represents the world “as it is.” This same enunciation holds that whoever disobeys the rules and rejects “true” knowledge deserves to be jailed, sacrificed, marginalized, disavowed, demonized, and all those signifiers of punishment that the rhetoric of modernity constantly invents to depose epistemic opponents, justify the physical elimination of political enemies or create economic disturbance for economic and financial competitors (the Reserve Fund’s management and manipulation of interests rates, the IMF and the European Central Bank’s poker game with “emerging economies”).

Conceiving ourselves as members of a growing global political society means that our goal should be to intensify our work (as scholars, journalists, politicians, artists, and activists) of creating and promoting pluriversality, which involves delinking from *ego conquiro* and *ego cogito*, so much entrenched in the formation of modern subjects/subjectivities: the winner, the most successful, the number one, the world leader, and all the other social roles that modernity and its aftermath—globalism—have created, endorsed and consolidated. What sustain the CMP are knowledge, the institutions that create and maintain knowledge, and the actors that are driven to the institutions and epistemic belief to refill the tank of the CMP. Delinking from *ego conquiro*, *ego cogito* and their successors means also delinking from the game of life that the ego has fashioned.<sup>24</sup>

I want to insist that the pluriversal horizon I am envisioning is a space where changing the terms of the conversation (and, by changing the terms, eventually changing the content too) is an ethically engaged project. By ethically engaged I mean that it works for the wellbeing of “the people,” instead of working solely for the institutions and their beneficiaries. I am not envisioning in this horizon blind anti-Western violence in the name of

dewesternization or decoloniality. Anti-X violence (whatever X may be) changes neither the content nor the terms of the conversation: such acts do not delink from the CMP but rather play its own game. And I am not referring either to the potential use of “dewesternization” and “decoloniality” as a mask for remaining within the rules of the CMP for whatever personal or familial benefit.

Allow me now to introduce a prickly example to clarify what I am saying. Humberto Maturana is a Chilean neurobiologist and philosopher, working in the field of second-order (or second-generation) cybernetics. Maturana is regarded by the scientific establishment—in spite of the impact of his theories—as someone who thinks outside the box. And, fortunately, he does. His reputation as an unconventional thinker is not unrelated to his being a third-world thinker and scientist. Being a scientist in the Third World is quite different to being a scientist in the First World. Science may be “universal” but scientists are not; and if scientists are not, then sciences cannot be universal either. The universality of the sciences is a myth and a fiction created by the rhetoric of modernity. It is coloniality of knowledge at its best.

Maturana’s theories were advanced in the seventies, right after the fall of Salvador Allende and the advent of Augusto Pinochet. And Maturana is neither oblivious to nor detached from this historical context. Of course, analyzing the nervous system of a pigeon is not related to the clash between Marxism with neo-liberalism taking place in Chile in the early seventies. But the reflections on knowledge derived from a pigeon’s cognitive system could be—as it is in Maturana’s case.<sup>25</sup> I would suggest that the mainstream scientific community finds Maturana problematic because he has changed the *terms* of the conversation, not merely the content.<sup>26</sup>

Maturana’s most relevant thesis to my argument can be condensed in the expression “the origin of humanness in the biology of love,” which is the title of one of his books. The species of living organisms that in the Western vocabulary came to be named “human” (in Aymara, “runa”; in Mandarin, “he”; in Persian, “bashar/ensan”; and so on) is a species that walks with two of its extremities and uses its upper extremities as instruments for improving its biological living conditions (via hunting, shelter, and agriculture) and for regenerating the species. These extremities can also be used to control and dominate other members of the species, so that the human can become pretty un-“human”. But the thing that distinguishes this particular species, which in each existing language has its own particular name, from other living species is, for Maturana, love and conversation.

Love is a necessary but not sufficient condition for survival. It is well known that, with few exceptions, the full range of species that fall under the category of “animals” nurture their newborns with love. However, not all the species categorized as “animals” engage in conversations that are fundamental to building the *communal*—not “the common,” or “the common good,” but the *communal*.<sup>27</sup> Conversation brings knowledge into the picture—communal and shared knowledge. The question, then, becomes: at what point in the evolution of humanness did its very foundation, love and the communal, become overpowered by competition, by rulers who did not obey but wanted everyone else to obey, and by languages and knowledge that became tools of control and domination instead of conversation and communality?

Based on this narrative, Maturana asks us to consider whether we want to preserve love and life for the planet and the communal, or competition and destruction unto death. The future of humanness and of the planet depends on which choice prevails. Decoloniality promotes the former choice; Westernization and rewesternization promote the latter; dewesternization has become caught in a game whose rules were established to advance Westernization during the creation, control and management of the CMP. As a biologist, Maturana changed the terms of the conversation within the theory of evolution by focusing on the origin (instead of the evolution) of humanness and the biology of love. The regeneration of the species involves, for Maturana, not only biological regeneration but also the preservation and conservation of love and the communal. Maturana also introduced new questions and changed conversations within the study and understanding of languages.<sup>28</sup>

## V. *Closing and Opening*

In an attempt to address questions about the causes of the prevailing global chaos and malaise, I have argued that the current situation should be explained, at least in part, by the history and development of the colonial matrix of power, and by the growing dispute over it (rewesternization versus dewesternization). The effect of this growing dispute is to mobilize and reorganize local conflicts around a global power struggle. The extreme complexities unfolding in Syria are in large measure tangled up with the dispute over the control and management of the CMP—which means, for some, maintaining long-lasting privileges and, for others, ending a situation that has created privileges for some and humiliation for others.

Addressing the second set of questions, I have suggested that alternatives to the current chaos cannot come from the creators and managers of the CMP, for the simple reason that neither the content nor the terms of the conversation can be changed without first questioning the rules, institutions and subjectivities that established the hegemonic terms and contents of the CMP in the first place.

I have also suggested that changes to the content of the conversation are to be found in the efforts of de-westernization, while changes to the terms of the conversation lie with decoloniality. I have further specified that dewesternization is a set of state-led projects, while decoloniality is in the hands of an emerging global political society that is delinking from the system of knowledge and assumptions embedded in the CMP. The CMP is not an autonomous entity, self-created and self-functioning. It was created by individuals who established institutions and implemented rules and principles for these institutions to follow, all within a set of languages that defined the bounds and principles of knowing and sensing, thereby creating knowledge and forming subjectivities.

Neither of the large axes at work (dewesternization or decoloniality) will achieve short-term tangible results. Dewesternization and decoloniality are moved by the energy of liberation, but rewesternization is moved by the reluctance to lose the privileges that Westernization has created. And losing privileges is a difficult reality to accept. Some of the causes and reasons behind the current malaise can be found in the West's moves and strategies to maintain managerial control over the CMP, which means maintaining a unipolar world order. The multipolar world order that dewesternization is creating and the *pluriversal* delinking from both rewesternization and dewesternization that decoloniality is aiming at are both struggles for liberation, and liberation always comes with violence and chaos.

Changing the terms of the conversation is undoubtedly a complex issue, but it is essential that we confront it at the WPF if we are to make a meaningful contribution toward a more just and sustainable world order. Changing the terms of the conversation means delinking not only from the hegemony of Western knowledge but also from the hegemony of the *content* of the conversation, which entangles dewesternization with rewesternization today.

## Notes

1. For the conceptual structures (theory) known as modernity/coloniality/ decoloniality see “Modernity and Decoloniality,” Oxford Bibliography Online, 2011, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0017.xml>; Walter Mignolo and Arturo Escobar, eds., *Globalization and the Decolonial Option* (London: Routledge, 2010).
2. I am assuming here—without time, unfortunately, for a longer explanation—that the consolidation and expansion of Western Civilization (from 1500 to 2000) was also the consolidation and expansion of the “idea of modernity,” which I also render as the “rhetoric of modernity”—rhetoric in the sense of persuasive discourses.
3. Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity* (NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1995).
4. Linda T. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies. Research and Indigenous People* (London: Zed Books, 1999).
5. Serge Latouche, *L’Occidentalization du monde. Essai sur la signification, la portée et les limites de l’uniformisation planétaire* (Paris: La Découverte/Poche, 1989). Latouche’s story begins in the mid-seventeenth century, mine (ours, shall I say) in 1500. If you start in 1650, or around there, you will not see the similarities between two events five hundred years apart: the dismantling of the great civilization of the New World makes it easier to see the similarities with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This is not a linear history, but a spiraling one within the same project: the homogenization of the planet according to western designs.
6. See Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization* (University of Michigan Press: 1995) and *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Duke University Press: 2011).
7. 2000 is merely a reference date. Although the invasion of Iraq took place in 2003, the obsession with national security provoked by the fall of the Soviet Union had already been mounting within the US government for several years. See Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interests,” *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 2000), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2000-01-01/campaign-2000-promoting-national-interest>
8. Manfred B. Steger, *Globalism: The New Market Ideology* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
9. Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G. L. Ullmen (Candor, NY: Telos Press, 2006).
10. *Nomos* (Greek: “law,” or “custom”), plural *Nomoi*, in law, the concept of law in ancient Greek philosophy. <http://www.britannica.com/topic/nomos-Greek-philosophy>.
11. Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G. L. Ulmen. (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006); Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africa: Race and Self-Determination in International Law* (Minneapolis: Minnesota U. Press, 1996); Antony Angie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*

(Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2007); Walter D. Mignolo, "The Making and Closing of Eurocentric International Law: The Opening of a Multipolar World Order," in *Kitabkhana, A Discussion Around Siba N. Grovogui, Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

12. Schmitt's superb argument and narrative is half of the story—the European half of the story. Without reference to Schmitt, Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui argued and narrated the other half: how does one see and feel international law from Africa instead of seeing and feeling it from Europe? See his study *Sovereign, Quasi Sovereign and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

13. Juan Donoso Cortés, Marquis of Valdegama, *Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism*. Originally published in 1852, first English translation in 1879. Recent edition in English Gornahoor Press, 2010, <http://www.gornahoor.net/library/CortesEssays.pdf>.

14. Vladimir Putin's discourse at the *Valdai International Discussion Club's XI session in Sochi on 24 October 2014*, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>

15. Marek Menkiszak, "The Putin Doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area," OSW Commentary, <http://aei.pitt.edu/57947/>. On China's imperial ambitions imagined from Western fears see Kerry Brown, Peter Cai and Dr Benjamin Herscovitch "The Rise of China's Imperial President." <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/10/Speech-150413.pdf>

16. Sun-yat Sen, "Pan-Asianism." Speech given in Kobe, Japan, in 1924. Published by International Relations and Security Network. ISN: Zurich.

17. Japan supports the role of Russia in the Middle East while the Pentagon claims that Russia is a danger for global peace. Japan: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/japans-abe-we-need-putin-for-global-peace/556169.html>; The Pentagon: <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/08/russia-is-putting-world-peace-at-risk-says-pentagon-chief-ash-carter>.

18. President Barack Obama's discourse in Cairo, June 2009, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>.

19. Hillary Clinton's discourse in Honolulu, November 10, 2011, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/176999.htm>

20. See Charles Clover and Lucy Homby, "China's Great Game", *FT*, October 2015, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6e098274-587a-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3y1jOKbSV>. On the other side of the equation, see Pepe Escobar, "The New Great Game Between China and the US." November 2015. In TomDispatch.com, [http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176072/omgram%3A\\_pepe\\_escobar,\\_the\\_new\\_game\\_between\\_china\\_and\\_the\\_u.s./](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176072/omgram%3A_pepe_escobar,_the_new_game_between_china_and_the_u.s./).

21. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-22/china-president-visits-middle-east-inks-deals-worth-billions/7106292>.

22. Quoted in *Value Walk*, October 3, 2015:

<http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/10/china-russia-to-promote-and-protect-world-peace/>.

23. Some examples, *La via Campesina* (<http://viacampesina.org/en/>) *the Zapatistas* (<http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/>) the Kurds' revolution in Syria, (<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/why-world-ignoring-revolutionary-kurds-syria-isis>).

24. Frank Schirmacher, *Ego: The Game of Life*. London: Polity Press, 2015.

25. Humberto Maturana, *From Being to Doing. The Origins of Biology of Cognition*. Heidelberg: Carl Auer International, 2004.

26. The reader not familiar with Maturana's thoughts can find a summary in this recent lecture: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twne4EqY15w>.

27. Walter D. Mignolo, "The Communal and the Decolonial." *Turbulence*, 2009, <http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/>.

28. For Humberto Maturana on language, see,

<http://www.enolagaia.com/MatMpo&Let %281995%29.html>; for Maturana on language and cognition, see <http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html>.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# TARGETED KILLINGS THROUGH DRONES

DANIELE ARCHIBUGI

It is nearly fifteen years since the United States, followed by a few of its closest allies such as the United Kingdom and Israel, used unmanned flying vehicles, better known as drones, for targeted killings. As is often the case with new weapons and new technologies, the implications of these actions have passed unnoticed. In a disturbing silence, occasionally broken by brave investigative journalists and scholars, they are becoming *de facto* standard practice of modern warfare. But a few moments of reflection suffice to realise that targeted killings through drones are egregious war crimes. They violate basic human rights and the laws of war that were established several centuries ago.

A fresh, well-researched and well-written book by Laurie Calhoun titled *We Kill Because We Can: From Soldiering to Assassination in the Drone Age* (London: Zed Books, 2015) provides an occasion to think about the deep implications of killing people through drones and hopefully to act to stop this high-tech barbarian practice.

The first and rather disturbing thing about drones' targeted killings is the lack of rights for those included in the "kill-list." When a human becomes a target—supposedly because he is terrorist, a would-be terrorist or has friends who are terrorists—he does not receive any notification and has no possibility to defend himself from the offences for which he is accused. The offences may be right or may be wrong, but once he has become a target, he is sentenced to death with no appeal.

How should we consider the target? What is he? An enemy, a soldier, an indictee, or a defendant? Nobody tells us and the use of the word "terrorist" is an alibi to avoid responding. If the target is regarded as a soldier, he should be given the typical guarantees that are provided in wars, including the possibility to surrender to the enemy. Soldiers can, of course, be killed in action, but this requires there to be a clearly-defined theatre of war and for the targeted soldier to be able in some ways to harm

others. None of these conditions apply in the case of a human being killed by a drone. In the majority of cases they are hit when they are unarmed and when they are far away from combat. If he is considered to be a defendant, he should have the right to a fair trial with explicit charges and a proper defence. The accusations should be singled out. Needless to say neither the human beings killed nor their relatives will ever know why and who has killed them. Individuals to be “taken out” will never benefit from any further cross-examination. As Calhoun clearly argues, there is no difference between killings carried out by drones and extrajudiciary executions. And this becomes even more worrying in light of the fact, as it has emerged from information recently uncovered by *The Intercept*, that according to the Pentagon most of the targets are “individuals exhibiting suspicious behaviour” rather than terrorists beyond any reasonable doubt.<sup>1</sup>

The second and surprising thing is who is responsible for carrying out these executions, at least those carried out by the United States. Even if using drones in other countries is an act of war, the Pentagon is not in charge. It is the Central Intelligence Agency who carries out these executions. In principle, we would expect the CIA to collect information for the security of its country and that of its allies. But in this case—and perhaps in many other cases—the CIA does not limit itself to collecting information. Killing through drones has apparently become the most popular method to eliminate (i.e. assassinate) enemies or simple suspects. The US Department of Defense is well aware of the difference between combatants and non-combatants and when and how the former can be attacked. It is true that the Pentagon often ignores the distinction, especially when aerial bombing is used, and it has been responsible for a huge number of civilian casualties. But at least the Department of Defense is familiar with the language and practice of the law of war. The CIA acts as if there are no legal constraints on its actions.

Who takes these decisions? The information recently provided by *The Intercept*<sup>2</sup> suggests that it is not the President of the United States, but an anonymous chain of spies in the field and bureaucrats in Washington. Ultimately, the selection of the targets appears to be in the hands of unknown bureaucrats. As it happens with extrajudiciary executions, the executors are unaccountable and anonymous.

The third and worrying factor is associated to the “collateral damage.” Since strikes by drones are secret, there is not enough information on how many of the individuals killed are the targeted ones and how many of them are their relatives, friends, children or simply pedestrians who were in the wrong place at the wrong moment. The CIA has not released any data on this particular dimension of drone warfare and this is, by itself, a terrible

sign: on the one hand, the most sophisticated technologies are effectively used to trace, follow and kill the targets and, on the other hand, the adverse consequences of these actions are simply kept secret. Independent estimates collected by individuals who have no direct access to the official sources estimate that individuals killed by mistake range from 9 to 25 per cent, according to the period and to the country.<sup>3</sup> This seems anyhow a very high percentage, a percentage that would be totally unacceptable in the fight against organized crime within countries.

Calhoun is not the only American voice to complain about the use of drones. Even in 2012, former President Jimmy Carter denounced the bipartisan enthusiasm for this form of warfare, noting that “this would have been unthinkable in previous times” and that it was contrary to the American tradition of human rights’ promotion.<sup>4</sup> In spite of such an authoritative call to review and eventually terminate killing-by-drones, nothing has happened and the Obama administration has further increased its recourse to this method of warfare. The voices against are, so far, too weak to contrast the public enthusiasm for this new deadly video-game.<sup>5</sup>

In the United Kingdom, the use of drones to kill has generated much wider concern and reprobation than in the United States. David Cameron had to inform the public that British drones killed individuals, and had to explain why he and his government opted for extrajudiciary killing rather than other forms.<sup>6</sup> He himself risks being incriminated for war crimes by the British judiciary.<sup>7</sup> But any judicial constraint has not emerged yet in the United States or Israel.

What is most disturbing is that a new military technology is used long before the social, political, ethical and legal implications are considered. Warfare is more and more led by the technical possibilities rather than by political aims or ethical considerations. It seems that once the new technology is available, the targets should be created to experiment with the new toy. If targets are not available they should be fabricated. It is not the threat that terrorists pose to US interests and security that has created the killing drones, but rather the technical feasibility of killing drones that has generated imagined terrorist threats.

Also in need of assessment is the impact of this warfare in comparison to the declared political aims of those who use it. Have they actually helped to win the war on terror? Have drones made the United States and their allies safer? Have they saved the lives of Western soldiers that would otherwise be deployed on the ground to fight the same insurgents? I do not feel competent to provide answers to these questions. But not even an enthusiastic positive answer to all these questions would justify a form of warfare that it is clearly illegal. Liberal states should apply their standards

even under the most uncomfortable circumstances.<sup>8</sup> And the advantages of assassinating would-be terrorists in Pakistan or Yemen do not justify the use of illegal methods.

The exhibition of technological muscle and the act of power implicit in the fact that one country could assassinate individuals without even exchanging a post-card with them is generating perverted reactions that ultimately damage the war on terror. If even a liberal regime such as the United States regularly carries out extrajudiciary executions, how can we fight ISIS for the same type of crimes? What are the lessons that we are providing to young people in the West and in the Middle East? The only lesson that the United States is currently providing is well explained in the title of the Calhoun book: “we kill because we can.” But if this is the lesson, why should any desperate teenager with a knife not behave likewise?

### *Dangers ahead*

At the moment, bombings are carried out by the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom. Proud of their new technology, their governments appear satisfied to show their rivals that they are ahead. But, as usual, this is far from being the definitive scenario. As the long and tragic history of the arms race has shown, it is very difficult for a nation to preserve its lead indefinitely. As already indicated by Paul Rogers more than two years ago,<sup>9</sup> the United States will not be the only country to play with the murderous toy. More countries are developing similar technologies, and emerging countries, including Russia, China and India, are now developing their own models. It will not take long before other states and perhaps even non-state actors will have their own flying killing devices. We will soon have a jungle in the sky and the extensive use carried out by the United States will make it more difficult to persuade new entrants to accept a common sense regulation. If they will continue to be accepted, soon there could be a proliferation of drones in the sky, and run by several states and even by non-state organizations, including terrorist organizations. Richard Falk has noted that drones can become more dangerous than nuclear weapons in an uncontrolled international scenario.<sup>10</sup>

### *What can be done?*

This form of technological assassination is shameful for Liberal states. It increases the hatred of technologically less developed countries for the West and it ultimately will fuel non-regular forms of political violence, including terrorism. There is no proof that this is an effective war strategy

or that it is serving precise political aims. It is a way in which a group of non-accountable old boys from the CIA enjoy themselves with a cruel weapon rather than with a joystick. It should be stopped before it becomes a standard method to get rid of your enemies.

The first thing is to make a direct appeal to the individuals that are using drones. These individuals should be clearly informed that they are committing war crimes for which they may be individually responsible. By using killing drones, they become combatants with all the associated risks and implications. The Principles of Nuremberg, promoted by the United States and other liberal countries nearly seventy years ago clearly stated that “the fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.”

The second is to activate judicial examination of these extrajudicial killings. The Human Rights Council has already included this form of killings in its report on extrajudicial executions.<sup>11</sup> The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions should clearly investigate the case in the United States and elsewhere and report the information collected to the Human Rights Council.

The third is to develop some clear guidelines on the prohibition of unmanned vehicles to carry out extrajudicial executions. There is already a model in which like-minded states could progress and this is the Ottawa Treaty Convention for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban. Politically, the countries willing to join such a venture might be few, but it is likely that the number of states will increase if, as expected, the use of unmanned killing drones continues to proliferate.

The fourth would be for civil society to take responsibility by organizing an Opinion Tribunal devoted to this form of crime. Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lelio Basso started this form of public denunciation for war crimes in Vietnam and activities have flourished since then with the Permanent People’s Tribunal of the International Basso Foundation in Rome.<sup>12</sup> More recently, an opinion tribunal has reviewed in detail the legality of the war in Iraq and the war crimes committed by occupation troops.<sup>13</sup> A similar venture should now be tried for the use of drones, with a view to obtaining a clear and definitive banning of remote killings in international law.

## Notes

1. See Cora Currier, *The Kill Chain. The Lethal Bureaucracy Behind Obama's Drone War; The Intercept*, Article no. 3 "The Drone Papers," Oct. 15, 2015, at <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-kill-chain/>.
2. "The Drone Papers," *The Intercept*, Oct. 15, 2015, at <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/>.
3. Chris Woods, "Drone War Exposed—the complete picture of CIA strikes in Pakistan," *Bureau of Investigative Journalism*, at <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/most-complete-picture-yet-of-cia-drone-strikes/>.
4. Jimmy Carter, "A Cruel and Unusual Record," *New York Times*, June 24, 2012, at [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-human-rights-record.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-human-rights-record.html?_r=1).
5. For a collection of critical perspectives, see Jeffrey Bachman, *Drones and the Human Right to Peace*, special issue of *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, vol. 27, no. 4 (October-December 2015).
6. Nicholas Watt, Patrick Wintour and Vikram Dodd, "David Cameron faces scrutiny over drone strikes against Britons in Syria," *The Guardian*, Tuesday 8 September, 2015, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/david-cameron-justifies-drone-strikes-in-syria-against-britons-fighting-for-isis>.
7. Press Association, "David Cameron faces legal challenge over Syria airstrikes. Green party politicians join forces with human rights group to criticise lack of clarity over government's 'targeted killing policy'," *The Guardian*, Thursday 24 September, 2015, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/david-cameron-legal-challenge-syria-airstrikes-isis>.
8. Daniele Archibugi and Marco Cellini, "Democracy and Global Governance: The Internal and External Levers," in *Global Governance from Regional Perspectives: A Critical View*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
9. Paul Rogers, "Drone warfare: a global danger, open democracy," 26 September, 2013, at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/drone-warfare-global-danger>.
10. Richard Falk, "Why drones are more dangerous of nuclear weapons," in *Power Shift. On the New Global Order* (London: Zed Books, 2016).
11. Christof Heyns, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions*, United Nations, Human Rights Council, 24 April, 2015 available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/082/34/PDF/G1508234.pdf?OpenElement>
12. See <http://www.fondazionebasso.it/2015/permanent-peoples-tribunal-2/>.
13. Muge GURSOY SOKMEN, ARUNDHATI ROY, and RICHARD FALK, eds., *World Tribunal on Iraq: Making the Case Against War* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Olive Branch Press, 2008). See also DANIELE ARCHIBUGI and ALICE PEASE, *Crime and Global Justice. The Dynamics of international punishment* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### BEYOND BRUTALIZATION

ASHIS NANDY

Organized violence and cruelties might have been there since ancient times, but they acquired a new cultural salience after the printing press, especially newspapers, entered the global public sphere.<sup>1</sup> The genocide of Native Americans had to some extent escaped harsh scrutiny; it happened somewhere far away and the victims had been demonized rather successfully through a series of intellectual manoeuvres such as the debates on whether they had something akin to souls that could be saved or on where they had to be placed amongst the flora and fauna of the New World. But the same strategies did not work that well with the four-continent slave trade and modern colonialism after Enlightenment values had made deeper inroads into Europe's public sphere. To cope with this "anomaly," there emerged in the nineteenth century new social theories that supplied three frames of certitudes: (1) ideas of scientific rationality and objectivity, combined with those of public hygiene and social evolutionism to produce a stratarchy of peoples at different stages of biology and history; (2) emphasis on a new form of dispassionate, scientized, assembly-line violence that could meet the demands of scientized laws of history; and (3) expansion of the sphere of secularism and the de-sanctification of human life, nature, childhood and femininity to create new concepts of disposable humans, infra-humans, de-masculinized peoples and child races.

These frames of certitudes are now crumbling. Dominance may not have ended but the politics of knowledge have taken a new turn. Breakdown could well be, as the old cliché goes, breakthroughs. This paper is based on that hope and is a preliminary attempt to briefly spell out one particular part of this story.

## I

The world is in disarray in many ways—in the form of roughly 60 wars fought since the end of World War II; the emergence of terrorist movements, terrorist states, even lone-wolf terrorists; mishandled environmental crises that have created vast tracts of inhabitality and massive displacements; a growing proportion of people who live with the feeling of being permanently in exile and are permanently searching for, what Hannah Arendt once called, pseudo-communities; consolidation of new forms of hegemony more dependent on “universal” categories of knowledge and expert-driven technological choices that are seen as outside politics and outside social audit; and the persistence of a large number of states where secrecy, surveillance and censorship continue to be parts of everyday life. The list is long.

Behind these obvious disorders, there are also the more dangerous disorders within, which facilitate the transmission of anxieties, fears and the experiences of traumata from one generation to another. These are accompanied by the persistence of the easy, escapist solutions of the earlier generations—such as drugs-dependent escapism, media- or virtual-reality-driven consumerism and the manic violence that has begun to come packaged with many of the totalitarian political and religious ideologies of our times. Despite the optimism our political leaders project in public, we are buffeted by incapacitating outer and inner storms, the origins of which remain a mystery to us. The feeling of being an exile, even in one’s own country; the loss of old certitudes that is accompanied not by robust scepticism but by a desperate search for new certitudes; the steep growth in the incidence of substance abuse, schizophrenia, depression and suicide; and, above all, the spread of the kind of anomic violence that was unknown fifty years earlier in many countries. This list is also long and I shall have to spare you the details here.

Here I concentrate on only one small part of the story—on the growing brutalization that is taking place all over the world. By that I do not mean simply wars, genocide and terrorism, but situations where surplus cruelty and surplus violence do not merely happen but are (1) built into the plans and strategic moves of a state, movement or army; and (2) where the spectacular expression of anger, hatred and cruelty itself becomes a part of one’s individual or collective self-affirmation and finding targets of and justification for violence becomes secondary and often a matter of random choice. The discovery by Winston Churchill and Arthur Harris of the psychological pleasures of area bombing, in place of old-fashioned strategic bombing, during World War II is a good example of the full-

blown version of this pathology. The shift was designed to terrorize the citizens of an enemy country.

This change was accompanied by a late entrant into the game of terror, the one that George Orwell diagnosed in 1946.<sup>2</sup> He described some murders, committed in America, characterizing them as meaningless, random violence without any genuine depth of feeling backing it. Orwell saw it as an individual act and implied that such violence was sired by anonymity, identity diffusion and the casual shallowness of relationships in a mass culture brutalized by World War II. Orwell's essay ends with the case of an American young man, a fake army officer, and his eighteen-year-old English girl friend who wanted to be a gun-moll, committing three casual, pointless murders, which I am tempted to call a weird, psychopathic style of self-affirmation with perhaps a touch of desperation. America still probably remains the citadel of such murders but others are catching up. In India such murders are no longer serious news. China joined the party in style when, about five years ago, a number of attacks on school children were mounted, most of them random and unprovoked.<sup>3</sup>

If the industrialized, dispassionate, routinized, banal violence that Hannah Arendt brought to our notice—and later influenced the works of Theodor Adorno and his associates, Stanley Milgram, Robert Lifton and Zygmunt Bauman—constitutes one axis of the new violence that the twentieth century brought centre-stage, the other axis, we may now have to admit, is the anomic, pointless, surplus violence Orwell talks about: perhaps many suicide bombers, particularly those coming from the First World with shallow knowledge of their own faiths but carrying the bitter memories on behalf of their families and communities. Robert Pepe may be right about the rationality that drives the suicide bombers to self-destruction but, in many of them, there is also a tacit attempt to defy the “soul-less” modern mass society to self-affirm as a member of a new-found community that legitimizes and, to borrow from S. Balagangadhara, transubstantiates, the theory and practice of violence-for-the-sake-of-violence.<sup>4</sup> We have been living in denial of both these changes for a long time. As a result, many parts of the world now face a serious problem of de-civilization.

## II

After the discovery of the Americas, which took a huge toll of Native American lives over a period of 150 years—in what at least some scholars have called the world's biggest genocide that might have killed close to a hundred million—and the grisly, four-continent, Atlantic slave trade,

modern colonialism took an even more determined, though perhaps still unselfconscious step towards a more globalized world. The six million lives, which the slave trade is supposed to have taken, grossly underestimates the collateral damage inflicted on African society and culture, not to speak of the families, communities and villages from which prospective slaves were abducted. No wonder that many scholars estimate the toll of modern slavery to be at least double the earlier estimates.

It is doubtful if we still know the full scope of the damage colonialism did. But we do know that the genocide of some of the communities left hardly any witnesses to testify to the posterity. Hereros and Namas of West Africa are examples. Nonetheless, colonialism could boast of at least two wonderful discoveries that were to prove useful not only to the colonial rulers but also to some of their successor regimes: manmade famines, first deployed in Ireland, and concentration camps, discovered during the Boer war. Finally, the two World Wars that marked the end of modern colonialism themselves took a toll of around 100 million lives; they were, as their very names suggest, the last scenes in that spectacular enterprise “on which the sun never set.”

Two caveats at this stage. First, this is not an effort to set up an intellectual kangaroo court for a summary trial of the European civilization and its North American variant. We all know that mass violence and wars were not unknown to other civilizations and cultures. Every civilization and each culture has its dark side. I am trying to draw attention to the way the growth of print media and the emergence of a global public and global idea of cosmopolitanism gave genocides and ethnic cleansing in which the European civilization participated, a new cultural status. These were legitimized as “natural” collateral damage that took place during the spread of Western civilization in the age of colonialism and the creation of three brand-new White continents. They were seen as part of the attempts to modernize the world and popularize the Enlightenment-driven idea of cosmopolitanism, with the normal share of distortions that any agenda of progress is likely to have.

Second, my focus in this paper is not on the magnitude of violence but on unnecessary or surplus violence, whether justified theologically or with reference to secular, scientific-rational values, the kinds of spectacular violence that brutalize its spectators as much as its victims and, thus, have a long-term brutalizing effect on societies and “normalize” cruelty not only in particular societies but often globally through mass media, literature, cinema and children’s literature and toys. In other words, I am not discussing here structural and other such forms of more invisible, institutionalized violence, however important or massive they might be

and however culpable a political system or political economy might be. That involves another kind of “numbing” or desensitization.

To return to my main argument, the large-scale butchery that went with these geopolitical changes of course brutalized the victims and many tears have been shed for them. A few like Mahmood Mamdani have even acknowledged and studied the way that the victims of such savagery can turn into efficient, dedicated killers themselves.<sup>5</sup> Sigmund Freud had something to say about such identification with aggressors too. But what about the perpetrators? Were they also not brutalized by what they had done? If they were, did they know it and how did they cope with that knowledge? Is the social knowledge Europe has produced contaminated by this record of three centuries of violence? Are the random racist remarks and formulations ornamenting the works of great European thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, David Hume, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels stray comments or parts of a distinct psychopathology of everyday knowledge waiting for a more serious interpretation?

Was it the same psychopathology that pushed Heinrich Himmler to speak openly of how the Europeans had to harden their hearts to do their duty to their civilization? For those concerned with dialogues of civilizations, Himmler moved about with a German translation of the Gita. Obviously he was not impressed with Gandhi’s interpretation of the Gita as an allegorical justification for nonviolence. Himmler had read, as many urban, middle-class, well-educated Indians now do, the Gita as a justification for dispassionate, nihilistic, mega-violence for a cause they hold just.

Did the violence and the cruelty exported to distant corners of the world, over generations alter the algorithm of Europe’s own cultural and social life? Apart from a few stray clues, we know very little about that part of the story. For, no serious work has been done on the subject.<sup>6</sup>

This silence, I guess, has something to do with one other contribution that nineteenth-century Europe made to the rest of the world—a two-pronged style of demystification that still dominates the world of social knowledge. First, impressed by the success of modern science in secularizing the world, a series of social thinkers popularized a form of demystification in which manifest social realities had to be unmasked to reveal a deeper “reality” acceptable to Baconian science and its “definitive” version of rationality. In quick succession followed a series of thinkers who ventured “global” theories with presumably perfect knowledge of the globe acquired through their colonial or crypto-colonial connections. Underneath the manifest reality some of them found power

relations (Nietzsche), others production relations (Marx), and still others psychosexuality (Freud). Each produced its own partisans who claimed that they had found the master key to human history and/or human nature and one did not have to further demystify the underlying reality they thought moved the world. Alas, the master key remained mostly in the hands of those who were reared in the culture of the perpetrators.

Second, under the influence of social Darwinism, the social knowledge vendors began to talk of societies and cultures in terms of diachronic, evolutionary stages. Some talked of inescapable historical stages of societies, economies and cultures; others tried to convert all synchronic experiences into diachronic ones. Their contributions ensured that, to Europe, strange countries no longer remained strange, mysterious and a challenge to the known world of knowledge; they all became parts of Europe's past. And of course, as I have already said, Europe's present was going to be their future. The past and the present of those who did not jump on the bandwagon of progress were to be museumized and turned into "researchables."

Please note that each of the searing, traumatizing, world-changing experiences—the American genocide, the slave trade, modern colonialism and the two world wars—took place *after* the Enlightenment values had begun to seep into European middle-class consciousness and European public life had begun to resonate to these values. The changing global sensitivities ensured that the earlier theological justifications of the conquest of America, the Atlantic slave trade and European colonialism were now an embarrassment. The metaphor of Christianization could no longer satisfy many believing Christians facing the charms of colonialism first-hand in the colonies. This did not lead to any deep self-exploration in the intellectual circles. The justifications of colonialism began to get secularized and modern science and scientized social studies became the main source of legitimacy for the four traumata through which the world had passed. The Third Reich, which knew a thing or two about violence, also knew how to use nineteenth-century biology, Darwinian evolutionism and twentieth-century public hygiene in matters of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

This secularization and the birth of secular theories of salvation threw up a new set of theories of progress to re-order the world according to a man-made design. In that design, the Christian God, despite protestations to the contrary, had only a subsidiary role. Secular gods like Galileo, Descartes and Francis Bacon were the ones who shaped the vision of a future that was mostly an *ex nihilo* product of human creativity. It was a self-confident and self-righteous design, mostly untouched by self-doubts.

In that secular vision, there must have been something especially attractive. For, almost virtually all subsequent efforts, European or non-European, to theorize changes in human affairs have drawn upon it. Perhaps the continuity had something to do with colonialism. Though the imperial project melted after World War II, it was never fully dismantled. Imperialism did not suffer any decisive, global defeat. The imperial powers emerged weakened but victorious from World War II. The way they loosened their grips on the former colonies also gave the impression that it was a triumph of conscience over self-interest, not of self-interest over the romance of imperial glory. Also, thanks to the authoritarian regimes they fought in the war, the colonial powers looked like champions of democracy and humane governance.

As a result, the culture of imperialism did not face any direct challenge and did not have to jettison some of the core tenets of its worldview. Indeed, these tenets became an inseparable part of the post-war culture of global politics and the network of international institutions set up after the war. Our ideas of human rights, equality, justice, democracy and progress, and even our dominant ideas of fighting imperialism are all tinged by the core categories popularized by imperialism. So are our concepts of statecraft, governance and diplomacy.

Thus, the developing countries are now seen through the prism of two discordant metaphors. They continue to be imagined as dumb, apprentice nation-states, some of them making laboured attempts to enter the big league of nation-states, armed with nothing more than a blood-curdling version of nationalism or religious passion and expensive military toys bought at the expense of their citizens. As for the rest, their current status as modernizing societies has made them look like, as a development economist once said, expectant, destitute mothers delivering their babies on a busy street corner. No vestige of dignity or privacy is left for them. Everybody crowds around them to witness the great event and give them sage advice, expert consultancy and development aid.

### III

Yet, everything is not lost and we are not probably fighting a losing battle. It is true that, mimicking Oscar Wilde, we too can claim that the well-educated, virtuous Indians and Chinese, two billion of them, nowadays have started going to New York when they die. But it is also true that many cultures and communities have maintained double ledgers, one public and one private, often one textual and the other mnemonic. Many cultures are not dead; they have gone underground.

It is certainly not an accident that the new global heroes who have entered the world stage during the last four decades are virtually all votaries of nonviolence and have shown a sharp sensitivity to the growing brutalization around them: Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi and the Dalai Lama being the best known among them. On all of them falls the shadow of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, disowned by the ruling circles in his own country.

Nor is it surprising that at long last in voluntary movements and in non-party politics there is emerging a powerful critique of modern science and its culture. A majority of scientists may still be willing to play footsy with their political masters and corporate bosses in the name of value-neutrality of science but the others are demanding ethical responsibility. Here too, the non-party political movements have taken a lead. Indeed, the role that trade unions and dissenting scholars played in the twentieth century is being in many places taken over by mushrooming non-party formations. As activist-scholar Fred Y. L. Chiu is fond of saying, wherever colonialism went in earlier centuries, syphilis went with it; now wherever globalized capitalism goes, non-party political activism goes with it. For, there is a growing, if tacit, awareness in many that the old means of resistance to uncritical urban-industrialism and corporatized life are not working anymore.

Finally, there is the consolation that intense, clenched-teeth, psychopathic killers and the political regimes they set up do not last very long. There is a built-in self-destructiveness in most of them. Space does not allow me to elaborate on this but please allow me to tell a brief story that may or may not be apocryphal.<sup>7</sup>

It seems that Sir Francis Bacon, the father of modern science and the one who believed that knowledge was power, once wanted to find out what would happen if one force-fed a chicken with snow. I believe I could have predicted for him the fate of the chicken. But Sir Francis did not believe in speculation; he was an empiricist who trusted only experimental results. So one wintry day in London, when it was snowing, he took a live chicken to his courtyard and began force-feeding it with snow. The chicken of course died but Sir Francis also caught pneumonia and died after some days.

## Notes

1. A briefer version of this paper was presented in the inaugural plenary of the Rhodes Forum at Rhodes, Greece, during 8-12 October 2015. Some sections of it borrow from a paper titled “200 Years of Silence on how Theories of Progress Affect Cultural Survival,” written for the Conference on the Notion of Progress in the Diversity of World Cultures, convened by Constantin von Loewen on behalf of the Alliance of Civilizations (UN), New York University and the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation at the United Nations headquarters, New York, during 31 May to 4 June 2015.
2. George Orwell, “Decline of the English Murder”, in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (eds.), *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968), Vol. 4, pp. 98-101.
3. Apparently, a majority of these attacks could satisfy the criteria set up by Orwell but, given the scrappy data and the quick death penalties awarded to the killers, we cannot be sure. What we can be sure of was the obvious shock and consternation of many ordinary Chinese citizens who had seen wars, revolution, famines and genocide. This was one form of violence they were not prepared for.
4. S. N. Balagangadhara, “What do Indians Need, A History or the Past? A Challenge or Two to Indian Historians”, Abul Kalam Azad Lecture, delivered under the auspices of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, 2014, unpublished ms.
5. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
6. For a preliminary attempt, see Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: The Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).
7. For a more detailed analysis of the colourful life of Sir Francis, see Jatinder S. Bajaj, “Francis Bacon: The First Philosopher of Modern Science: A Non-Western View”, in Ashis Nandy (ed.), *Science, Hegemony and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch. 1, pp. 24-67.



## **PART II.**

### **MOVES TO COUNTER GLOBAL DISORDER**



# CHAPTER SIX

## REFLECTIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY, REGIONALISM, AND PEACE

FABIO PETITO

There is no blueprint for the construction of a multicultural and peaceful world order in contemporary international relations. It is my contention, however, that for such a global structure to emerge, we need a theory inspired by the idea of a dialogue of civilizations. In this presentation, I want to offer some thoughts on how the link between the growing multipolar configuration of the international system and regionalism as political process could represent a critical issue for the future of global peace. My aim here is to oppose—not Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations as an analytical framework—but the Huntingtonian construction of a multicivilization and multipolar system as the normative solution he proposed to the danger of the Clash. My concern is that a multicivilizational and multipolar world order—that is an unproblematic emphasis (or even an enthusiasm) on multipolarity—leaves us with a worrying system of forces, of civilizational macro-regional great powers, ready for collision—the clash of civilizations. To counter these risks under conditions of multipolarity I shall put forward an argument for multiculturally and dialogically constituted processes of regional integration and for a comprehensive idea of peace as an antidote to the possible negative politicization of cultural differences on a global scale: these steps are in my view critical to construct a realistic dialogue of civilizations in international relations for the decades to come while preventing the risk inherent in its multipolar configuration. In developing this argument, I will draw on a few examples from the current not-very-popular case of the European integration project which in my view has delivered a realistic peace and constructed a unique regional order of “unity in diversity” since WWII.

The ideal of a dialogue of civilizations in international relations emerged as a radical critique of the political and ideological dominance of

a US-centric Western and Liberal world. At the core of this discourse one finds a clear normative resistance against the idea of a unipolar world order often accompanied by the conviction that we are gradually, but ineluctably moving towards a multipolar world. The question then arises of whether the idea of a dialogue of civilizations should endorse the notion of a multipolar world order. This is a relevant question, since polarity is clearly associated with a Realist approach to international politics and with a conceptualization of the international arena as a system of forces to be brought into equilibrium (the stability of the system) by the well-known mechanism of the balance of power.<sup>1</sup> The emphasis here is overwhelmingly on material resources and great power status, the rest—the normative dimension which is at the heart of the vision of dialogue—being fundamentally irrelevant.

In this presentation I want to argue that the increasing consensus on the empirical trend of the worldwide decentralization of power away from what Huntington has defined the “lonely superpower”<sup>2</sup> toward other major regional powers (China, India, EU, Japan, Russia, Brazil, Iran and others) may well be more conducive to the emergence of a more pluralistic, just and peaceful world order. This is why even critical scholars such as Chantal Mouffe and Danilo Zolo have recently focused on the idea of a balance of regional spaces and argued for a multipolar world order in the context of their critique of the American unipolar project.<sup>3</sup> There is a risk, however, that without a process of a dialogue of civilizations at different levels, as an overarching framework of reference, this multipolar multicivilizational world leaves us with a worrying system of forces, of civilizational macro-regional great powers, ready for collision—the clash of civilizations. This is an important point as this part of Huntington’s argument—absent in his original *Foreign Affairs* article—has gone largely unnoticed (the reason also being that it is sketched in the last few pages of a book of more than 300 pages—an imbalance which arguably confirms the impression that the book is really about the clash rather than how to avoid it). To counter this risk inherent in the potential antagonistic logic of multipolarity, I want to suggest the need for multiculturally and dialogically constituted processes of regional integration within a horizon of a comprehensive idea of peace that is a commitment to a different understanding of peace than the one that is nowadays politically predominant in international relations. But before critically discussing the Huntingtonian risk of a multipolar world order, a few preliminary remarks on the very notion of multipolarity are in place.

A widespread debate has been ranging throughout the post-Cold War period on whether the end of the bipolar international system would lead

to unipolarity or multipolarity. While there have been different positions on the nature of the post-1989 international system in terms of the distribution of power, it is fair to say that the view that we are living in a “unipolar era” is today less popular than it was in the early 1990s and the predictions that the twenty-first century will see the emergence of a genuine multipolar structure are increasingly common.<sup>4</sup> This view is arguably the result of the recent security and political developments and in particular the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it is also based on less contingent medium/long-term economic evidence and estimations which suggest the fast progression of the (relative) economic decline of America in favor of the new Asian fast-growing economies of China and India;<sup>5</sup> a reality that had become more visible with the recent financial crisis, whose origins were in the American heartland of the West and from which for the first time the way out, the return to global growth, is expected to come from the East.

In his 1996 book, Huntington argues that the only way to avoid the clash of civilizations is to envisage a multipolar multicivilizational order organized around what he calls “the core states of civilizations [which would be the] sources of order within civilizations and, through negotiations with other core states, between civilizations.”<sup>6</sup> He then adds that “a world in which core states play a leading or dominating role is a sphere-of-influence world” and that “a core state can perform its ordering function because member-states perceive it as cultural kin.”<sup>7</sup> The problem with such a model of order is its being constructed only on the grounds of a material structure of power, which might well represent the spatial/geopolitical orientation of the global order but does not make for the normative structure of such an order. It is true that Huntington sketches very briefly (in less than a page) three rules for a possible normative structure of his multipolar multicivilizational order: the *abstention* rule (core states should abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations); the *joint mediation* rule (core states should negotiate to contain or halt fault-line wars among states or groups from their civilizations); and, finally, the *commonalities* rule (peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations).<sup>8</sup> These rules, however, reveal even more neatly the “(IR) realist” assumptions of the model as they in essence amount to nothing but a minimalist ethics of non-interference—the commonalities rule pointing perhaps to some “thin” minimal common denominator of universal morality, but in fact being the perfect exemplification of that rhetorical technique which consists in vaguely referring to some kind of undefined

normative necessity of an opposite aspiration to the clash. The result of the Huntingtonian construction is, therefore, a worrying system of forces, of civilizational macro-regional great powers ready for collision—the clash of civilizations—and the only possible hope is to make the stability of the system attainable through the mechanism of the balance of power. However, the “realist” emphasis, shared by Huntington on the centrality of fear, insecurity and threats in an anarchic environment, seems simply to make the clash of civilizations unavoidable—as merely a matter of time.

Paradoxically, at first sight such a framework seems strikingly similar to the arguments advanced by Mouffe and Zolo in the context of their critique of the American unipolar project, the idea being the construction of a multipolar planetary balance of power around macro-regions defined along civilizational lines.<sup>9</sup> Mouffe has argued that the central problem that the current unipolar world, under the unchallenged hegemony of the United States, is facing is the impossibility for antagonisms to find legitimate forms of expression. Under such conditions, antagonisms, when they do emerge, tend to take extreme forms. In order to create the channels for the legitimate expression of dissent we need to envisage, Mouffe suggests, a pluralistic multipolar world order constructed around a certain number of “greater spaces” and genuine cultural poles. Along similar lines, Zolo argues that to confront the United States’ dangerous imperial tendencies,

the project of a peaceful world needs a neo-regionalist revival of the idea of *Grossraum* [greater space], together with a reinforcement of multilateral negotiation between states as a normative source and a democratic legitimization of the processes of regional integration.<sup>10</sup>

These arguments for a multipolar multicivilizational world order, however, require a degree of caution for as Zolo has correctly sensed “before this kind of order can be achieved complex economic, technological, cultural and religious conditions must be met that make a dialogue between the world’s major civilizations possible.”<sup>11</sup>

Zolo correctly cautions about the apparent self-evident force of this multipolar model and points to the necessity of immersing it in a broader and real process of dialogue between the world’s major civilizations. This is even more necessary in the present international situation which imposes on all of us a moral obligation to pursue a politics of inter-civilizational understanding: to engage in an inter-cultural dialogue is today crucial for peace as it cannot be ignored that since September 11, in the very year designated by the United Nations as the “Year of Dialogue of Civilizations,” global political violence and conflicts have reached a

critical new level both quantitatively and qualitatively and the shadow of a future clash of civilizations has been hammering down on the world and, very worryingly, in the collective psychologies of its peoples.

This overall political context of growing cultural misunderstanding and mistrust, which prompted Edward Said to speak of a real danger of a clash of ignorance, should be opposed by creating the conditions for widespread processes of “inter-civilizational mutual understanding” at multiple levels. In this respect, the link between civilizational dialogue, mutual understanding and peace is fortunately becoming more widely acknowledged. The ideal of “building bridges of mutual understanding” in order to learn (or re-learn) how to live together among different cultural communities—what Andrea Riccardi has called in his last book the art of “living together”<sup>12</sup>—I want to argue, is also critical for the global order in a more specific sense: it provides the key antidote to the potential antagonistic logic of multipolarity. To explain this point I want to return for a moment to the Huntingtonian model of multipolar multicivilizational order discussed above.

The popularity of Huntington’s thesis no doubt has to do with bringing to center stage of the post-89 debate on the future of international relations the political resurgence of religion and the emergence of a multicultural international society. In other words, it could be said that Huntington has framed post-89 international politics as a multicultural fact. In this respect, its proposal of multipolar multicivilizational order is indeed an acknowledgement of the centrality of the growing multicultural nature of international society but, and here lies the problem, it is based on the opposite logic to what I would call “dialogical multiculturalism” and that I want to argue we need to strengthen.

In Huntington’s view the multicultural nature of the world has, on the one hand, internationally to be almost confined within a civilizational cage following the “good fences make good neighbors” principle and, on the other hand, has domestically to be contrasted through strict immigration policy and a new integrationist approach, as Huntington has argued in his most recent book with reference to the growing presence of Latinos in the United States and what, he argues, could be its weakening effect on American national identity.<sup>13</sup> In sum, his argument is not about building bridges of mutual understanding but rather walls of containment and separation.

The idea of a dialogue of civilizations envisages “bridges” not “walls.” In particular, here the emphasis is not on the geographical-territorial dimension of civilizations but rather on the normative one, that is, on civilizations as the great cultural and religious social traditions of the

world. This implies, for example, that the neo-regionalist revival that Zolo and Mouffe favor as a way of constructing a multipolar spatial ordering does not need to take shape along civilizational-culturalist lines. Rather it cannot be detached from reinforcing a politics of multiculturalism “at home and abroad.”<sup>14</sup> To illustrate this point I refer to a case of contemporary relevance to European regional integration and the relationship between Europe and the Muslim world: the hotly debated issue of EU enlargement to include Turkey.

From such a perspective, the framing of Turkey’s EU-accession discursive strategy as a “bridge” between Asia and Europe or as a new “alliance of civilizations” is to be welcomed and supported.<sup>15</sup> My argument is, in fact, that multiculturally-constituted processes of regional integration are more conducive to a peaceful global order as they act as a preventive antidote to the possible negative politicization of cultural differences on a global scale. A similar additional point can be made to support the creation of multicultural forms of regional cooperation and integration, which are, anyway, arguably justifiable on functionalist grounds to respond to the common challenges brought about by the processes of globalization. Initiatives of regionalization involving, for example, member-states from a plurality of existing regional political organizations can further contribute to the dilution of the risks of a multipolarization along enclosed civilizational lines.<sup>16</sup> For example, from such a perspective initiatives of Mediterranean regionalization involving European and Arab countries are to be encouraged as a way of fostering bridges of communication and mutual understanding between the European Union and the Arab League and can also constitute laboratories for the praxis of inter-civilizational dialogue, in particular in the context of the post-Arab spring. Finally, multiculturalism “abroad” is likely to facilitate “living together” at home and vice versa, a fact that cannot be overlooked in our era of global communication. I would, for example, anticipate a reciprocally beneficial relationship between the integration of the growing Muslim presence in Europe, arguably the greatest challenge facing the future identity of Europe, and a peaceful relationship between Europe and the Muslim world in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

An active politics of a dialogue of civilizations, in other words, may represent an essential mechanism to mitigate the risk of a “culturalist enclosure” in the multipolarity model and to dialogically inscribe plurality in its configuration. If this is so, however, the driving idea, the polar star of the idea of a dialogue of civilizations should be a comprehensive and politically realistic idea (ideal) of peace. Here I can only suggest a few

lines of thought to shed light on this comprehensive and realistic idea of peace which I think should be central to any future model of world order.

A realistic idea of peace points to the need for creatively accommodating in a broader normative vision the realities of interests and power represented, in this case, by the condition of multipolarity. But more importantly, the ideal of peace also needs to be comprehensive. Contrary to an abstract emphasis on the legal engineering of the cosmopolitan “legal pacifism” and the ethnocentric and problematic emphasis by the so-called “democratic peace theory” on the liberal-democratic model *as conditio sine qua non* for international peace;<sup>17</sup> a comprehensive re-conceptualization of peace should explore the mutually constitutive and reinforcing relationships, at various concrete levels, among peace, justice and reconciliation, as the visionary words of John Paul II, “there is no Peace without Justice and no Justice without Reconciliation” suggest and the remarkable concrete experience of the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in South Africa proved.<sup>18</sup> It is my view that such a comprehensive re-conceptualization might effectively inform real-world bottom-up initiatives of conflict-resolution, prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and may indeed have greater chances of politically realistic success than the top-down abstract approach of proceduralism and liberal rule of law.

Was this sort of realistic peace not the very aspiration, which drove Robert Schuman (and Jean Monnet) to imagine the European integration project? In these words of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, which I want to quote at length as they are self-explanatory, is the paradigmatic example of a search for a realistic peace whose topicality is today absolute:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers, which threaten it. . . . Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a *de facto* solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries. . . . It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.<sup>19</sup>

Today, a dialogue of civilizations is at the very heart of such creative efforts to secure the future of world peace. My argument is that an alternative model of world order inspired by a dialogue of civilizations can

indeed have multipolarity as its spatial/geopolitical orientation but under the condition that a global active politics of a dialogue of civilizations flourishes as a way to mitigate the risk of a “culturalist enclosure” in this former model and to dialogically inscribe plurality at its center. Concretely, this neo-regionalist, multipolar and cross-cultural model of greater spaces would be different from the Huntingtonian model of multipolar multicivilizational order as: (1) it is not shaped by civilizational-culturalist lines but by a dialogical multiculturalism; (2) its conflicts and disputes are neutralized by a commitment to a comprehensive ideal of peace; and (3) it is committed to a widespread process of “inter-civilizational mutual understanding” at multiple levels.

As I said at the beginning of my presentation, there is no blueprint for the construction of a multicultural and peaceful world order; but as Robert Schuman’s actions and words have proved, we need realistic visions as “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers, which threaten it.” The political articulation of the idea of a dialogue of civilizations that I have sketched here—multipolar spatiality, multiculturally constituted regionalism and a realistic peaceful ethos—is offered here in the hope that it might contribute to a more peaceful and just future to come.

## Notes

1. For the classical realist and neo-realist views see, respectively, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948) and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
2. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2) (March/April 1999): 35-49.
3. Chantal Mouffe, “Carl Schmitt’s Warnings on the Dangers of a Multipolar World” in *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, eds. Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (New York: Routledge, 2007), 147-153; Danilo Zolo, “The Contemporary Use of the Notion of Empire” in *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, eds. Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (New York: Routledge, 2007), 154-165.
4. This debate has mainly taken place in some of the leading mainstream US journals such as *International Security*, *Foreign Policy* and *The National Interest* as a sort of “analytical” controversy. For a classical discussion on the ascendancy and decline of US hegemony, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).
5. If at the end of WWII the United States accounted for half of the world’s economic output, today it is estimated to account for less than one-third; whilst on

current projections it is estimated that by 2020 it will be about 20%. See, for example, Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies, 2003).

6. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 316 & 320.

9. Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt's Warnings on the Dangers of a Multipolar World" and Danilo Zolo, "The Contemporary Use."

10. Danilo Zolo, "The Contemporary Use," p. 7.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

12. Andrea Riccardi, *Living Together* (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 2008).

13. Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (London, UK: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

14. "At home and abroad" stands for "domestically and internationally" and is an expression taken from the title of Michael Walzer's book *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

15. For the UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative, see <<http://unaoc.org/>>.

16. This is a sort of open-regionalism which could represent the basis for a truly decentralized and multilateral structure of global governance. In this context, however, the system of global governance, to borrow an effective image of Zolo, should operate a transition "from the logic of the Leviathan to that of the thousand fragile chains of Lilliput," Danilo Zolo, *Cosmópolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1997), 154.

17. For the approaches that Danilo Zolo critically labels in his volume *Cosmópolis* as "legal pacifism," see Norberto Bobbio, *Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979) and Hans Kelsen, *Peace Through Law* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944). For the democratic peace theory, see Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

18. See for example, Miroslav Volf, "Forgiveness, reconciliation, and justice: A Christian contribution to a more peaceful social environment," in *Forgiveness and reconciliation: Religion, public policy, & conflict transformation*, ed. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., and Rodney L. Petersen (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 27-49. See also Pope John Paul II, "There is No Peace without Justice and No Justice without Forgiveness," Message for the celebration of the World Day for Peace, 1 January 2002, extracts in John Paul II, *Non uccidere in nome di Dio* and available online at

<[http://www.vatican.net/holy\\_father/johnpaul\\_ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii\\_mes\\_20011211\\_xxxv-worldday-for-peace\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.net/holy_father/johnpaul_ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii_mes_20011211_xxxv-worldday-for-peace_en.html)>. For the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" in South Africa see, Desmond Tutu, *God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

19. Text presented by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman and which led to the creation of what is now the European Union, see the Declaration of 9 May 1950, <[http://www.robert-schuman.eu/declaration\\_9mai.php](http://www.robert-schuman.eu/declaration_9mai.php)>.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

# THE “BANDUNG SPIRIT” AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT CHAOS

BEATRIZ BISSIO

The 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Bandung Conference (1955) invites us to think about the legacy of the African and Asian Countries’ proposal for peaceful coexistence, independence from the hegemony of the superpowers and for South-South cooperation, challenging us to propose alternatives to the present chaos.

### *Massive Global Disorder*

In recent years, we have been following on the news the tragedy of thousands of human beings who set off from different places on the African coast and the Levant into the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, to reach the European shore. The Mediterranean was called *Mare Nostrum*, “our sea,” by the ancient Romans, and according to Pope Francis’s warning, in his speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, it may be in the process of becoming the graveyard of immigrants.<sup>1</sup> In desperation, families pay as much as two thousand to fifteen thousand *Euros* in order to board boats that carry sixty to eighty passengers, even though they are designed to carry only thirty to forty people at the most.

Overall, during the first eight months of 2016, some 281,740 people have made the sea crossing to Europe, according to the UN’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and some 4,176 people have died or gone missing on the Mediterranean – “an average of 11 men, women and children perishing every day over the last 12 months.”<sup>2</sup>

This flow rates continues unabated. But Europe cannot, and does not wish to, assimilate such large numbers of refugees. Having left everything behind, those who survive the journey promptly find that they will not find a minimally decent life in Europe, where all their hopes were placed. But

seeking asylum is a human right, a right that is included in the international agreements on refugees signed after World War II.

The refugee phenomenon is not a new one, but the extraordinary proportions it has reached, are. It provides a meaningful context for the analysis of the theme of this volume: “A World Beyond Global Disorder” and for tackling the key questions: Are there alternatives to the present chaos? How can we find pathways pointing in the direction of a more just and sustainable world order?

Let us review the episode that marked the beginning of the twenty-first century: the attacks of September 11, 2001. There are still many obscure aspects in these attacks, but for the purposes of this analysis, we shall take the most widely accepted version of events. According to this version, members of Al-Qaeda—the terrorist group founded and directed by Osama bin Laden, a *protégé* of Washington during the struggle against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and later seen as enemy number one of the Western world—were (wholly) responsible for the most important attack ever perpetrated on US territory.

This attack served as a justification for US President George W. Bush to defend the doctrine of the preemptive strike; that is, in view of the threats that the country was facing, the United States should anticipate and surprise the potential enemy, even without being certain of when or where this enemy might act. In this way, a security strategy<sup>3</sup> was formulated (known as the Bush doctrine), which, in order to adapt the concept of imminent threat to the size of the alleged one posed by the new opponents, gave the superpower the green light to seize the initiative and undertake military actions around the world. On October 7, 2001, less than a month after the attacks, claiming that Afghanistan had been giving shelter to Al-Qaeda, the United States began its invasion of that country. Little did those responsible for this initiative know that they were starting one of the longest war in US history: the withdrawal of troops occurred (in part) in December 2014, after thirteen years. Official US sources indicate that up to 2010, more than one thousand US soldiers had lost their lives in Afghanistan; British troops had suffered, at the time, 300 casualties.

Regarding the casualties suffered by the civilian population of Afghanistan, be it as a direct result of acts of war—bombings, crossfire, illegal night raids on alleged suspects’ homes, etc.—or indirectly, from the destruction of the public health infrastructure, for example—no serious institution will venture to cite reliable figures. But it is estimated that the figure has already surpassed one hundred thousand dead and a similar number of injured civilians. In 2009, the Ministry of Public Health

reported that two-thirds of the Afghan population suffered from mental problems as a result of the war.<sup>4</sup>

### *Multiple Interventions*

In 2003, President Bush, with Britain’s support and without the approval of the UN Security Council, began the invasion of Iraq, thus violating all the norms of international law. In the words of the US Head of State, Iraq was one of the “axis of evil” countries, along with North Korea and Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s regime was hiding the fact that it had large amounts of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as links to Al-Qaeda. Because of all this, it had become an “imminent danger to humanity.” The doctrine of the pre-emptive strike was applied once again. But these justifications were just for public use. Today, many scholars and much public opinion advocate an alternative interpretation of the reasons for the invasion. Neoconservative representatives in the Bush administration targeted Saddam Hussein’s Iraq because of its use of significant oil reserves<sup>5</sup>—to maintain its independence from US hegemony. Despite a circumstantial alliance with Washington in the war against Iran in the 1980s, Iraq and its bold proposal to build a Middle East free from US hegemony should become an example of the way those who dared challenge the US would be treated from then on. Indeed, the aim to overthrow Saddam Hussein was not new and over the years there had been different attempts (especially by the CIA) to remove him from power.

The result is well known: hundreds of thousands of deaths (190,000 in conservative estimates), millions of refugees, Iraqi civilians arrested without trial and subjected to barbaric torture. As noted by Noam Chomsky in his 2015 article, the aftermath of the US invasion is so dreadful that Iraqis have compared the destruction to the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century—leaving Iraq the unhappiest country in the world according to WIN/Gallup polls. Meanwhile, sectarian conflict was ignited, tearing the region to shreds and laying the basis for the creation of the monstrosity that is ISIS. And all of that is called “stabilization.”<sup>6</sup>

At no time did the Iraqi army use anything resembling a weapon of mass destruction to defend the country from the invasion; on the contrary, its lack of preparation to face a military force such as that being deployed by the coalition led by Washington—by air, sea and land—quickly became evident.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistan is another country which has been directly affected by the troubled regional situation, particularly by the invasion of Afghanistan. It is estimated that about 57,000 civilians, 6,000 members of the security

forces in the country and 30,000 activists from different organizations have died as a direct or indirect result of violence. In addition, totals for the injured are an estimated 60,000.<sup>8</sup> Civilian casualties have increased considerably since the United States began using drones to kill suspected terrorists. Refugee figures in the case of Pakistan amount to one million four hundred thousand displaced people—inside and outside the country. All of this reveals a scenario involving serious violations of international law, including the laws governing the conduct of war, such as those defined by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. And it is important to point out that there has been no formal declaration of war by the US against Pakistan or Iraq, nor against Afghanistan.... The consequences of war are also felt within the US, where suicide rates among the military—although exact figures are inaccessible to researchers—have increased exponentially since 2004, and so has the number of injuries and deaths among their support staff.

Let us have a look at other interventions, such as the case of Libya, for example. Libya is responsible for supplying oil and gas to several European countries, with a production of two million barrels per day. Eighty per cent of the Libyan oil reserves are in the basin of the Eastern Gulf of Sidra, where foreign forces provided confidential military and logistic support to the rebels. Despite the abstentions of Russia, China, Brazil and other countries, on 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council adopted the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya together with “other necessary measures,” although they did not include the military occupation of the country. However, what took place was a NATO intervention, once again led by the US and Britain. They donned no disguise for their ultimate goal of changing the country’s regime—both countries said that to ensure the human rights of civilians, conditions should be established for the resignation or the removal of Muammar Gaddafi. What we now know of this “humanitarian intervention” is that the country was brought into a state of complete chaos: life never went back to normal for the Libyan civilian population. Who rules Libya today? No one knows; the best description is that the country has become a patchwork quilt, a collection of feudal domains. The true cost of this war will never really be known. Libya’s conflict spreads to other countries and it is easy to understand that in a scenario like this, terrorist groups like ISIS are free to continue to act.

Libya is on the verge of economic and financial collapse, said Bernardino Leon Gross, the UN special envoy on matters relating to Libya, in May of 2015. He stated the economic collapse of Libya “is a real possibility” (*Reuters*, May 28, 2015). Civil servants, for example, who in

absolute numbers make up the largest workforce in Libya, had not received wages “for the past two months up to June this year” (*Reuters*, June 1, 2015).

And Syria? The country is being destroyed in an alleged attempt “to save the population” from the so-called misdeeds of the government of Bashar al-Assad. As usual this conflict that violates international law is presented to the international public opinion as “humanitarian intervention.” To accomplish this the American and NATO strategists count on media outlets controlled directly by interests linked to them or which are ideological allies of their vision. The worsening of the conflict showed explicitly that the humanitarian intervention transformed itself into a “regime change” proposal. A study by Save the Children, CfBT Education Trust (CfBT) and the American Institutes for Research (AIR) notes that after four years of war in Syria, nearly three million children are out of school, which is a “slow and quiet robbery” of their right to education. Taking into account solely school building destruction and damage, the study evaluates losses at US\$3 billion. “Owing to the impact of war on the economy, some 2.8 million Syrian children will never go back to school.”<sup>9</sup>

We could go on listing the human and material costs of the wars waged in recent years, mainly by the US in alliance with NATO members, in the Middle East and North Africa in particular. We have not referred to the events that have taken place in Mali, Sudan and Somalia—this last country having been used as a test target for the military, political and media strategies that were later employed in the Middle East. But the examples cited so far are enough to illustrate the central theme of this analysis: the fact that military interventions have only resulted in the destabilization of the affected countries, showing side-effects throughout and beyond the region, causing untold suffering to civilian populations and being responsible, to a large extent, for the current refugee crisis. This humanitarian tragedy, an indirect result of the interventions, has very serious consequences for the European continent, many of whose countries have been jointly responsible for the military operations that have contributed to creating this situation. And the long-term consequences bode ominously for future generations,

Returning to the issue of the refugees, it is important to note that history repeats itself, even if it is with different characteristics. As a consequence of the end of World War II, Europe was the stage for the largest population movements in its history. Millions of Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe; survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, hundreds of thousands of Jews sought new lives far away from their native lands; coming from every country in Eastern Europe, other refugees

escaped from the newly installed regimes allied to the Soviet Union. The British historian Bernard Wasserstein, in his article “European Refugee Movements after World War Two,” wrote: “Before the end of the war, the greater part of the German population of East Prussia had fled westwards—although thousands drowned *en route*, in overloaded ships that sank in the Baltic Sea.”<sup>10</sup>

Nowadays, overloaded ships are sinking *en route* to Europe in the Mediterranean Sea and the people traveling on them are not Germans but Arabs and Africans, most of them hoping to be received in Germany. The UN Charter, signed in 1945, incorporates the dramatic lessons of World War II and reveals that the objective of its member States is to prevent future clashes. For this reason, already in the Preamble it states that to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (...) armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” That is, in the event of a threat of attack to a state, the challenge should be solved collectively and peacefully. Recalling the ideas of Immanuel Kant, the first article of the Charter states that the UN’s purpose is “To maintain international peace and security.” And Article 39, which deals with “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” points out that it is up to the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” and that it is up to this body to “make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Undoubtedly, the landscape has changed since the end of World War II, particularly since the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Further changes have occurred since the beginning of the twenty-first century, with all of the ramifications of the attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. So-called “new threats”—terrorism first—have given rise to new interpretations of the preventive use of force and legitimate preventive defense. In this context, the National Security Strategy that was put into practice by George W. Bush continues to be used. But in the light of the events in the Middle East and North Africa, and of the consequences of this tragedy for the rest of the world, the questions arise: Who should decide what poses a threat? And how should one act on behalf of endangered populations?

“Political change cannot be imposed from the outside by an outside power, much less by means of gunfire.” These are the words of Paul R. Pillar, an expert CIA veteran, now a professor of security studies at Georgetown University. This statement takes us to the heart of this chapter: the Bandung Conference and “Bandung Spirit.”

### *The “Bandung Spirit”*

Let us remember that the Bandung Conference (April 18 to 24, 1955) brought together leaders from some thirty Asian and African nations, responsible for the destiny of 1.5 billion human beings. Today many of the same problems that were analyzed and debated at the pioneering conference continue to challenge a huge part of humanity. This observation invites us to think about the relevance today of some of the assessments and proposals made at that event, which constituted a landmark in the history of twentieth-century international relations.

By consecrating the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement and the concept of the Third World, the Bandung meeting represented, symbolically, the moment in which a significant sector of humanity became aware of its role and made its voice heard. After attending the conference, Richard Wright wrote *The Color Curtain. A Report on the Bandung Conference*.<sup>11</sup> He was a journalist who had received recognition after his novel *Native Son* (1940) became the first book by an African-American writer to be selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club.

In *The Color Curtain*., he wrote:

The despised, the insulted, the hurt, the dispossessed—in short, the underdogs of the human race were meeting. Here were class and racial and religious consciousness on a global scale. Who had thought of organizing such a meeting? And what had these nations in common? Nothing, it seemed to me, but what their past relationship to the Western world had made them feel. This meeting of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon the Western world!<sup>12</sup>

To be sure, there were differences among the participants. But guided by the ideal of creating a space of their own—an imagined community?—in the bipolar world of the period, this group of nations identified ten principles which guided their action in favor of the promotion of peaceful coexistence. And through these principles the “Spirit of Bandung” marked the process of liberation from the colonial world and determined the path for the international insertion of the countries that formed the Non-Aligned Movement, with an explicit condemnation of racism, colonialism and imperialism.

The “Ten Principles for Peace” were based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as defined in the declaration signed by India and China, with the presence of Myanmar, in 1954, in order to overcome their differences and focus on the defense of sovereignty and peace, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

These are the *Ten Principles* of Bandung:

- 1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- 3) Recognition of equality among all races and of equality among all nations, both large and small.
- 4) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- 5) Respect for the right of every nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- 6) A. Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers.  
B. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.
- 7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression, or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- 8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- 9) Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation.
- 10) Respect for justice and international obligations.

These *ten principles* and the general content of the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung<sup>13</sup> not only outlined a plan of diplomatic action, but also left no doubt as to the determination of African and Asian countries to make their voice heard, declaring themselves clearly in favor of negotiation and diplomatic solutions to conflict, and condemning, a priori, the use of force by the powers still adhering to the interventionist tradition.

In the explosive scenario of the Cold War, the ten principles of Bandung laid out the rejection of participation in any kind of military pact and the defense of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and with respect for fundamental human rights at the top of the list. They recognized the equality of all races and the right of any nation to defend itself individually or collectively, in the framework of the provisions of the United Nations Charter. They rejected any agreements for collective defense destined "to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers,"<sup>14</sup> and they defended the solution of

all conflicts by pacific means, with respect for justice and international obligations.

Do we need anything further, at present, to create alternatives to the present chaos? Non-intervention, respect for international law, seeking peaceful and negotiated solutions to conflict . . . such a scenario seems so very remote. However, with political will and with a good mobilization of public opinion, it would be far more accessible.

The issue of public opinion leads to other proposals made by the non-aligned countries, which should be re-visited, adapting them to the current situation: in the 1970s, when the level of intervention was rising, the non-aligned countries adopted two new priority areas for their demands: the implementation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO). The latter was incorporated by UNESCO, which in 1977 set up an international commission to study the problems of information flow. Three years later, the commission released the paper “Many Voices, One World,” known as the MacBride Report (after Sean MacBride, who chaired the Commission)<sup>15</sup> with concrete proposals seeking a balance between the developed countries and the Third World regarding the production of and access to information, together with a condemnation of the huge international information monopolies. The reaction of the United States and the UK was drastic: both countries abandoned UNESCO and cut off their funding for this UN agency, which faced years of crisis and was finally forced to set aside any discussion of the issue.

Directly related to the proposal for a profound change in the rules of the game in the economic system, and in the production and distribution of information at world level, the non-aligned group questioned the division of the world according to the Cold War rationale, based on ideological options (East/West confrontation), and identified the real division as being based on the unequal capacity of nations to dispose of their own natural resources (North/South antagonism). For the non-aligned countries, economy and communications were strategic areas through which to achieve their central goal: the full development of every country. Ambitious development goals were seen as the only way to eliminate exploitation and domination of all kinds.

Although much of the analysis made by the Non-Aligned Movement was correct, the power balance at that historical moment did not allow for the implementation of this alternative. The movement itself lost momentum in the face of the economic and political impasse and took on a lower profile on the international scene. Nevertheless, in the first decades

of the twenty-first century, in a world marked by globalization, a new reality is emerging.

The group known as the BRICS has brought together five major emerging economies—with great disparities among them, of course, considering that the Chinese economy represents the second biggest GDP in the world (rapidly approaching that of the US), India is the third biggest, and Brazil and South Africa lag well behind. These countries represent 40% of the world's population: approximately three billion people. Having for some time remained informal, this association, originally established to promote cooperation in specific areas, is becoming more strongly consolidated over the course of its successive meetings and has taken significant steps towards institutionalization.

The projects of the BRICS group tally with the (frustrated) goals of the Non-Aligned Movement. The 1970s' proposal for a New International Economic Order depended, to a great extent, on agreements that could have been reached with some of the powers of the developed world. Today, the BRICS are beginning to modify the rules of the macro-economic game simply by using their own resources and acting with a clear political will. For instance, instead of using the structures of Bretton Woods—in particular the IMF and the World Bank—the emerging powers have chosen to create alternatives that do not involve an open dispute with the hegemonic powers, thus allowing them to create more inclusive conditions for global growth. The proximity of China and Russia to the Non-Aligned Movement was already a fact at the time of the Cold War, but the rationale of that historical moment made coordinated action difficult. It is easy to understand that non-alignment did not imply, on the part of its members, an equidistant relationship with one block or the other. With the exception of one or two countries which, for historical reasons, openly or implicitly defended an alliance with the West, most of the non-aligned countries were fully aware that their potential allies were in the socialist bloc and that they could not expect any similar support from the Western bloc, which included the old colonial powers. But they could not advance much further in that bipolar world system.

For this reason, it is important to situate the BRICS in the context of a historical process that calls into question the rules of the game that emerged after World War II. Today, the BRICS can move forward with the gradual substitution of the Bretton Woods framework, due to their own weight in the world economy.<sup>16</sup> This was the essence of the project of the non-aligned nations when they advocated a new international economic order. The difference lies in the concrete possibilities of achieving these goals in the past and today.

We are talking of two moments, two styles and the same objective: a less unequal world, with opportunities for development, prosperity and social justice for the great majorities, in an atmosphere of cooperation and peace.

Let us draw our inspiration from the rich experience that was born in Bandung, a harbinger of the irruption of the Global South, to find new answers to the challenges of today. It is vital to establish the essential common objectives clearly, and from this starting point, to expand partnerships in order to make these goals a reality. With this in the view, the struggle under the old banners of

1. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
2. Recognition of equality among all races and of equality among all nations, both large and small;
3. Non-intervention;
4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; continues to provide a *good compass* as we undertake this journey.

### *Conclusion*

Will it be possible to defend these goals in a world which is in such turmoil? It seems an unrealistic and utopian dream, which refers back to Immanuel Kant and his defense of perpetual peace. However, I am convinced that these are the goals that should guide our action. In the short term, we need to be guided by them in order to avoid new conflicts. And it is also necessary to begin to do away gradually with the causes of existing conflicts. Terrorists feed upon frustrations generated by the non-resolution of conflicts. As frustrations grow, so do the numbers of their followers.

An excellent starting point would be to make up our minds once and for all to find a genuine solution to the Palestinian issue. If we were able to eliminate the Palestinian problem by means of a fair solution, we would be dismantling one of the most perverse and persistent sources of conflict and suffering in the Middle East. Let us also continue the search for a diplomatic, negotiated solution to the Syrian tragedy and for a just way of dealing with the refugee drama, involving a global resettlement effort. Let us review the issue of debt and fight for alternatives to the austerity (neoliberal) policies. We shall thus be taking significant steps to overcome the frustration of millions of young people throughout the world and relieve the pressure on African societies in particular.

Let us move forward in setting up rigorous controls of tax havens and in seeking total transparency for financial transactions. In this way, we

shall be cutting off corruption at its roots and enabling the detection of the clandestine world's sources of funding. And importantly too, let us promote the multiplication of media outlets committed to all of these goals and sharing these ideals. Wars feed on the lack of information and misinformation. Well-informed public opinion will be our best ally in the fight for a peaceful world.

## Notes

1. *The Guardian*: "Pope Francis attacks EU over treatment of immigrants". Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/25/pope-francis-elderly-eu-lost-bearings>
2. "UN refugee agency: 2016 is deadliest year for refugees crossing to Europe via Central Mediterranean," UN News Centre website. Available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54828#.WYIfLVyhQs>. More information: 23 December, 2016, *The Guardian*: "Migrant death toll passes 5,000 after two boats capsize off Italy". It stated: "The causes for the alarming increase in deaths this year are multiple but appear to be related to the declining quality of the vessels used by people-smugglers, the vagaries of the weather and the tactics used by smugglers to avoid detection by the authorities... These include sending large numbers of embarkations simultaneously, which makes the work of rescuers more difficult." Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/record-migrant-death-toll-two-boats-capsized-italy-un-refugee>
3. Available at: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2320.htm> and "National Security Strategy (NSS)" <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
4. Data from the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. The same source points to the indirect effects of the war as regards malnutrition, poverty and environmental degradation, all of whose consequences are very difficult to estimate (<http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan>).
5. Iraq has the world's second-largest proven oil reserves, with 140 billion barrels, after the Saudi's.
6. Noam Chomsky, "Iran Is Not the Greatest Threat to World Peace," *The Nation*, August 21, 2015.
7. The former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced on 15 June 2009 that an Inquiry would be conducted to identify lessons that could be learned from the Iraq conflict. Seven years after, on 6 July 2016, Sir John Chilcot announced the publication of the official report. Usually referred to as the "Chilcot report" by the news media, the document stated that Saddam Hussein did not pose an urgent threat to British interests, that intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction was presented with unwarranted certainty, that peaceful alternatives to war had not been exhausted, that the United Kingdom and United States had undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council, that the process of identifying the legal basis was "far from satisfactory," and that a war in 2003 was unnecessary.

8. Data from the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
9. “The cost of war. Calculating the impact of the collapse of Syria’s education system on Syria’s future”. Available at [http://www.savethechildren.de/fileadmin/Berichte\\_Reports/Report\\_The\\_Cost\\_of\\_War\\_01.pdf](http://www.savethechildren.de/fileadmin/Berichte_Reports/Report_The_Cost_of_War_01.pdf)
10. Available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/refugees\\_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/refugees_01.shtml)  
“The international response to the refugee crisis took both legal and organizational form. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 guaranteed a ‘... right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,’ and forbade the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. The Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 defined refugees, accorded them specific rights, and prohibited their *refoulement* (or forcible return) from countries of refuge.”
11. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956).
12. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956), 12.
13. Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung. Available at: [http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final\\_communique\\_of\\_the\\_asian\\_african\\_conference\\_of\\_bandung\\_24\\_april\\_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html](http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html)
14. The principle of collective defense is at the heart of NATO’s founding treaty.
15. Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0004/000400/040066Eb.pdf>
16. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement - with a total capital of \$200 billion – are the best examples of its present international role. The NDB started its work in 2016, having approved the first projects in all five countries, giving priority to renewable energy.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

### *UBUNTU:* BEYOND DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL DISORDER

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY

#### *Introduction*

Weeks before President Kennedy was executed in broad, open daylight before our very eyes, he spoke of what he characterized as the most important topic on earth: peace. Addressing the American University 1963 Commencement, he asked, “What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek?” Answering his own question, he added:

Not a *Pax Americana*, enforced on the world by American weapons of war; not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I’m talking about the genuine peace: the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living; the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children; not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men and women; not merely peace in our time, peace in all time.<sup>1</sup>

On that auspicious August day, Kennedy said that “total war makes no sense” and that “we have no more urgent task” than to pursue peace which, for him, was the “necessary, rational end of rational men.”<sup>2</sup> President Kennedy asked those of us who want to pursue peace to begin our journey first by looking inward. And that is exactly what I want to do here.

As many of you know, I served in elected office in my home state of Georgia and then I went to Congress. When I was first elected, almost my entire district of poor sons and daughters of Georgia’s slave autocracy went to Washington, DC with me. We traveled up there in the cheapest, almost-completely-broken-down buses that we could afford. And one of those buses did break down! But, we made it. People who had never seen their Congressperson before, stood in the gallery with me and raised their

hands as I raised my hand and spoke my oath of office. Such was the hope that buoyed my reality of becoming Georgia's first African American woman Member of Congress. I represented the second poorest district in my state, where attitudes and behaviors were still mired in the 1800s, not the twentieth century. I was determined to make a difference in their lives and I did. I got health care for neglected people dying from exposure to chemicals in their neighborhoods; I got people moved out of neighborhoods that would flood and destroy all of their possessions every time it rained because they lived on what were formerly rice plantations worked by African slaves whose descendants were still on that land. I renovated a 103-year-old woman's home that did not have running water in it in 1993. In fact, lots of my constituents did not have running water in their homes—even as they paid rent every month.

The poverty that I encountered was staggering. No American would believe if it they did not see it for themselves; and so, I invited a national reporter to come to my district and witness for herself the overwhelming poverty that existed in the world's greatest, freest democracy. She departed Georgia in tears. Racism and discrimination were rife; even I was told to get out of town before it got dark if I did not want any trouble while I was on the campaign trail. Several of my supporters were threatened at their jobs for supporting me and shots were fired over the homes of two of my supporters. Had one of them sat up in her bed, as she tells the story, she would have been killed right there on the spot.

The United States' domestic situation was a ticking time bomb waiting to be set off. Because of my fierce advocacy, and quite frankly, outrage, the press began to call me names; I called myself unruly, because in the pace of injustice, unruly is what my father taught me to be. While in Congress, I was part of every hot button issue that came across my desk. That included justice for Aborigines in Australia and the U'wa in Colombia trying to protect their lands from US mining companies, stolen US Presidential elections, September 11, Palestine, and black people in the US trying to get back home after Hurricane Katrina. I heard John Kennedy when he enunciated that commencement address. I heard every word of it—and I too, believed that peace was possible, starting with peace between Blacks and Whites inside the US and I still believe that today.

I am here with you today as a *former* Member of Congress because I tried to align my values with my behavior, my talk with my walk, my proof and my pudding. I became more than just an irritant; I became dangerous. I began to live dangerously with political stalkers and other signals that I was too close to the cutting edge. I got cut from Congress—not once, but twice! I had racked up an interesting and powerful array of

opponents. But the fact is that, with each engagement, those who opposed my straightforward talk about my values of peace and justice and truth had to reveal themselves in ways that perhaps only I could see. It became quite clear that most of the Congressional leadership had ties with people who were more comfortable lurking in the shadows. And so I began to call more names. I was engaged in the political equivalent of hand-to-hand combat fighting for my political right to represent my constituents every day while very few people nationally even knew my name.

I became immersed in US foreign as well as domestic policy. My academic background included the study of International Relations in undergraduate and graduate school. I entered Congress having read John Stockwell's pioneering book, *In Search of Enemies*, and so intellectually, I understood that I had entered "occupied territory." That is, political space that was occupied by people who did not share my values, and in many respects, actively opposed my vision and definition of what a "better" US policy could look like. I specialized professionally in the covert activities of US intelligence agencies operating both inside the US (illegally) and abroad. I studied US government documents; I became a student of US wars waged at home as well as abroad. Like President Kennedy, I concluded that permanent war was the preservation of irrational leadership.

### ***"War Need Not Be Inevitable"***

In that June 10, 1963 speech, Kennedy said, "war need not be inevitable. No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered lacking in virtue."<sup>3</sup> But today, demonization is the name of the game as a prelude to attack. Attacks from the US can come in many different ways, at many different levels. They call it *Full Spectrum Dominance*. Today, US Presidential candidates thump their chests for war—proudly.

Can you even imagine today a President of the United States speaking as President Kennedy spoke on that American University campus? Probably not. And the reason is that when that bullet blew our President's brains out, US elected leadership for peace was eliminated. The man was killed and so was his policy. But his message still resonates today against the backdrop of a war-ravaged world. How much more blood on our collective hands can we stomach? It is clear that we in the United States need now, more than ever, peace leadership. That is, leadership that is unafraid to articulate a vision of peace and to live that as a mission. It should also be clear that the "peaceniks" of the world need to embrace this objective with us, because we in the US do not seem to be able to lead and

manage this necessary transformation alone. No, war is not inevitable, but peace is not attainable until we receive the kind of help for peace leadership that the warmongers receive for their war leadership. Think about it: if I were to announce tomorrow that I agree with the War on Terror and the destruction of whole states, I would find outstretched hands filled with wads of cash to help me on my way and I would get good press to boot. But the leadership for peace bears only the scars of battle while the press draws attention to your bruises.

### ***“The rational end of rational men” (and women)***

By now, it should be clear that the progenitors of the “Clash of Civilizations” and the Global “War on Terror” are not the kind of rational men or women around which political theories are built. Because if, as President Kennedy stated, peace is the rational end of rational men and women, and we have been told by successive US Administrations to prepare for a generation of war, then clearly a different kind of rationality is at work. They have their vision of the future and they are on a mission—and their mission is war. War, not for war’s sake, but war to achieve their political agenda because war is the only way they can implement their vision and fulfill their mission.

Let me be clear about this: this “Clash of Civilizations” crowd will not stop because of naive appeals to their sense of responsibility. They are in a different orbit. I have even witnessed that some people think they can strike bargains with these people in order to save themselves. “Leave me alone to live my life in comfort and go ahead and kill my neighbor.” All such thinking accomplishes is the elimination of their own potential allies—eventually increasing their own vulnerability with each day of collaboration or silence. We can cite current real-world examples of leaders whose days are numbered precisely because they remained silent or chose to collaborate in the destruction of their brothers and sisters, rather than to oppose these senseless, endless wars.

So what do we do? After years of being inside the ring, getting bloodied and bruised, I formulated my own vision of the values that are important to me. I start with truth, because so much of our present world has been built on an edifice of lies that we must start all over again and rebuild with truth. With truth it is possible for us to revision a just reality for we cannot build justice on a foundation of lies. With justice at hand, peace can be also. And a just peace moves us up in our humanity to the ultimate level which, in my opinion, is dignity—of both Humanity and Earth. These are the values that I walk with every day of my life.

I had the great opportunity to work side-by-side with one of the architects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Stéphane Hessel, who told us to “*Indignez-vous!*” that we should be indignant and outraged about what is happening in the world. I think drastic corrective action is urgently needed. Quite frankly, the world is in a shambles—by design. But it is now time for us collaboratively to interpose our vision and our directed action onto the warmonger’s plan. We need to give them more resistance than they are getting from us now.

I have also begun to formulate a vision of what transformation in the United States would look like so that the people can dare to dream again about the kind of United States they are willing to work for and build. Some have suggested that egalitarianism should be a part of the vision. I don’t disagree. Others, including the Pope are suggesting that we move beyond capitalism and start building a post-capitalist vision. We should definitely add to that post-racist, too, as hatred and division work to our disadvantage and to the advantage of those who advocate never-ending war.

In addition to egalitarianism, post-capitalism, and anti-racism, one suggestion that came to me was that we should support a sharing economy; I do not disagree with that. In Venezuela, people have begun to take these matters, of building the future that they want, into their own hands and are recreating the Kilombo—the cities of old begun by trafficked Africans who fought for their freedom and staved off the fate of becoming a slave. These “liberated zones” are popping up all over Venezuela right now, today. Some also call them Socialist Cities.

The *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America] (ALBA) states of Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and others in the region affirm the centrality of human and Earth dignity in their Constitutions and in their policies. Africans refer to it as African Socialism or *ujamaa*; some call it *ubuntu*. And the Kilombos are run on the basis of this. Where love and connection are the basis of human interaction, vengeance is replaced by restorative action. Therefore, I take the opportunity granted to me by the Rhodes Forum to renew my commitment to live by my values and to always, always try to be a part of the solution and not the problem. To act on my mission of enhancing the impact of effective peace leadership as a way to ensure my vision of a United States whose values and behavior shine like a beacon around the world: a United States that joins in the Commonwealth of mankind.

Finally, writer Alice Walker wrote that “Anything We Love Can Be Saved.” In this time of homicide, genocide, ecocide, and sociocide—

President Kennedy's message of peace is what we urgently need to hear from a US President in the near future. I will dare to, and encourage others to imagine the US as a participant in the *dialogue* (and not in the clash) of Civilizations.

### Notes

1. John F. Kennedy, "Commencement Address at American University in Washington," June 10, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9266>.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

## CHAPTER NINE

# “SILK ROAD WORLD ORDER”: UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY AND IMPACT

PEIMIN NI

It was not too long ago when China started to rise, that people were talking about how China must seek to be accepted by the world and merge itself into the existing world order “as a responsible power.” Just a couple of decades later, many have started to talk about how China is playing an active and even a leading role in creating a new world order. China’s bold initiative known as “One Belt and One Road” presents a grand scale blueprint of the future geopolitical landscape. With reference to this initiative and China’s leading influence in international organizations such as the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, some have coined a new expression called the “Silk Road World Order,” or simply the “Silk World Order.”

### *Silk Road Tradition*

It is well-known that centuries ago when China was at its most glorious periods, there was a trading route linking China’s ancient capital Xian westward all the way to Europe, through which commerce and cultural exchanges took place. In addition to the land route traveled with camels, China also had taken ocean voyages from its east coast to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and all the way to Africa, bringing Chinese artifacts and culture to these regions. These were known as the Silk Roads. Now the Chinese government has announced its development strategy to revive these ancient routes. In September and October 2013, China’s new President Xi Jinping, in his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia, proposed to build the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21<sup>st</sup>-century Maritime Silk Road.”

The former calls for the integration and cooperation of the countries on the original Silk Road through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, forming a cohesive belt through building infrastructure, increasing cultural exchange and broadening trade. The latter is a parallel plan to foster collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa through contiguous bodies of water. Since then, China has taken numerous solid steps to implement these initiatives, including setting up a 40 billion US dollar Silk Road Fund, reviving the plan for a Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP), and more importantly, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). Set to become operational in 2016 with an initial capital of 100 billion US dollars, the bank will be a rival<sup>1</sup> to the financial system dominated by developed countries like the United States and Japan.

There is no question about the vast scale of the One Belt One Road strategy—it involves 26 countries and 4.4 billion people, which account for 63 percent of the world's entire population, and roughly one-third of the world's economy. There is also no question that the genie is already out of the bottle, with huge momentum. The AIIB plan has gained support from 37 regional countries and 20 non-regional members, including some of the closest allies of the US, such as Australia, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and even the United Kingdom—despite Washington's pressure to dissuade them not to join. And there is no question that this vast, non-stoppable trend is not merely an economic phenomenon. Economic development is always accompanied by other changes. With the new trend, people are waking up to the realization that the dominance of the US-led West is waning and a new world order is emerging.

### *A New World Order?*

What is the major characteristic of this new world order? Will it be just a changing of the guard or will the new order be different in substance? Although no answer can be definitive until the new order unfolds fully, based on what we have seen, I think we can reasonably expect it to be drastically different from the old order. The main difference, as Yuri Tavorovsky puts it, is that the new order is “not vertical, but horizontal.”<sup>2</sup> Unlike the old model which is structured on the basis of economic and military power with the ones who have the strongest muscle at the top of the pyramid, the new world order is multilateral. It will be based on integration and cooperation, ideally to the benefit of all involved. For example, we notice that despite the fact that China is taking a leading role

in the establishment of the AIIB and holds an overwhelming 30% of voting shares, it offered to forgo veto power at the AIIB to ensure that no single country can dictate decision-making at the new bank. This is in stark contrast to the long-standing practice at the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund), in which the US retains the only veto power despite holding less than 30% of voting shares (16.75% in the IMF and 17.13% in World Bank, to be more exact). Indeed, we find China has been so cautious that it avoids using words like the “China model” or “Beijing Consensus.” They do not want to create an impression that China is creating a rival to compete with the West, or that it has a model for the rest of the world to follow. They also stayed away from terms like “leadership” and “alliance”; instead they prefer words like “dialogue,” “partnership,” and “cooperation.” It is interesting that a country tainted with the reputation of lacking democracy is advocating a trend of global democracy, while the country proud of its democracy is now haunted by the image of being hegemonic in the world.

Of course, China’s One Belt One Road strategy is not an operation of philanthropy or charity, nor are the countries that collaborate simply getting a favor from China. While China has accumulated a lot of experience in building infrastructures (e.g. high speed railways) and a huge foreign fund reserve, it needs to balance its underdeveloped western regions with the more advanced east coast; meanwhile the countries in Central and West Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe can use China’s help to speed up their modernization process. It is logical for China to shift its focus from the east coast toward the west. But I think there is a deeper philosophical realization behind China’s move toward this direction. There are two phrases used frequently by China’s President Xi Jinping. One is *minguyn gongtongti*—“community of shared destiny.” The phrase contains the insight that the world has increasingly become a community in which we share our destiny with each other. No country can be better off by itself. If you want to live well, you must let others live well! During the first two years since Xi stepped into China’s top leadership position, he has mentioned the phrase over 60 times in various contexts, including his recent visit to the US, urging the international community to abandon the zero-sum game mentality, and think in terms of our shared common destiny.<sup>3</sup> The second phrase is *hezuo gongyin*—“cooperation and co-prosperity.” If we are a community of shared destiny, then we have no option but to cooperate with each other. There is no zero-sum game. It is either zero-zero, if we fight against each other, or win-win, if we cooperate!

### *Confucian Roots*

This philosophical insight is deeply rooted in the traditional Chinese culture, which the new generations of Chinese leaders have been trying to revive. As China's main spiritual tradition, Confucianism holds the belief that "Great heaven has no affections;—it helps only the virtuous."<sup>4</sup> Confucius advocated "human-heartedness" which he variously described as "to love people" (*Analects*, 12.22) and to "not impose on others what you would not wish for yourself" (*Analects*, 12.2). He taught that "Exemplary persons have self-esteem but are not contentious; they socialize but do not form cliques" (*Analects*, 15.22). They "seek harmony but not conformity" (*Analects*, 13.23). Confucius' major successor Mencius added to this a contrast between the way of sage kings and the way of hegemons. The way of sage kings attracts people toward them through moral influence, and the way of hegemons makes others submit to their forces (*Mencius*, 2A3). These Confucian teachings, if well implemented, will provide a basis for a responsible government that seeks to have a pluralistic world in which differences are not just tolerated for political correctness but cherished for their unique contributions to the harmonious whole, very much in the same way that each and every different note in a piece of music makes the entire music beautiful. Confucians are well-known for their sense of seeing *tianxia*, "all under heaven," as a community of shared destiny.

As contemporary Chinese political philosopher Zhao Tingyang points out, the term "*tianxia*" represents an underlying philosophy that is totally different from the philosophy behind the notion of the nation-state. *Tianxia* entails what Tu Weiming refers to as the "anthropocosmic vision," a sense of seeing all under heaven as interconnected, while the notion of the nation-state is based on the sharp distinction between what is mine and not-mine. The individualistic philosophical foundation of the nation-state explains the irony of the current world order which allows one country to force a destiny on the entire world on the basis of its narrowly defined national interests. The government of such a country may be democratically elected, but its leaders are not rewarded by the system for thinking beyond pleasing their own voters, even when the vital interests of other nations are at stake.

Although Confucian ideas have never been followed perfectly in the history of China, they played a significant role in shaping the Chinese mind. If you ever wondered why the Chinese territory goes far beyond the Great Wall, history will tell you that it was not because the Chinese conquered these regions; on the contrary, it was the result of China being

invaded by the people of these regions (notably the Mongols and the Manchurians), which consequently brought these regions into the map of China. China has never colonized other countries. In the early fifteenth century, a huge fleet was led by China’s Admiral Zheng He, who took voyages across the oceans down to South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as the east coast of Africa. The size of Zheng’s ships and the scale of the fleets were by far the most advanced in the world, which predated and dwarfed the voyages taken by Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus. Yet unlike the latter which marked the beginning of the colonial era, Admiral Zheng’s voyages did not result in the occupation of an inch of foreign land or the enslavement of a single person.

One may say that Xi and his colleagues are probably more communists than Confucians. But one thing people often forget today is that inherent in communism is also a global *tianxi* vision. Despite the unfortunate fact that the communist movements resulted in huge disasters and oppressive regimes, the original vision of communism held by Karl Marx was to emancipate people from exploitation and oppression. The principle announced in the *Communist Manifesto* can be summarized as only in emancipating the world can the proletariat emancipate himself.<sup>5</sup> It was this original vision, rather than the later image of totalitarianism, that inspired millions of Chinese people to join the cause of communism in the first place, including Xi Jinping’s father, one of the veterans of the Chinese communist revolution. They saw in this communist vision what the early Confucians called *datong*, or Grand Harmony.

It was no surprise that the communist Chinese government did what a Confucian government would do during the 1997-98 financial crisis: China resisted the temptation to devalue the RMB against its own immediate interest in keeping its export sectors competitive; instead it extended its financial support to its distressed neighboring countries. China’s way of handling the return of Hong Kong through the “one country, two systems” policy, and China’s aid to other developing countries with no strings attached also show the government’s willingness to embrace plurality. If some communist leaders turned out to be narrow-minded nationalists, power-thirsty dictators, or corrupted bureaucrats, that only means they had betrayed the real spirit of communism.<sup>6</sup>

Now everyone is talking about China’s rising economic power and global influence. In my view, the real strength and significance of China’s rise are not in its increasing economy or rapid growth of military capability which would make it a strong rival to the United States. Its real strength and significance are in its re-appropriation and implementation of

the Confucian philosophy and the best parts of the communist ideal. The reason is simple: with the *tianxia* vision, the vision of the global community as a community of shared destiny, it will be able to overcome the narrowness of a typical nation-state, to make friends, and to become a leading force in the world toward a much more peaceful world order. And exactly because of this, it will be able to bring prosperity to its own people. As the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Zi puts it, “The sage stays behind, thus he is ahead. He puts himself outside his person, thus he retains his person. Through overcoming selfishness, he attains self-fulfillment” (*Daodejing*, 7).

Of course, I could be wrong. Anyone who has studied philosophy will know that we can never have absolute certainty on anything. Maybe I have too much confidence in the current Chinese leadership. But at least we can take this as our hope. We do hear the Chinese leadership calling for the international community to “work together to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and create a community of shared future for mankind.” This call is so central to its vision that it was featured prominently as the title of Xi Jinping’s recent address at the United Nations. I also see demonstrations of such a philosophy in China’s practice of implementing the One Belt One Road strategy. Philosophy teaches us to maintain a reasonable degree of skepticism, but it also teaches us that doubting is not a suspension of action; it is itself an action. Reading China from a perspective of cold-war mentality can become itself an action of nurturing a cold war. Reacting to China’s rise as a threat and trying to contain China not only run the risk of missing a historical opportunity to join the emerging world of peaceful co-prosperity, but also the risk of becoming the very force against global peaceful co-prosperity.

“To be or not to be—that is the question.” This is a famous line in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*. Today, we are facing a similar dilemma: to survive through implementing the philosophy of horizontal win-win cooperation as equals or to clash and perish through holding on to the vertical pyramid of hegemonic domination. That is the question.

## Notes

1. Although the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs puts it as a “supplement” rather than a “rival,” for the reason that I will mention later.
2. <http://russian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0716/c95181-8921285.html> (accessed Aug. 25, 2015).
3. <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/opinions/whats-behind-chinese-president-xi-jinings-corruption-crackdown> (accessed Aug. 25, 2015).
4. *The Chinese Classics*, v. 3, *The Shoo King or The Book of Historical*

*Documents*, trans. James Legge (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc. 2000), 490.

5. This is a summary of the original statement in the Preface to the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto, which says: “the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinction, and class struggle.” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), 6.

6. Here I am not giving an overall evaluation of Communism. I am just pointing out one fact about it that is often overlooked today.



## CHAPTER TEN

# CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A FACTOR IN GLOBAL DISORDER: THE NEED FOR EDUCATION

MARIETTA STEPANYANTS

It has been very wise and thoughtful to title the 13<sup>th</sup> World Public Forum on Rhodes in October 2015 as “The World beyond Global Disorder.” It is hardly possible to find a more accurate definition for the present predicament. In his introductory remarks at the Plenary Session of the Forum, Professor Fred Dallmayr, pointed out how dramatically the contemporary disorder differs from previous disorders: violent conflicts, hot wars, cold wars, hybrid wars, and civil wars, in other words, all of these things we mean by “world of disorder,” presenting not just some minor inconveniences, but real threats, and real dangers. In addition they are aggravated by economic disorder, the avalanche of refugees, and global warming.

Fully sharing these views, I would like to add a very dangerous and frightening peculiarity of modern world disorder: the wide-spread involvement of children in violent conflicts and wars. The animosity and hatred in the minds and hearts of adults have been transmitted to children! Can we overcome this kind of disorder? Are we able, at least, to prevent violence between children? Rethinking school education could be a very helpful remedy.

Every culture considers violence to be immoral. In spite of that everywhere and in various forms the practice of violence is widespread. Most immoral has been violence towards children. Indirectly this results in violence between children, starting from school age.

Russia is not an exception from this unfortunate rule. The subject of violence between children is a topic of public discussions. Unfortunately, however, this serious problem is still not at the center of public attention. In the press we find increasingly trotted out the term “criminalization of

minors.” There are reports on an alarming growth of child and juvenile delinquency. In 1993, its growth in Russia amounted to more than 13 percent, while the total number of crimes has increased by just 1.4 percent. To the different causes which commonly produce violence in schools a new one has been added, that is violence on ethnic and religious grounds.

It is true that cultural diversity has always been a characteristic of humanity. However, it is only in our time that cultural multiplicity has emerged as a problem not only at the level of a particular state, but at the planetary level. The “beginning of global history” is fraught with a threat of enforced unification, and of leveling the cultural plurality. Consequently, there is a widespread rise of national self-consciousness, a boost of the efforts to find our personal and collective identities. Zygmunt Bauman in his *The Individualized Society* justly pointed out that “the ‘era of identity’ is full of sound and fury. The search for identity divides and separates.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, for example, in France, Germany, UK, and Denmark the problem of immigrants, mainly from the countries of the Muslim world, has emerged acutely. “New” citizens, in accordance with the principles of a democratic state, demand equal rights with indigenous nationalities. At the same time, they are not ready or willing to change their lifestyles, traditions, or religious beliefs. Europeans wish to maintain their national unity, but find it difficult to recognize as equals people recently settled in their land who work there for the good of the whole nation. Immigrants want to be thought of as Europeans, but they are not willing to give up their identity inherited from birth. Consequently, explosive hostility, distrust and hatred are increasing.

The era of globalization calls for adjustments in the field of education that meet the demands of the times. Education can no longer be limited exclusively to national culture. It should take into account cultural diversity. This has become a moral imperative.

Besides common global reasons for the need to promote changes in education there are some specific internal problems which make the problem for Russia even more acute. Russians wish to gain a new collective identity in place of the lost Community—“Soviet people.” It is not easy, taking into consideration the desire for the identity, autonomy, and even sovereignty of national and ethnic groups living in the Russian Federation.

Tatars and Bashkirs, Yakuts and Buryats, Ossetians and Chechens—these are only a small part of the many ethnic groups that live compactly together and are truly indigenous citizens of the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of democratization there was a rise of national consciousness among large and small non-Russian peoples. This

throws into sharp relief the problem of Russian identity as such and its self-determination.

There is in Russia today an unprecedented influx of immigrants. Some of these are citizens from the former Soviet Republics; the others are nationals of China, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia. Economically, Russia needs immigration, given the shortage of labor. However, immigrants often cause strong dislikes. They are hated for taking job vacancies, for tending to stick together, for demonstrating group solidarity, and for adhering to their traditions and customs. Sometimes that dislike reaches a high point. The above concerns not only adults. The children are following the attitudes and behavior of their seniors, in particular of their parents. The situation is especially disturbing in big cities.

According to Russian Federal Migration Service data, in 2014 about 70,000 children born to foreigners attended Moscow schools. Mixed education is the most common approach taken. When surveyed, 35 percent of Muscovites said their children study alongside migrant children in schools. 18 percent of respondents noted that their children are in the same kindergarten group as migrants' children.

According to public opinion polls, the teenagers in Moscow mostly dislike the same people who are disliked by adults. These are—the migrants.

The network “Poster” on the condition of anonymity asked different children in Moscow about the “national” question (<http://www.afisha.ru/article/kids-tolerance/10.10.2013>). Naturally, the answers were not all the same. Thus, a 14-year-old boy from a school class of 29 pupils among whom slightly more than half were Russians, said:

I don't know the ethnicity of the others, which has never interested me. Though the names are different, they are unlike in appearance, yet it seems that ethnicity is not a characteristic of the person as such. In any ethnic group there are both good and bad persons.

A 13-year-old Tajik boy from a Russian class at school acknowledges that Russia is a normal country, but there are some Russians whom he calls “morons” or “freaks.” He opines that no less than 7,000 morons assemble around social networks like “In Contact” or pejorative “Stop Khach,” and they insult the Tajiks and other non-Russians.

A 15-year-old boy who could be called a cosmopolitan says that in his class there are children of many races and nationalities: Caucasians, the Mari, the Udmurts, the Vietnamese, the Germans, and the Scandinavians. He himself is half Tatar, and he is proud to call himself internationalist. This boy thinks that nationalist and racist jokes should be banned. He acknowledges that the solution of the national issues will take a long time

and many generations. We must educate children, he says, in a special way. He suggests introducing stricter laws and regulations on nationalism and racism; anti-Semitic, nationalist and racist jokes should be banned. And so, over time, there will be a common culture and mentality, and only history will recall that people were different from each other.

The Internet comments on the above cited polls. One of these comments stands out for its simplicity and reasonability. A boy (Roman Samarin) asks the adults:

Why, though we live in a multicultural country, are we not told at school which nations live in Russia; what history they have; how they differ from each other? I live in Central Russia and, perhaps, I know a little about the Tatars, but there are many others like the Buryats, the Kalmyks, and the Chukchi. There are dozens of other peoples who remain unknown. How can the country be unified, if citizens do not even know who lives in it and what is special about them? We do not know our country either geographically or ethnically or whatever. The national question in our country has always been ignored, and that will not lead to good. Why do we have a multinational state if there is no clear understanding what should be the attitude to different nationalities that live in Russia? I think that the only way to unity is knowledge about the differences which exist between the cultural heritages of different peoples and nations.

There is a Russian proverb: “The baby’s mouth speaks the truth”. In fact, children and teenagers say what those who are responsible for education in the country are not aware of: that school education needs to be reformed radically. It should become intercultural.

Intercultural education could be one of the most important tools in the transition from abstract and often simply demagogic declarations to practical implementations. The purpose of intercultural education is not only to create a favorable climate for the coexistence of different cultures, but also to profit as much as possible from that diversity for the sake of both individual and common perfection.

Despite a growing awareness of the need for intercultural education, a model system of its kind does not yet exist. Few people are prepared for the full introduction of this kind of education. Let me mention two factors that are of particular importance.

The first is that the ruling elite has no political will for genuine, rather than imaginary, educational reform in the above-mentioned direction. In Russia this situation is partly due to the inertia of past practices. Secondly, actual intercultural education is not possible without the training of teachers, the availability of textbooks and methodological studies, which in turn are directly dependent on the situation in the humanities. Since the

latter are designed to provide commented translations of original texts, thus ensuring at least basic source materials, broad and deepened research is required so as to identify the specificity of a given culture and to prepare a level of meaningful comparative analysis.

What methods are fundamentally important in introducing intercultural education?

- (1) Young people are to be prepared to listen to the position of the Other one. To listen, of course, does not just mean to hear, but rather to understand. Understanding is closely correlated with the difficulties of learning the language of the other culture. It is not so much the vocabulary, but rather the meaning of words or concepts, especially those which constitute the backbone of a culture;
- (2) Along with the nominal existence of human universals, each culture has its own set of universals that makes up its “rim”; every culture being a complex of socio-biological programs of human life activity which consists of world-outlook universals. They represent the historically accumulated social experience, and in the system of those universals the people of a specific culture are evaluating, perceiving and exploring the world;
- (3) Tension or conflict between different cultures often arises from widespread stereotypes rooted in the erroneous view that a given culture is made up of static constants. In fact, time has always left its fingerprint even on what are considered immutable dogmas of a culture. This is especially true in an era of radical transformation of traditional societies, when they are trying to join the modern post-industrial world;
- (4) It is impossible in practice, and not acceptable in principle, to strive for uniformity in understanding the meaning of human existence and the norms of conduct. At the same time, efforts should be made to develop common approaches to the problems of the world, approaches on which the fate of humankind depends.

In short, there are internal and external reasons demanding the introduction of intercultural education in schools. They could be summed up as:

- (1) The reduction of the level of violence among school children. Consequently, there is a need for teaching children that the differences which exist between them (language, ethnic,

- confessional, social, gender, etc.) do not make them enemies to each other;
- (2) The training of the younger generation for the dialogue between the cultures is vitally needed for a global society.

Up until now, intercultural education has nowhere been practiced as an integral part of education. In fact, the first major initiative to change the situation came in 2012 from the World Public Forum—"Dialogue of Civilizations". Its implementation has been started on the basis of the educational institutions of the "Russian Railways" Company in cooperation with scholars from the UNESCO Chair "The Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures" at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Program/Syllabus, Teachers' Book and Text Book for the students of the 9-10<sup>th</sup> grades have been published and successfully put into practice (under the title "Schools of Dialogue").<sup>2</sup>

The course is limited to 64 hours that have to be allocated in an already overloaded school curriculum. With this in mind, it seemed appropriate to include in the course mainly those civilizations which are the main actors of the contemporary global dialogue of cultures. According to estimates by international analysts, Chinese, Buddhist and Muslim civilizations will play a crucial role in geopolitics, in shaping the future of humanity. It is they who will be in competitive and often very tough confrontation with Western civilization.

In terms of internal Russian interests, the three "Oriental" civilizations are highly important through the proximity and presence of shared borders (with China and many states of the Islamic world), and also due to the fact that Muslims and Buddhists are the largest (after Orthodox Christians) religious communities in Russia. Presently the Chinese are not very populous in Russia, but the rapid growth of migration from China is expected in the nearest future. The inclusion of Western civilization is obvious and necessary, given that the problematique for the dialogue of cultures is set by the West, aspiring to the dominant role in the world on the basis of the presumed universal significance of the values of Western culture.

From the above comments it is clear that the project "Schools of Dialogue" is a pioneering landmark in advancing the goal which is difficult to reach and requires much time and collective efforts. Such education should be aimed at creativity and at building an original solution to the problem of having different identities in shared space, so that the whole could be a combination of parts. It is intended to help people with different identities who are at the same time forced or wish to live

together, to think about, discuss and voluntarily come to inevitable compromises. This is the way to accomplish a smooth coexistence between the peoples of our planet. Intercultural education aims not only to create a favorable climate for the coexistence of different cultures, but also to profit as much as possible from that diversity for the sake of both individual and common perfection.

## Notes

1. Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge UK, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2001), 151.
2. *Диалог культур. Программа учебного курса для 9-10 классов негосударственных общеобразовательных учреждений ОАО «РЖД»* (Intercultural dialogue. The program of the course for higher secondary schools of the educational institutions of the “Russian Railways” Company) (Москва: ФГБУ «Учебно-методический центр по образованию на ж-д транспорте», 2013); *Книга учителя. Диалог культур*. Под редакцией М.Т.Степанянц (Teachers’ Book: Intercultural Dialogue, ed. M. T. Stepanyants) (Москва: ФГБУ «Учебно-методический центр по образованию на ж-д транспорте», 2014); *Диалог культур. Учебное пособие для учеников 9-10 классов*. Под редакцией М.Т.Степанянц. (Intercultural dialogue: A textbook for higher secondary schools, ed. M. T. Stepanyants) (Москва: ФГБОУ «Учебно-методический центр по образованию на железнодорожном транспорте», 2015).



**PART III.**

**RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL  
RESOURCES FOR GLOBAL RENEWAL**



## CHAPTER ELEVEN

# HERALD OF GLAD TIDINGS: POPE FRANCIS AS TEACHER OF GLOBAL POLITICS

FRED DALLMAYR

The voice of the turtle dove. . . .  
(Sol 2:12)

Scriptures, some learned people say, are not so much to be read as to be heard—heard with the outer and the inner ear. For there is a voice or voices clamoring for attention, sometimes voices of anguish, suffering, and grief. Thus, Prophet Jeremiah says (Jer. 31:15): “A voice is heard in Ramah, lamentation and bitter weeping. Rachel is weeping for her children; she refuses to be comforted because they are no more.” In our world today, such lamentation and weeping can be heard everywhere around the world; all of humanity seems to be engulfed in bitter cries of suffering and torment. Prophet Isaiah writes in a general vein (Is. 40:8): “A voice says: Cry! And I answered: What shall I cry? All flesh is grass and all its beauty is like the flower of the field.” But there are also other voices, other calls or invocations. In the same chapter Isaiah states (40:3): “A voice cries in the wilderness: prepare the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway.” And he adds (40:9): “Get up to a high mountain, O Zion, herald of good news; lift up your voice with strength, herald of glad tidings.”

In the following pages I want to lift up for attention the voice of a contemporary which speaks to us in many modalities or registers: the modes of lamentation, anguish and grief, but also the modes of joy, happiness, and glad tidings. In September 2014, Pope Francis visited the Memorial and Cemetery in Redipuglia, Italy, containing the graves of thousands of soldiers from World War I. At that time, he said grief-stricken: “War is madness. . . . War destroys. It ruins also the most beautiful work of God’s hands: human beings.” Moreover, his lamentation

was not confined to the war waged a hundred years ago, but extended to our global situation today: “Even today, after the disaster of the second World War, perhaps one can speak already of a third war: one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, wanton destruction.” In the face of this grim scenario, Pope Francis urged humanity to step back from the brink of a global abyss and undergo a radical turning or “*metanoia*”: “I ask each of you, indeed all of you, to have a conversion of heart: to move from indifference to tears.”<sup>1</sup> For Francis—as for any genuine religious leader—such a turn was the precondition for any personal, social and political renewal, that is, for the proclamation of “glad tidings” or the “joy of the gospel” (to use the title of a book published by Francis in 2013).<sup>2</sup> The confluence of different registers of speech shall be a main concern of my reflections here.

### *A Culture of War and Waste (Kaddish)*

From the Pope’s perspective, our contemporary world is by no means a seedbed of glad tidings; on the contrary, our global situation is filled to the brim with bad news, cries of anguish, suffering, and desolation. In his speech at the cemetery in Redipuglia, Francis pointedly said: “Here lie many victims. Today we remember them all. There are tears, there is sadness, there is pain. . . . Humanity needs to weep, and this is the time to weep.” His speech, however, reflected not only sadness, but also outrage and revulsion regarding the sources or origins of devastation: “Greed, intolerance, the lust for power . . . these motives underlie the decision to go to war, and they are often justified by an ideology; but first there is the distorted passion or impulse.” Becoming steadily more pointed and urgent, he added: “In today’s world, behind the scenes, there are interests, geopolitical strategies, lust for money and power, and there is the endless manufacture and sale of arms.”<sup>3</sup> This is certainly a grim picture, and a grim denunciation of motivations running berserk or out of control.

Close attention to the afflictions and miseries of our world is not limited to the Pope’s memorial homily but pervades all his writings, sermons, and teachings. *The Joy of the Gospel* devotes a central chapter to a discussion of the “crises” and “challenges” of today’s world. Francis writes: “A number of diseases are spreading.” Despite the epochal changes set in motion by the “enormous advances” in the sciences and technology, “the hearts of many people are gripped by fear and desperation, even in the so-called rich countries.” Almost everywhere, “lack of respect for others and violence” are on the rise, and inequality is patently evident. The pontiff immediately zeroes in on the main source of inequality: the

enormous gap between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless. Just as the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” seeks to safeguard human life, he writes, today we also have to say a “thou shalt not” to an economy of exclusion and inequality—because the latter also “kills.” While food is being thrown away in large quantities in rich countries, many people are starving; while wealth is concentrated increasingly in small elites, masses of people are penniless. Under the reigning ideology of “competition and survival of the fittest,” the rich and powerful “feed upon the powerless.” In Francis’s account, we live increasingly in a “throwaway culture” where human beings are themselves considered consumer goods “to be used and then discarded.” The upshot is that the “underside” of society no longer simply means the exploited or disenfranchised, but “the outcasts, the ‘leftovers’.”<sup>4</sup>

The pontiff in his text does not hesitate to challenge the doctrines or dogmas of contemporary economic “science,” especially the ideology of neo-liberalism. “Some people,” he observes, “continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the world.” For Francis, this opinion—which “has never been confirmed by the facts”—expresses “a crude and naive trust in the goodness of those wielding economic power”; meanwhile, “the excluded are still waiting.” From this angle, the ongoing globalization of markets is by no means an unqualified boon; on the contrary, it sustains a lifestyle of affluence which excludes others, thus ushering in a “globalization of indifference.” Under the impact of this indifference, human sensibilities are stunted; we more and more end up “being incapable of feeling compassion at the outcry of the poor, weeping for other people’s pain, and feeling a need to help them.” Ultimately, the defects of the reigning neo-liberal culture can be traced to a glaring human and theological derailment: the emergence of a new “idolatry”: “We have created a new idols. The worship of the ancient golden calf has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose.”<sup>5</sup>

The reigning ideology, however, is damaging not only materially and religiously but also politically and ethically. The worship of money robs public life of its basic purpose: the effort to cultivate the common good by providing for the just or equitable distribution of resources and life chances. In the pontiff’s words, neo-liberalism undermines the role of states or governments, which are “charged with vigilance for the common good,” to exercise any kind of public leverage. In this way, a new, private-economic “tyranny” is born—invisible and often behind the scenes—

which “unilaterally and relentlessly” imposes its own laws or rules without accountability to anyone. (One thinks here of private armies, private militias, and privatized prison systems.) To all this we can add—the pontiff continues—“widespread corruption and self-serving tax evasion” which today have taken on worldwide dimensions, showing that “the thirst for power and possessions knows no limits.” Allied with this public malaise is the “rejection of ethics,” where ethics means concern for the welfare of fellow-beings, an outlook which is a precondition for “a more humane social order.” In our time, such an ethics is felt to be a “threat” since it condemns the manipulation and debasement of fellow-beings. Unfortunately, this debasement is furthered or aggravated by the media which are often controlled by elites and which are satisfied with providing shallow drivel or entertainment: “We are living in an information-driven society which bombards us indiscriminately with data and which leads to remarkable superficiality in the area of moral discernment.”<sup>6</sup>

The Pope’s anguish and dismay about the condition of our world are eloquently stated in *The Joy of the Gospel*; but they are not confined to its pages. During the first two years of his pontificate Francis presented a large series of speeches, sermons or homilies on different occasions—a number of which are collected in his book *The Church of Mercy* (2014). A crucial chapter in that book is entitled “Demolishing the Idols.” A major idolatry rampant in our time is the worship of military power and violence. In the pontiff’s words, what humanity most urgently needs and desires is “a world of harmony and peace”—in ourselves, in our relations with others, and in and between nations. But the situation is precisely the opposite. Due to the lure of selfishness and greed, we are “captivated by the idols of dominion and power” which open the door to violence and bloodshed. The pontiff at this point recalls the story of the “Fall” where “man” entered into conflict with himself and creation. Later, conflict gave rise to fratricide. The pontiff here recalls God’s question to Cain: “Where is Abel your brother?” and also the former’s reply: “Am I my brother’s keeper?” (Gen. 4:9). For Francis, we are all asked this question; but our response must not be Cain’s. No, we *are* “our brother’s keeper! To be human means to care for one another!” But we have stopped up our ears and silenced our conscience, thus rupturing the initial harmony; and when this happens, the brother who is to be cared for becomes an enemy to be fought and killed. This, Francis adds, is not a matter of coincidence, but the stark truth: “We bring about the rebirth of Cain in every act of violence and in every war. All of us!” Today, the rebirth of Cain is being globalized:

We have perfected our weapons, our conscience has fallen asleep. . . . As if it were normal, we continue to sow destruction, pain, death! Violence and war lead only to death; they speak of death. Violence and war are the language of death!<sup>7</sup>

In *The Church of Mercy*, the denunciation of warmongering is closely connected with the attack on rampant profit-seeking, on the idolatry of the new mammon. In a speech addressed to a general audience titled “The Cult of the God of Money,” Pope Francis takes aim again at financial profiteering, linking it this time with wasteful consumerism giving rise to a “throw-away” mentality or a “culture of waste.” Today, he says, men and women are increasingly “sacrificed to the idols of profit and consumption” leading to a “culture of waste” where not only food but human beings are discarded or thrown away. In stark language, Francis denounces the steady normalization of indifference endemic in modern society:

That some homeless people should freeze to death on the street—this does not make news. By contrast, when the stock market drops ten points in some cities, it constitutes a tragedy. Someone who dies is not news, but lowering income by ten points is a calamity.

What incenses the Pope most of all is the insensitivity to human suffering: the fact that people tend to be discarded “as if they were trash” and that human life is no longer considered as “a primary value to be respected and safeguarded.” But the excessive waste of food and natural resources is also an issue of grave concern: “Let us remember that whenever food is thrown out, it is as if it were stolen from the table of the poor, from the hungry!”<sup>8</sup>

From the small venues of his homilies and speeches Pope Francis in the Fall of 2015 carried his message to the seats of global power in Washington and New York. On September 24, he addressed a Joint Session of the two chambers of Congress. At this point, he reminded the assembled representatives of their great task and responsibility, both to the nation and to the world. As he said:

You are called to defend and preserve the dignity of your fellow citizens in the tireless and demanding pursuit of the common good, for this is the chief aim of all politics. A political society endures when it seeks, as a vocation, to satisfy common needs by stimulating the growth of all its members.

To this extent, legislative activity is always based on “care for the people.” In the same speech, however, the pontiff reminded the audience of the dark side of modern society: of the penchant for selfishness, hatred and

violence. “All of us are quite aware of, and deeply worried by,” he stated, “the disturbing social and political situation of the world today.” For, increasingly our world is “a place of violent conflict, hatred and brutal atrocities, committed even in the name of God and of religion.” We find violent types of extremism, fueled by religious or ideological dogmas, tearing up societies and communities. In addition, sectarian violence is aggravated by economic division, by the gulf between rich and poor, financial elites and dispossessed people. This divide also causes mayhem. “Why,” Francis asks, “are deadly weapons being sold to those who plan to inflict untold suffering on individuals and societies? Sadly, the answer is: simply for money, money that is drenched in blood, often innocent blood.”<sup>9</sup>

On the day following his congressional speech, Pope Francis addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York, shifting the accent from one country to the world at large. In his address, the Pope congratulated the Assembly—then celebrating its 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary—for the advances made since its creation: the development of international law, the enactment of norms regarding human rights, the furthering of humanitarian law, and the resolution of numerous conflicts in many parts of the world. However, he did not neglect the dark background against which these advances are profiled: “All these achievements are lights which help to dispel the darkness of the disorder caused by unrestrained ambitions and collective forms of selfishness.” For Francis, global disorder is manifest particularly in widespread social disorganization, political antagonisms and “the relentless process of exclusion” (of the poor and disadvantaged). In his words, we are experiencing today a “growing and steady social fragmentation which places at risk ‘the foundations of social life’ and foments ‘battles over conflicting interests’.” Such battles easily decay into military confrontations or clashes; but “war is the negation of all rights as well as a dramatic assault on the environment.” In particularly blunt and forthright language, the pontiff’s address denounced the frequent use of military power for the sake of externally induced “regime change,” that is, for the purpose of expansionist geopolitical agendas: “Hard evidence is not lacking showing the negative effects of military and political interventions not coordinated between members of the international community.” If the practice continues unchecked, the United Nations may soon deteriorate into a Hobbesian world, that is, a gathering of “nations united only by fear and distrust.”<sup>10</sup>

### ***Turning Around (Teshuvah)***

Pope Francis' complaint about the prevailing global disorder was not meant as a message of despair; on the contrary, it was designed as a spur to active renewal.

One of the more serious temptations which stifles boldness and zeal," he writes in *The Joy of the Gospel*, "is a defeatism which turns us into querulous and disillusioned pessimists, 'sourpusses'. Nobody can go off to battle unless he is fully convinced of victory beforehand.

Francis at this point recalls the words of Pope John XXIII (uttered half a century ago):

We feel that we must disagree with those prophets of doom who are always forecasting disaster, as though the end of the world were at hand. In our time, divine Providence is leading us to a new order of human relations which . . . are directed to the fulfillment of God's superior and inscrutable designs.

In the same context, Francis also recalls a passage in the gospel which is directly relevant to our time: "While painfully aware of our own frailties, we have to march on without giving in, keeping in mind what the Lord said to Saint Paul, 'My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness'" (2 Cor. 12:9). This means that Christian struggle is always a cross, but a cross "which is at the same time a victorious banner borne with aggressive tenderness."<sup>11</sup>

What the gospel passage pinpoints is the fact that change or renewal cannot just be a worldly project carried forward with the same arrogant self-assurance that has produced the global disorder in the first place. This means that change has to be preceded and accompanied by an inner spiritual renewal which is the work of mediation, reflection and prayer. The pontiff is very explicit on this point. Genuine renewal, he states in the same book, is not the same as "a set of tasks dutifully carried out despite one's personal inclinations"; in fact, it cannot possibly succeed unless "the fire of the Spirit" burns in our hearts. Thus, what is needed is the cultivation of an "interior space" which can give meaning and direction to action: "Without prolonged moments of adoration, of prayerful encounter with the word . . . our work easily becomes meaningless"; we fall prey to weariness and "our fervor dies out."<sup>12</sup> The same conviction was also expressed forcefully in the Pope's address to the UN General Assembly.

Citing an address to the same Assembly by Pope Paul VI (in 1965), Francis said:

The hour has come when a pause, a moment of recollection, reflection, even of prayer, is absolutely needed so that we may think back over our common origin, our history, our common destiny. The appeal to the moral conscience of humanity has never been as necessary as it is today.

To this he added the final statement also taken from Pope Paul's address: "The edifice of modern civilization has to be built on spiritual principles, for they are the only ones capable not only of supporting it, but of shedding light on it."<sup>13</sup>

To be sure, just as actions without guiding principles are deficient, good intentions without action are of no avail. This is why Pope Francis in his writings and speeches gives equal emphasis to inspired leadership and sound political principles. In his speech to Congress he reminded his audience of the spirited leadership of Moses who liberated his people from their enslavement in Egypt, led them on their journey to the "promised land," and maintained their unity by means of "just legislation." In the specifically American context, the same kind of leadership was demonstrated by President Lincoln who struggled to emancipate the African-American population from bondage, and still later by Martin Luther King Jr. who pursued the "dream" of securing for African Americans the full range of civil and political rights. The pontiff's speech to Congress also lifted up for remembrance the work of Dorothy Day, the founder of the Catholic Worker Movement, who aimed to relieve all working Americans from the burden of economic inequality and oppression. "Her passion for justice and the cause of the oppressed," he said, "were inspired by the gospel, her faith, and the example of the saints." Tellingly, precisely in order to balance social activism with the need for inner renewal, the pontiff's speech also commemorated the work of Thomas Merton, the Cistercian monk, who was and remains a spiritual guide for many people. In Francis' words: "Merton was above all a man of prayer, a thinker who challenged the certitudes of his time and opened new horizons for souls."<sup>14</sup>

In the case of the cited figures, practical work was always guided by sound ethical and political principles, especially by the Golden Rule and the maxim of justice. In this respect, the Pope's speeches and writings differ sharply from much of contemporary "political philosophy" (where such notions are widely shunned). With regard to the Golden Rule, his address to Congress is particularly forthright. "We need to avoid a common temptation today," he stated: "to discard whatever proves

troublesome or inconvenient,” for example the “Golden Rule” which says: “Let us treat others with the same passion and compassion with which we want to be treated, let us seek for others the same possibilities which we seek for ourselves; let us help others grow, as we would like to be helped ourselves.” Adding a startling implication for both national and global politics, the speech continued: “In a word, if we want security, let us give security; if we want life, let us give life.” Next to the invocation of the Golden Rule, the Pope’s reflections are enriched by the remembrance and affirmation of the conception of justice articulated by Greek and Roman thinkers. As he observed in his remarks to the UN General Assembly: “To give to each his own (*suum cuique tribuere*), to cite the classic definition of justice, means that no human individual or group can consider itself absolute, permitted to bypass the dignity and rights of other individuals or social groupings.” This conception clearly puts up a barrier to any striving for unlimited power or domination: “The effective distribution of power (political, economic, military, technological) among a plurality of subjects, and the creation of a juridical system for regulating claims and interests, are one concrete way of limiting power.” The implementation of this limit, the pontiff added, requires as one of its essential elements “constant and perpetual will” (*Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi*)—which means that our world demands of all leading politicians a commitment to justice “which is effective, practical and constant.”<sup>15</sup>

The principle of justice, insisting on reciprocity and mutual regard, militates against an excessive individualism or self-centeredness which has become a central creed of the modern and “postmodern” age. In the words of *The Joy of the Gospel*: “The individualism in our . . . era favors a lifestyle which weakens the development and stability of personal relationships and (also) distorts family bonds.” As opposed to this creed or tendency, a crucial ethical demand of our time is the willingness “to respect others, to heal wounds, to build bridges, and to ‘bear one another’s burden’” (Gal. 6:2). An important part of the need for mutual bonding is the rehabilitation of a word which, under the influence of liberalism, has become nearly apocryphal: the word “solidarity.” In Francis’ account, the word is “a little worn and at times poorly understood,” but it refers “to something more than a few sporadic acts of generosity.” Basically, solidarity for him implies “the creation of a new mind-set which thinks in terms of community and the priority of the life of all over the appropriation of goods by a few.” More specifically, the term denotes “a spontaneous reaction by those who recognize that the social function of property and the universal destination of goods are realities which come before private property.” As he adds pointedly, the “convictions and habits

of solidarity”—once they are put into practice—open the way to “structural transformations” (especially the removal of the structural causes of poverty) and make them possible.<sup>16</sup>

The issue of solidarity is also a major theme of the Pope’s *The Church of Mercy*, figuring there in the titles of two chapters or speeches. As the pontiff fully realizes, invoking the term implies struggling almost against a cultural taboo. “*Solidarity*,” he states boldly “this word that frightens the developed world. People try to avoid saying it; to them it is almost a bad word. But it is our word!” The term denotes basically the ability of “recognizing and accepting requests for justice and hope, and seeking roads together, real paths that lead to (shared) liberation.” Shunning empty rhetoric and stressing concrete work, the pontiff addresses his listeners: “Ask yourself: do I bend down over someone in difficulty, or am I afraid of getting my hands dirty? Am I closed in on myself and my possessions, or am I aware of those in need of help?” In our contemporary world this question has a global dimension; for everywhere there are “huge numbers of people who are unemployed or underemployed and countless multitudes suffering from hunger.” In this situation, solidarity cannot be limited to sporadic almsgiving. Hence, for Francis, there is a need to rethink solidarity no longer as simple philanthropy, but as “a global rethinking of the whole system, as a quest for ways to reform it and correct it in a way consistent with the fundamental rights of all human beings.” Continuing with emphatic urgency, the Pope adds these memorable words: “It is essential to restore to this word *solidarity*, viewed askance by the world of economics, the social citizenships it deserves.” It is not an occasional attitude; rather, it is “a social value, and it asks for its citizenship.”<sup>17</sup>

As one should note, Pope Francis’ stress on solidarity does not at all involve the endorsement of a monolithic, undifferentiated collectivity. His writings and speeches always pay close attention to the rich diversity of phenomena, natural and cultural, in the world; repeatedly he speaks of a “healthy pluralism” which “genuinely respects differences and values them as such.” Thus, the bond of solidarity which he valorizes is not one imposed compulsively from above, but rather one which emerges through lateral interaction from the ground up (what is sometimes called “transversalism”). What is not always sufficiently recognized by observers of his papacy is the extent to which Francis upholds and celebrates *dialogue* (sometimes to the point of evoking “conciliar” memories). His *The Joy of the Gospel* is full of praise for dialogue and reflections on its deeper meaning. As he writes at one point: “Dialogue is much more than the communication of [or information about] a truth. It arises from the enjoyment of speaking and it enriches those who express their love for one

another through the medium of words.” It is an enrichment which does not consist of the accumulation of things but in the deepening of the persons who “share themselves in dialogue.” Since dialogue is mediated by the word (or words), it is not only interpersonal but also transpersonal—remembering the biblical teaching that “in the beginning was the word” (John 1:1). Thus, dialogue involves not just the interlocutors but an “intermediary” who guides and inspires the understanding. This is how words can “set hearts on fire.”<sup>18</sup>

While honoring the “transpersonal” élan, Pope Francis is emphatic in stressing the broad range of situations where dialogue is needed today. *The Joy of the Gospels* singles out three main areas where dialogue can and should promote social justice and peace: first, dialogue with states or governments; secondly, dialogue among groups in and between societies; and lastly, ecumenical and interfaith dialogue inside and outside the Church. In the first category, dialogue is perhaps most urgently required. “I ask God,” Francis writes, “to give us more politicians capable of sincere and effective dialogue aimed at healing the deepest roots—and not simply the appearances—of the evils in our world.” Of great importance also is intra- and inter-societal dialogue: “I beg the Lord to grant us more politicians who are genuinely disturbed by the state of society, the people, the lives of the poor!” What needs to be bridged or reconciled on this level are festering rifts dividing cultural and ethnic communities as well as gulfs separating castes, status groups and economic classes. Of special concern for the pontiff is the cultivation of good relations among Christian churches (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox) urging them to “put aside all suspicion and mistrust and turn the gaze to what we are all seeking: the radiant peace of God’s face.” Of equal significance, in our globalizing age, is the fostering of harmony with other world religions as well as with non-believers. In this respect, “we hold the Jewish people in special regard because their covenant with God has never been revoked.” *The Joy of the Gospel* also ponders the demands placed on Christian faith by the encounter with Islam, Hinduism and other great religious traditions. On all levels, justice and the common good are the yardstick: “A dialogue which seeks social peace and justice is in itself, beyond all merely practical considerations, an ethical commitment which brings about a new social situation.”<sup>19</sup>

### *Glad Tidings (Tikkun)*

The aim of dialogue for Francis, one needs to realize, is not so much the honing of argumentative skills, but rather the opening of new horizons

pointing ultimately to a promise. He is forthright in stating this promise: “The new Jerusalem, the holy city (Rev. 21:2-4) is the goal toward which all humanity is moving”—although moving in spurts and through many dead ends and derailments. To bring “glad tidings” is to remember this promise and to prepare the way for making “the kingdom of God present in our world.” To be sure, the world is not very hospitable to this kind of preparation. As Francis acknowledges, there is a growing desert in our world, a “desertification” militating against efforts of renewal. But it is precisely in the desert that people are needed who, by the example of their own lives, “point out the way to the Promised Land and keep hope alive.” Precisely in our desert condition “we are called to be living sources of water from which others can drink.” These living sources, Francis adds, are not just for special individuals or select groups but for all people. To this extent, glad tidings have “a clear social content”; at their very heart is “life in community and engagement with others.” Citing the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, Francis writes that redemption has a social dimension because God “redeems not only the individual person, but also the social relations existing between persons.”<sup>20</sup>

In an important section of *The Joy of the Gospel*, the Pope reflects on four major principles which, arising out of existential tensions, facilitate the movement toward social justice and peace. One refers to the tension between openness and limitation, between time and space, infinity and finitude. “People,” Francis writes, “live poised between a finite moment and the greater horizon of a utopian future.” The tension has to be carefully negotiated by retaining the sense of finitude while tilting the balance toward open potentiality. Another issue is the tension between wholeness and particularity, unity and diversity. The best way to deal with this tension, for Francis, is to face it head-on and to make it “a link in a chain of opening horizons” where differences can be reconciled. A further conundrum is the tension between abstract theory and concrete practice, a tension which can only be overcome or at least mitigated by “putting ideas into practice”; for “not to make them reality, is to build on sand.” A final issue, particularly relevant today, is the relation between globalization and localization. “We need to pay attention to the global,” Francis writes, “so as to avoid narrowness and banality”; but on the other hand, attention to local problems “keeps our feet on the ground.” By navigating a path between these tendencies, we avoid getting caught up in either a top-down universalism or else “a museum of local folklore.”<sup>21</sup>

The image of global order which inspires Pope Francis is a complex combination of wholeness and diversity, of centripetal and centrifugal elements. In his words:

Our model is not the sphere, which is no greater than its parts, where every point is equidistant from the center, and there are no differences between them. Instead it is the *polyhedron*, which reflects the convergence of all its parts, each of which preserves its distinctiveness.

Differently put, *polyhedron* means “the convergence of peoples who, within the universal order, maintain their own individuality.” A very important aspect of the Pope’s global vision is the fact that it includes not only Catholics, and not even only religious believers, but also people outside any religious affiliation, such as secular humanists, who lead decent and upright lives. “As believers,” Francis writes, “we also feel close to those who do not consider themselves part of any religious tradition, yet sincerely seek or yearn for truth, goodness and beauty.” We consider them as “precious allies in the commitment to defending human dignity, in building peaceful coexistence between peoples and in protecting creation.” In a surprising and exhilarating passage, the Pope refers to the possibility of a global forum (or global fora) bringing together people of good will globally for discussion and cooperation. “A special place of encounter,” he writes, “is offered by new Aeropagi such as the Court of the Gentiles where ‘believers and non-believers are able to engage in dialogue about fundamental issues of ethics, art and science, and about the search for transcendence’.” This too, he adds, is “a path to peace in our troubled world.”<sup>22</sup>

By way of conclusion, let me lift up again the theme which runs through all of Francis’ writings and speeches, serving as a kind of *basso continuo*: the theme of bringing good news or glad tidings. As he states at one point, citing Mark and St. Paul, the mandate of all faithful people is to “go into all the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation” (Mark 16:15), for the creation “waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God” (Romans 8:19). If this mandate is fulfilled or implemented, he adds, “the life of society will be a setting of universal fraternity, justice, peace and dignity.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, in the midst of the bad news tormenting humanity on a daily basis, the pontiff holds up a beacon of gladness and redemption—a beacon not just operating in another world or in afterlife, but in our world.

Let us believe scripture,” he writes, “when it tells us that the kingdom of God is already present in this world and is growing, here and there, and in different ways . . . like the good seed that grows amid the weeds (Mt. 13:24-30) and can always pleasantly surprise us.”<sup>24</sup>

In upholding this trust, Pope Francis is like the messenger of whom Isaiah says: “How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him who brings good tidings, who publishes peace, who brings good tidings of good, who publishes salvation” (Is. 52:9). The glad tidings mentioned here are the tidings of “a good land, a land of brooks and water, of fountains and springs, a land of vines, fig trees and pomegranates, of olive trees and honey” (Deut. 8:7-8). This is a place filled with the fragrance of “a rose of Sharon, a lily of the valleys,” where “flowers appear on the earth, and the time of singing has come,” and where “the voice of the turtledove is heard in our land” (Sol. 2:1, 12).

## Notes

1. Pope Francis, “Homily in Redipuglia, Italy,” September 13, 2014 ([/blog/society/19/73-pope-frances-homily-at-the-world-war-1-memorialin-redipuglia](http://blog/society/19/73-pope-frances-homily-at-the-world-war-1-memorialin-redipuglia)).
2. See Pope Francis, *The Joy of the Gospel: Evangelii Gaudium* (New York: Image, Random House, 2013).
3. See note 1.
4. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 42-43. One is reminded here of Marx’s notion of “*lumpenproletariat*.” One might also recall here Martin Heidegger’s notion of “*Gestell*” under whose aegis human beings are reduced to economic “resources” (*Menschenmaterial*).
5. *The Joy of the Gospel*, p. 44. For a critique of neo-liberal economics compare also Angus Sibley, *The “Poisoned Spring” of Economic Libertarianism* (Washington, DC: Pax Romana, 2011); and my “Market and Democracy: Beyond Neoliberalism,” in my *Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginnings* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), pp. 79-95.
6. Pope Francis, *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 45-46, 51.
7. See “The Logic of Power and Violence,” in Pope Francis, *The Church of Mercy: A Vision for the Church* (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2014), pp. 111-112. The homily was presented at a prayer vigil for peace on September 7, 2013.
8. *The Church of Mercy*, pp. 113-114. The audience was held on June 5, 2013. The chapter “Demolishing the Idols” attacks a few other personal or social derailments which cannot be discussed here: like the “leprosy of careerism” and the arrogance of self-centered “worldliness.”
9. See “Pope Francis’ Address to Congress,” <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/24/politics/pope-francis-congress>.
10. See “Pope Francis’ Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/pope-francis-remarks>.
11. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 64-65.
12. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 175-176.
13. See note 10 above.

14. See note 9 above. The invocation of inspired leadership was also prominent in the Pope's speech to the UN General Assembly. "I pay homage," he stated there, "to all those men and women whose loyalty and self-sacrifice have benefited humanity as a whole in the past 70 years. In particular, I would recall today those who gave their lives for peace and reconciliation among peoples, from Dag Hammarskjöld to the United Nations officials at every level who have been killed in the course of humanitarian missions, and missions of peace and reconciliation." See note 10 above.

15. See notes 9 and 10 above.

16. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 52-53, 134-135. Invoking an Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI, Francis adds (p. 136): "We need to grow in a solidarity which 'would allow all peoples to become the artisans of their destiny', since 'every person is called to self-fulfillment'."

17. See "A Culture of Solidarity" and "For a New Solidarity" in *The Church of Mercy*, pp. 106-107, 129-130. Compare also my *Freedom and Solidarity* (note 5 above).

18. Pope Francis, *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 101-103, 171. Invoking an "Apostolic Exhortation" of Pope Paul VI, Francis (p. 104) stresses the need to recognize that "the word is always beyond us, that 'we are not its masters or owners, but its guardians, heralds and servants'." Regarding dialogue and the "word," see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), Part II, 2, pp. 405-438.

19. Pope Francis, *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 145, 161, 164, 166, 168. By counseling interfaith dialogue, the pontiff did not support a "facile syncretism." In his words (p. 168), such a syncretism "would ultimately be a totalitarian gesture on the part of those who would ignore greater values of which they are not masters. True openness involves remaining steadfast in one's deepest convictions, clear and joyful in one's own identity."

20. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 55, 65-66, 125-126. The reference is to the Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace, *Compendium* (p. 52).

21. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 152-160.

22. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 160, 172. The reference is to *Propositio* 55 adopted at the 13<sup>th</sup> Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops gathered in Rome, October 7-28, 2012. I might add that, also in 2012, such an Areopagus was established under the name "World Public Forum—Dialogue of Civilizations," headquartered in Vienna and Moscow.

23. *The Joy of the Gospel*, pp. 128-129.

24. *The Joy of the Gospel*, p. 187.



# CHAPTER TWELVE

## FINDING PEACE IN AUTHENTIC RELIGION

PAOLA BERNARDINI

### *Introduction*

When addressing the religious leaders of Albania, Pope Francis emphatically stated that “*authentic* religion is a source of peace and not of violence. No one must use the name of God to commit violence! To kill in the name of God is a grave sacrilege. To discriminate in the name of God is inhuman.”<sup>1</sup> In his first Apostolic Exhortation, the *Joy of the Gospel*, the Pope even went so far as saying that “*authentic* Islam and the proper reading of the Koran are opposed to every form of violence.”<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, made the same point in September 2014, when he was expanding the campaign against the Islamic State into Syria. At that time, speaking to the American nation, he said that ISIS “is not Islamic”<sup>3</sup> and that “No religion condones the killing of innocents.”<sup>4</sup>

While Pope Francis, Obama and many of us would agree that authentic religion defies violence, the reasons to believe so may not be always clearly shared, and warrant an explanation. This is the question I want to address: what is and what should count as authentic religion? Why should Saint Francis of Assisi, Mother Teresa of Calcutta, Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., or the Muslim pacifist, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, count as more authentic representatives of their religion than Al Qaeda, the Jewish militant groups and the US radical Christian right which became known for their violent shootings in the name of religion?

In trying to offer an answer to this question, I will list four different criteria of authenticity which have been discussed by scholars of religion, both within the Catholic tradition and other religious denominations. These criteria are the philosophical, the etymological, the ethical, and the hermeneutical. While I list these criteria separately, they are often intertwined in religious discourse properly construed.

### ***Philosophical Criterion***

First, I will start with the philosophical criterion. According to this standard, a religious claim is authentic in as much as it makes sense of the fundamental philosophical questions about the ultimate meaning of life. As prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and later Pope, Joseph Ratzinger was very interested in the relations between faith and reason, and religion and truth, from the point of view of Catholic philosophy.<sup>5</sup> In *Truth and Tolerance*, he explains how the conversion of the ancient tribes of Israel to monotheism was “associated with an attempt to understand the world in a rational fashion.”<sup>6</sup> In their effort of making sense of the orderly structure found in creation, the people of Israel, spurred on by the Prophets, could not but reject faith in polytheism. As the great Jewish philosopher, Herman Cohen put it: the Unique God of Judaism is perfectly aligned with the rational conviction that the foundation of the unity of the cosmos must be “only one kind of being.”<sup>7</sup> Put somewhat differently, the Unique God of Judaism offered answers to fundamental, philosophical questions such as “What is the ground of the being that is?”; and “Why is there order and not chaos?”<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the Gods of polytheism, being merely cosmic elements, and always warring with each other, could not explain why there was order instead of chaos, nor could they explain what the origin of the cosmos was. Interestingly, this belief in the one true God not only made more sense from a rational or philosophical point of view. It also had very practical implications. As Rabbi Jack Bemporad explains, “it is monotheism that makes it possible to conceive of a world of peace.”<sup>9</sup> If the God of Israel was the God of all people, tribalism and nationalism had to be overcome. If human beings were created by the same God, why would they have any more reason to fight one another? We know from history that, unfortunately, belief in the One God did not prevent monotheisms from waging war and fighting against one another. However, as the philosophical argument goes, this was due more to the distortion of their faith, than to an inherent incompatibility between faith and reason, religion and truth, monotheism and peace.

### ***Etymological Criterion***

Second, we have the etymological criterion of religious authenticity. According to the science of etymology, the very concept of religion is authentic, insofar as it remains true to its original or traditional meaning. In this respect, some Catholic scholars point out that the words *Christian*

*religion* derive from the Latin word: *religio*, which originally meant due deference, and from the word *religare*, which means to bind together, connect or reconnect.<sup>10</sup> It was this meaning of the word *religio* that the Church Fathers eventually adopted when they started referring to the Christian life of obedience and charity as a *religio*.<sup>11</sup> A similar point has been made by scholars of Islam about the Arabic word “Islam,” which literally means “submission” to God, and derives from the same root as *al-salam*, meaning peace.<sup>12</sup> The words “Islam” and *al-salam* are so intertwined because submission to God is the source of peace, and inextricable from “doing good to others” (Qur’an, Sura 2:112).<sup>13</sup> Even the word *shari’a*, which has always been central in Islam, literally means “path to the water” (a symbol of life, especially for the Bedouins living in the desert). It did not signify a set of legal rulings—most of them archaic—to which it is reduced today by both insiders and outsiders of Islam. Rather it symbolized an ethical and spiritual path to life, prosperity and wellbeing.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, some Jewish scholars make the same claim about the Torah. In *The Inner Journey*, Rabbi Bemporad writes that “while *Torah* has all too often been translated by the word *law*, its literal and etymological meaning is more appropriately translated as direction, instruction and teaching.”<sup>15</sup> More specifically, “the Torah is ...that body of ethical teaching...that shapes behavior toward all human beings, other creatures and the environment.”<sup>16</sup> Bottom line: if we were to take this etymological criterion seriously, and apply it to the religions of the book, we would have to conclude that the more authentic (in the sense of more traditional) meaning of religion essentially lies in submission or obedience to God first, and then in positive relationships with all human beings and even creation.

### ***Ethical Criterion***

Third, we have the ethical test of authenticity, advanced, among others, by the Jesuit theologian Hans Küng. According to this criterion, if a religious claim contributes to the good of humanity (all humanity), it is authentic.<sup>17</sup>

This is what Socrates suggested in the Platonic dialogue called the *Euthyphro*, where he asks a religious believer of his time: “Is religious piety loved by the Gods because it is good, or is religious-piety good because the Gods love it?” With this ancient question, also known as the *Euthyphro* dilemma, Socrates challenged the belief that the meaning of religious piety depends on the ancient Gods’ clashing and ever-changing desires. Rather, he suggested, religious piety is doing what is objectively

(or universally) good and just, for all humanity, and therefore loved by the Gods.

Interestingly, the idea that what is morally good for oneself is also good for humanity is stated, in different terms, in the Golden Rule recognized by different religious texts and traditions. In Judaism, we find a famous saying by Rabbi Hillel, who once stated “What is hateful to you, do not do to other human beings.” In Christianity, we have Jesus’ saying: “Do to others as you want others to do to you. For this is the meaning of the law of Moses and the teaching of the prophets.” In Islam, we have a saying (*hadith*) attributed to Muhammad, which states “No one is a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.” In light of these criteria, the contemporary Muslim scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im argues that whatever fair treatment Muslims expect for themselves, they should grant to everyone else. An-Na’im goes so far as to say that this requires a re-interpretation of those passages of the Qur’an and *shari’a* which have been traditionally read to justify unequal treatment especially of women and non-Muslims.<sup>18</sup> This leads me to the last criterion of authenticity, which is hermeneutical or exegetical.

### ***Hermeneutical Criterion***

Finally, this criterion deals with the proper interpretation of religious texts. One of the modern scholars of Christian hermeneutics, the Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, used to emphasize “the twofold movement” in the science of textual interpretation, from the part of the text to the whole and from the whole back to the part.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Judaism and Islam have developed a thick body of commentaries and theories on the proper interpretation of religious texts, requiring readers to consider the past and present contexts (including new scientific discoveries), the time of revelation, and the overarching values of the scriptures. If we were to apply the hermeneutical criterion to religious texts, especially those inciting violence or discriminating against outsiders, we would have to consider their contextual framework, and not read them in isolation from the other preponderant parts of the scriptures which bespeak of reconciliation, forgiveness, and mercy.

For instance, the most significant text relating to war in the Bible is Deuteronomy 20. While this chapter opens with a description of a warfare situation, several classical and contemporary rabbis agree that God is introduced as the real warrior for the Israelites. Secondly, Rabbi Bemporad claims that, in Deuteronomy 20,

the list of all those exempted from military service...is so extensive that it becomes seemingly impossible to mount an army to make war... Those who built new houses, farmers, bridegrooms and those who were afraid or emotionally susceptible to compassion during battle were all exempt from going to war.<sup>20</sup>

Third, Deuteronomy 20 concludes with a call to peace and “a caution against wanton destruction.”<sup>21</sup>

Likewise, the Qur’an contains several passages inciting violence, including the famous verse of the sword (Sura 5:9), often quoted by Islamic terrorists to justify the killing of the unbelievers. This verse reads:

When the forbidden months are over, wherever you encounter the idolaters, kill them, seize them, besiege them, wait for them at every lookout post; but if they repent, maintain the prayer, and pay the prescribed alms, let them go on their way, for God is most forgiving and merciful.

According to not a few Muslim scholars, passages such as these have to be understood in the context of the time and place of Revelation. The famous verse of the sword, some argue, was revealed in Medina, at a time when the Prophet and his companions were under siege from local tribes. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Professor of Islamic Law at Emory University, ventures to say that this passage should be disregarded, arguing that “aggressive *jihad* was a concession to the social and economic realities of the time and not the message Islam intended for humanity at large into the indefinite future.”<sup>22</sup> Others argue that, while the use of violence is justified in very specific settings, the Qur’an also mentions specific bounds for the use of violence and makes forgiveness, mercy and justice preferable to revenge or violence, whenever it is possible.<sup>23</sup>

So, for instance, Sura 17:33 reads: “and if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority (to demand punishment): but let him not exceed bounds in the matter of taking life.” Moreover, Sura 25:63 states: “And the servants of Allah most gracious are those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say ‘Peace!’”

Peace—al *salaam*—appears several times in the Qur’an, and God Himself is called “Dar al Islam,” “Abode of Peace” (Sura 10: 25).

### *Conclusion*

In conclusion, what do these four criteria tell us about the original question? Why should we consider Saint Francis of Assisi, Mother Teresa

of Calcutta, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or the Muslim pacifist, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, as more authentic representatives of their religion, than religious extremists? The short answer is because they promoted peace and justice. The long answer is because peace and justice are the most rational, traditional, morally authentic, and preponderant message of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

## Notes

1. Pope Francis, Address (presented at the Meeting with the Leaders of Other Religions and Other Christian Denominations, Catholic University of Our Lady of Good Counsel, Tirana, Albania, September 21, 2014), [https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/september/documents/papa-francesco\\_20140921\\_albania-leaders-altre-religioni.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/september/documents/papa-francesco_20140921_albania-leaders-altre-religioni.html).
2. Pope Francis, *Apostolic Exhortation. The Joy of the Gospel: Evangelii Gaudium* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013), 122.
3. Aaron Blake, "Obama says the Islamic State 'is not Islamic.' Americans disagree," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/09/11/obama-says-the-islamic-state-is-not-islamic-americans-are-inclined-to-disagree/>.
4. Ibid.
5. One of his most eloquent writings on the topic is "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," in *Pope John Paul II Lecture Series* (St. Paul, MN: College of St. Thomas, St. John Vianney Seminary, 1985), 10-13.
6. Benedict XVI, *Truth and Tolerance Christian Belief and World Religions* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 150.
7. Hermann Cohen, *Religion of Reason. Out of the Sources of Judaism* (New York: F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1972), 41-42.
8. Jack Bemporad, "Religion and Morality," in *Knowledge, Value, and Belief*, eds. H. Tristram Engelhardt and Daniel Callahan (Hasting-on-Hudson, NY: Hastings Center, 1977), 108.
9. Jack Bemporad, "Sharing Sacred Spaces: A Jewish Perspective," in *Between Cultural Diversity and Common Heritage: Legal and Religious Perspectives on the Sacred Places of the Mediterranean*, eds. Silvio Ferrari and Andrea Benzo (Surrey, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2014), 76.
10. Bill Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 62-63; Fred Dallmayr, "Whither Democracy? Religion, Politics and Islam," in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37 (2011): 437.
11. Bill Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, 66-67.
12. John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 9.

13. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Non-Violence and Peace-building in Islam: Theory and Practice* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 45.
14. S. A. A. Abu-Sahlieh, *Il Diritto Islamico. Fondamenti, Fonti, Istituzioni* (Rome: Carocci, 2008), 44; Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Language of the Age: Shari'a and Natural Justice in the Egyptian Revolution," in *Harvard International Law Journal* 52 (2011): 315.
15. Jack Bemporad, *Introduction to The Inner Journey. Views from the Jewish Tradition* (Sandpoint, ID: Morning Light Press, 2007), xx.
16. Ibid.
17. Hans Küng, "What Is True Religion? Toward an Ecumenical Criteriology," in *Toward a Universal Theology of Religion*, ed. Leonard Swidler (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 239-243.
18. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 163.
19. Leo D. Lefebure, "Violence in the New Testament and the History of Interpretation," in *Fighting Words: Religion, Violence, and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts*, ed. John Renard (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 2012), 76.
20. Jack Bemporad, "Norms of War in Judaism," in *World Religions and Norms of War*, eds. Vesselin Popovski, Gregory M. Reichberg and Nicholas Turner (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), 108-109.
21. Ibid.
22. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 284.
23. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Non-Violence and Peace-Building in Islam*, pp. 37, 43.



CHAPTER THIRTEEN

HIGH TIME FOR A CHANGE OF MIND

ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH

Permit me to present my thoughts in a sequence of five main points.

*First*

Approximately a quarter of the inhabitants of the inhabited world are Muslims, for whom the name “Mohammad” (peace be upon him) represents flag and honor. Defiling the name shakes them to their very core. The satirists and others who mock him deem it their right to make vile pictures of his face, undermining the reverence and awe people have for him.

I have no quarrel with the right to free speech. But, whatever it may be, it is still a right, not a duty, and this is the whole point. The defenders of this right speak as if it is a duty! Indeed, by virtue of this right a person is permitted to caricature that which is held sacred, but there is no obligation to do so; that is, no harm is done if one refrains from drawing such a picture, and no-one’s rights are tarnished. A duty is defined as binding, when not performing it results in an infraction. Therefore, were we to ask those who make the Prophet look “morose, dreadful and dark” or who give him the face of an ape or a pig, why they did so, it would not be enough for them to say, “because we have a right to.” They also have a right not to do so. There has to be a reason for their behavior that goes beyond the mere right to do so. And this is exactly why Muslims are tormented heart and soul by the nagging doubt that, God forbid, there may be something more going on behind the scenes, some hidden source of annoyance that privileges the right to draw such pictures over the right not to.

Setting aside the ethics of such injustice, it is in no way forgivable that several people by way of amusement and, shielded by the right to freedom of speech, make a business boom with an abominable image that mocks the object of devotion and pride of countless loving believers. This only

serves to make millions heartsick and, worse, enlivens the vicious circle of a terrorism that knows nothing of truth or ethics or duty.

Yes, one can tell Muslims (if they are able) not to take offense; but one must also tell non-believers not to cause it, and not to soil with insults what the dear folk of one ethnic group revere (note: I did not use the word “sanctify” lest it offend the dignity of non-believers). Let them heed the wisdom of Jalal al-Din Rumi:

What do you know what sort of fowl are we,  
What songs we forever sing under our breath?

So long as we are in this form from one person  
Let’s not take offence nor cause it either.

Downing the wine of Truth in good measure while by rights not donning Truth with the cloak of duty is the very essence of good drinking manners and the requisite of gratitude; as Hafez the poet says:

If the Sufi drinks in measure, let him enjoy his wine;  
But if not, may the very thought leave his mind.

Today the challenge posed by rights, ethics, and duty is one of the West’s most pressing problems. No society is capable of being vital and saved based solely on rights without regard for ethics. Insulting the flag and honor of others is no moral duty (the school of Kant), nor is it a virtue (the school of virtue-based ethics), nor do its benefits outweigh its damages (the school of utilitarianism); and in any event, it is unjust and vile. What goodness is there in causing heartache and senselessly tormenting the souls of others? As the poet Sa’di says:

By the spirits of the young at heart, Sa’di! the realm of existence  
Is not worth the heart of one whom they cause to offend.

## *Second*

As Karl Popper has said, knowledge grows by way of learning from our mistakes and mutual criticism. Religious knowledge is no exception to this rule. While caricaturing the honorable Prophet is sinful (religiously speaking) and unjust ethically, criticizing his personality, behavior, and discourse is absolutely no sin, nor is it unjust. Not even a single half-verse from the Qur’an, much less, a single doubtful tradition handed down from the Prophet, exists that says it is unlawful to apply rational and ethical

criticism to the behavior and discourse of the Prophet as well as to both the unambiguous parts of scripture and to those that require explanation.

There is absolutely no reason intrinsic to religion why Muslim society has yet to do so. The dignity and pivotal personality of the Prophet, the sanctity of the Qur'an, and the fear of falling into the vale of sin have made both scholars and the general public wary of the danger. They are unaware that criticism neither diminishes faith nor demeans it. Believers must little by little accept the rational imperative of the analytical, ethical, and historical criticism of the Qur'an, the sayings of the Prophet and the other prophets, and those divinely guided ones who came after him. They must agree that valuing criticism is essential to respect for reason. Lovers should not refrain from criticizing their beloveds' features for fear of disfiguring them; instead they must hope that, through the alchemy of faith, the pure gold of belief will emerge from the smelter of rationality even purer and more pristine, and, like the legendary hero Siavash, rise safe and sound from that fiery test. The fact is that the Creator allows His creatures to engage in arguments, and, in the words of Hafez, "does not grow tired hearing the bickering of the angels by His throne." The Qur'an itself exclaims that even if jinn and man were to band together for all eternity to produce its like, they would never do so. This cry undoubtedly arises from certainty. Muslim society then is left with no choice but to fearlessly open the raiment of the Qur'an to the competition, let it speak for its own merchandise and, in the words of Hafez, "shame on anyone held back by fear."

Hafez himself, supremely eloquent and elegant, joined this battle. With the utmost deference and courtesy, using an ambiguity unique to him, he said the Qur'an contains no poetics more eloquent and pleasing than his own verse:

Hafez, I haven't seen verses better than your own  
In the Qur'an you have learned by heart!

If competing with and challenging the Qur'an is permissible, it follows that other types of critical analysis are not forbidden or proscribed. Criticism is not insult, mockery, sowing doubt or enmity. It does not uproot faith; rather it abets rationality, fosters religious understanding, and promotes tolerance and moderation in religion. Were believers to accommodate the cognitive category of religious criticism and were the divines to give the seal of approval to criticism and to the modification of certain categories (for which there is no doctrinal impediment), people would not become so agitated upon seeing the disgusting and disparaging caricatures (which, of course, are contrary to reasoned criticism). They

would not set fire to newspapers at men's shops nor slash their stomachs with knives.

I realize that we Muslims have strayed far from rational criticism, and that our "sanctities" have become so grim and gloried that the very thought of criticizing them beggars our imaginative capacities but we must know that it is these very cups of criticism that whet the appetite for reason. We must take strength from the fact that if our faith is true, then that very truthfulness will be its cornerstone.

Our religious scholars in their learned manuals write: "To give an unbeliever the Qur'an is forbidden and to take one from him is obligatory." And it is with such edicts we propose to teach tolerance to believers in dialogue with other faiths and further the cause of piety!

Years ago, I gave a politically incorrect talk on "The Seminary and the University" and opened myself up to assault and battery. There I brought up the neglected notion that seminarians were occupied solely with the understanding of religion and with the hermeneutics of the text of the Qur'an, which are fine things in themselves but there is something greater than mere hermeneutics and that is criticism. So long as the seminarians do not cross over from the comforting pursuit of merely fathoming what they are taught to the challenges posed by criticism, the service they render to religion will not be fulfilled nor perfected. Students who are educated in a milieu of criticism and disputation will have a powerful tool for suppressing rage and tolerating "doubts." Exchanging a closed society based on pure legalism for an open, ethical society is the antidote to having violence prevail.

### *Third*

Muslims (and Easterners) can rightfully take pride and exult in having received the blessings of "powerlessness" and "the wealth of poverty." Their hands are clean. They have never been stained with the shame of colonialism, of the extermination of Jews and of the Inquisition; they were not the ones to make nuclear and chemical weapons, and nor have they nurtured Bolshevism, Nazism, and Fascism. They have not started world wars or wars in Vietnam or Algeria.

I do not know what Muslims would have done had they been more powerful. Perhaps they would have done worse things and brought about even greater devastation. But luckily they avoided the misfortune of power, and this impotence prevented them from being marked by shame. Perhaps Sa'di spoke for all Muslims when he said:

How can I express my thanks for the boon  
Of not having the power to inflict harm?

Preserving our historical innocence and virginity is the religious duty of today. This is precisely what I have advised Iran's rulers: do not wish for or build nuclear weapons out of the need to avoid foreign sanctions, but keep yourselves politically innocent. Permit future generations to say that one nation, though able, chose not to "sully the name of poverty and contentment"—chose not to have the power to harm people and was so potent as not to let the force of equity and justice slip from its fingers. Allow others to make and sell weapons. True power lies in the hands of the people, and the government that makes them content with equity and justice has the most powerful weapon at its command. As Sa'di says:

Make peace with the subjects and keep immune from the foe;  
For the just sovereign the people are his army.

Today the selling of inhumane and dreadful weapons that leave humanity with no recourse is the most profitable business in the West. I do not know how modern liberalism justifies the development and marketing of violence, but Islamic civilization has never engaged in this type of arms manufacture. To be stained with such shame will have ethical and historical consequences. Whatever this armed Machiavellianism may be, it is not a good model for a Muslim future. It is not enough to say merely that we shall accept power, but contend with its corruption. As Rumi says, "O butcher, this bone comes with the beef." It is time for a change of mind.

Apparently ever since the Age of Enlightenment, the more secular Western politics becomes, it grows more violent and murderous toward the powerless. It does not drink the wine of power in good measure, nor does it look out for those unable to look out for themselves. Can the return to the stage of religious morality terminate the nurturing of violence and conflict?

#### ***Fourth***

Peter Berger, the Austro-American sociologist and author of the classic *The Sacred Canopy* (1967) was once of the opinion that future societies would fall into the clutches of secularism. But in 1999, after witnessing the then state of the world and the growing strength of religion with its forceful return to history, he changed his mind and wrote *The Desecularization of the World*.

The return of religion, sorry to say, was more concerned with the assertion of identity than it was with the production of knowledge.

Religion is the source of three things: identity, knowledge, and salvation. It not only endows followers with a durable identity in which they can take pride and with an understanding that assures them about the beginning and end of days, it also offers the sweet promise of salvation and resurrection. For a religion to be compelling and to enjoy popularity there has to be a rational balance between identity and wisdom. After centuries of experiencing failure and colonialism, it occurred to Muslims to re-establish their own knowledge and honor and they have made great strides along this path. It is now at least a century that the revivers and reformers have been occupied in reconstructing religious thought and gaining some success; however, the auspicious chords of their religious teachings have been muted somewhat by those clamoring for identity: some shouting for conservative values, others for Salafism and purity. On the one hand, we have the conservatives who, with a crude understanding of the products of Islamic history and civilization, shy away from confronting modern ideas. They content themselves with, in Hafez's words, "what we once had" and try not to "beg outsiders" for what they lack. Attempting to stand on infirm wooden legs, they practice the "faith of old ladies" and try not to come down with a case of "Westitis."

On the other hand, we have the purists and Salafists, who, in the false hope of returning to "the flawless faith of the beginning" and "pure" Mohammadi Islam, want to redeliver from the womb of history a baby that already had emerged fourteen hundred years ago, and has since attained manhood and maturity and developed his own personality in the intervening years. They try to uncover anew that initial seed, which now has grown into a mighty tree, and plant it again in the soil of history. In the words of Hafez, "What possesses this misguided drop of water to think it's an ocean." These are the same misguided thinkers who clear the way for violence. An identity that is not based in knowledge, that is solely concerned with its own "storied" past, that is stigmatized with decline and collapse, and that bears the scars of colonialism, has no choice but to use violence to avenge itself. The only weapon these zealous fellows have in the fight against modernity is identity, and they stitch up a threadbare comprehension of the past with bits of empty selfhood. They vainly hope that by boasting of past glory and by refashioning the ratty cloak of identity, they will gain enough strength to be worthy opponents of modern science, philosophy, and politics.

It does not follow that just because we were once somebodies, we are somebodies now; we have to try to be somebodies again. This will not

come to fruition by killing infidels, seeking a caliphate, and reconstituting the *Umma* (all elements of identity), rather it will advance by employing knowledge, nurturing thought and criticism, re-establishing religious thinking, and exchanging views with those who champion cognition and excellence. We should not be satisfied with what we once had, with returning to what we once were, or with brandishing weapons and killing innocent people—none of these will convince the world that we are somebodies. A hefty identity paired with skimpy learning makes us look distorted and ridiculous. One can run with two sound even legs and fly with two working balanced wings but one can only limp on two lame legs. As Rumi says

Since vinegar makes things more sour,  
Sugar must be added to the mix.

Today, it is the time for and the duty of scholars to spread the sugar and pour out the honey that will neutralize the sour ignorance of the unthinking. The world of Islam is in need of brave new thinkers who will teach believers: love is not enough, reason is also necessary. Rational people must fulfill their responsibility and temper the fervor of the assailant's hot zeal with the gentleness of cold reason.

### *Fifth*

Having spoken both well and poorly of Islam and Muslims, let me add that Muslims are also human beings and like others captive to passions and fury, desirous of profit and gain. The title of Muslim does not confer superiority or inferiority on anyone. Religion, like wine, makes the good better and the bad worse. Rumi says:

Many have been led astray by the Qur'an,  
Many have fallen into the well by that rope

It's not the rope's fault, O you who stray,  
You had no desire for reaching the top

Desires come before religious faith; they give faith direction. If you wish to find mercy in faith you shall find it, but if you look for violence in it, that is what you will find. One can use a rope to go down a well, as well as escape from it. In times of danger, religion can be a sword, but in times of peace a cloud [bringing rain]. Muslims are a varied lot and religion, in the way many speak about, is no more than a "stork's squawking" (in the

eloquent phrasing of Imam Hussain), and the number of people who are not properly informed about Islam and its history is not small. They are not bound by the edicts of Islamic law, but their religiosity is a mix of ignorance and superstition. They are captive to power-hungry and violent leaders and have reached the end of their ropes due to their domestic tyranny and foreign intervention. When people are threatened, or endangered, demeaned and discriminated against, they will reach for the most familiar weapon available to them to repel the danger. Religion is that familiar weapon for the religious. Those knowledgeable about religion must medicate the religiously zealous from within, while those who are well-intentioned must help from without.

It is the duty of enlightened Muslim thinkers to teach believers when harshness is called for and when kindness is appropriate, when to engage in the Lesser Jihad and when to perform the Greater. They must heal believers and direct their passions upward, use their expertise to interpret the principles of religion, temper law with ethics and, separate what is essential to religion from what is accidental, and expand the reach of economic and political justice. In this respect non-Muslim thinkers also bear a heavy responsibility and without their help the efforts of Muslim intellectuals will not be fulfilled. Taking full advantage of the right to free speech, they must confront the powerful governments that rule them to explain the basics to their fellow countrymen: open and covert violence against Muslims begets open and covert violence; after sowing the seeds of contempt and discrimination, one reaps corruption and sedition and sourness and bitterness beget sourness and bitterness.

Nothing is more devastating than wounding the pride of a people. The vigilant Muslims of today are not those drowsy victims of colonialism of the past, who were unaware of the dimensions of their poverty. They are well aware of being a people with achievements and shining laurels, untainted by a colonialist past and the holocaust. They are endowed with an identity that can give them a firm footing in the upheavals of history. These people merit respect, and without them the portrait of human civilization would be incomplete. Secularism is a mindset boasting of tolerance and, predicting the end of religion, tolerated it. But now it must refrain from conflict and officially recognize this awakened populace and not provoke them to violence by mocking and degrading them. It should realize that a few thorny, barren trees do not represent a fragrant garden. Everyone knows that rose bushes include thorns. If there are ISIS Muslims who do not think straight or go right, there are also non-ISIS Muslims who have a cure in their pharmacy for that misguidedness which can right those wrongs.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# MUSLIM ETHICS IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISM: RECONCILIATION IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE

EBRAHIM MOOSA

When events occurring in a variety of Muslim societies around the globe are projected in the media on a daily basis, then it does momentarily appear that Islam has “bloody borders” to use Samuel Huntington’s now widely criticized description of Islam as a world civilization.<sup>1</sup>

With the diversity of Muslims around the world, the multiple conflicts, civil wars, revolutions, worldwide migration of people and continuing power struggles, then surely these events must by necessity create multiple vortexes of conflict and instability. Often these media portraits cast Islam and Muslims as a people without ethics. Or the common-sense conclusion that observers should reach of the events of 9/11, the hostage-taking by pirates in Somalia, the abduction of young girls by the insurgency group Boko Haram and the menace of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria could be this: ethics is an oxymoron in Islam. Yet, the ethical is deeply entrenched in Islam from the personal level to the communal. How Muslims can both practice and project an ethics that is consistent with the temporality of globality is both a challenge internal to Muslim communities and a work-in-progress. This chapter will examine a few kernel ideas for consideration.

### *Imperialism: Post-modern Style*

Can we still speak of a global ethics when there is such a profound absence of a moral consensus on some of the most fundamental issues of life? Can one identify a *modus vivendi* for governance, a balanced international order and the accountability of the powerful? Rhetorical questions posed in this vein do not only identify the aspirations for global ethics, but also point to what the French philosopher Giles Deleuze called

an emerging “chaosmos,” a cosmos or world marked by chaos as a distinctive feature.

While nation-states partake in traditional forms of “vertebral globalization” there is a marked growth in what Arjun Appadurai described as “cellular globalization.” The latter is a rapidly growing form of globalization where transnational networks can effectively replicate themselves without central messaging.<sup>2</sup> This condition only adds to the “chaosmos” since cellular globalization flourishes in complex global networks as different as the World Social Forum as a positive exemplar, and in dangerous networks sustained by groups like al-Qaida/Islamic State activists, as deplorable examples. Global corporate capital too is operating in cellular globalizing modes and altering the habits and practices of publics beyond the control of the state and with little accountability. And the intensification of social media and the growing power of cyberspace and its technologies have only enhanced cellular globalization and diminished accountability.

### ***Globalization and Emergent Imperialism***

Given some very real asymmetries in power between existing global cultures, the question that arises is this: is there a need to hit the restart button and contemplate the need for reconciliation between the relatively powerful and the relatively powerless? What options do ordinary people around the world have in choosing between fratricidal foot-soldiers who deploy archaic means of warfare from suicide bombings to the use of missiles to down passenger liners in different theaters of conflict versus the sophisticated armory of imperial powers which utilize drone technologies and devastating air-power in order to vanquish their adversaries? For the dispossessed of the world, however, to seek reconciliation with both imperialist powers and nihilistic insurgencies borders on the burlesque.

The rise of the Islamic State across Syria and Iraq and the growth of the Taliban in Pakistan are both directly related to failed imperial ventures in the Middle East and South Asia prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks and developments *after* that fateful onslaught on innocents in the United States.

For millions of people around the world, the imperial ventures of the twentieth century still linger vividly in their living memories. Yet, imperial ambitions have yet to abate. It is as if we had failed to learn from history; Karl Marx’s improvisation on Hegel’s idea, that history often repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce is an apt reminder. Let me remove all ambiguity about the farce in point. The United States’ imperial ventures have brought with them a bitter harvest

and an unstoppable afterlife of violence in the regions it attempted to reshape with force. The farce stretches from the savage and illegal wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that culminated in the occupation of both countries with devastating consequences. That is aside from the extra-judicial executions of terrorist suspects and the inhumane and indefinite imprisonment of hundreds of Muslim men in violation of international law at the US base in Guantanamo Bay, all events that US lawmakers and the public at large have sought to ignore. These events are one large tragedy that has already placed the fragile international political order and our tenuous inter-cultural ethical system in mortal danger.

American imperium has for a long time been in the making, wrote the renowned but often conflicted political writer Michael Ignatieff. It is an imperium that has been acquired in a state of deep denial.<sup>3</sup> It took a cataclysmic event for this illegitimate child of the republic to be acknowledged, publicly adopted and immodestly paraded in demonstrations of awesome power first in Afghanistan and then following in Iraq. Morally, the whip of imperial power is ambiguous: was it in self-defense or just pure revenge against anyone who silently cheered the 9/11 hijackers with their box-cutters into the netherworld?

The sanctimonious claims made by the former US President George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair that the “war against terrorism” was not a battle against Islam does indeed ring hollow. The facts on the ground and the real-life reality only revealed one monotonous picture: it was a war waged against entities that identified as “Muslim” and no amount of massaging could alter those facts. One could not miss the hidden subtext of President Bush’s speech from USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003. “We have not forgotten the victims of September 11, the last phone calls, the cold murder of children, the searches in the rubble,” Bush said. “With those attacks, the terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got.” Replace the word “terrorist” with “Muslims” and you hear this: *“With those attacks, the Muslims and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got.”* In fact, the Bush-Blair rhetoric, according to experts, was nothing but double-speak and part of the ruthlessness of the Bush administration’s policies against all and sundry, especially the heavy-handed government treatment of Muslims living in the United States with regular harassment and witch-hunts that has now abated but has morphed into the practices of influential elements of civil society. Almost in unison all pro-Bush commentators were unanimous in their motive for going to war in Iraq, once the fig-leaf of weapons of mass destruction withered in Iraq’s desert sun: this was a war to teach the

“Muslims” everywhere in the world a lesson for the terrorist attacks against the US.<sup>4</sup> The courageous writer Norman Mailer indicted the American political leadership in the form of a rhetorical question: “Can leaders who lie as a way of life protect any way of life?” he asked.<sup>5</sup>

Islam is a religious tradition with a long and complex history that encompasses almost all the major cultures of the world, including Europe and North America. It has some semblance of uniformity from the outside but is immensely varied from within. The only Islam one can talk about is an embodied Islam: one that takes shape in flesh and blood; actions and consequences. What Karl Marx once said about small-holding peasants insofar as that “they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented,” rings truer when used to describe a complex discursive tradition like Islam.<sup>6</sup> Practically and theoretically speaking, Islam cannot represent itself; it is always represented by Muslims themselves or by actors claiming to represent it on a spectrum of diversity. In truth “Islam” only manifests itself, when it is embodied and represented by Muslims and when it is discursively articulated. Therefore, a great deal of demagoguery and downright ignorance is involved when actors and spokespersons speak for the whole religion, culture or civilization. It makes no sense to talk about “Islam,” when it is in fact more accurate to speak about the specific acts of persons who are accountable for their deeds. If there is going to be any hope for reconciliation between communities, it begins with getting the vocabulary right when speaking about the “other”.

In what appears to be an indirect and belated *mea culpa* for his “clash of civilizations” thesis that generated so much anti-Islam hysteria, the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington admitted US culpability in world affairs after 9/11. In his words US foreign policy was to blame:

To a considerable extent we ourselves have generated these attitudes by our efforts to impose our values and institutions on other countries. We suffer from what can be called the universalist illusion that people of other countries have the same values and culture that we do; or if they do not have them, then they desperately want to have them; or if they do not want to have them, that something's wrong with them, and we have the responsibility to persuade or coerce them into adopting our values and culture.<sup>7</sup>

This is an astonishing admission on the part of a man whose wrongheaded intellectual contribution was crafted at the time when brave colleagues in the US academy and beyond challenged the “universalist illusion” he later chastised.

If there are concrete issues which Muslim and Euro-American partners in any dialogue need to discuss, then they must include questions about equity in the international political and economic order. The equitable sharing of the world's resources in a peaceful and non-hegemonic manner is long overdue and to ignore it is to invite peril on a global scale. And, an effective end to the direct and indirect Euro-American colonization of Muslim lands would be the first step in the right direction. Euro-American support and tolerance for ruling elites and dictators lacking in legitimacy in the Muslim world from Saddam Hussein previously in Iraq, and Hosni Mubarak to Abdelfattah el-Sisi in Egypt to name but a few, must come to an end. The post Arab-spring political leaderships present themselves as buffers against an exaggerated threat of political Islam, but actually serve as proxies for a range of imperial interests that are pitted against the democratic interests of the people. There is a reason why some parts of the Muslim world incubate so much political violence and totalitarianism, especially the metastasizing menace of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. This is because the rule of law and human rights were never effectively enforced in governance and hence the severest of solutions are presented as alternatives. In fact, the violation of the most fundamental norms of governance was almost silently abetted by foreign powers to their own advantage, of course. Should there be any surprise why extremist violence targets foreign forces—who present themselves as liberators from despotism—when they had actually colluded with local dictators till recently? The remedy the US had adopted to be rid of tyranny by imperial conquest has monumentally backfired with unpredictable and unintended consequences.

In order for a global ethics to succeed one would need the following elements in a cross-cultural dialogue: fostering an ethos of accountability and responsibility that begins with self-critique; transcending the nation-state structure in nurturing an ethos of cosmopolitan citizenship focused on people-to-people relations; and, promoting an inclusive ethical content in the international legal and political order that goes beyond the limitations of liberal ethics.

### ***Inclusive and Meaningful Reconciliation***

However, we need to ask a more fundamental question: why dialogue and reconciliation? Can people reconcile with each other when fundamental suspicion is about the only tangible substance that sustains the conversation between antagonists? Far from the rhetoric of Samuel Huntington about an impending clash of civilizations or Francis Fukuyama's

end of history thesis, we have now possibly reached a point of irreconcilable differences in our globalized and interdependent world. In other words: do we face the ominous prospect of globalized apartheid?

Let's face it, the gulf in perception between communities on political, economic, cultural, political and religious issues reflects deep fissures within our pluralistic global community. The burden of reconciliation is to lift the veil of suspicion on crucial issues that affect the real interests of people and their ultimate values and ideals. Thus, the idea of reconciliation itself requires re-definition.

Any act of reconciliation requires justice as a pre-requisite. Without justice reconciliation is not only elusive, but can lead to a greater blindness of the soul. At least in the Islamic tradition, the conventional view is that the absence of justice can only pave the way for greater injustice and tyranny. While aggrieved parties can forgive their perpetrators for offenses, the right to retributive justice cannot be abrogated in advance of the reconciliation process. The mere disclosure of the crime and knowledge of the offense may provide the victim with some relief but it cannot compensate for true reconciliation. In a true reconciliation the consent of the victim is explicit.

South Africa's historic Truth and Reconciliation Commission is held out as a beacon of reconciliation. But despite all its virtues, this process denied victims the ability to be effectively part of the process of reconciliation. It simulated reconciliation, without truly reconciling victim and persecutor. Victims knew in advance that they would not be able to exact justice from their persecutors. The South African experience tried to pass off the political truce reached between the apartheid government and the liberation movement to negotiate a future political dispensation as a process of personal and individual reconciliation. The two are not identical. While individual victims told their stories of suffering and got relief through catharsis by hearing their persecutors confess their guilt, the individual was a cipher, if not an instrument, for greater social and political reconciliation, not personal reconciliation.<sup>8</sup> And thus, one has to then concede that the South African style reconciliation process has its limitations. It is then not about retributive justice. Rather, it is reconciliation designed to kick-start a political truce.

Reconciliation at the beginning of the twenty-first century means something more than what we are accustomed to thinking of when evoking that term. We require reconciliation at a macro-scale: it goes beyond reconciliation within or between religious or ethnic communities, groups, families, or, in relation to God. Our moment in history requires nations, transnational, cultural, political and religious communities to

reconcile with each other. In order to talk meaningfully about reconciliation we need to answer the critical questions: reconciliation for what breach? Reconciliation with whom? Reconciliation toward which ends?

Can the religious imagination teach us how to maintain global community at a time when imperialism, insecurity, terrorism and the breakdown of global order are all rapidly on the ascendant? More importantly, can anything be retrieved from the complex diversity of Muslim traditions? What are the resources within Islam for reconciliation between “self” and “other”? Who is the “self”? Who is the “other”? Are we both “self” and “other” simultaneously within ourselves and in relation to others?

### *Hope and Despair*

On June 16, 2001, roughly three months before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, I cautioned a distinguished audience of Stanford University graduates and their parents of looming threats. I identified a few issues that required urgent attention such as the double standards in international affairs, especially the lack of equity in global economic and political governance; the absence of accountability on the part of the powerful; the inability of the powerless to own up to their responsibilities and to end playing the blame game; the reluctance of powerful nations to lead by example in the crucial task of the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and, the threat of menacing terrorism on a global scale.<sup>9</sup>

The early signs of the rising spectacle of terror in recent years were the US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998. Informed observers knew that a showdown between al-Qaida and its former handlers in the US security establishment was inevitable. However, it was the gravity, scale and spectacle of 9/11 that was unnerving as fortress America was being conquered from the air. America, a country that dropped Agent Orange and atomic bombs in Asia and ruthlessly gerrymandered the international political order for its own interests was suddenly vulnerable. The vulnerability of a giant, it is said, is always more terrifying and unpredictable, than the pain caused by the thorn in the giant’s paw.

Since that fateful day one is conflicted by two sets of emotions in a phrase made famous by the Sicilian theorist of Marxism, Antonio Gramsci who talked about the optimism of the spirit versus the pessimism of the will. The optimism of the spirit proclaimed that a wounded America could serve at least two broad purposes. One had hoped that the communities to which the 19 hijackers belonged, namely a medley of Muslim countries in the Middle East with competing interpretations of Islam starting with

Saudi Arabia could take a critical and comprehensive look at themselves.<sup>10</sup> With this they could begin the difficult but necessary process of self-critique. They would have to answer questions such as: why do our societies produce young people bent on such spectacular violence against innocents at home and abroad? What are the root causes of violence, political and otherwise in Muslim societies? What are the possible solutions? Is it due to the absence of democracy? Is democracy a mask for dictatorship in many post-independence Muslim states? What is the role of foreign powers, especially the United States and Europe, in perpetuating these dictatorships? Yet, these questions were never seriously asked and the short-lived Arab Spring was suffocated by reactionary powers and morphed into an Arab Freeze.

The other hope was that Americans would take the opportunity to do some introspection. How and why did a society that once offered itself as a model for democracy over time become such a despised entity among people of conscience the world over? What is it that the US government and state does to offend more than one nation, more than one culture or civilization? Why is its influence and power actively opposed by Christian Latin Americans, secular Europeans, traditionalist Africans, Taoist Chinese and Muslims of almost all stripes? Is it really true that America aids and abets other people's miseries in order to secure its own interests? How does the desire for mahogany toilet seats and cheap gas in the developed world dictate that all civilized values be abandoned in order to procure cheap goods from the developing world? Do first world nations acquire their comforts and increase their consumption in flagrant violation of international human rights? Does "stability" in the Middle East translate into a US national interest that means the continued uncritical support of Israel?

Since September 11, 2001, only an endangered species of writers, thinkers and activists in the US and Western Europe, together with only a solitary number of rare politicians have dared to ask the question as to why former US proxies from Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein had turned so violently on their former handlers. Convulsed by a wounded nationalism both the populace and the elite in the US embarked on revenge anywhere in the Muslim world. Striking at potential sources of threat before they even became real, to use John Quincy Adams's prescient 1821 phrase turned America into the "dictatress of the world."

Bombing a war-ravaged and impoverished Afghanistan into the stone-age was for all intents and purposes, as the late actor and satirist Robin Williams cynically put it, possibly welcomed by many Afghans as an upgrade!<sup>11</sup> Unable to find satisfaction for their bloodlust, the hawks and neo-

conservatives in the Bush administration unveiled their long prepared imperial plan for the Middle East. Beyond the vacuous promises of democracy for Iraqis lay the sinister plan: the Anglo-American plan to occupy Iraq was to teach Arabs and Muslims in the region to wear their chains with less reluctance as the prospect of freedom and liberty is removed before their very eyes from Baghdad to Bethlehem, and from Kabul to Karachi.

Some institutions of American civil society are interested in ostensibly fostering dialogue with Muslims. However, these are largely self-serving and uni-directional efforts aimed at selling American foreign policy to Muslims. Since these are not genuine efforts in pursuit of effective dialogue and mutual learning, one can confidently predict the failure of such projects. Part of the problem is that the “Islam industry” wishes to foster dialogue between the West and “Islam” or the “Muslim world.” This is a total misnomer leave alone a faulty diagnosis, since it does not have reconciliation as an end. At worst it is an attempt to prescribe to Muslims; at best it is a subtle civilizing mission. *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman has perfected this art from his newspaper pulpit. The war in Iraq, said Friedman, was to “unleash a process of reform in the Arab-Muslim region” and help it embrace modernity.<sup>12</sup> It takes somechutzpah to make such muscular claims, almost as preposterous as it would be for an Ayatollah to propose that the next Pope be a female from France!

Does reconciliation have more limited prospects for success? It depends largely on whether the right issues are identified that lead to meaningful outcomes for both parties. No two cultures, religions or civilizations have to date in history ever fully reconciled. Had they done so, they would have both ceased to exist. Yet, people, as individuals and sometimes as part of representative groups can reconcile with each other on concrete issues and substantive matters. And, collectivities too can be held to standards of accountability.

### ***Ethics of Accountability***

Most, if not almost all, ethical communities and systems of moral reasoning recognize some notion of responsibility and accountability. An ethics of responsibility is not only the burden to be shouldered by an individual. Beyond the law, larger collectivities, especially nations and countries, ought to be held accountable for their actions as part of an ethic of responsibility. Threatened by global warming and ecological threats there is now a greater awareness than ever before that we cannot shed our

shared responsibility and collective accountability as stewards of the globe.

Mystics often have an arresting way of explaining complex themes with their successful use of imagery to drive a point home. Jalaluddin Rumi (1207 - 1273) the famed mystic reminded us to be aware of those who obfuscated reality and urged us to not be intimidated by our own fears. No matter how large and dreaded the challenge, human beings do have the ability to overcome and conquer. But if we do not confront the challenge then indeed the problem will metastasize. Rumi uses the parable of the snake known for its deadly venom. But something more happens if the snake is not confronted.

‘It is said,’ says Rumi, ‘that when a snake does not see a human being for forty years it turns into a dragon. That is, it sees no one who would cause its evil and vileness to melt. A big lock indicates that there is something valuable and costly inside. The greater the obfuscation, the better the essence—like a serpent guarding a treasure trove. Don’t look at the ugliness of the serpent; look at the value of the treasure.’<sup>13</sup>

One moral from Rumi’s multivalent uses of parables can be the following reading of mine. If one does not confront a problem, then a venomous, but comparatively harmless snake can turn into a dragon to become a bigger problem. For Rumi the serpent is a metaphor for the animal soul or lower self: if this self that often covets everything is left unrestrained, then it will turn into a dragon. Hence, Rumi says, the inner workings of the human being are predisposed to go out of control and therefore require constant vigilance and regulation.<sup>14</sup> Since no human being confronted the snake, namely the lower self, to curb its vileness, it turned into something more grotesque—a dragon. Now the human being will need a rare talent in order to combat the menacing dragon: instead of needing the elementary skills of a snake-charmer, the human being now has the herculean task of becoming a dragon-slayer. Yet, it is worth killing the snake or the dragon for the dividends are rich. Often in Rumi’s stories, the serpent guards the precious treasure of emeralds often found in ruins. Those emeralds are the gems that make a human being: the capacity to love, and this is the essence of the human being. Of course, the treasure in every instance could be different and thus it is situational. When Rumi is applied to our context then the dragon guards the treasure of love. With love comes responsibility and for twenty-first-century Muslims there is nothing greater than the question of responsibility and accountability. And if it means that in order to acquire responsibility one has to be exposed to some risk, then Rumi encourages us to make that leap of courage, and

become the dragon-slayers in order to unleash the potential of love and its consequences. Instead of being intimidated by the ferocity of a snake turned dragon, he encourages us to value the treasure.

If people are derelict in their responsibilities, then the Muslim tradition treats such a disregard of duty as the equivalent of the day judgment. In a famous tradition, the Prophet Muhammad said: "When responsibility/trust (*amāna*) is destroyed then surely expect the hour [of judgment]." When he was asked, how responsibility was destroyed, he provided a devastating but insightful explanation. Responsibility, he implied, is not destroyed willy-nilly. Responsibility is established through elaborate processes of institutions and networks of trust, obligations and responsibilities. Human beings are responsible and accountable for what they do. Hence, in reply to the question of how responsibility is destroyed, Prophet Muhammad replied: "When matters are entrusted to the incompetent then expect the hour!"<sup>15</sup> Responsibility begins with competence.

So could one begin with the global solidarity of responsible people and the alliance of competent people? Even if one is agnostic about Western governments in their conduct, especially toward the Muslim world, one must ensure that the alliances and solidarities in America and Europe's civil societies will be rooted in an ethic of responsibility, preceded by trust and competence. It is at that level that individuals and communities will identify their interests in global solidarity and begin their reconciliation with communities and individuals of their choice on a global scale. Already thousands of courageous Americans and Europeans are engaged in self-questioning their countries' imperial and unethical global postures.

Similarly, citizens of Muslim majority countries and those living in minority contexts can earnestly engage in reconciliation processes with citizens elsewhere in the world. Surely, in a world of cellular globalization, relationships of trust and responsibility at a people-to-people level would prove to be a giant step in the right direction. Muslims located in countries like India, Nigeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Africa, the United States and Israel could take the lead. Often these are deeply divided societies and are in dire need of reconciliation. Here Muslims of goodwill can become key role players in cellular globalization for the good, rather than cellular globalization in pursuit of the nefarious ends of terror that the foot soldiers of al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria pursue.

Reconciliation demands a radical posture of self-critique; and, those of us living in the imperium may have to engage in even more rigorous self-scrutiny. Self-critique can begin with the longer memory of the past in mind or a more immediate context. Take the attitude of the West, and with America insisting that the nations of the global south disarm and get rid of

nuclear weapons, especially Iran and North Korea. In the streets of different parts of the global south this demand is met with much dismay and greater questioning. They range from: is the US not the owner of the largest stockpile of the most advanced weapons of mass destruction? Was the US not the first country in human history to use a devastating atomic bomb to kill thousands of civilians, not combatants, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Furthermore, the US frequently tries to undermine the most effective international instrument, namely the International Criminal Court of Justice formed to prosecute dictators and international terrorists for war crimes. In other words, if one returns to Rumi's parable, then surely even nations are like serpents which have morphed into dragons and are out of control.

Reconciliation does not only involve the need to identify the causes of moral and political harm, but it must simultaneously involve self-correction, self-improvement and social reform. Muslim countries, especially at the level of the individual, community and society, will have to take the lead in changing their own condition. Such change begins with governance. The lack of good and responsible governance creates a growing pool of disgruntled and frustrated people in Muslim societies whose futures are bleak, if not non-existent. These pools of young people become the incubators for radicalism that morph into frightening swamps of militancy and terror. In several Muslim countries attention will have to be given to the treatment of religious minorities. Platitudes will not be sufficient. Discriminatory laws and practices that make non-Muslim minorities into effective second-class citizens in countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to mention but a few, are intolerable. Ordinary citizens will have to be empowered in order to show zero tolerance for autocratic regimes. But such change can only take place if people in those very societies promote transformation according to their own values and standards. Many Muslim countries might have to consider establishing truth and reconciliation tribunals *à la* South Africa in order to come to grips with atrocities of the past, acts of genocide and massacres undertaken by governments and military rulers. The disclosure of past atrocities might be sufficient and more healing rather than Nuremberg-style justice for offenders in order not to create further divisions. These kinds of procedures will set the gold standard for accountable governance so that future rulers can be held responsible for their deeds.

### ***Reconciliation and Re-Covenanting***

In the Muslim tradition reconciliation is a public act; one can actually say it is a political act, where politics means an act or demonstration of power or will. Reconciliation is the restoration of public morality, values and ethics, after these elements had been willfully distorted and perverted. Therefore, it requires an equal act of will to restore the normative moral order. Thus the offender and aggrieved must publicly reconcile their differences and announce their commitment to restore what had been breached. The Qur'an suggests a three-pronged approach for reconciliation. It involves a personal act of repentance; a change in the self, followed by restitution and the full disclosure of the truth.<sup>16</sup>

Historically speaking, Muslim ethics promoted political associations that are shaped by the hegemony of faith, with a preference for the homogeneity of the political, but one that could also accommodate pluralism and diversity. The transnational "community of believers" (*umma*) has the dualistic feature of being both a political entity, as well as a community that transcends politics. In this role, it is a community that is committed to a moral responsibility and stewardship towards humanity.<sup>17</sup> What the Qur'an, and in turn Muslim ethical teachings in the past strongly resisted was when believers undermined or abandoned their own political entities in order to make alliances with interests that were hostile to the interests of their communities. In other words, at a time when one's religion was also one's political badge, reaching out to other religious groups was seen as an act of sedition. But with the separation of religion and politics in modern nation states, that concept by itself has disappeared. In the absence of hostilities, it is not only permitted for Muslims to collaborate and participate along with people, including non-Muslim political entities, but Muslim moral guidelines scrupulously encourage the advancement of virtue and justice in dealing with the religious "other."

One can possibly make the case that in the past Muslim ethics, especially public morality, were treated differently from individual or private morality. Only the return of justice, conceived historically, mediates the public space. Thus when Muslims create alliances and friendships (*wali*, pl. *awliya*) and participate in a plural moral and ethical context, then the key ethical register in their public morality would be the application of justice. Conventional wisdom teaches that the demonstration of love belongs to the private sphere as the act of an individual. For individual and private morality has an altruistic dimension to it. An individual can engage in an act of self-sacrifice towards friend and enemy. Love could be the motivation to befriend the private adversary

which in turn could turn hate into friendship. “Love your enemies” (Matt. 5:44, Luke 6:27) or, as the Qur’an 23:96 states: “Good can never be the equal of evil. Thus, repel [evil] with that which is [aesthetically] beautiful or better (*ahsan*); then you will find that your enemy will turn into a bosom friend (*wali hamim*).” Yet, we are challenged in the present to think of a notion of justice that is permeated with love; a justice that does not only correct or provide retribution, but also heals. In that sense reconciliation in South Africa provides many lessons.

Muslims should also have less difficulty in entering into relationships of integrity with the “other”. Philosophically and theologically-speaking Muslim dogma does not create an impermeable wall between its own revelation and those revelations that preceded it. The closest association is of course with the other Abrahamic faiths of Judaism and Christianity, while also generically including other monotheistic species of divine life forms. In fact, to exclusively claim the truth of the Islamic revelation and deny the truth in others would contradict both the letter and spirit of the Qur’an. While Muslims may have differences on the specifics of Christian and Jewish doctrine, it is a requirement of one’s Muslim-ness to accept the theological and doctrinal “other” as precursors that are integral to one’s own faith. How is it possible that a culture and tradition like Islam that is so demonized in contemporary Euro-American culture can produce figures like the mystic thinker Muhi al-Din Ibn Arabi (d. 1240) who could say to the world in his *Translator of Desires*:

My heart can take on any form:  
for gazelles a meadow,  
a cloister for monks,

For the idols, sacred ground,  
Ka’ba for the circling pilgrim,  
the tables of the Torah,  
the scrolls of the Qur’an

I profess the religion of love.  
wherever its caravan turns  
along the way, that is the belief,  
the faith I keep.<sup>18</sup>

In a tradition that views communion with the “other” as part of the “desire” of the self, there can be no shortage of ethical and moral resources to make possible a truly cosmopolitan existence. At least Muslims living in European and North American democracies should have fewer difficulties to make an ethical contribution to cosmopolitan thinking. In

alliance with likeminded people from other traditions, Muslims ought to ensure that the foreign policies of their respective countries are consistent with justice and global equity. In particular, they will have to be alert to the growing global gulf in economic antagonisms. Walter Rathenau pointed out some time ago that our destiny today is not politics, but economics. Economics has become *the political* and hence the destiny of humanity. One has to ponder the morality of efforts to sustain the prosperity of Euro-American democracies at the expense of the impoverishment and exploitation of the developing world. The developing south is a world that is held hostage by the overwhelming military might of the developed world.

Reconciliation can only take place in terms of specifics. One area on which efforts in reconciliation have to be focused is the asymmetrical Euro-American economic consumption of the world's resources and the depletion of vital ones. It is insatiable capitalist consumption that drives Western governments to seek raw materials and economic power at whatever cost to the human rights of others no matter how miserable are the living conditions of people in the South. Imperialist powers will go to war to procure these cheap goods for their citizenry. In this respect the citizenries in Europe and North America, including their growing numbers of Muslim citizens, are equally responsible and have a duty to restrain the deeds of their governments who represent them.

It is a gross fallacy perpetuated by self-serving political pundits that American or even European electoral politics largely focuses on domestic issues. For it ignores the fact that foreign policy dividends keep voters' wallets filled and their appetites sated thanks to cheap oil and to even cheaper imported consumer goods. Hence, it is just not sufficient to blame the multinational corporations like Enron, Bechtel and Haliburton for peddling their interests and perverting the international political and economic order; the consumers and citizens in the West, equally share the burden of responsibility; for they are the key constituencies that sustain the web of political, economic and cultural interests. If one of the goals of reconciliation is to put an end to imperialism, then it must address this knot of economic issues. Anyone threatening the economic peace of Euro-American hegemony is a "disturber of the peace."

The exploitation of the developing world of course takes place with the collusion of the elites from the global South. These elites manage failed states or advance their narrow economic interests at the expense of the majority of people in their countries. Not only is it immoral to sustain such people in power, but also their misrule produces the menace of terrorism that affects the West. Western global hegemony is not only sustained by

economic imperialism; economic imperialism must be preceded by cultural and political imperialism. Therefore, every people and nation must have the free right to choose cultural and political systems that are consistent with their history and culture and free from external meddling.

Reconciliation must be directed at the underclasses of the developing world and not the elites, who are often in cahoots, consciously or unconsciously with international capital and imperialism. The underclass and non-cosmopolitan constituency, if given the opportunity, is most likely to bring about effective social change in the developing world. For they have the most to gain from social change. The middle classes in the short-term may rightfully fear that they have everything to lose with social change, even though their long-term prospects would improve if their entire societies improve.

Just as religious communities adopted creeds, edicts and covenants in the past to create a sense of commitment to goals and values, similarly we too in our age may require a covenant for cosmopolitan co-existence, one that will commit us to the fundamental respect and integrity of the “other” and co-existence without hegemony. As Walter Mignolo, Abdelkadir Khatibi and Richard Falk, among others, have pointed out, cosmopolitan citizenship can be built over language and cultural, ethnic and religious divides in ways unimagined before, thanks to increasingly innovative information technology, interdependency and cellular globalization.<sup>19</sup> Globalization without domination may have to be the ethical creed of such a new movement, where the contributions of local cultures and practices are treated with integrity and viewed as sustainable knowledge for life-forms that are significant to the diverse groups of humanity.

### *Conclusion*

If terrorism is one of the most serious problems of the twenty-first century, then it is symptomatic of larger, deeper and invisible causes; causes that imperialist powers are reluctant to address since it will affect their interests. In order to assist failing societies we need much more comprehensive plans and remedies, plans that go beyond aid, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It requires the deepening of cosmopolitan citizenship and re-covenanting to values that go beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. Foreign policies can no longer be premised on self-interest, the absence of ethics and by viewing other nations as potential enemies. Neither is imperialism the remedy to failed states. Imperial ventures only cause greater failures as

the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria have played out before our very eyes in the span of just over a decade.

When the interests of imperialism and those at the helm of failed states coalesce, they create the fertile conditions for the growth of terrorism. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is alarming to note that not all people in the world see terrorists as criminals. In many instances Western powers, especially the US, have dubbed legitimate freedom struggles against tyranny and dispossession as terrorism. For millions of people, liberation movements, and regrettably even those who espouse violence as an end, are viewed as the allies of the defenseless and offer hope for alternative life conditions.

In the light of these very desperate but largely invisible conditions that bring about globalized spectacles of violence, reconciliation is the only hope in times of despair. But the end of reconciliation must result in re-covenanting to values and practices that will turn the conciliation into meaningful life forms. These may be very small steps as intra-cultural covenants between micro-units of people, but it at least begins to restore hope and alternative life styles and values among those determined to change and make a beginning. This hope, as writer Anne Lamott points out, is a revolutionary patience.<sup>20</sup> Reconciliation could be the beginning of such a silent revolution.

## Notes

1. This chapter is a revised version of my essay first published as: Ebrahim Moosa, "Muslim Ethics in an Era of Globalism: Reconciliation in an Age of Empire," in *Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalising World*, ed. Janusz Salamon (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2015); reprinted with the permission of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
2. Arjun Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Public planet books (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 131.
3. Michael Ignatieff, "The Burden," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 2003.
4. Thomas Friedman, *New York Times* columnist in an interview with Terry Gross on her program, *Fresh Air* on 21 April 2003, <http://freshair.npr.org/> who in the American context is seen as a moderate who unequivocally and supportively confirms that the war on Iraq had an underlying message. The message was to go into the "heart of the Muslim world and going door to door" in order to effectively teach Muslims a lesson in response to 9/11 as a way to puncture what he calls the "terrorism bubble," even though there is no evidence of Saddam Hussein supporting terrorism or possessing weapons of mass destruction. The difference between Friedman's viewpoint and those of the neo-cons from William Kristol to Douglas Freith and others, is that he presents the neo-con agenda in a velvet glove.

- See Robert Worth, "The Deep Intellectual Roots of Islamic Terror," *Arts & Ideas*, *The New York Times*, October 13, 2001; Holland Cotter, "Beauty in the Shadow of Violence," *Arts & Leisure*, *The New York Times*, October 7, 2001. In these samples of press articles and countless others, everything in Islamic history from the Prophet Muhammad to Muslim art is associated with violence and criminality in a sleight of hand that can only be described as sinister Islamophobia.
5. Ronald Tiersky & Norman Mailer "Bush & Terror: An Exchange with Norman Mailer," *New York Review of Books*, August 14, 2003, 41-42.
  6. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, trans. Saul K. Padover (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1937), Part VII.
  7. Samuel P. Huntington, "America in the World," *The Hedgehog Review: Critical Reflections on Culture*, 5: 1, Spring 2003, 18.
  8. See Ebrahim Moosa, "Truth and Reconciliation as Performance: Specters of Eucharistic Redemption," in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, eds. Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: Juta, 2000), 113-122.
  9. Ebrahim Moosa, Baccalaureate Celebration address, titled "*Globalizing the Humanum: The Continuous Struggle for Justice*"  
<http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/june20/moosatext-620.html>.
  10. See Amir Hussain, "The Outer Edges of Islam," in UC Observer,  
<http://www.ucobserver.org/features/2014/12/islam/>; Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004).
  11. *Robin Williams on Broadway*, HBO Video, 2002.
  12. Thomas Friedman, "The War Over the War," *The New York Times*, op-ed., Sunday August 2, 2003.
  13. Jalaluddin Rumi, *Signs of the Unseen*, trans. W. M. Thackston Jr. (Boston: Shambhala, 1999), 245.
  14. I want to thank Nargis Virani for her insights in deciphering Rumi's metaphors.
  15. Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī, *Fath al-bārī sharḥ ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-'Aṣrīya, 1428/2007), 13:7822.
  16. Qur'an 2:160 "...Those who repent, make amends and disclose the truth: it is they whose repentance I accept..." Repentance is *tawba*; corrective action and making amends is *islah*; disclosure, making manifest and known is *tabyin*.
  17. Qur'an 3:110: "you are best of communities delivered unto humankind, for advancing the good and restraining wrong," *khayra ummatin ukhrijat li 'l-nas*.
  18. Muhi al-Din Bin 'Arabi, *Tarjuman al-Ashwaq* (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1418/1998), 43-44. I have used the translation of Michael A. Sells, *Stations of Desire: Love Elegies from Ibn 'Arabi and New Poems* (Jerusalem: IBIS Editions, 2000), 74-75.
  19. Walter Dignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledge and Border Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
  20. Anne Lamott, *Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life* (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), xxiii.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# SPIRITUAL HUMANISM: AN EMERGING GLOBAL DISCOURSE

TU WEIMING

I would like to propose that spiritual humanism rooted in the Confucian tradition is an insight worth exploring for our world.<sup>1</sup> On the surface, it does not seem to have any bearing on China's promise of a peaceful rise or of the so-called First World's willingness to accept China as an important player in the multipolar world order. However, from the perspective of the world of ideas, finding a path toward peace and cultural understanding through dialogue among civilizations and a sustainable relationship with the Earth depend on a new way of thinking, a new ethic, and a new cosmology. Are there any resources in the Confucian tradition that might help us think through these issues? Is spiritual humanism a viable option to emerge (or re-emerge) from the current Chinese ethos?

Arguably, the most influential ideology in human history is the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West. Capitalism and socialism are variations of the Enlightenment theme. "Wealth and power" loom large in these theories and practices. But they are basically at odds with the ways of learning to be human before the advent of modernity. In our secular age, presumably as a result of what Max Weber characterized as the process of "rationalization," secular humanism has become the dominant ideology. It is so common and prevalent that it now overshadows virtually all other religious and ideological persuasions. Moreover, for almost a century, the intellectual ethos in China has been overwhelmed by scientism, materialism, and instrumental rationalism.

As it seems to me, we are desperately in need of formulating effective critiques of the unintended negative consequences of the Enlightenment mentality, such as aggressive anthropocentrism, imperialism, colonialism, the Faustian drive to dominate, and possessive individualism. By advocating the "unity of Heaven and humanity," a sense of reverence toward Heaven, respect and care for the Earth, a fiduciary community (that

is, a community based on trust), and “peace for All under Heaven,” spiritual humanism underscores dialogue, reconciliation, and harmony. While the opposite of harmony is uniformity and sameness, a precondition for harmony is difference. These ideas resonate with the value orientations of what feminists, environmentalists, multiculturalists, religious pluralists, and communitarians have been advocating for decades.

The emergence of an ecumenical and cosmopolitan spirit is a precondition for us to envision a truly authentic global culture of peace. I assume that all historical religions (originating in the “Axial Age”) and indigenous traditions, when confronting the dual challenges of ecological degradation and dysfunctional global governance, will be encouraged to cultivate, in addition to their particular religious grammars for action, the language of humanism. We choose to be Christians, Buddhists, or Muslims, but we are first of all and inevitably, human. Put differently, we may choose to be human through the Christian, Muslim, or Buddhist ways, but we are obligated by the current state of the world to be responsible for the well-being of the human community as a whole. The humanism that can guide us to survive and flourish in the twenty-first century must broaden our intellectual horizons and deepen the moral depth of the Enlightenment mentality. A minimum requirement for this humanism would be that it transcends “secularity.” A prominent expression of secular humanism is nationalism. Nationalism is a major challenge to Americans, Russians, and Chinese and, of course, to people of many other nationalities as well. The social thinker Ashis Nandy is deeply concerned about the emergence of Indian nationalism. For him, true Indian patriotism is inconceivable without the voices of Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore.

China’s moral crisis is closely related to the lack of faith in something beyond the material world here and now. It is of great urgency that Chinese people, especially the young, cultivate a sense of awe (or reverence) toward Heaven, Earth, and also the human world in between and beyond wealth and power. Spiritual humanism, a holistic vision for human flourishing, can help religions to become more public-spirited. It is vitally important for China’s political and intellectual elite to become religiously “musical.” This will definitely improve Sino-Western relations. It is also crucial for Chinese leaders to cultivate religious sensitivity through mutually beneficial dialogues with minorities, notably Tibetans and non-Chinese-speaking Muslims. The significance of these developments, in my opinion, goes beyond issues of security, striking at the heart of a Chinese cultural identity and global perceptions of China as a civilization-state.

Cultural China is currently undergoing a major, even unprecedented, spiritual renaissance. If we observe the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Chinese diasporic communities as a symbolic cultural universe, underlying their economic vibrancy and political dynamism there is a concerted effort to recover, retrieve, restore, reconfigure, reconstruct, and renew Chinese traditional culture.<sup>2</sup> These dialogical encounters with the past are revitalizing. They enable Chinese to discover a rich reservoir of symbolic resources to share with the world. The Golden Rule stated in the negative is an obvious example. Indeed, it is one of the most theoretically sophisticated and practically consequential principles for dialogue among civilizations: “Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you” (*Analects*, 15.24).

In spiritual humanism, reciprocity, and the so-called Golden Rule stated in the negative, must be supported by the positive principle of “humanity” (*ren*), comparable to the Christian Golden Rule: “In order to establish myself, I help others to establish themselves; in order to enlarge myself, I help others to enlarge themselves” (*Analects*, 6.30). By implication, in international communications, the global public good, such as environmental protection and the establishment of a world order, takes precedence over exclusive national interests.

I think that the time is ripe for us to engage in dialogues on core values. Universal values embodied in the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West, such as liberty, rationality, legality, rights, and the dignity of the individual, should be fruitfully compared and substantially enriched by other universal values embodied in spiritual humanism, such as rightness (justice or fairness), sympathy, civility, responsibility, and social solidarity.

I have recommended in China that, given the severity of corruption and untrustworthiness in the public sphere, we learn to appreciate the values underlying *homo economicus* (economic man). These values include freedom, rationality, rights, legality, and the dignity of the individual. Obviously, in order for the human community to survive and flourish, these values must be augmented and enriched by other universal values, such as liberty by justice, equality, and fairness, legality by civility, rights by responsibility, the dignity of the individual by social solidarity, and rationality by sympathy, empathy, and compassion. This reminds me of the great economic thinker Adam Smith. He considered that his most important contribution for humanity was the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, rather than his famous *Wealth of Nations*. Sympathy features prominently in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. It is worth noting that the leading European thinkers, such as Voltaire and Leibniz, as well as Emerson and

the American humanist Irving Babbitt, greatly appreciated and admired the Confucian ideas of civility, harmony, and responsible governance.

An important spiritual exercise in the practice of Confucian self-cultivation is extending our sympathetic feelings so that they encompass an ever-expanding network of human and non-human relatedness. The ideal in spiritual humanism is to “form one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things.” With this ideal, Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (1472-1529) offers an illustration indicating how the human capacity for sympathy, if properly cultivated, is all-inclusive.

From a cultural perspective, I envision the emerging global community to be highly differentiated by primordial cultural ties. As a result, plurality and multifacetedness will characterize the cultural scene throughout the world. The “future of history” strongly suggests that the international order will become multipolar. Any desire by a regime to achieve hegemonic uni-polarity will inevitably fail. A dichotomous mode of thinking, such as dividing the world in terms of socialist/capitalist, modern/traditional, religious/secular, progressive/regressive, liberal/conservative, democratic/authoritarian, and so forth, is simplistic at best. This shows a clear trend toward what Shmuel Eisenstadt dubbed as “multiple modernities.” With a view toward the future, as the enduring presence of traditions in modernity and the various modernizing processes inevitably assume different cultural forms, concepts such as “multiple modernities,” or even “many globalizations,” will be recognized as insuppressible trends and common experiences.

As a beneficiary of the Christian-Confucian dialogue, I bear witness to the often experienced and yet rarely articulated case of a truly significant intellectual illumination because of a fruitful encounter with radical otherness. I used to take it for granted that Confucianism is rational, this-worldly, and pragmatic, and that it is diametrically opposed to any form of transcendent spirituality. Without my encounters with brilliant Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theologians, my research and thinking would have been confined to a rigorous but parochial domain of secular humanism as the most authentic way of understanding the Confucian tradition and its modern transformation.

The great advances in communications and information technologies have exponentially broadened and deepened the human capacity to learn, unlearn, and re-learn. Space and time have collapsed into a new reality of immediate accessibility to data, information, and knowledge about Heaven above, Earth below, and all things in between. In light of this, the opening lines of the *Western Inscription* by the eleventh century Confucian thinker, Zhang Zai (1020-1077), far from being a romantic assertion about a

universal brotherhood totally rejected by the advent of our disenchanted world, remain a source of inspiration for all of us aspiring to the idea of “forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things”:

Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother. Even such a tiny creature as I finds intimacy in their midst. All that fills the universe is my body and all that directs the universe is my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters and all things are my companions. (Zhang 1978: 62)

Realizing this requires that a fully developed humanity is involved in self-cultivation and in building a fiduciary community based on dialogue. It also requires that we embrace and respect nature as an integral part of our communion. In addition to self, community, and nature, there is also a fourth dimension, that is, Heaven. A defining characteristic of spiritual humanism is the awareness that we ought to show reverence for Heaven.

I am pleased to note that in my interreligious and inter-civilizational dialogues, I have come to the realization that Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, and Muslims can take the authentic Confucian humanistic stance without in any way losing their primary identities with their faith communities. Indeed, there is increasingly a group of believers who are willing and happy to call themselves Confucian Hindus, Confucian Buddhists, Confucian Jews, Confucian Christians, and Confucian Muslims. The presupposition of these identifications is that the term “Confucian” can be broadened and deepened to go beyond the Sinic world and embrace true cosmopolitanism. If so, I believe that many more religionists will be willing to identify themselves as spiritual humanists.

This spiritual humanistic vision presupposes that the ultimate meaning of life is realizable and ought to be realized in ordinary human existence. The lifeworld is not merely secular, but also creative, dynamic, vital, and noble. “Heaven engenders and humans complete”<sup>3</sup> (Mou 1979: 213) entails partnership. Implicit in this proclamation is the idea that through human effort, Heaven’s creative vitality will be brought to fruition on Earth. Indeed, as participants in the cosmic transformation and co-creators of the evolutionary process, we are capable of, and indeed obligated to, realizing Heaven’s creativity on Earth.

Each one of us, and our community as a whole, are so intimately and inseparably connected with all other modalities of being in the cosmos that it is our human responsibility to be cosmologically responsive and responsible. The Chinese legend of Sage-King Yu, comparable to the story of Noah in the Hebrew Bible, is instructive. Through his scientific rationality, sympathy, charisma, courage, self-sacrifice, endurance, and humility, the Sage-King Yu transformed the disastrous flood into an

ingeniously designed and engineered hydraulic system. He is revered as a paradigmatic personality who brought together Heaven and Earth for the well-being of humanity. In a deeper sense, the wholesome development of the human is our filial reverence of Heaven and our genuine respect for the Earth.

This human reading of the Way of Heaven is not anthropocentric, but it is laden with moral implications. The flood is abnormal, but we are responsible for and capable of adapting ourselves to the disaster of the flood by restoring order out of chaos. If we are the cause of major calamities, we should not expect Heaven to fix them for us.

Let me conclude with a summary statement about the salient features of spiritual humanism. As a comprehensive and integrated humanism, four dimensions of the commonly shared human experience—self, community, Earth (nature), and Heaven—form a four-dimensional space where we can aim to achieve the highest manifestation of human flourishing: (1) integration of the body, heart, mind, soul, and spirit of the self; (2) fruitful interactions of self and community (home, neighborhood, village, city, province, nation, world, and beyond); (3) sustainable and harmonious relations between the human species and nature (the animal kingdom, plants, trees, rocks, mountains, rivers, and air); and (4) mutuality between the human heart and mind and the Way of Heaven.

Since 2013 a consensus has been emerging in China that Gross Domestic Product is a very limited and limiting measure of development. Besides attending to economic factors, the overall development strategy must include political, social, cultural, and ecological dimensions. This broad vision compels us to think courageously and creatively about the cultural message that China is capable of delivering. Will it be open, pluralistic, and self-reflexive?

China is at a crossroads. It must pursue its own exceptionally unique path, but its path cannot be exclusively Chinese. Even if a broad consensus is reached, China cannot afford to be nationalistic. Rather, China should live up to its own cultural ideal to be cosmopolitan and spiritually humanistic.

## Notes

1. I am indebted to the eminent Indian philosopher R. Balasubramanian for the term “spiritual humanism.”
2. About the concept of symbolic cultural universe, see Tu Weiming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” *Daedalus* (Spring 1991): 1-32.
3. This is Mou Zongsan’s theoretical crystallization of the Pre-Qin Dynasty Confucian scholar Xunzi (313-238 BCE).

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# WORLD IN TRANSITION: FROM A HEGEMONIC DISORDER TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN ORDER

EDWARD DEMENCHONOK

The twentieth century was marked by a sharp contrast between technological achievements on the one hand, and the unprecedented violence of two world wars and the Cold War which brought humanity to the brink of a nuclear holocaust on the other. The rise of global consciousness, which resulted in movements for peace and democratization, led to the end of the Cold War. These movements were underpinned by the understanding of the necessity to change from the bipolar war-prone confrontation to a pluralistic world order of peace and multilateral cooperation. Escalating global problems of nuclear proliferation, ecological crisis, and economic underdevelopment, which threaten the future of humanity, can only be solved by joint action, which requires peaceful and cooperative relationships among the nations as a condition for possible solutions or at least mitigation.

On the eve of the twenty-first century, many hoped that “they shall beat their swords into plowshares” (Isaiah 2:4) and humanity would at last embrace new opportunities for peaceful international relations and cooperation in the search for solutions to existing social and global problems. However, these hopes were soon dashed. Unfortunately, instead of a world order grounded in the rule of law and comity among nations, the world remains overshadowed by a heavily militarized superpower that implements a strategy of global hegemony in a unipolar world. The claims of America’s world leadership, the Bush Doctrine (2001), the US-led invasion of Iraq (2003), the boundless “global war on terror,” and similar hegemonic policies asserted global domination.

The idealized picture of a “benevolent hegemon” is already showing cracks, evident in the negative consequences of this policy. Attempts to

solve the problems of human rights and other human problems by military force have not only been unsuccessful, but in many cases, have made them even worse. The “humanitarian interventions” turned out to be “humanitarian imperialism,” destabilizing the countries and causing the destruction, death and suffering of many.

The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which many critics viewed as being in violation of international law, resulted in a myriad of consequences, including further war and destruction, and the rise of ISIS. Regardless of international efforts to establish the rule of law, “might makes right” continues to assert itself as a type of new norm. The other nations, realizing that no one country can rely on international law for protection, may think that their only resort is to rely on themselves for self-defense.

The domestic side-effect of all this disorder—in the United States and especially in Europe—has been the burden of a heavy influx of refugees from war torn countries. In reaction to flagging domestic economies, high unemployment rates, the refugee crisis, and disappointment with neoliberal politics, we have recently seen the rise of neonationalism, anti-immigration, and right-wing populism. Nationalistic isolationism in the name of self-protection is the flip-side of hegemonic domination. Moreover, the policy of domination of the international arena has internal parallels as evidenced by the infringement of civil liberties on the pretext of homeland security, including surveillance programs that invade the privacy of citizens, which amounts to authoritarian control over the people it purports to protect. And so, the pendulum swings again.

All this undermines efforts since the end of WWII to develop an international system based on the rule of law and the equality of relationships of sovereign states. It contributes to the further fragmentation of the world, and it leaves nation-states ever further from the sort of meaningful cooperation that is necessary to achieve solutions to global problems.

In the neoconservative and some of the neoliberal assessments, the current world situation is frequently described deterministically as an inevitable process emanating from globalization. They present the current situation as a dilemma: either fall back to the pre-United Nations anarchy or accept the “imperial necessities.” In either case, they suggest that we have no choice but to capitulate to the flow of events, relying on the mercy of the “benevolent hegemon.” Instead, protracting the hegemonic policy only deepens the current disorder and delays the domination-free normalization of the international order.

However, the current rise of the hegemonic power should not obfuscate a broader historical picture, which is replete with the rise and fall of

empires. The complexity of the contemporary diverse world, which contains many different, competing tendencies and possibilities, does not make being controlled from one hegemonic center the only possibility. A hegemonic future is not preordained.

Although the United States still remains the preponderant military superpower and has the largest economy, it has no monopoly on global power: China is growing as the second world economy, Russia has been reasserting its role as a global player, and competing regional and transcontinental alliances such as BRICS (an economic association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have been rising in prominence. The world is already not unipolar, but it is emerging as politically multi-centric and socio-culturally diverse.

Military domination by a superpower is perceived as a threat by nations that do not want to be dominated; this provokes defensive reactions and spurs the arms race, increasing the risk of war. In commenting on current confrontational rhetoric, some political analysts have opined that an eve of a new Cold War is upon us, or actually beginning. Given the current state of world affairs, it is unlikely that a second Cold War would have a peaceful happy ending like the first. In such a case, the world community is once again facing an escalation of the nuclear arms race, threatening the future of humanity. The overkill capacity of the existing stockpiles of thermonuclear weaponry is so enormous that even if 90 percent of nuclear weapons were eliminated, the remaining 10 percent would still be enough to exterminate life on Earth. There exists not only the immediate threat of living on the powder keg of the stocks of weapons of mass destruction, which can be detonated by regional wars and explode at any time, but also the time bombs of the escalating ecological crisis and of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the underdeveloped countries. The “end of history” can come not as a bang but as a whimper: an entropy-like, agonizing process of degradation.

Concerns about escalating global problems are reflected in academic critiques, which also question the hegemonic policy. How does a hegemon-centric world order influence international relations? What alternatives might preclude a hegemonic dystopia and lead to a peaceful, post-hegemonic future? Is it possible to break the vicious circle of power politics and self-destructing violence against human beings and nature that pushes us closer to the precipice of nuclear or ecological catastrophes? Could a cosmopolitan ideal be such an alternative?

A few methodological perspectives have come to the forefront as helpful in approaching the problems of the contemporary world. First is

the concept of open history. As opposed to deterministic accounts of history, in viewing history as open—as containing many potential alternatives and implying moral responsibility—we can identify decisive moments or historical turning points. For any given historical situation, we can deliberate about paths of action or decisions not taken and unrealized alternative paths that could have been taken. We can examine the processes shaping our world order from the perspective of the history open in the past as well as in the future. Second, the present historical period is viewed as a period of transition—understood, however, not as teleology, but as potential opportunities for the solution or at least mitigation of the global problems and positive transformation of societies and international relations. Third, the realization of these opportunities is viewed as dependent on the political forces, including social movements, actors representing global civil society, and mobilization from below, which are willing to strive for these transformative goals. Fourth, the concept of transition suggests a process toward a better alternative to the existing conditions, a feasible social ideal, which can serve as a goal for transformation. In the long-range perspective, such ideal is expressed by cosmopolitan thought. Fifth, universal concepts, such as human rights, are viewed as normative criteria for the evaluation, critique, and possible improvement of any society. Similarly, the cosmopolitan ideal serves as a normative perspective for a critical assessment of the international order and its possible transformation. It shows the problems that hinder such a progressive transformation and their possible solutions. Sixth, many researchers relate some of these problems to the tendency of the United States toward hegemony, which presumes a hegemon-centric world to be the future of humanity. Nevertheless, it should be clear that today, the United States is not the only cause of the problems, nor does it hold the potential to solve global problems. However, given its unchallenged military and economic power and claims of world leadership, its hegemonic policy has become a major factor influencing contemporary international relations, with all its short- and long-range consequences. An analysis of this tendency will be helpful for getting a better understanding of the complexity of the problems of today's world. Arguably, the current period can be envisioned as part of a gradual, long-range process of transition from an international order and hegemony toward a cosmopolitan world order of law and peace.

This chapter reviews some of the oppositional conceptions found in contemporary academic discussions. The first opposition is *unipolarity/multilateralism*. Hegemonic unipolarity is contrasted with the conceptualization of a pluralistic multilateral world. The idea of a

multipolar world as an alternative to unipolar world is important, but still limited: Multipolarity can be attractive only if understood as the first step toward dismantling unipolar hegemony. The divisive term “-polarity” already implies sharp contrast or opposition, so it would be better to use terms conveying plurality and coexistence, such as “multicentric” or “multilateral.” Normatively, it would be necessary to change the character of relationship among the nations—from domination/subjection to dialogical and collaborative relations as equals. The second opposition is *statism/cosmopolitanism*. Cosmopolitan thought strives for an ideal beyond a conflict-ridden state-centric system—a domination-free, cross-cultural, dialogical world order. This contrast is most glaring when the United States, which is the sole military superpower, has ambitions for global hegemony. A hegemon-centric world order, claiming to represent the future of humanity, is what the cosmopolitan project opposes. This chapter asserts that the ideal alternative would be not *for* the dominating power to change hands, but to strive for a world free *from* any hegemonic domination. These two oppositions overlap, since cosmopolitanism is an anti-hegemonic project. Thus, the *hegemony/cosmopolitanism* opposition stands at the forefront of the struggle for the future of humanity.

In this chapter, I will analyze a rebirth of the ideals of cosmopolitanism in the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s, as well as challenges posed to it by hegemonic policy in the twenty-first century. Models of cosmopolitan democracy and agonistic democracy will then be surveyed. Next, I will examine the concepts of radical cosmopolitanism, after which cosmopolitan views of hospitality in relation to the problem of refugee immigration will be presented. Finally, I will describe the main characteristics of a new cosmopolitanism, which is critical, democratic, and dialogic.

### ***A Rebirth of the Ideals of Cosmopolitanism***

The end of the twentieth century was marked by an escalation of global problems such as the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the worsening plight of underdeveloped Third World countries, and the ecological crisis, all of which threaten the very future of humanity. The peaceful end to the Cold War opened up opportunities to achieve positive change, to break the vicious circle of violence, to establish peaceful international coexistence and collaboration, and to redirect resources from supporting military-industrial complexes to develop solutions to social and global problems.

In the quest to improve the future prospects for humanity, the 1990s were a time of a rebirth of the ideals of cosmopolitanism and striving

toward their practical implementation. A wave of publications and discussions on cosmopolitanism reflects an interest that is not merely academic, but one containing fruitful ideas for progressive changes.

Cosmopolitanism expresses a quest for changes moving from the war-prone world of divisions and hegemonic domination toward a world order of peace and multilateral cooperation as equals. This requires strengthening international law and institutions, such as the United Nations. Cosmopolitanism envisions a long-range democratic transformation of societies and international relations.

As its central idea, cosmopolitanism asserts that all human beings are equals. Since this idea is understood in diverse ways, it generates a broad spectrum of cosmopolitan positions. Amid the diversity of voices in the debate on the philosophy of cosmopolitanism, two main, interrelated trends can be identified: One is toward an emphasis on identification with humanity as a whole and world-citizenship. It elaborates a concern with the equal moral status of each and every human being, inalienable human rights, and the future of humanity as a whole. The other trend emphasizes protection of the cultural diversity of nations, minority groups, and individuals, as well as the significance of their familial, ethnic, and religious affiliations. This trend is akin to other movements that champion cultural diversity, as opposed to the depersonalizing politico-economic systems or homogenizing globalization. Both trends reflect a tension between the universal and the particular, as well as the attempts of their reconciliation as embodied in the motto "unity in diversity."

In the 1990s, the predominant view was *moral* cosmopolitanism, which asserts that every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern, is entitled to equal respect, and must be properly considered in practical deliberations about any lawmaking and policymaking actions that may affect anyone's vital interests.

Thomas Pogge, expressing the post-Cold War atmosphere of relief, wrote, "the human future suddenly seems open." By that he meant that instead of containment, political scientists were discussing grand pictures of mutual pacifism; he added, "politicians are speaking of a new world order."<sup>1</sup> Pogge distinguishes three key elements shared by all cosmopolitan positions: First, individualism, meaning that the ultimate units of moral concern are individuals (rather than communities, nations, or states). Second, universality, implying that every individual equally possesses this status of ultimate unit of concern and that the equal moral worth of persons should be recognized by all. Third, generality, namely that individuals are ultimate units of concern for everyone (not only for their compatriots).<sup>2</sup> The requirement to respect one another's status as ultimate

units of moral concern imposes limits upon the individual's conduct and institutions. Pogge also mentions the principle of impartiality, which requires impartial consideration in public deliberation as well as impartial administration of rules by public officials without privileging the interests of their friends or compatriots. His conception of social-justice cosmopolitanism is formulated in terms of human rights. It is related to basic human needs and it is compatible with a wide range of political, moral, and religious cultures. Pogge's proposal of cosmopolitan institutions is also based on human rights. He considers a form of "legal cosmopolitanism," understood to mean any cosmopolitan conception that demands that social institutions be designed so that they take equal account of the interests of all human beings. This cosmopolitanism is committed to an ideal of a global order under which all persons have equal rights and duties as cosmopolitan citizens. He offers an idea of global institutional reform which would disperse political authority in a multilayered system. This "institutional cosmopolitanism would favor a global order in which sovereignty is widely distributed vertically," aiming to reduce poverty, oppression, and wars.<sup>3</sup>

Moral cosmopolitanism is also understood as a demand to apply worldwide a principle that asserts that policies and institutions should impartially consider the claims of each person who would be affected by them. This understanding is developed by Charles Beitz in his analysis of the basis of international morality and global distributive justice. He criticizes the widespread belief that moral judgments are fundamentally inapplicable to matters of foreign policy and international relations. According to him, a theory of international politics should include a principle of international distributive justice in virtue of its resemblance to the justice of a state's domestic institutions, in order to establish a fair division of resources and wealth among persons in diverse societies.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast to much contemporary political philosophy, Charles Jones's cosmopolitan vision of global justice is underpinned by a strong moral imperative. He defends the view that distributive justice is best conceived in terms of human rights. From this it follows, "the demands of globalization include various positive actions aimed to protecting the vital interests of everyone regardless of their location, nationality, or citizenship."<sup>5</sup> He addresses the fundamental question of international distributive justice regarding obligations that the wealthy have to ensure that the world's poor achieve a decent quality of life.

Moral cosmopolitanism underpins most late twentieth century cosmopolitan political theories, which deal with issues of the injustice of national or global economic and social conditions. Political theorists address

issues at the interface between moral cosmopolitanism and its political applications and discuss how to implement cosmopolitan principles through new institutions. They distinguish various institutional dimensions of cosmopolitanism in relation to the key problems embedded in the international order, such as: legal cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism, economic cosmopolitanism, and cultural cosmopolitanism.<sup>6</sup>

The end of the Cold War bipolar division of the world inspired scholars to seek ways of democratizing relationships among the nations in a multicentric world. Since the early 1990s, several philosophers and political scientists, including Daniele Archibugi, Ulrich Beck, Richard Falk, Jürgen Habermas, David Held, and Mary Kaldor, among others, insisted on the need for substantial transformations of world politics to make them more accountable and more respectful of the rule of law. They expressed the innovative idea that the concept and practice of democracy should not be limited by state borders, but should be applied to international relations as well. They initiated discussions about the issues of “democracy beyond borders,” of democracy within international organizations, and the possibility of a cosmopolitan democracy.<sup>7</sup> This initiative has evolved into a conceptualization of cosmopolitan democracy as a political theory regarding the application of principles and values of democracy at the transnational and global levels. Its adherents have elaborated on normative questions and institutional models related to a cosmopolitan democracy and they have conducted empirical studies of the socio-economic processes that may lead some social movements and political agents to carry out such transformations.

Since the late twentieth century, cosmopolitan theories developed by a group of thinkers, associated with Critical Theory, such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, and James Bohman, among others, became increasingly influential. They view cosmopolitanism as a normative philosophy, which enhances the universalistic norms of discourse ethics. Despite their differences, for all of them, Kant serves as a source of inspiration in the search for solutions to today’s problems. And while they believe that Kant’s theory needs substantial modification, they all insist that it continues to possess normative relevance.

Apel transformed Kant’s transcendental argumentation into transcendental-pragmatic argumentation, in accordance with which universally valid norms should be acceptable with regard to their expected consequences for all affected persons. This laid the ground for a planetary macro-ethics of co-responsibility for humanity. The principle of discourse ethics provides a moral foundation for human rights and thus for international law. In the critical reconstruction of the Kantian conception of history, Apel writes,

“once we rethink teleology in terms of opportunities to realize the cosmopolitan order of law and peace in history, it is also possible to reevaluate Kant’s assessment of the positive means that help realize these goals.”<sup>8</sup> It must be understood as a moral duty to take advantage of these political opportunities to create conditions for the realization of the cosmopolitan ideal.

A central issue in thinking about cosmopolitanism is the status of the sovereignty of nation states as political communities within a larger cosmopolitan order. In “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” (1784), Kant suggests solutions to social conflicts through establishing a law-governed social order, “a perfectly *just civil constitution*”<sup>9</sup> and a lawful external relation between states which enter into a federation of nations, where every state will have equal rights and security. This will lead to “a universal *cosmopolitan condition*.”<sup>10</sup> Ten years later, in 1795, these ideas were further elaborated in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, in which he abandoned his earlier idea of a “world republic,” modeled after a state, for fear that the hegemony of a powerful state would be like a despotic “universal monarchy” and a danger for human freedom. Kant envisioned the possible danger of such a supreme political power and, as a preventative, emphasized the right of a state to be independent or autonomous with respect to other states. Instead of a world republic he advocated for a *federalism* of free states, a voluntary league of peace among nations, called a *pacific league (foedus pacificum)*.<sup>11</sup> Its members must feel obligated to subordinate their own *raison d’etat* to the common goal of peace, while at the same time preserving their sovereignty and independence as voluntarily associated members, which retain even the authority to dissolve a coalition: “Such an *association* of several *states* to preserve peace can be called a *permanent congress of states*, which each neighboring state is at liberty to join.”<sup>12</sup>

Cosmopolitan theorists view the sovereignty as differentiated, polycentric, and interactive. Kenneth Baynes develops a conception of “differentiated sovereignty.” He sees it as the necessary element in introducing the concept of democracy into Kant’s cosmopolitanism, arguing that global governance requires local forms of sovereignty in order to allow for citizens’ accountability.<sup>13</sup>

Models of cosmopolitan democracy and the possibilities of a new international order have been explored by Held. In critically rethinking Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan law, Held advocates enacting democratic public law in the wider global order. He has developed a conception of cosmopolitan democratic law. According to him, cosmopolitan right is a necessary complement to the codes of existing national and

international law, the basis on which a cosmopolitan order can be constructed. Accordingly, individuals can be citizens of the world as well as of nation-states. In contrast to the ideas of a centralized “world state,” Held endorsed Kant’s conception of the federation of free states. He considered the idea of confederalism to be necessary, since a democratic international order can be legitimate only if it is voluntary and based on the consent of the peoples.<sup>14</sup> Based on those ideas, Held has suggested a series of changes in international institutions, including the appropriate reform of the United Nations system, the creation of a global parliament, and so on.

Cosmopolitan law is incompatible with the existing models of politics and centralized institutional forms, and thus its implementation requires deep transformation of the existing power structures. As Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann suggest: “Cosmopolitanism requires not a unified center of political power but a differentiated institutional structure with various levels of democratic sovereignty.”<sup>15</sup> It also requires the emergence of indigenous cosmopolitan public spheres. Today, in the globally interconnected world, when all political communities are facing the same dangers of global problems, “it is clear that living up to democratic ideals of political and economic justice (democratic self-determination and freedom from destitution, abject suffering, hunger, and environmental catastrophe) is now truly and unavoidably a cosmopolitan project.”<sup>16</sup>

Martha Nussbaum stresses that Kant is very relevant with his “politics based upon reason rather than patriotism or group sentiment,”<sup>17</sup> a politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian, a politics that was active, reformist, and optimistic. She opines that it would be helpful for us to adopt a cosmopolitan philosophy and to follow a “Stoic/Kantian tradition of cautious rational optimism,” which means certain postulates of practical reason and hope for better times to come, which are necessary for “doing something useful for the common good.”<sup>18</sup>

Jürgen Habermas notes that Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan order must be reformulated according to the changing world situation. The cosmopolitan idea itself is evolving. Attempts to implement it in politics were made after WWI by the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, and after WWII, by the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Likewise, “the challenge of the incomparable catastrophes of the twentieth century has also given new impetus to Kant’s idea.”<sup>19</sup> Habermas asserts that the contemporary reformulation of the Kantian idea of the cosmopolitan order of law and peace inspired the efforts to reform the United Nations, to create supranational organizations in various regions of the world, and to improve the institutional framework necessary for a politics based on

human rights. He views the world situation as being at a crossroads: “the contemporary situation can be understood in the best-case scenario as a period of transition from international to cosmopolitan law, but many indications support regression to nationalism.”<sup>20</sup>

That was the situation back in the 1990s. The theorists of cosmopolitanism were optimistic about the possibility of the transformation of an international system and transition toward a cosmopolitan order. Their analyses and prognoses were based on the assumption that the positive changes toward democratization inside the societies and in the relationships among the nations would continue. Their philosophical groundings and proposals for political reforms were working to promote this best-case scenario for a new world order.

Unfortunately, at the same time, political forces that were interested in the preservation of the status quo and the vested interests of power and privilege continued in a course of action that was viewed by advocates of a cosmopolitan world order as actively undermining the conditions for going toward the transformation they sought. These conservative forces not only supported the retention of nationalism, but since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the neoconservative “revolution” has shifted world politics even further to the extreme right. Advocates of a cosmopolitan world order view this as a worst-case scenario: continued militarism and world hegemony.

### *Cosmopolitanism as an Alternative to Hegemonization*

Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the world was already troubled by the appearance on the world stage of a unilateral national actor that seemed increasingly determined to go it alone. Since that time, the process of disarmament and the improvement of international relations have been interrupted and reversed. This shift in world politics was not inevitable however; rather, it was a result of the neoconservative “revolution,” which, in the name of global domination by a superpower, torpedoed the peaceful achievements of the post-Cold War decade.

The superpower established its hegemonic dominance not only through its “hard power” of military preponderance and economic leverages, but also through the “soft power” of diplomacy and legislation. Along with attempts to diminish the role of international law by disingenuously opposing it to the “ethos” of superpower, there is also the tendency to change its function from an emphasis on constraining the use of power to rather legitimizing its unilateral use; in short creating a “hegemonic

international law” as a tool for the superpower’s policy.<sup>21</sup> Of special concern have been the US influence in the United Nations and legislative initiatives in the UN Security Council, particularly, its resolutions related to self-defense and the war on terrorism. José E. Alvarez raises concerns regarding the use (and possible abuses) of its powers saying, “an effective Council may well be an imperial one,” and “it may yet emerge as the hegemon’s little helper or junior partner.”<sup>22</sup>

After the US-led invasion in Iraq, Habermas opined that the behavior of the American government evinced its belief that “international law is finished as a medium for resolving conflicts between states and for promoting democracy and human rights.”<sup>23</sup> He worried that a precedent had been set for every country to feel free to do the same. Thus, in the future, no one country could rely on international law as a bulwark against precedents set by hegemonic predators. No country can feel safe from being the next target of similar “democratizing” or “humanitarian” intervention or “regime change,” and this precedent provides an excuse for those who are criticized for not being in compliance with the international law, and who now point the finger to that precedent as an excuse. It makes many wonder if “might makes right” is becoming a new norm.

Many progressive intellectuals have been concerned about the hegemonic geopolitics and have protested against hegemonic interventions.<sup>24</sup> A case in point is that of Habermas and Jacques Derrida, who co-authored “February 15, or: What Binds Europeans Together,” which refers to February 15, 2003, a day of mass demonstrations across Europe in protest against the preparation for the US-led invasion of Iraq. They spoke of

the call for a renewed confirmation and effective transformation of international law and its institutions, in particular the United Nations, a new conception and new practices of distributing state power, etc., in the spirit, and even the letter, of the Kantian tradition.<sup>25</sup>

Their works have shown that a hegemonic project has no future, that the solution to the social and global problems in the interrelated world requires peaceful and collaborative relationships of all nations, based on the rule of law and democratically reformed international institutions in a multicentric world free of domination, aiming for the cosmopolitan ideal.

In the theoretical realm, discussions about the tendencies and future of international law and institutions reflect the complexity of the situation. We need a critical revision of existing theories, one that assuages reservations regarding potential detriments of employing universalizing concepts and their possible hegemonic “capture,” while at the same time

elucidating the real possibilities of a non-hegemonic future and the means for its realization.

Scholars were concerned about hegemonic policy which was degrading the international law and institutions, thus undermining the basis for the amelioration of international relations and cooperation for solving social and global problems. The imposition of democracy or even human rights by force, within the framework of power politics, cannot succeed in the long term. Traditional policies have failed to solve the real problems, because they have not removed their root causes. Instead, the problems have gotten worse while new problems have been generated. Imposition of the hegemon-centric order can have grave consequences for the whole world, including the hegemon itself. Thus, new approaches and policies are needed.

Two centuries ago, Kant, in his proposal for a peaceful world order, warned against a “world republic” or a world state as a despotic “world monarchy,” and instead envisioned a lawful federation of free nations, and a gradual transition from an international to a cosmopolitan order. The post-Cold War world was facing unresolved problems inherited from the past, including the necessity to reform the international system by strengthening international law and institutions, such as the United Nations, which were debilitated and almost paralyzed by four decades of the two world superpowers’ geopolitical struggle. The world order envisioned in the UN Charter remains an unfinished project. Advancement in establishing the rule of law, peace, and cooperation among the nations as equals would lay the groundwork for the gradual transition from an international state-based (Westphalian) system toward the development of transnational or postnational arrangements, which, in a long-range perspective, would evolve toward what Kant envisioned as a cosmopolitan order. The relatively peaceful situation during the 1990s opened opportunities for starting long overdue reforms, strengthening international law and institutions, and implementing the principles of the UN Charter, which would provide conditions for the collective security and cooperation of nations in solving social and global problems. This transformation was necessary to accommodate the increasingly interrelated world. The increasing activities of the United Nations and the movement for human rights were promising signs of the possibility of such transformation.

However, the hegemonic turn in US foreign policy has undermined these opportunities and derailed international relations, pushing them backwards—from the possibilities of a multicentric world of cooperation of sovereign nations as equals based on the rule of law toward a hegemon-centric unipolar world. The hegemonic design is neither new nor an

attractive alternative to the traditional state-centric system. The hegemonic “world state” is a superpower nation-state, with its own interests and ethnocentrism, which projects imperial domination over the other states as vassals. It reproduces a well-known historical pattern, while in this case the imperial ambitions are not regional but global, and the methods of domination are more sophisticated. Contemporary Big Brother may be technologically equipped for electronic global surveillance and other means of control, but still, as in times past, the hegemon tries to represent its own interests as the interests of the nations it tries to dominate, this time on the global stage. It uses its paternalistic leadership and international institutions to increase its own power and wealth.

This is a regressive geopolitical tendency toward pre-United Nations anarchy and imperial clashes—as if we have learned no lessons from WWI, WWII, and the Cold War nuclear “balance of terror.” The efforts of the world community to prevent recurrence of such tragedies by establishing a world order according to the UN Charter and international rule of law and cooperation are in danger of being derailed.

Architects of “imperial design,” have used military presence—in effect expanding national interests beyond its borders as symbolized by nearly 800 military bases in more than seventy countries and territories—to dominate and exploit other nations. All this is a repetition of the sort of imperialistic designs that caused the world wars of twentieth century.

Critics argue that “hegemonic stability” and other neorealist theories are flawed, pointing out that the hegemonic policies are conducive to wars rather than preventing them. Such practices threaten other nations and provoke defensive reactions and counter-hegemonic alliances, thus accelerating the arms race and causing “hegemonic instability.”

Scholars have been concerned about these policies, which undermine peaceful international relations and cooperation for solving global problems. They show in the US policy a glaring discrepancy between declared ends and the means used to achieve them: world stability through power politics and the hegemony of a global empire; security through militarization and global electronic mass surveillance; prosperity of the few at the expense of the many; economic growth at the cost of destroying the environment; and the forcible “spread of democracy” in violation of international law. They also show discrepancies between the “benevolent” declarations of the self-styled “world leader” and its self-serving actions in pursuing its own interests; between promises of ensuring world stability and the actual increasing of global disorder; between its ambitious geopolitical goals and its overstretched economic resources.

The design of hegemon-centric world, dominated by one state alone or with its allies (condominium) is inherently undemocratic. It is modeled on the rule of an authoritarian state, expanded globally, infringing on the self-determination and sovereign equality of states, as enshrined in the UN Charter. It is at odds with the diversity of the world. Its promise of world stability is not feasible, because it does not solve the root causes of instability, and its repressive measures provoke resistance and counteractions, thus perpetuating the vicious circle of destabilizing violence.

Hegemonic policy is an outcome of the neoconservative “revolution” as the reaction to the demands for progressive changes. It is focused on the preservation of status quo, of the existing system of power politics, inequality, and exploitation. It serves and benefits powerful dominating nations at the cost of the less powerful; it benefits big transnational corporations at the cost of ruining the local society-friendly forms of production and employment; it benefits political parties financed and serving the interests of powerful elites instead of the interests of the people, thus degenerating democracy into a fiction. This system is the major cause of the exacerbation of current social and global problems, not their solution. Its continuation will only aggravate these problems, diminishing the likelihood of their possible solutions. The imperial foreign policy of domination is inseparable from its domestic authoritarian extension, making citizens of the imperial state the hostages of the global conquest and bearing the burdens and risks of this adventure.

History shows that, despite the ambivalence of different tendencies within US foreign policy—vacillating between unilateral “realism” and messianic “idealism” of spreading democracy, and between an emphasis on military “hard” power or diplomatic “soft” power—its dominant orientation remains consistently hegemonic. This pattern does not change appreciably with the change of presidential administrations. Under President William Jefferson Clinton, there was the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the NATO expansion east to the borders of Russia. The hallmark of George W. Bush’s Presidency was the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Barack Hussein Obama’s foreign policy was a continuation of that of Bush, adding to it another regime change in Libya. President Donald J. Trump, in his inaugural address January 21, 2017, stated: “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First.” It is fine for any nation to prioritize the interests of its own people—as far as this doesn’t harm other nations and the same principle and right of self-determination and non-interference is respected regarding other nations. President Trump also stated that “together, we will determine the course of

America and the world for years to come.” This can be understood as envisioning the United States’ intention to continue its hegemony.

This position has always been implied in American foreign policy, but not necessarily expressed openly. Instead, the United States has acted under the guise of “benevolence” and a paternalistic mission of “spreading democracy.” On the other hand, Trump’s rhetoric could also be understood as a signal that the United States may intend to back away from its previous paternalistic promises. Faced with insurmountable national debt and economic problems of its own, and with the world imploring the United States to discontinue hegemonic control and foreign interventions, it might seem as if this would be a good time to withdraw those promises, along with its hegemony. Only concrete actions in foreign policy will show its real intent. However, President Trump’s budget proposal in his first address to a joint session of Congress on February 28, 2017 “calls for one of the largest increases in national defense spending in American history,” which seems to indicate an increase in militarized hegemony.

History also shows that, according to the logic of power politics, the powerful bully will try to go as far as it can, until stopped by the resistance. How far the current tendency toward hegemonic authoritarian policy will go will depend on how much the citizens are willing to tolerate an authoritarian regime domestically, and how much the other sovereign nations are willing to subject themselves to foreign domination. Their future ultimately rests in their own hands.

In following the example of the world leader, other countries may similarly assume a self-interested, isolationistic policy. However, this falling back toward a kind of the nineteenth-century paradigm of international relations is at odds with the imperatives of the twenty-first century interdependent world. Global warming, nuclear weapons stockpiles, poverty, and other global problems are escalating, all of which threaten the future of humanity. Solutions to these problems, or at least their mitigation, require a radical change in international relations—self-liberation from being a hostage of the global empire and establishing dialogical and collaborative relationships of sovereign nations as equals. Without this, humanity will continue sliding toward the precipice of potential catastrophe.

In the twenty-first century, cosmopolitanism is not merely an idea, but it also is emerging as a project and a viable alternative to the hegemon-centric design. Cosmopolitanism offers the promise of a world order beyond a state-centric system; it is emerging as an alternative to hegemony. At the center of cosmopolitanism are human individuals and humanity as a whole. It champions the noble human ideals of freedom,

equality, and justice. It asserts the universality of principles of the moral equality and autonomy of individuals and of inalienable human rights. It views individuals as “citizens of the world.” It values democracy at all levels, including the democratization of international relations. This dimension is articulated in the theories of cosmopolitan democracy.

In contrast to the homogenizing hegemonic “integration,” cosmopolitanism enhances cultural diversity and encourages dialogical relationships among peoples with different cultural backgrounds, leading toward unity in diversity. Cosmopolitan universalism combines respect for diversity with dialogical relationships, including in search for consensus and peaceful solutions to the problems. It views each individual as an end in itself. From this perspective, institutions and policies are justifiable only insofar as they serve the well-being of individuals as well as humanity generally.

The cosmopolitan project tries to bridge the gap between the ideal and the current reality of a conflicted world. Currently, this gap is huge—almost abysmal. The cosmopolitan ideal is an alternative to a conflicted state-centric international system. However, it does not deny the existing international system or call for its demise. Instead, it critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this system and suggests ways for its improvement. In contrast to hegemonic attempts to avoid the constraints of international law and transform it into “hegemonic international law,” cosmopolitanism calls for strengthening international law, free from hegemonic influence. The rule of law is viewed as a bulwark against injustices.<sup>26</sup> For example, while hegemonic ideologues criticize existing international law and institutions, especially the United Nations, as inefficient and conclude that they should be ignored and replaced by the “ethos” and voluntaristic unilateralism of the superpower, adherents of cosmopolitanism point out the weaknesses of the United Nations, but call for its proper reform to strengthen it and make it fully functioning, along with other international institutions and NGOs. Adherents of cosmopolitanism believe that a properly reformed United Nations as the meta-institution of global discourse and the political representation of international law, could successfully serve its core mission of maintaining peace and the global enforcement of human rights, as well as fostering socio-economic advancement of the underdeveloped countries.

Cosmopolitanism strives for true stability, which can be achieved only through constructive approaches, seeking the balance of interests through negotiations and the consensus of all nations as free and equal, based on the rule of law. Such an approach recognizes the socio-cultural diversity of the nations and their own ways of development within the framework of

peaceful and collaborative relationships with the other nations. This approach would achieve a dynamic stability of mutually beneficial growth.

The cosmopolitan project is akin to humanistic thought which affirms the value of human life, freedom, and the future of human civilization. Similarly, cosmopolitanism asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind, and the rest of the biotic community, must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to any particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. It also asserts an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility. It orients toward the solution to the world problems that concern all human beings living at present, as well as future generations. This philosophy speaks to the vital interests of all peoples.

For cosmopolitanism, moral ends can be achieved only by morally good means. This excludes violence and domination. It objects to the use of force and wars, and instead insists on the collective security and lawful and peaceful solutions to international disputes. It affirms the sovereign equality of the nations and their relationships based on the rule of law. This would provide favorable conditions for the cooperation of nations in their joint efforts to find solutions to global problems or at least the mitigation of them.

The cosmopolitan ideals in their normative role as criteria for evaluation and critique of the current socio-political processes can help us to see obstacles and problems on the way toward achieving these goals and help to determine which issues need to be solved to facilitate progress toward, if not an "ideal," then at least a realistically better, more peaceful and just world.

Admittedly, it is premature to think that we already live in a postnational or cosmopolitan world; such an assumption would play into the hands of the hegemonic policy pretending to be a means of the realization of these ideals. But it would be equally premature to abandon all hope for the realization of these ideals, surrendering them to hegemonic ideology. Reformist projects, inspired by the great humanistic ideals of world peace and a cosmopolitan order are not dead and should not be discarded. Rather, it is realistic to admit that they have been historically postponed, and put into perspective: "a cosmopolitanism to come."

Resistance to hegemonic domination by developing viable alternatives to it is an immediate necessity. At the same time, as long-term tasks, we must not lose our vision of a post-hegemonic future and the normalization of international relationships free of domination; the project of a cosmopolitan world order must be viewed as a guiding ideal. The battle for the democratization of international relations and the cosmopolitan future needs to start here and now.

Cosmopolitanism has always played an important role in the critique of the existent world order. This role increases in the time of hegemony. For example, the concept of universal human rights plays a role as a regulative principle or normative standard for the evaluation and the possible critique of all states, including democratic ones. The cosmopolitan ideal serves as a regulative principle for a critical assessment of the international order and its current hegemonic tendencies. However, hegemonic ideology attempts to “capture” humanitarian and universalizing concepts and transform them into “humanitarian imperialism” and “imperial cosmopolitanism.” This involves a critique of certain versions of cosmopolitanism. On the positive side, philosophers are contributing to the further elaboration of the concept of a cosmopolitan order, rethinking it in the light of the current hegemonic turn in world politics. To the “imperial” interpretation of cosmopolitanism they oppose democratic and dialogic cosmopolitanism.

To realize its transformative potential in today’s conflicted world and to respond to internal theoretical and external political-ideological and social-cultural challenges, cosmopolitan theories need to undergo self-transformation and revitalization. This transformation is a process in which the dialectics between tradition and innovation are in play. The steps in this direction can be seen in recent publications on cosmopolitanism. Although it is too early to surmise about a fully developed theory, nevertheless some distinctive approaches and ideas show the contours of the twenty-first century new cosmopolitanism (in comparison to earlier ideas which also were called “new” for their time).

First of all, its theorists are not deluded either by the fear-aggressive militaristic bravado of the superpower or by the ideological pronouncements of its pundits trumpeting the “end of history” and the beginning of the hegemon-centric world order as a future for humanity.

In contrast to the economic determinism of neoconservatives and neoliberals, cosmopolitan theorists point to the roles of culture, diversity, and human subjectivity, which influence events. To the deterministic teleological view of history as unilinear, driven by a technology-guided economy toward a hegemon-centric world order, cosmopolitan theorists oppose the view of history as open, and implying the moral responsibility of people to take an active role in historical-cultural creativity. In contrast to “might makes right,” these theorists call for the democratization of relationships within society and among nations. To dehumanizing power, they oppose the ideas of human freedom and solidarity. Distinctive characteristics of the new cosmopolitanism, some of which will be elucidated in this chapter, are summarized here:

- (1) Self-reflexivity regarding its philosophical and methodological assumptions;
- (2) Rooted or embedded in a specific history, culture, nation or people, bridging both global and local;
- (3) Critical of the status quo and of hegemonic domination;
- (4) Ethico-political;
- (5) Champions democratic principles and values within the society and in international relations;
- (6) Values dialogism as a normative principle for its own theorizing and as the best method to conduct intercultural and socio-political relationships, both domestic and international;
- (7) Transformative, committed to the amelioration of world problems and representing an alternative to both the existing conflictual state-based international system and hegemonic centralization.

Based on these basic characteristics, the new cosmopolitanism contributes to the rethinking and re-articulation of some conceptions and principles of relationships within society and among the nations. For example:

- (1) The conception of universality is subjected to critical analysis; in contrast to “abstract” universality, it offers “concrete” universality and “diversality;”
- (2) The hegemonic design is criticized as constituting pseudo-universalistic ethnocentrism;
- (3) A new light is shed on moral cosmopolitanism and international ethics, focusing on freedom and freedom of choice for political agents;
- (4) Political cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitics are elaborated;
- (5) Hegemony, seen as “totalizing centralism” is rejected;
- (6) Cosmopolitan democracy is elucidated, offering pluralistic and multilayered models of institutional organization as viable potentialities;
- (7) Socio-cultural diversity and recognition of the Other are preeminent priorities;
- (8) Dialogical relationships among peoples with different cultural backgrounds are articulated;
- (9) The political conception of human rights is extended, holding that human rights and sovereign equality are two interrelated legal principles of the international system, both of which are crucial to make this system more just;

(10) Freedom and equality are foundational values.

New cosmopolitanism is not only an attractive *ideal* but an emerging viable *project* offered to counter hegemonic policy, which would lead to the normalization of the international system and to the subsequent development of conditions for a gradual transition to a cosmopolitan world order.

### *Cosmopolitan Democracy versus Hegemony*

The theorists of cosmopolitanism see it as a perspective on long-range, progressive changes. They reject ideas of “world state” or centralized “world government,” which would associate the concept with global empire. They emphasize the diversity and interdependence of the multicentric world, and the need for democratization of international relations and multilateral cooperation of nations as equals—as an antidote to undemocratic unilateralism and to forcible “spreading of democracy.”<sup>27</sup>

Habermas develops a concept of the future world order as “the postnational constellation.”<sup>28</sup> He outlines its institutional architecture as a multilevel framework of what he calls a “global governance without a world government.” It consists of a global three-level system: national, transnational, and supranational. Habermas distinguishes two contrasting conceptions of international law: one is state-centered international law, which reflects multilateral relations between sovereign states, and the other is the hegemonic law of an imperial power. As an alternative, he highlights “the concept of the juridification of international relations, in the sense of a transformation of international law into a cosmopolitan constitution.”<sup>29</sup> He outlines the conceptual parameters of the project of the constitutionalization of international law and of a political constitution for world society. At the same time, he warns against the possible “perplexing fusion of a constitution for world society with the hegemonic law of superpower” and that under hegemonic unilateralism the juridification of international relations would assume a meaning of “a recurrent imperial variant *within* international law.”<sup>30</sup>

In the postnational multi-level global system, “the classical function of the state as the guarantor of security, law, and freedom would be transferred to a *supranational* world organization specialized in securing peace and implementing human rights worldwide.”<sup>31</sup> The treatment of the problems of underdevelopment, the ecological crisis, and of averting other collective threats will be addressed within the context of *transnational* negotiation systems.

Habermas elaborates on the problem of legitimation. In his conceptualization, at the supranational level, the need for legitimation would be met by the mobilizing power of global opinion, such as the condemnation of crimes against humanity and wars of aggression. At the transnational level, war making as a means of resolving conflicts would be prohibited, and the cosmopolitan constitution would prohibit the power-driven compromise formation between unequal partners. As Habermas states, “power politics would no longer have the last word within the normative framework of the international community.”<sup>32</sup> The balancing of interests in the transnational negotiation system should be in compliance with the parameters of justice subject to continual adjustment in the General Assembly.

He shows the contradictions of the unilateral imposition of democracy and human rights by military force. In contrast to an imperial universalism, he argues for an “egalitarian universalism” that, he thinks, is imminent in law and in its procedures and that promotes multilateral will-formation in interstate relations. Moreover, the idea of equal treatment, related to the law of peoples and to the vocabulary of human rights, can serve opposition and liberation movements as the standard for an ideological critique of the abuse of “spreading democracy” by hegemonic power.

Daniele Archibugi explores the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy as a viable and humane response to the challenges of hegemonic globalization. Many world problems, old and new, require the transformation of global governance. He compares peoples struggling to achieve self-government during the 1990s to regressive trends since the 2000s. He attributes what he sees as a regression to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, after which many oppressed peoples have ceased to fight for a democratic regime, saying:

The West had promised to treat all peoples with the same dignity and to promote the same rights for all individuals irrespective of the color of their skin and the passport they held, but these promises were not kept and the wars of aggression have had the effect of blocking any authentic mass movements in support of democratization.<sup>33</sup>

At the same time, Archibugi sees in the movements for democratization at the global scale the force which can counter hegemonic policies: “The project of imperial dominion pursued using the instrument of war must be countered by a project of cosmopolitan governance based on the values of democracy, which thus uses methods that are opposite of those used so far.”<sup>34</sup>

He suggests a cosmopolitan approach to democratic global governance that connects individuals to decision-making. The authority and legitimacy of such governance rest in the collective will and participation of citizens. At the heart of cosmopolitan democracy are the guiding principles: nonviolence; popular control; and political equality, understood as equal participation rights for individuals. These general principles are equally applicable at both national and supra-state levels.

Archibugi argues that democracy can be extended to the global political arena by reforming existing international organizations and creating new ones. He outlines reform proposals for the UN Security Council, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, and the Human Rights Council, and he calls for the establishment of a UN-based World Parliamentary Assembly. His proposed model seems to be a middle path between federal structure with some transfer of sovereignty from the state to the global level, and confederal arrangement where states are the exclusive actors and retain considerable authority. He insists in giving voice to new global players such as social movements, minorities, and cultural communities. Cosmopolitan democracy is anchored to the core principle of democracy: “democracy is a regime that must be constructed bottom-up and not top-down and that may be imported but cannot be exported.”<sup>35</sup>

Held opines that we can specify a set of principles that expresses the idea of each person having equal moral significance. He identifies eight of these principles: equal worth and dignity; active agency; personal responsibility and accountability; consent; collective decision-making about public matters; inclusiveness and subsidiarity; avoidance of serious harm; and sustainability.<sup>36</sup> Due to a hermeneutic complexity in moral and political affairs, while these principles are universal in scope, they are interpreted in local contexts in situated discussion. He termed this a “layered cosmopolitan perspective.”<sup>37</sup> He articulates a cosmopolitan concept of “multilevel citizenship.”<sup>38</sup>

Held asserts that democracy within a single community and democratic relations among communities are deeply interconnected, and both are needed for the progression of democracy. Contemporary challenges to global governance “raise issues concerning the proposed scope of democracy, and of a democracy’s juridification, given that the relation between decision-makers and decision-takers is not necessary symmetrical.”<sup>39</sup> He develops a concept of “multilayered democracy.” Its realization requires institutional development, such as: multilayered governance and diffused authority; a network of democratic fora from the local to the global; “enhancing the

transparency, accountability and effectiveness of leading NGOs,” as well as giving “voice” to non-state actors.<sup>40</sup>

The shadow image of a hegemonic “world republic” (against which Kant warned) is haunting the imagination of the designers of global democracy models. Cosmopolitan theorists emphatically distance these models from any centralism, which can potentially be abused by the hegemonic “capture.” Thus, theorists reject the idea of a “world state,” and most of them oppose a centralized “world government,” but instead favor the idea of a decentralized, multilayered “world governance” structure with multiple checks and balances, which would preclude any possibility of hegemony. Some (Held and Archibugi) are even cautious about federalism, which would deny the right of exit to the member states, preferring confederalism instead, which gives more independence to the member-states and allows them the right of exit. These details and differences may seem insignificant in the normal circumstances, but under the shadow of a hegemonic global Big Brother, the details of proposed models are important to consider.

*In Search of Ethics and an Institutional  
Framework for Cosmopolitan Democracy*

“Either democracy is global or it is not democracy . . . Any political system that applies allegedly democratic principles within a limited scope is either hypocrisy or an illusion.” This is the opening line of Raffaele Marchetti’s *Global Democracy*,<sup>41</sup> setting the tone of the analysis. It constitutes a strong indictment of the current state of democracy in the world while describing his vision of a normative ideal characterized by an all-inclusive democratic political system. He proposes a model of cosmopolitan democracy, which he calls “cosmo-federalism.” The concept of freedom as “freedom of choice” is at the center of his ethical grounding of cosmopolitan democracy. He proposes an ethical theory of cosmopolitan democracy, that being termed “consequentialist cosmopolitanism,” which combines a revised ethical theory of agent-centered choice-based consequentialism and a political theory of cosmopolitanism. Both share the principles of individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. His theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism uses a single principle of justice applicable to different levels of political action, that being the maximization of world welfare. This promotion of global welfare is pursued through procedural instruments in terms of rights. Of paramount importance among those being the right to freedom of choice and the right to political participation.

Marchetti characterizes consequentialist cosmopolitanism as an ethical theory aiming at the promotion of the good, which resides in a comprehensive conception of individual well-being. It prioritizes the good over the right. The goodness of outcomes and the rightness of related actions are judged by the maximal quantity of good determined to be beneficial to all concerned. Thus, a choice of actions should be guided by the likely consequences that are expected to produce the best outcome in terms of maximum general well-being. The agents' responsibility is conceived as their capacity to influence the outcome of any given situation to promote goodness. The theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism includes three key principles of ethical discourse: normative individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. This leads to "the core factor distinguishing political element of consequentialist cosmopolitanism: freedom of choice as the metric for well-being."<sup>42</sup>

Freedom here is understood as non-domination and as the opportunity to achieve self-mastery. Freedom involves individual power of choice, meaning an absence of mastery by others. An individual is free to choose life options when arbitrary interference of a dominating or coercive power is absent. In consequentialist cosmopolitanism as a goal-oriented normative theory, freedom of choice is closely related to well-being. Freedom of choice is a crucial component of the consequentialist cosmopolitan ethics, "because it is necessary for promoting individual well-being, not because of its independent value."<sup>43</sup>

The normative structure of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, as a system of international political theory, involves the following three sets of principles: (1) the *ultimate* consequentialist principle, that is, the maximization of conditions for world well-being through the guarantee of freedom of choice; (2) the *intermediate* principles, each referring to a specific applicative level, which contribute to the design of the political structure and institutions of a consequentialist global political system, such as, for example, the "human rights regime" and the principle of state self-determination; and finally, (3) the *immediate* rules of action, which derive from this consequentialist political structure, for instance, policies to guarantee the protection of human rights.<sup>44</sup>

Individuals' capability to choose freely and to pursue their own path to well-being needs to be guaranteed by social and political rights pertaining to vital interests and political agency. The rights concerned with vital interests (such as health, education, and security) are an absolute precondition for any other meaningful choice and they should be formulated in a transcultural way and implemented universally. The other

rights regard the possibility of political participation in the public decision-making processes at each level of political action.

Marchetti further analyzes the other elements of the consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of justice. The notion of freedom of choice is inherently related to two contrasting but interdependent social principles: *responsibility* and *vulnerability*. Persons are free to strive toward whatever achievements they wish, but they are consequently responsible for their actions in that effort. Conversely, freedom has as a goal the amelioration of vulnerability and any external factors that could deprive one of opportunities or impede progress toward goals. Consequentialist cosmopolitanism holds a universal and reciprocal consideration of these two principles, since they are implicitly required by the adoption of the freedom of choice ideal. It considers the link between responsibility and vulnerability “which determines the double universalistic conception of moral agency in terms of choice-maker and choice-bearer.”<sup>45</sup> The choice-maker is the agent who is in the position to choose and carry out actions producing consequences on others. Conversely, the choice-bearer is the agent who bears the burden of the consequences of someone else’s action.

What can be done to decrease the vulnerability of those who are not represented and increase the responsibility of those who are supposed to ensure the representation of all? A general answer, which can be found in this theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, is that a political system should be transformed in such a way as to protect the agent’s free choices from vulnerability and to impose responsibility on the agents for their decisions.

Consequentialist cosmopolitanism uses freedom as a criterion for the evaluation of the political system and institutions. Freedom of choice is considered as the normative basis for a universal metric of justice. Since the subject of cosmopolitanism is humanity at large, the best moral code and institutional system is one that would produce the highest increase in world well-being conditions. Marchetti says:

Since the latter refers to the well-being functions of every person, the morally ideal world is then identified as that which maximizes, through a scheme of public rules, the capability of choice of all humanity. This entails an enlargement of the traditional sphere of moral consideration toward the recognition of global issues as fully political problems and of humanity as the political subject.<sup>46</sup>

The consequentialist cosmopolitan proposal envisions diverse social actions on different levels in the multilayered domains of action: individual, state, regional, and global. Marchetti indicates that in the

current political system the rights concerned with global political participation are mostly denied, thus it is necessary to establish new institutional mechanisms in which subjects can expect political recognition for their actions through an all-inclusive form of transnational citizenship. He concludes:

At the global level of action in particular, the strategy of consequentialist cosmopolitanism consists in the creation of a political system characterized by a universal constituency, which is granting rights of political participation to all citizens, is able to identify both responsible and vulnerable agents, and consequently to implement a sanctioning system on several levels.<sup>47</sup>

As an alternative to the unjust system, Marchetti offers a model of cosmopolitan global democracy, which he terms “cosmo-federalism,” oriented toward implementation of these ethical principles. He advocates for radical changes in international politics and structural reforms of existing institutions. This model would implement the ethical-political principles of democratization (freedom of choice, vital minimum, political inclusion and participation) leading toward an all-inclusive cosmopolitanism. In defense of a non-exclusionary theory of global democracy, he gives a working definition of democracy, saying, “a political system is more or less democratic to the extent that is characterized by non-exclusion from an entitlement to an equal share of public power.”<sup>48</sup>

According to Marchetti, the “evil of political exclusion” can be avoided and the democratic ideal can be genuinely implemented only by overturning the traditional thinking about politics and by allocating public power to political authorities within which every single individual can be represented. Differing from the intergovernmental and global governance proposals, his global polity model considers the restructuring of the political system at the global level as crucial for the advance of cosmopolitan democracy. As an alternative to the current compartmentalizing and exclusive international system, he presents “the radical project of stretching the paradigm of democratic inclusion to the ultimate boundaries encompassing the whole of mankind as ultimately a single *demos*.”<sup>49</sup>

The idea of inclusion is considered to be a key democratic requirement of a central all-inclusive authority capable of delineating jurisdictional boundaries of distinct sub-units, accommodating their potential conflicts, and deciding on political membership. The normative principle of global polity is all-inclusiveness. Marchetti proposes a global polity which combines bottom-up initiatives of political communities with an overarching top-down institutional structure and links ultimate principles

to institutions, thus integrating a global democratic system, which he calls “an all-inclusive and cosmo-federalist model of global democracy.”<sup>50</sup> This is a proposal of democracy beyond borders with an internationally all-inclusive and multilayered institutional framework. The general principle of universal inclusion should be firmly maintained as the fundamental basis of democratic practice: “No discrimination or exclusion can be tolerated anymore, if we stick to the democratic ideal. All of humankind has to be considered as part of a single, global *demos*.”<sup>51</sup> To avoid transnational and global exclusion, all individuals are entitled to participate “via direct voting in decision-making and frame-setting processes at the global level.”<sup>52</sup>

The institutional design of global polity is that of a world federalism, or “cosmo-federalism,” for joint action on a specific set of global issues, such as the world economy, global poverty, nuclear containment, migration, and environmental degradation, etc. In contrast to the indirect representation of citizens through states’ representatives, cosmo-federalism proposes a “democratic rather than diplomatic union of states,” according to which “all political representatives would be directly elected to a law-making assembly by the people, and political decisions taken by the federal government would apply directly to citizens rather than states.”<sup>53</sup> Political power would be organized on several levels, allowing for self-government and a democratically coordinated plurality of centers of autonomous power. “A new covenant would be signed among individuals, states, and a world organization, according to which states would delegate power to a superior institution in charge of both addressing global issues and allocating competences on the sub-levels.”<sup>54</sup> With this, interstate relations would be subjected to the rule of law. The institutional structure would include a world parliament, a world supreme court and a global constitution, and would give an opportunity for participation to all individuals, regardless of their nationality, thus effectively realizing the idea of inclusive democracy.

This project envisages the reform of the United Nations into a global federal organization in which individuals and states would share power for specific global purposes under a strengthened international law. States would be compelled only to accept decisions taken according to majority rule by General Assembly resolutions. A multi-tiered system would be regulated by world legislation and a global constitution. Every citizen would be subject to two powers (dual loyalty), acquiring a full cosmopolitan citizenship while remaining national citizens.

In his analysis of the trends in international politics, Marchetti observes that “the relative decline of the United States, the crisis of the

EU, the consolidation of the BRIC countries, and the diffusion of the power to non-state actors all constitute significant elements that characterize today's political constellation at the international level."<sup>55</sup> Among the possible scenarios of the future, he contemplates the paths of supranational integration different from those imposed by the West, with the increasing role of the previously marginalized non-Western politico-cultural traditions:

It is this scenario by which the consolidation of the emerging powers will not necessarily lead to a phase of conflict to win the new global hegemony, but rather to the formation of differentiated areas of development, some of them governed according to principles which are alien to us in the West.<sup>56</sup>

The theories of cosmopolitan democracy play an important normative role, showing the current "democratic deficit" and orienting toward regaining robust democracy at national, transnational, and global levels. Against this background, the negative characteristics of a hegemonic project—undemocratic, curtailing freedom, divisive, and obstructing collaboration of the nations for solutions to the global problems—are glaring.

Democracy as political system is characterized by non-exclusion from an equal share of public power, whereas hegemonic power shows an example of exclusion on an extreme and massive scale. In the hegemon-dominated hierarchy of top-down vertical power, not only do individual citizens have no voice, but whole states are excluded from decision making that affects their interests. In the traditional system, citizens have at least an indirect voice through their elected representatives. But in the hegemonic structure, even this opportunity is eliminated. Exclusion takes a systemic form of polarization of power, which is concentrated in the hegemonic "center" as opposed to the powerless majority of population in the margins.

In taking a closer look at the processes and mechanisms of exclusion, we can find, for example, Marchetti's observation, with which I agree, about the roots of the phenomenon of transnational exclusion. He opines that, in the current socio-economic situation at the global level, "collective agents, such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and international organizations, have a decisive and protean capacity to intrude in states' domestic politics and individuals' lives." Moreover, he continues, "individuals are on the whole denied direct political access to institutes which could provide an opportunity for their public expression of dissent/consent. In this, they are denied of the right to self-determination."<sup>57</sup> Evidently, such a pattern of intrusive control over the states and individuals and the denial of their right to self-determination are in a much

larger, global scale represented by the hegemonic superpower as a kind of a top collective agent, controlling the whole system of multinational corporations and international organizations. As in a zero-sum game, the extreme asymmetry of power, the monopoly of power by the hegemonic world-state means the almost total exclusion of most of the powerless population from control over their own destiny.

Normative long-range projections are important, and they should be a part of the holistic approach, which also explores the realities of the political processes in today's world. Recent publications show attempts to combine both normative and empirical perspectives of studies of global democracy.<sup>58</sup> This would make cosmopolitan theorizing more rooted in reality and invigorate its transformative role.

Richard Falk, in commenting on the recent publications regarding cosmopolitan democracy, states that the *idea* of global democracy "is staking serious claims as to its relevance for political theorizing about the future," but its realization as a *project* depends on many factors and its feasibility requires further exploration.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, he suggests seeing the cosmopolitan future in a broad perspective, to think globally, and to be actively engaged in the search to the solution to problems of the contemporary world:

Whether global democracy should occupy the entire horizon of desire for humanity deserves debate and further exploration. . . . What can be said with confidence is that as citizens in the troubled early period of the twenty-first century we need to act, think and feel globally and normatively, whatever we decide to do locally and personally.<sup>60</sup>

Cosmopolitan theories are important in their critical task of showing the democratic deficit, its root cause, and the obstacles hindering the desirable global democratization. Unmasking the undemocratic tendencies imposed by the hegemonic erosion of world politics would wake up the social consciousness and mobilize social movements—national and international—for the defense of democratic principles and counter the anti-democratic hegemonic policies.

An important topic of recent works on global democracy is the political agency. An agent-centered political theory highlights the active role of the political actors in shaping the future. This theme needs to be further explored in relation to the current processes of the struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward global hegemony versus cosmopolitan democracy. The studies should identify the agencies behind each of these tendencies. On the one hand: who are the actors—representing political forces and vested interests—advancing the

hegemonic policies and working for their implementation on all levels, including international institutions? How can their activities be made more transparent to the public and how can these actors be held accountable for their actions?

On the other hand, it is also important to analyze the social forces interested in regaining and implementing the democratic principles and institutions as the tools for their struggle to improve their lives. Who are the political agents able to carry out the proposed democratic reforms of the international law and institutions, including the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations? What are the existing or potential social forces and movements, which would be interested in actively participating in the reshaping and democratization of the international system? These political actors—national and transnational social movements, leaders, and active individuals, pursuing this goal—will need robust analyses and scholarly knowledge about the political situation, as well as guiding ideas, strategies, and tactics needed to effectively organize their struggle for the democratic transformation of the political system.

In its critical role, cosmopolitan theorizing should clearly distinguish genuine cosmopolitan ideas from the hegemonic pseudo-democratic and pseudo-universal simulacra such as “imperial” versions of cosmopolitanism. In a positive role, this theorizing should elaborate the progressive course for the promotion of the cosmopolitan alternative to the hegemonic regression: the struggle for cosmopolitanism in the time of hegemony.

In contemporary political theory, cosmopolitan democracy has been developing in relationship—dialogic and sometimes critical—with some other traditions, such as agonistic democracy and radical democracy, as well as radical cosmopolitanism. Although these theories are criticized from different perspectives, each provides some valuable insights for better understanding of the problems of democracy and cosmopolitanism. In the following sections, I will briefly review these traditions.

### ***Agonistic Democracy and Cosmopolitanism***

The recent manifestations of crisis and protests in our conflicted world have given impetus to “agonistic” political theories. The term “agonism” derives from the Greek *ἀγών* *agon*, meaning conflict or strife. A particular view of the current global disorder is presented by the theorists of agonistic democracy as a distinctive tradition within political theory. The main agonistic political theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe, James Tully, Bonnie Honig, William Connolly, and Mark Wenman share significant

similarities in their thought, which distinguishes them from liberalism and deliberative democracy.

These theorists criticize the mainstream narrative of a triumphant West, as epitomized in Fukuyama's "end of history," with economic globalization and spread of democracy under the guise of "benevolent hegemony," and the unchallenged predominance of neo-liberalism with its claim that there is no alternative to the existing order. In contrast to this bucolic picture, these agonistic theorists present the analysis of the manifold problems and conflicts which cut across the ethnic, racial, cultural, social, and national lines. This includes the abysmal gap between wealth and poverty within societies and among nations, wars, the refugee crisis, the rise of religious fundamentalism, nationalism, right-wing populism, and terrorism. Agonists have been addressing these challenges head on. They issue a wake-up call from the complacency of the neoconservatives and neoliberals, who ignore conflicted reality and who paralyze citizens' political will at a time when political actions are necessary to confront these problems.

Despite their differences, the theorists of agonistic democracy have in common an acknowledgement of "pluralism, tragedy, and the value of conflict."<sup>61</sup> This means, first, a view of societies as diverse and featuring an ineradicable pluralism of conflicting values ("constitutive pluralism"). Second, the "tragic viewpoint of agonism" means that conflict, strife, and suffering are inevitable phenomena of social life and may never be completely overcome. Third, the recognition that an acknowledgement of conflict is valuable as a condition for its mitigation and the prevention of its escalation toward antagonism and violence. These theorists view politics as a struggle against domination, dependence, and arbitrary forms of power. They are influenced by post-structuralism and post-modernism and have post-foundational viewpoints.

In contrast to the mainstream liberal political theories, which seek to overcome or transcend conflict by implementing regulative principles of rationality, justice, or communicative ethics, agonists believe that these approaches are not only useless, but may even exacerbate the problems. They hold that democracy must also enable the expression of conflict so that citizens can have the possibility of choosing between real alternatives. Otherwise, the denial of the reality of conflict, instead of solving its underlying problems, and the emphasis on consensus provoke a heightened potential for antagonism and make it more likely. The absence of real opportunities for those who disagree to express their dissent in a democratic manner may fuel extremism and play into the hands of populist and right-wing extremist parties who claim to be alternatives to

mainstream politics and to bring their radical “solutions” to the conflict, but which actually make things even worse. Instead, the agonists suggest recognizing conflict but advocate sublimating hostility by transforming it into “a *constructive* mode of contest and rivalry” as the way to social cohesion in a conflicted world.<sup>62</sup> However, in their understanding of the causes of the conflicts, such as the rise of fundamentalism, agonists try to explain those conflicts mainly in existential and cultural terms, without paying enough attention to their underlying socio-economic and political causes.

At the same time, there are notable differences among these theorists, including in their versions of agonistic democracy and their views of cosmopolitanism, ranging from skepticism (Mouffe) to hopes for a cosmopolitan community which reside in “glocal citizenship” (Tully) and “our encounters with the other” (Honig), as well as proposals of “plural matrix of cosmopolitanism” (Connolly), and “militant cosmopolitanism” (Wenman).

### *Multipolarity in a Hegemonic Key?*

Chantal Mouffe explains that the main difference between her conception of agonism and that of other theorists is that it is bound to the notions of *antagonism* and *hegemony*, which are at the center of her view of the political. She elaborates on these concepts regarding liberal democratic society. Then she applies these concepts, as well as her concept of “agonistic pluralism,” to the international domain, proposing an “agonistic model of world order.” She opposes this model to cosmopolitanism. In this section, I will analyze Mouffe’s interpretation of these concepts and her vision of an agonistic world order, which is multipolar, and characterized by a plurality of hegemonic regional blocks.

Mouffe presents a timely account of the current state of democracy, showing the flaws of liberalism and the negative impact of globalization. She criticizes Western liberal democratic theory, particularly that of John Rawls, and the deliberative democracy of Jürgen Habermas.

Indeed, John Rawls’s theory of justice, as an attempt to describe a perfectly just society and then consider the society in which we live as “nearly just” stands in striking contrast to the massive *injustices* rooted in dominance that permeate the real world. In *The Law of Peoples*,<sup>63</sup> Rawls has extended his theory and the difference principle to the global arena, excluding from the society of nations what he calls “rogue” or “outlaw” states. The whole pretense of constructing an ideal, self-congratulatory theory, presenting the West as being comprised of “nearly just” societies

and as an example for the rest of the world, is ultimately an illusion. A struggle against *injustices* needs a reorientation toward theories of *injustices*.<sup>64</sup> This is important for the critical analysis of the social system and a broader theory of society. Also, Rawls's using the analogy between just relationships of citizens in a liberal democracy and just relationships of peoples on the level of international law is problematic from the point of view of universalistic human rights, because it leads to the law of sovereign states rather than to a law of "cosmopolitan citizens."

Mouffe is also critical of deliberative democracy, saying, "there is much talk today of 'dialogue' and 'deliberation,' but what is the meaning of such words in the political field if no real chance is at hand and if the participants in the discussion are not able to decide between clearly differentiated alternatives?"<sup>65</sup> This certainly resonates with the disillusionment and frustration of many who are disappointed with empty talk about "democracy," when their voices are not heard, when they are unable to influence political decisions affecting their lives, and when their role is reduced to the mere formality of voting for a "choice with no choice" between similar parties, which represent rather the vested interests of the political establishment and big corporations. The model of deliberative democracy certainly has both advantages and limitations in some contexts. As a persuasive means to foster democracy democratically, politics has to resort to sound rational argumentation, and deliberation is indispensable. However, it is insufficient when the situation is reduced to rational arguments about "validity claims." To be transformatively effective, deliberation must be persuasive to the voters and result in the political actions informed by social movements, which are striving for certain goals. The right to have rights can be achieved only as result of social struggles.

Mouffe is critical of the global disorder and of (neo-)liberal policy and the theories used as its ideological justification. Unexpectedly, however, in her criticism, she uses insights of "conservative theorists," stating, "I have chosen to conduct my critique of liberal thought under the aegis of Carl Schmitt."<sup>66</sup> The influence of these insights is shown in her political theory, including in her critique of democratic theory and cosmopolitanism.

In contrast to Hanna Arendt, who envisaged the political as a space of freedom and public discussion, Mouffe sees the political as "a space of power, conflict and antagonism," and as the dimension of antagonism which she opines to be "constitutive of human societies."<sup>67</sup> The ever-present possibility of antagonism "impedes the full totalization of society and forecloses the possibility of a society beyond division and power."<sup>68</sup> For her, to think politically requires recognizing "the ontological

dimension of radical negativity.”<sup>69</sup> By “the political,” she refers to “the ontological dimension of antagonism,” distinguishing it from “politics,” which refers to the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of potentially conflicting conditions affected by the political.<sup>70</sup>

Mouffe takes from Schmitt his idea that political identities are relational, they consist in we/they opposition as a friend/enemy discrimination, with the possibility to become antagonistic. In the process of identity-formation the “other” serves as its constitutive outside, thus the creation of a “we” can exist only by the demarcation of a “they.”<sup>71</sup> Political relations are inherently conflictual, with “the ineradicability of the conflictual dimension of social life.”<sup>72</sup> According to Mouffe, “antagonism, as Schmitt says, is an ever present possibility; the political belongs to our ontological condition.”<sup>73</sup> Mouffe sees the political in its antagonistic dimension, which also implies that violence always remains a possibility in human relations.<sup>74</sup>

Along with antagonism, the category of *hegemony* is also highlighted by Mouffe as an indispensable element of the political, which identifies the nature of the agonistic struggle. In a conflicted society, trapped in the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, there are always dominating and dominated: “every order is political and based on some form of exclusion.”<sup>75</sup> According to Mouffe, the hegemon enforces order by subjecting or excluding others from the political community. Social order and institutions are established through “hegemonic practices,” which, in turn, are challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, aiming “to install another form of hegemony.” Apparently, Mouffe insists on hegemony as a vehicle for change and emancipatory politics, mentioning a counter-hegemonic struggle, but it ends only in a new hegemony: “every hegemonic order can be challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, which attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to establish another form of hegemony.”<sup>76</sup> This, however, means that hegemonic domination would perpetuate forever, with no hope for emancipation. In Mouffe’s agonistic approach, the public sphere is not a ground in the search for consensus (as it does, for example, for Habermas), but the battlefield of the opposing hegemonic projects that can never be reconciled rationally.

Mouffe rightly stresses the importance of pluralism for democracy. However, the influence of Schmittian views of the political creates a tension with the idea of democratic pluralism. The bellicose tendencies in Schmitt’s theory leave no opportunity for pluralism within the community. The presumption of the ever-present possibility of conflictual relationships turning violent leaves little chance for the coexistence of political

oppositions within the community, leading to the conclusion that they must be externalized or expelled.<sup>77</sup>

On the one hand, Mouffe postulates the ineradicability of antagonism, while on the other hand, she argues for the possibility of democratic pluralism. She recognizes that an ontological postulate of the ineradicability of antagonism usually leads political theories toward “defending an authoritarian order as the only way to keep civil war at bay.”<sup>78</sup> To avoid it, democratic theorists assert the rational solution to political conflicts. Notwithstanding, Mouffe tries to reconcile this, suggesting “timing” antagonism. She refers to “agonism” as the type of we/they relation between the conflicting parties, when they are unable to find rational solution to their conflict, while nevertheless recognizing the legitimacy of their opponents and seeing them not as enemies but adversaries among whom exists a “conflictual consensus.” While antagonism is a friend/enemy relation, agonism is a relation between adversaries. She proposes a model of democracy called “agonistic pluralism.” Thus, “the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism.”<sup>79</sup>

Of course, it is crucial for democracy to provide the political conditions for the prevention of antagonism and for democratic fair solutions to conflict. The question, however, remains: if Mouffe maintains an ontological postulate of the ineradicability of antagonism, how can it be transformed into agonism? Mouffe mentions, in general terms, that antagonism can be “tamed” by the establishment of institutions, which permit conflicts to take on an “agonistic” form, and by legitimate political channels, through which dissenting voices can express themselves in non-violent ways. However, she does not elaborate on this specifically. She does not explain clearly enough the ways in which antagonism can be transformed into agonism.

So, the questions arise: What could keep the conflicting political parties and opposition groups from using violence? What would motivate them to opt for agonism instead of antagonism, or to transform antagonism into agonism? For political theorists committed to democracy, the possible means for this could be, for example, through dialogue, deliberation, or rational agreement, helping to come to mutually acceptable consensus. However, Mouffe criticizes all these approaches as deficiencies of liberal democracy.<sup>80</sup>

Mouffe believes that citizens of democratic communities can be unified by a “conflictual consensus.” For her, however, the conflictual consensus in a political community is preserved by antagonism—by citizens who are united in opposition against those who are considered not as adversaries to be tolerated but as enemies, because a democratic society

“cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries.”<sup>81</sup> Doubts have been expressed about whether her ideas can actually serve as a guide to transform antagonism into agonism.<sup>82</sup>

Indeed, democratic politics involves a struggle or *agon* between competing groups and political agendas. But this begs the questions about civil-ethical rules of such a struggle, its ends and means. Without clarity on this and without civil or ethical norms there is a risk that a struggle can become undemocratic and escalate to violence. Fred Dallmayr, for example, expressed his ambivalence regarding Mouffe’s agonistic democracy. On one hand, he endorsed its emphasis on the shifting and “fugitive” character of the democratic regime: democracy does not have a finished “essence” nor can it be possessed by a set of rules. On the other hand, he pointed out the focus of this theory on particularity (dividing society along social, political, ideological, religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, gender or other lines) without any consideration of a shared frame of reference and framework of significance, such as “the exclusive emphasis on particularity or the agonistic struggle between particularities, seemingly for its own sake and without civil or ethical bounds,” which in political life “can generate a nasty and potentially aggressive kind of ‘identity politics’.”<sup>83</sup>

In her view of international relations, Mouffe is critical of homogenizing globalization and the negative consequences of the unipolar world, arguing for a pluralistic view of the world. She criticizes what she calls the illusions of the universalist-globalist discourse, which envisages human progress as the universalization of the Western version of democratic values and the universal relevance of the notion of human rights, which is at the core of the Western conception of democracy. She argues that Western liberal democracies are not the only possible way to understand democracy and that human rights should be understood within a socio-cultural context of societies. She finds support of this view by referring to Raimundo Panikkar, Bikhu Parekh, and Bonaventura de Sousa Santos.

Mouffe’s model of an agonistic world order is an application of her agonistic domestic model to the field of international relations. She rhetorically asks, “what are the consequences in the international arena of the thesis that every order is an hegemonic one?” Replying, “the only solution lies in the pluralization of hegemonies.”<sup>84</sup> She envisages the world order in terms of a multipolar model of a plurality of hegemonic blocks:

At a time when the United States—under the pretense of a true universalism—is trying to impose its system and its values on the rest of the world, the need for a multipolar world order is more pressing than ever. We should aim at the

establishment of a pluralist world order, in which a number of large regional units might coexist, with their different cultures and values, and in which a plurality of understandings of human rights and forms of democracy might be considered as legitimate.<sup>85</sup>

An idea of a multipolarity as an alternative to the existing unipolar world is broadly discussed in current international relations theories. The specificity of Mouffe's proposed version of multipolarity is that it remains hegemonic. It is not that other theorists are naïve and unaware of the existing hegemony and the possibility of its continuation in a foreseeable future: there are many publications criticizing hegemonic domination and trying to find a way of liberation from it. In contrast, Mouffe presents hegemony as if it were an inevitable (and thus justifiable) characteristic of politics, both domestically and internationally, with the only change from a unipolar to a multipolar version.

Mouffe's conceptualization of an agonistic model of liberal democracy envisages citizens of democratic communities being unified by a "conflictual consensus." But the democratic mechanism, which serves to transform antagonisms into agonism and which is necessary for democratic unity is absent in her international conceptualization: "a 'conflictual consensus' . . . cannot be realized at the global level." The view of world order as a plurality of hegemonic blocks "requires relinquishing the illusion that they need to be part of an encompassing moral and political unit." Furthermore, "the illusions of a global ethics, global civil society and other cosmopolitan dreams prevent us from recognizing that in the field of international relations, one can only count on prudential agreements."<sup>86</sup> Thus, this model has no mechanisms that would preclude possible antagonism and clashes of hegemonic blocks.

Critics point out the limitations of Mouffe's agonistic democracy, which does not envision democracy at the global level. As Oliver Marchart writes:

where cosmopolitan democrats advocate the democratization of the global system, for Mouffe and other realists a multipolar world does not need to be a democratic one. . . . Her vision of global order is not the vision of a more democratic world, it is merely the vision of a world where a single hegemon is replaced by a small number of rivaling regional fiefdoms.<sup>87</sup>

He stresses that, by focusing on conflict between regional blocks, Mouffe "tends to underrate the democratizing role of another kind of conflict: the trans-national struggle for democratization."<sup>88</sup>

In comparison to the global hegemony of one state in a unipolar world, the multipolar model of large regional units seems advantageous, but it is

limited because it doesn't solve the problem of hegemony. Hegemonic domination will continue within the large regional units dominated by the powerful states. Such a world order could be a combination of a most powerful "central" hegemon, with peripheral regional hegemonic blocks. Given the logic of power politics, it is quite possible that competing regional hegemonic blocks could be engaged in a geopolitical rivalry for influence and their antagonisms could lead to wars (as the history of inter-imperial wars have shown).

The agonistic model, which Mouffe elaborated in the context of liberal pluralistic democracy, was extended to the field of international relations. While she made remarks that she is not trying to "apply" her agonistic domestic model to the field of international relations, but only seeking to show some similarities between these very different realms, nevertheless, the parallel is pretty clear, and she writes, "the crucial task both in the domestic and international domain is to find ways to deal with conflicts so as to minimize the possibility that they will take an antagonistic form."<sup>89</sup> Her extension of the domestic model of conflictuality to the global level is problematic. The concept of hegemony, referring initially to struggle within socially stratified society, has quite a different meaning when it is used in describing the hegemonic domination of one state over the others, particularly in regard to the global hegemony. The thesis of the ineradicability of antagonism, if applied to the international relations of sovereign states (which have standing armies and are united in military-political alliances confronting each other), sounds chilling. The scale of risk and the gravity of consequences are also incommensurably different. As the worst-case scenario, antagonism within a society can evolve into a civil war. But antagonism and military confrontation between states can result in a regional war or even a world war, which in the nuclear age could be the end of civilization. As Mouffe writes, "in an agonistic politics, the antagonistic dimension is always present, since that at stake is the struggle between opposing hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled rationally, one of them needing to be defeated."<sup>90</sup>

The question arises: What would have happened if the citizens and political leaders of superpowers had followed this confrontational Manichean logic "either or" during the Cold War? Fortunately, the protests against nuclear weapons, peace movements, and common sense rational judgements of political leaders found alternative to confrontation—namely, peaceful coexistence and "new political thinking," peacefully ending the military-political confrontation and averting a nuclear holocaust.

The idea of multipolarity can be attractive only if understood as the first step toward dismantling unipolar hegemony. In the long range, multipolarity is as limited as unipolarity, since both constructs are grounded on the idea that the world is divided into states. A system of sovereign states itself suggests continuation of polarity, and within such a framework, regional or other alliances can still be subject to the hegemony of their most powerful members. In such a multipolar world order, a hegemon can arise, even if it be some nation or alliance other than the United States, as well as regional hegemonic blocks such as the European Union, China, and Russia, that continue the power struggle. Therefore, multipolarity still does not solve the problems of state-centric world order and possible hegemonic domination. Instead of divisive “-polarity,” it is suggested that an ideal, pluralistically self-organized, non-hegemonic order would be multi-centric or multilateral; it might be called a “pluriverse.” Ideally, relationships between peoples and nations need to be more peaceful and collaborative, with all being treated as equals.<sup>91</sup>

Thus, we can say that in search for an alternative to hegemonic unipolarity, we should strive for a substantial transformation of the international system, law and institutions, to guarantee the rule of law, the domination-free relationships of nation-states as equals, peaceful and fair resolution of the conflicts, and cooperation in the solution to the social and global problems. This perspective of such a new world order is envisioned in cosmopolitan theories.

The quest for an alternative needs to be informed by new political philosophy and theory. Important insights for it can be found in cosmopolitan thought. Mouffe’s dismissal of cosmopolitanism is premature, when she says, “the illusion of a cosmopolitan world beyond hegemony and beyond sovereignty has to be relinquished.”<sup>92</sup> Her criticism of cosmopolitanism becomes a kind of defense of “the pluralization of hegemonies” as the only alternative to a unipolar world order.

Mouffe criticizes what she calls the illusions of the universalist-globalist discourse, which envisages human progress as the universalization of the Western version of democracy. She considers that cosmopolitanism belongs to this universalist discourse, saying that “it is usually predicated on the universalisation of the Western model and therefore does not make room for plurality of alternatives.”<sup>93</sup> She considers a call for the establishment of a cosmopolitan democracy and a cosmopolitan citizenship as based on the universalization of the Western interpretation of democratic values and of human rights, and attempts at their worldwide implementation to be dangerous. This would: “justify the hegemony of the West and the imposition of its particular values. . . . This

is why the establishment of a World Republic, if it ever came about, would only signify the world hegemony of a dominant power that was able to erase all differences and impose its own conception of the world on the entire planet.”<sup>94</sup>

Mouffe rightly criticizes the rationalistic and universalistic illusions of a traditional mainstream cosmopolitanism. These illusory views are also addressed and criticized by theorists who are striving for its rethinking and substantial renovation in developing fresh ideas and approaches for a “new cosmopolitanism.”

In her recent publications, Mouffe mentions some of these new approaches, such as the “discrepant cosmopolitanism” of James Cliford, “vernacular cosmopolitanism” of Homi Bhabba and Paul Giltroy, the “multi-situated cosmopolitanism” of Bruce Robbins, and the “critical cosmopolitanism” of Walter D. Mignolo. She acknowledges that their aim is “to foster a sense of reciprocity and solidarity at the transnational level” and that “this new cosmopolitanism does not emphasize the values of rationality and universality and it criticizes the Eurocentrism it sees at the core of the traditional cosmopolitanism.” Further, the symbols of the cosmopolitan community are the diaspora, the refugees, the immigrants, and minorities, which are the representatives of a “minoritarian modernity.”<sup>95</sup>

Nevertheless, Mouffe repeats her concerns about universalism in the light of the need to preserve the cultural diversity of the world, saying, “cosmopolitanism pictures the world as a universe and this can bring about the desire for the advent of a single culture that could be shared by the whole world.”<sup>96</sup> She does not seem to have a problem with cosmopolitan ethics, as for example, in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. However, she expresses serious reservations with the cosmopolitans’ approach to politics, “since they aim at establishing the conditions for pursuing democratic politics in a globalized world.” She believes that their approach “misses ‘the political’ in its antagonistic dimension” and that their pluralism is without antagonism, and that it “conveys the illusion that there could one day exist a world without politics, a world beyond hegemony and beyond sovereignty.”<sup>97</sup>

Mouffe briefly mentions some of the innovations of the new cosmopolitanism in passing, but actually they are much more substantial and deserve a closer look, since they respond to some of her concerns. Analysis shows that contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be responsive to diversity and power relations in today’s global conditions. It is critical to Eurocentrism and homogenizing globalization. Its main tendency is to

combine an identification with humanity as a whole and world-citizenship with an emphasis on plurality and the protection of the cultural diversity of nations and minority groups. The discourse on cosmopolitanism helps to clarify some of its own normative claims, at the core of which is the dialectic of difference and identity, otherness and sameness. In contrast to an abstract universality, philosophers are looking for a universalism that is not the unwarranted generalization of some of the Western particular views. They elaborate on a new concept of universalism as a process of universalization, suggesting that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of the other: of those excluded, the subaltern, the stranger, and the marginalized.<sup>98</sup> They reject “World Republic” or “world state” and oppose to it (akin to Kantian “peaceful federation”), an idea of democratic multilayered governance. They argue for noncoercive and egalitarian cosmopolitan politics. Democratic cosmopolitanism is further elaborated in radical cosmopolitics.

Progressive theorists see the possibilities of radical democratic transformation of societies and international relations in conjunction with cosmopolitan ideas, while rethinking them within new theoretical perspectives. James Ingram comments on Mouffe’s conception, noting that “while she helpfully identifies a key limitation of mainstream cosmopolitanism, the conclusions she draws from this criticism are misguided in instructive ways.”<sup>99</sup> Ingram himself is critical to the shortcomings of traditional cosmopolitanism and argues for its radical rethinking. At the same time, however, he disagrees with Mouffe’s views. Ingram thinks that Mouffe’s culture-based analysis misidentifies the moral and political problems with “false universalism”: it assumes that Western countries seek to impose their political models out of faith in democracy, while the resistance to this comes from those who see such imposition as a threat to their cultures and ways of life, which reminds us of the Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations.” As an alternative, Ingram offers his conception of radical cosmopolitics, which takes insights from both radical democracy and political cosmopolitanism. In it, democracy is viewed not as institutional design, but as a process of democratization, and he replaces an abstract universalism by a contestatory politics through which universal values are implemented from below through the people’s struggle, aiming for a transformation of society. Ingram’s conception will be analyzed in the next section of this chapter.

Mouffe’s criticism of what she calls the illusions of the universalist-globalist discourse is too general. She fails to differentiate the use of universalist notions in the ideology of hegemonic globalization from the constructive efforts of theorists who try to grasp conceptually the processes of

interdependence in today's world and the possible common ground for collaboration of peoples which is so needed for the solution to the world problems, which affect all human beings.

For those concerned with striving for the preservation of cultural diversity and democratic pluralism of the world, which are challenged by hegemonic homogenization in a unipolar world, the sweeping undifferentiated critique of "universalist discourse" can be associated with any universalistic ideas, including that of cosmopolitanism, and raise suspicion of them. Such a suspicion is also provoked by the pseudo-universalistic claims of the hegemon, pretending to speak on behalf of the world and to represent the future of humanity. However, as a matter of fact, the cosmopolitan project of a peaceful, democratic, and domination-free pluralistic world is an antidote and alternative to the hegemon-centric design of militarized "order," dominating the other nations, and neo-totalitarianism in domestic politics. Theorists need to clearly and emphatically articulate the fundamental difference between the hegemonic pseudo-universalistic "imperial cosmopolitanism" and genuine democratic cosmopolitanism, which offers a viable alternative to the hegemonic unipolar order.

### *Agonism and Militant Cosmopolitanism*

Other agonistic theorists have developed conceptualizations of agonistic democracy, which are compatible with their own versions of cosmopolitanism.

James Tully explores manifestations of domination both within societies and globally, referring to these new modes of "informal imperialism," and he elucidates the relations between dominating powers and subalterns. His conception of agonistic democracy is focused on the practice of "civic freedom." His critical studies of the possibilities of civic freedom are related to a variety of political collective action, such as struggle over recognition, over distribution, the global struggles of Indigenous Peoples, and the unequal relationships of informal imperialism between the global North and South. He describes the relations between dominating powers and the subaltern peoples, who are suffering from a double oppression. They are oppressed by their own elites, and if the people manage to gain power, the dominating great powers use covert or overt means to undermine the independent governments and to effect regime change in order to impose neoliberal structures that promote the interests of corporations.<sup>100</sup>

Tully criticizes the traditional cosmopolitan paradigm which, on his view, was associated with Eurocentrism and imperialism. He suggests to replace it by bringing in more non-Western elements with the aim of formulating a non-hegemonic and more pluralistic conception of cosmopolitanism. He critically examines the predominant conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy and global governance, aiming to sketch some forms of democracy that enhance liberty and civic freedom in the age of globalisation. In contrast to what he views as the idealization of Euro-American citizenship as a universal model, he argues that there is no single model for all democratically organized political societies. He proposes an idea of transnational forms of democratic agency called “glocal citizenship.”<sup>101</sup> “Glocalization” refers to the global networking of local practices of civic citizenship. It represents the horizontal relationships of glocal citizens as “agonistic dialogue” and non-violent civic partnership at local and transnational levels. The dialogue with the others opens the interlocutors to a non-hegemonic relationship of dialogue and mutual understanding, which would be the beginning of an alternative to imperialism. He views in these relationships and social movements a new, bottom-up form of cosmopolitanism.

Central to Bonnie Honig’s conception of agonistic democracy is agonistic contestation and its emancipatory potential. Contestation and the permanent questioning of dominant ideas makes it possible for citizens to maintain a space of debate and avoid confrontation. Encounters with the other may disrupt illusions of sameness. Questioning and openness to the other is important when faced with fear-mongering politics at the time of ascendance of the security state. Honig takes a broad approach to emergency politics, considering immigration, new rights claims, and the infringement of civil liberties at the time of “global war on terror.” For her, this tragic perspective also enlivens “human efforts to bring order, meaning, and justice to our universe,” and can be seen rather “to issue in a call to action, responsibility, and the creative communalities of festival and ritual—not an excuse to withdraw from them.”<sup>102</sup>

William Connolly champions cultural diversity and multi-dimensional democratic pluralism. He argues for the need for a positive “ethos of engagement,” critical responsiveness, and agonistic respect. He is critical of the West-centric concepts of the world and a “concentric” model of culture, with one dominating “center,” such as that espoused by the Samuel Huntington image of a unipolar world order, which places the United States at the center of Western civilization, whose “job is to protect the larger civilizational complex from multiculturalism on the inside as well as economic and military threats from the outside.”<sup>103</sup> Connolly calls

this unipolar view “civilizopolism.” He criticizes traditional cosmopolitanism, which is characterized by Eurocentrism and abstract universalism, saying that “today the specific terms of that cosmopolitanism have not only become even more contestable, they continue to carry within them elements of a dogmatic Western imperialism.”<sup>104</sup> He calls for rethinking of this concept, opposing to the negative views that have given rise to anti-cosmopolitanism, his more positive view.

Connolly points out the process of acceleration of “tempo” of the changes within societies and in the international arena (he calls it a factor of “speed”), which brought to the fore the socio-cultural diversity of the world. In today’s world, the speed of global communication networks makes it possible for people to unite in defense of their identities. For example, in the struggle against hegemony, vigorous movements by indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are magnified by their ability to reach an audience beyond their states. As he writes, “today, when speed compresses distance and intercultural action transcends state boundaries, the cosmopolitan dimension of politics becomes both unavoidable and diverse.”<sup>105</sup>

Instead of one-dimensional concentric view of homogenized culture, Connolly’s version of cosmopolitanism is open to an “eccentric” view of cultural diversity. It distinguishes between a “thick, constitutive universal” and “a regulative universal.” Instead of articulation of one regulative idea that encompasses all others, “the task today is to inspire more participants in each religious and metaphysical tradition to come to terms receptively with its comparative contestability and to explore creative lines of connection to other orientations.”<sup>106</sup>

A plural matrix of cosmopolitanism is grounded in respect for diverse responses to persisting mysteries of being. Cosmopolitanism is indispensable, because the problems which are faced by contemporary humanity require joint efforts; “to the extent that a variety of Christians, Jews, secularists, neo-Aristotelians, Islamists, Kantians, deep ecologists, Buddhists, and atheists cultivate such self-modesty in their respective existential faiths, the late-modern world becomes populated by more citizens coming to terms thoughtfully with contemporary issues unsusceptible to resolution by one country, one faith, or one philosophy.”<sup>107</sup>

Wenman calls for raising “the difficult question of agonism and the possibility of historical transformation.”<sup>108</sup> Maintaining that the current global state of affairs calls for radical change that would introduce new social and political forms, he critically assesses the predominant theories of liberal democracy, as well as the differences that separate agonistic

from radical democracy. He elucidates the democratic challenges facing hegemonic globalization. Democracy is to be understood as a founding moment, rather than a form of government, and finds its expression in the notion of constituent power. He discusses the tension between the constituent power (power *qua* capacity, *potentia*) and constituted power (legislative, power *qua* right, *potestas*).

While liberal and deliberative theories focus mainly on constituted institutions and principles, agonistic approach asserts the priority of the free constituent power of collective action that initiates and disrupts established forms of authority. According to Wenman, constituent power manifests in two distinct modes: augmentation and revolution (a distinction that he draws from Arendt's writings). By way of contrast, an augmentation builds on the existing order in ways not predetermined by its inner logic as "a (re)foundation that simultaneously expands and preserves an existing system of authority," while revolution "is characterized by an absolute beginning—and consequently a moment of radical rupture—that brings a new principle or set of norms and values into the world, as it were *ex nihilo*."<sup>109</sup> Both modes of constituent power are expressions of authentic moments of human freedom.

For Wenman, agonism offers a politics of augmentation rather than an account of revolution. He sees the weakness of the theories of agonistic democracy in their exclusive emphasis on the constituent power in the mode of augmentation, only seeking to transform the existing order from within. Although agonistic theorists advocate the possibility of political innovation, they envisage change merely as something "*extra-in-the-ordinary*," in the sense that they principally acknowledge the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions and practices. He opines that agonistic theorists conceptualize constituent power in terms of a non-dialectical augmentation of existing rules, practices, and institutions. This differentiates agonists from radical democrats, such as Alain Badiou, Ernesto Laclau, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek, who advocated for revolution. Wenman asserts that a consistent theory of agonistic democracy needs to consider both augmentation and revolution as modes of constituent power. He combines these two moments in his theory of agonism and militant cosmopolitanism.

Most of the agonistic theorists share their critical views of the Eurocentrism and abstract universalism of mainstream cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, they believe that it is possible to formulate alternative conceptions of cosmopolitanism that would overcome these deficiencies and which would allow for civic activity on local, national, and transnational levels.

Although Wenman shares these views, he thinks that agonists should do much more to explore alternatives for the future. From his perspective, he reviews some of the agonistic concepts of cosmopolitanism, saying:

For Connolly, cosmopolitanism means little more than transnationalism, and he associates this with those forms of social movement politics that apply pressure on particular states; for Honig, cosmopolitanism is conceived in terms of forms of solidarity that are not confined to the nation-state, but which, at least, represent an incessant *resistance* to false claims to universality; whereas for Tully, cosmopolitanism supposedly manifests directly in the present, in these “glocal” relations between citizens, directly acting otherwise, and that apparently emerge from the gaps in the present institutions.<sup>110</sup>

Wenman asserts that each of them highlights necessary but insufficient conditions of cosmopolitanism, because they “overlook what is the most fundamental point which is that ‘cosmopolitanism’ must mean something more than simply transnationalism.”<sup>111</sup>

Perhaps most interesting, however, is Wenman’s attempt to find a new approach for a possible alternative conception of cosmopolitanism. Being critical of the mainstream theories of cosmopolitanism because they “do not represent a credible alternative to economic globalization,” he argues for a radical mode of cosmopolitanism that “must take a more militant stance towards presently hegemonic forms of governance,”<sup>112</sup> and he starts his radical revision with a post-foundational critique of the moral and juridical foundationalism of mainstream cosmopolitanism.

Wenman abandons the notion of Man, which is postulated by cosmopolitanism as a necessary basis for establishing “humanity” as a morally significant criterion. This opens new possibilities for an alternative conception of cosmopolitanism, where it becomes possible to regain the dignity of the human being in the capacity for “world disclosure.” Wenman also objects to a “post-human” materialism, which diminishes human agency. In contrast to superficially grounded theories of humanism, he is looking for groundless conceptions of human agency, where the “human” is understood as open possibilities. In search for an alternative mode of cosmopolitanism that asserts itself without recourse to moral foundations, he turns to Martin Heidegger’s thoughts on humanism and to Hanna Arendt’s ideas, which can help to grasp the “human” as an open set of possibilities and with the emergence of new beginnings. These possibilities “are glimpsed above all in the agonistic struggles of political actors, who initiate new beginnings and thereby reveal not only themselves but also a new mode of being-in-the-world.”<sup>113</sup> An opening up to the world is associated with agonistic political struggles or with the

world disclosure activity of a political action. Human freedom represents a moment of radical possibility, from which might emerge a new principle or a distinctive set of values: “through initiation of new values, she personifies the *humanitas* of the human, and she might just become the spark of an expanding mode of cosmopolitanism as her intervention is picked up, judged, and further enacted upon in multiple contexts and in diverse public arenas around the globe.”<sup>114</sup> The distinctive understanding of the humanness of the Man as struggle, contestation, and open possibility becomes the source of an open-ended mode of cosmopolitanism.

Wenman insists in acknowledging the expressly political conditions of cosmopolitanism, because it is “only through the struggles of political actors that we might see the emergence of an alternative standard, one that effectively counters neoliberalism, and which could be judged retrospectively to have universal (or cosmopolitan) significance.”<sup>115</sup> He argues that the current circumstances—the global economic and environmental crisis, the power of big corporations, the security state, and the conditions of domination—require radical changes that would introduce new social and political forms. Consequently, he stresses the need to improve the prevailing theories of agonistic democracy by taking “a more militant stance towards existing institutions and practices.”<sup>116</sup>

Wenman outlines a model of what he calls “militant cosmopolitanism.” He views cosmopolitanism as transformative and representing an alternative to the current neoliberal system, insisting that “another world is possible,” which is not merely an augmentation of liberal democracy. He highlights three areas of theoretical consideration to delineate a more militant iteration of agonistic democracy: the conceptual distinction between action and judgment, and why the democratic *agon* appears in the interface between decisive action and open-ended judgment; the crucial importance of a politics of militant conviction as a response to passive nihilism; and the need for leadership.

Militant cosmopolitanism is primarily concerned with the capacity of democratic actors to generate new social and political forms that are subsequently recognized to be wider and having universal significance, so that they are “picked up and carried forward by different actors and spectators in different locales, and become the foundation of an expanding open-ended form of universality.”<sup>117</sup> At the heart of the idea of militant cosmopolitanism is a belief that “a moment of absolute initiative” for change can arise from the politics of national and transnational democratic movements. Wenman highlights the role of the digital communication technology, which facilitates the emergence of novel transnational social movements and organization of protests; e.g. World Social Forum, anti-

globalization G20 summit protests, the anti-austerity protests in Athens and Madrid, the Occupy, and the Arab Spring. The combination of this revolutionary origin (Benjamin's *Ursprung* concept) of social transformation with its ensuing augmentation would make it possible to create conditions for the emergence and growth of a new mode of cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitanism seeks an act of radical initiative emerging from within the transnational social movements. In Wenman's words, "[It] might deliver an original principle that is subsequently judged to be of broader importance by a wide range of spectators, who then carry the new standard as a lived experience and as a set of values to multiple institutional settings, above, below, and at the level of nation-state."<sup>118</sup>

Wenman concludes, "the biggest challenge today is to translate the radical capacity for innovation associated with the transnational social movements into a genuine material force in the world." The new principle or standard must become embedded in the lived practices of the citizens, so that they, "carry the new standard into the arenas of governmental and trans-governmental decision making and debate, so that it begins to operate as a genuine rival to the utterly discredited system of disciplinary neo-liberalism, and in turn provides the foundation for a new organizing code for the networked global system." With this call to action, Wenman seeks something radically transformative of the institutions and practices that comprise global politics. The dilemma we face is to either initiate a transformative (ideally cosmopolitan) movement, or continue "to muddle on as before, but the destructive consequence of the present system will be more and more acutely felt."<sup>119</sup>

### *Radical Cosmopolitics*

The theorists of cosmopolitan democracy offer diverse models of the institutional structures of a desirable cosmopolitan future. Their proposals are mainly from a normative perspective, but there are also some from an empirical perspective. They suggest some reforms in the United Nations and international organizations. However, the crucial and the most difficult questions still remain: how to get from here to there? Or, in other words, how can we get to the cosmopolitan democracy from the current situation of hegemonic domination? This also includes questions about agency: Who will be able to carry out the necessary changes?

Cosmopolitan democracy has been the subject of criticism from different perspectives—right and left. However, most interesting is its assessment and critique from the representatives of radical cosmopolitanism.

Some of them deny cosmopolitan democracy, which they perceive as a continuation of the status quo.<sup>120</sup>

In contrast to this view, the more constructively oriented representatives of radical cosmopolitanism, such as James D. Ingram, show a more balanced approach. They view the main ideas of it—its critical stand regarding the existing democratic deficit, inequality and injustice, the need for change—as an alternative to the existing order. At the same time, they express their dissatisfaction with cosmopolitan democracy models and point out the limitations of this approach. They view the problem with the concepts of cosmopolitan democracy in that they seem to propose reforms and improvements mostly within the existing institutions. They argue that these institutions are part of the existing system, are designed by the dominant social groups and states, and represent their own interests; they are oriented toward the preservation of the status quo rather than toward the transformation of the system. Thus, the proposed changes are limited in a cosmopolitan sense. These theorists hold that meaningful changes can come mainly from outside of existing institutions.

Ingram presents his critical views of cosmopolitanism and democracy, and his alternative view of universalization and democratization. He emphasizes that this must be a “bottom up” struggle by those whose interests would benefit from a more democratic system. He critically assesses and revises historical and current cosmopolitanism. He points out that the universalistic notions such as “reason,” “cosmopolitanism,” and “human rights” have long been used to justify the imposition of power over the powerless. The universalism of these ideals is reduced to identity politics, to culturally specific values possessed by some and not by others, which are to be imposed as an ideology of domination.

As an example of critical rethinking of cosmopolitanism, Ingram refers to Walter Mignolo’s image of cosmopolitanism as project and design.<sup>121</sup> The term “cosmopolitanism” is used as a counter to “globalization,” although not necessarily in the sense of globalization from below. Mignolo sketches world history as a series of “global designs,” through which dominant Western powers sought the colonization and transformation of the non-Western world under the banner of “Christianization” and “civilization,” as well as the recent American project of global hegemony around “modernization.” The violence and injustice of enterprises such as these have been denounced by Western critics such as Francisco de Vitoria, Kant, and Marx, who each proposed cosmopolitan counter-projects. Yet even as these critics sought to offer a just and truly universalistic alternative to imperial domination, they remained captive to the underlying assumptions and telos of the historical designs. In order to avoid the

intertwinement of cosmopolitan universal projects and global designs, Mignolo suggests a search for “diversality” or “transversality.” Transversality refers to relationships of dialogue between different cultures as opposed to the domination of one over all others. He writes that universal terms like “democracy” can signify different things in different contexts. For example, although the Zapatistas use the term “democracy,” their use is conceptualized not in terms of European political philosophy, but in terms of Maya social organization based on reciprocity, communal values, and the value of wisdom. This meaning is different than that used by the Mexican government, which does not acknowledge an interpretation of democracy that includes the Other. The concept of democracy, displaced and enriched from a subaltern position by the Zapatistas’s meaning becomes a “connector,” through which liberal concepts of democracy and indigenous concepts of reciprocity within community for the common good must come to terms. Thus, we can re-imagine such universal values as connectors of a critical, transversal cosmopolitics, rather than accept their hegemonic Western interpretations. Mignolo’s concept of critical and democratic cosmopolitanism calls for building a multi-centric politico-economic world of dialogical co-existence and of pluriversity of understanding, knowing, believing, and thinking.<sup>122</sup>

Ingram critically evaluates theories of democratic cosmopolitanism. He prizes the theoretical-political project of cosmopolitan democracy, inspired by Kant’s ideal, for promoting a global order based on the rule of law, respect for human rights, and democracy at the national and global levels. However, he sees its problem in that it does not show the path toward its realization. He also sees a tension in that the Kantian theory of right provides, on the one hand, a normative standard for the criticism and possible reform of existing arrangements, and on the other, a justification of their legitimacy. This is reflected in contemporary works on cosmopolitan democracy. Its theorists emphasize the normative-critical moment and harshly criticize reality for its failure to live up to the declared norm. Its deficiency, however, concerns action.

According to Ingram, the widespread tendency in cosmopolitan writing is to make concrete problems, such as human rights violations and interventions, into arguments for a more just world order, calling for a comprehensive reform of international law and institutions and the cosmopolitan legal order. In his view, “such long-term remedies may indeed be the only real solution to the challenges of global politics, but they fail to address the question of what to do here and now.”<sup>123</sup> How is a just order to be achieved? This limited approach would seem to suggest accepting the current authorities, international law, and the United

Nations, as an immediate first step, while at the same time pursuing reforms to these institutions. However, the problem with this approach is that the existing international institutions reflect the interests of the powerful, and their internal capacity for reform is anything but clear. Says Ingram:

this means that the UN system, like international law in general, is to a large extent based on the facticity of power, allowing great powers—especially the great power—to use it for their own purposes, even as it struggles to constrain them. And if accepting the legitimacy of existing institutions is problematic in a case like the UN, it is little short of ludicrous in the case of institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, whose service to dominant interests is transparent.<sup>124</sup>

Thus, relying on institutions even provisionally is problematic because they always have a Janus face: they represent the instantiation not only of principles of justice but also of prevailing power relations. As a result, “‘Rightful’ institutions of the world order are not only a solution to the violence and injustices of that order; they are also, in their existing forms, an essential part and cause of it.”<sup>125</sup> Considering institutions from the standpoint of their normative justification and potential may confer on them an undeserved legitimacy. Ingram concludes that cosmopolitan democrats are “able to recommend attractive alternatives but unable to come up with a plausible account of how they might come about.” They cannot “explain how these alternatives might be realized.”<sup>126</sup>

Theorists of cosmopolitan democracy see the global public sphere as a means by which individuals can promote the pacification, legalization, and democratization of politics. Ingram recognizes the importance of local and global popular initiatives in defense of human rights, democracy, and justice. At the same time, he stresses that these initiatives should not be limited to only having a “voice,” but rather should also strive for suffrage, and to make steps from theory to practice, from morality to politics.

In analyzing this phenomenon of so-called globalization from below, Ingram refers to the works of Falk and Habermas as expressing the importance of an active role of the people in the struggle for their rights. For example, Falk writes that a more peaceful and just world order “will be brought about by struggles mounted from below based on the activities of popular movements and various coalitions.”<sup>127</sup> Habermas expressed the same idea in his comments about the rallies against the occupation of Iraq in 2003:

When thousands of Shiites in Nasiriya demonstrate against both Saddam and American occupation, they express the fact that non-Western cultures must appropriate the universalistic content of human rights with their own resources and in their own interpretation, one that establishes a convincing connection to local experiences and interests.<sup>128</sup>

Here Ingram highlights the idea that the only practical expression of the universal values of human rights and democracy would be their active realization by the agents themselves, saying, “for Habermas, as for Falk ... the most reliable agent of peace, justice, human rights, and democracy is the power of those who suffer most in their absence.”<sup>129</sup> Yet he adds that the movement toward cosmopolitan justice and equality would require the step from theory to practice, from morality to politics.

A related lesson is that such changes can be achieved only through political struggle. This understanding was theoretically reflected in the shift beyond moral cosmopolitanism toward political cosmopolitanism. The further articulation of this shift to the political was expressed in the term “cosmopolitan politics”; combined into one word, the term, “cosmopolitics” was coined.

One of the lessons to be drawn from the analysis of the failure of the previous cosmopolitanism of the 1990s is that the changes it requires cannot be realized “from above” by ruling elites, who are interested in the preservation of their power and privileges. Relying on the powerful to constrain their own abusive power seems to contradict the egalitarianism on which cosmopolitanism rests. In an attempt to fix this problem, Ingram sketches a concept of a radical cosmopolitics, which would respond to democratic requirements.

The way to avoid the empty abstraction and hidden particularism of the previous cosmopolitan universalism, and to avoid the strong likelihood of the co-optation of cosmopolitan ideas by the powerful is to rethink cosmopolitanism, not from the top down but from the bottom up. Changes leading toward universal freedom, equality, and justice can be effectively carried out first and foremost through initiatives from below, meaning by the people—by those who suffer from dependence, exclusion, and injustice. Thus, cosmopolitanism should provide the oppressed and the powerless with a strategy to overcome their exclusion and inequality. This would avoid the abstract universalism. This involves the shift from the view of cosmopolitanism as merely an ideal or end state to cosmopolitics as action from below against the denial of equal freedom, as “the always partial struggles against particular forms of hierarchy and exclusion—a shift from

procedure to process, from the standpoint of the future to that of the present, from the spectator to the actor.”<sup>130</sup>

In summary, Ingram’s analysis is twofold: one challenges the concept of universalism of mainstream cosmopolitanism; the other critiques the existing democratic system from the point of view of radical democracy.

### *From Universalism to Universalization*

In contrast to an abstract universalism, we have seen that Ingram argues that the principles of freedom and equality can be realized directly, by the affected individuals and groups themselves. However, values or principles are neutral; they can be invoked to support action for good or ill, for liberation or domination. Therefore, they are vulnerable to being usurped by the powerful from above or they can be reappropriated for the benefit of the masses from below.

In response to the problems of substantial and procedural universalism, Ingram offers an alternative concept of universalism as universalization. He points out that universal claims are always made in a specific context, and these claims reflect hidden particularisms. The pursuit of universalism then consists of a constant challenge to the limits of the accepted and the thinkable.

Universalism faces the challenge of its understanding in relation to the pluralistic world. The problem is that any universal norm or idea always turns out to be particular in its conception or application. If we accept some values or principles (human rights, for example) as universally valid, their interpretation or application in particular cases may nevertheless be distorted by subtle prejudices or exclusions. This poses a theoretical problem of the interpretation or application of universal values.

The challenge of universal values is to understand how they come to be articulated. Instead of seeing norms as timeless ideas to be philosophically discovered or grounded, Ingram suggests following Kant’s understanding of them as authored by those who are to be subject to them in a process that unfolds over time.<sup>131</sup> He explores the possibility of understanding universality of norms, and thus of the content of moral-ethical cosmopolitanism, as a bottom-up process of contestation. He examines how universal values can emerge through the critique of false universals. In explaining the transition from a theory of universalism to a practice of universalization, he turns to perhaps an unexpected source—Judith Butler, who developed an intriguing account of universalism as unfolding over time through challenges from the outside. She examines how universal values can emerge through the critique of false universals.

Butler refers to Theodor W. Adorno's critique of abstract universalism as violence. Adorno uses the term "violence" in relation to ethics in the context of the claim about universality in a situation in which such a claim fails to include the individual and ignores its rights.<sup>132</sup> This does not mean, however, that universality is, by definition, violent. The problem is with an application of universality that fails to be responsive to social-cultural particularity. Adorno helps us to understand that such violence of universality consists in part in indifference to the social conditions under which a living appropriation might become possible, resulting in "a deathly thing, a suffering imposed from an indifferent outside at the expense of freedom and particularity."<sup>133</sup>

Universal values are often framed in ways that favor some and disadvantage or exclude others. Butler raises the question: what does happen when an excluded group proceeds to claim "universality" and inclusion within its purview?<sup>134</sup> Claims of universality by those who are not covered by it, but nevertheless demand that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them, show its fundamentally temporal modality, its "non-place." Certain norms of universality function as exclusionary, while pretending to transcend the cultural locations from which they emerge. "Although they often appear as transcultural or formal criteria by which existing cultural conventions are to be judged, they are precisely cultural conventions which have, through a process of abstraction, come to appear as post-conventional principles."<sup>135</sup> The critical task is to show the ideological obfuscation of these formal conceptions of universality, tracing them back to the particularity of their culture-related content, and to expose the parochial and exclusionary character of a given historical articulation of universality. Only through challenges from its outside does the universal come to be articulated as "more" universal.

Ingram takes from Butler her criticism of false universals and the dynamic of contestation. At the same time, he sees the limitations of Butler's approach, in that it does not articulate the normative bases of such contestation and does not explain how it could itself be oriented by the ideals of freedom and equality.

For Butler, "equality" is just another normative term, open to indefinite interpretation. While Ingram agrees that we must always be open to the possibility of new claims to equality, above all from a cosmopolitan perspective, he nevertheless insists that equality is not simply an "empty signifier" into which we can put any content. Instead, it is also a measure of the relations between people or positions. In response to Butler's question regarding whether or not there is a way of posing the question of equality without claiming to know of what this phenomenon consists,

Ingram answers affirmatively: “by focusing on particular *inequalities*.” In this approach, the problem of false universals would then be not the different interpretations of universal values or principles, but rather the unequal access to the universal, and “equality then can be thought of as a measure or ‘operator’ that is at least relatively independent of its interpretations.”<sup>136</sup>

However, Ingram himself does not provide a straightforwardly positive account of the concepts of freedom and equality either. He turns to Pierre Bourdieu, seeing the advantages of Bourdieu’s approach over that of Butler. He shows how Bourdieu’s analysis of social relations in political terms of power, domination, exclusion, and the inequalities regarding unequal access to various forms of capital (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), by simple inversion, provides him with an evaluative standard: equality.

Bourdieu demonstrates how the critique of exclusion and discrimination is implicitly oriented toward the ideal of equal inclusion in social life. In this sense, for Ingram, the aim of the universalistic critique of false universals “boils down to the Kantian one of *political equality*.”<sup>137</sup> Bourdieu applies this standard in the evaluation of the system: since the system itself claims to provide equal opportunities, “*any de facto inequality can be presumed to stem from inequality of opportunity*,” and “the system can thereby be shown to fail by its own lights.”<sup>138</sup> He reformulates social relations in terms of inequalities and domination. His sociology shows how individuals are each differently constrained by the uneven distribution of symbolic power: “one of the most unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of symbolic capital, that is, of social importance and reasons for living.”<sup>139</sup>

The idea of equality serves Bourdieu not only as a standard for the critical evaluation of social relations but also as an aim in the political struggle against them, including against the cross-border relations that produce global inequalities. He views universalism as a logic of democratic politics. There should be a ceaseless struggle against inequalities in the distribution of the good that underlies all others: “symbolic power—the power to give meaning to things and people and thus to determine the shape of collective life.”<sup>140</sup> This includes “symbolic democracy.” Symbolic democratization means the struggle for equal citizenship. Ingram concludes that Bourdieu’s approach “is ideally suited to the open-ended claims to freedom and equality that would make up a democratic cosmopolitanism.”<sup>141</sup> Through the works of Butler and Bourdieu, Ingram helps us to see “cosmopolitanism as a process of universalization rather than as the simple application of the principle of universality.”<sup>142</sup>

In summary, we have seen that cosmopolitanism is always a claim against the status quo. It seeks to challenge a given set of rights and responsibilities by placing them in a wider framework. Such claims are expressed in terms of the extension or realization of universals, such as freedom, equality, and democracy (Habermas and Seyla Benhabib), or in terms of their displacement or reappropriation (Butler and Bourdieu). Ingram, however, argues that cosmopolitan claims point out that the area of our social relations and responsibilities is broader and that the standards of equality and justice ought to extend further than we imagine:

They will tend to ‘open up’ new dimensions of universal norms or to argue that those norms should be applied in unexpected ways to new parties and contexts. To this extent, the normative dimension of cosmopolitan universality is best thought, with Butler, as futural, emergent, insurgent, and counterhegemonic.<sup>143</sup>

This understanding of cosmopolitanism means an understanding of universality as coming about through contestation, and it includes the contestatory politics through which universal values are implemented from below.

### *Rethinking Political Cosmopolitanism*

Everything we have been discussing, as viewed by Ingram, aims for a radical transformation of society. To elucidate his project, he turns to Hannah Arendt’s view of politics and her theory of action (praxis). For Arendt, action is one of the fundamental categories of the human condition and the realization of the *vita activa*.<sup>144</sup> Action is tied to freedom and plurality. For her, freedom means the creative capacity to begin or to start something new, and political freedom is active and public. Plurality refers to equality and distinction. Arendt viewed action as a mode of human togetherness, based on which she developed a conception of participatory democracy (as opposed to the bureaucratically institutionalized and elitist forms of politics). Democratic politics is viewed as an activity that directly expresses the equal autonomy of its participants. In contrast to the abstract conceptual constructions of traditional political philosophy, Arendt inquired into the nature of the political as a mode of human experience and existence. In analyzing the American and French Revolutions, she pointed out the spontaneous initiatives of ordinary individuals who had the courage to step forward toward political actions in order to create a public space for freedom, and their “eagerness to liberate and to build a new house where freedom can dwell.”<sup>145</sup> She also mentioned the political

creativity of people during the Parisian Commune (the French Revolution), whose popular councils were spontaneous organs of the people and the “entirely new form of government, with a new public space for freedom.”<sup>146</sup>

These and other Arendtian ideas of anchoring democracy in political action and therefore in the direct expression of freedom and equality resonate with Ingram’s search for “true democracy” and a radical cosmopolitics. Yet the radically democratic and egalitarian implications of Arendt’s work still need to be fully articulated and developed. Thus, Ingram turns to theorists who have radicalized Arendt’s ideas and further developed her way of thinking about democracy within a counter-tradition of “radical democracy,” such as Claude Lefort, Sheldon Wolin, Miguel Abensour, Étienne Balibar, and Jacques Rancière, among others.

Wolin shows in a more explicitly radical way how democratic politics can be understood as an expression of the activity of citizens. In his seminal work, *Politics and Vision*, first published in 1960, he expressed concerns that citizenship and political society are disappearing into the “age of organization.” At the time, he could probably not even imagine what would happen with democracy in the following decades. In the revised and expanded edition of *Politics and Vision*, Wolin moved beyond his appeal to citizenship to envision a theory of radical democracy at odds with corporate capitalism and the state. He wrote about the “break” that occurred in the evolution of power, the degeneration of democracy by the corporate state, and a shift toward “postmodern democracy,” which is virtual and “fugitive.” He characterized the beginning of our new millennium as the era of Superpower, imperialism, “inverted totalitarianism,” deregulated markets, manipulated demos, anti-democratic culture, and “the ‘grafting’ of ‘empire’ upon popular sovereignty.”<sup>147</sup>

He saw the expression of the quintessence of Superpower in the declaration of war against terrorism by the George W. Bush administration of the United States, which warned that “‘We intend to oppose [terrorism] wherever it is.’ As a hybrid power and an empire, Superpower challenged the idea of a state whose identity was rested in and restricted to a distinct territory.”<sup>148</sup> The imperial Superpower spreads its influence around the world, significantly changing “the lives not only in the ‘homeland,’ but in the near and distant societies as well.”<sup>149</sup>

Wolin examines what he calls “inverted totalitarianism” emerging in America—which is a tendency toward totalizing power as a result of the paradoxical “inversion” of liberalism, when economic rather than political power is dangerously dominant, and more increased rights exist alongside a less participatory citizenry under increasingly pervasive governmental

control by Superpower. In facing this political reality, Wolin stresses the need for a new theory of democracy that is substantive as well as critical, “that expresses the shallowness of Superpower’s claim, that identifies what types of practices would qualify as democratic, and that points to actual examples.”<sup>150</sup> He points to some key characteristics marking the contours of a new theory, approaching democracy as a phenomenon characterized by plurality, openness, and fluidity, shaped by experience, and responsive to the needs of the people. A new theory needs to consider the plurality of possible forms. Democracy is rather an ephemeral phenomenon, “protean and amorphous, embracing a wide range of possible forms and mutations” in response to people’s needs.<sup>151</sup> Democratic theory should be focused on the needs of people, of average citizens, especially those disadvantaged and in need. Democracy should be conceived not as an institutionalized process, but as “a moment of experience, a crystallized response to deeply felt grievances of needs on the part of those whose main preoccupation—demanding of time and energy—is to scratch out a decent existence.”<sup>152</sup> The term “fugitive” democracy, which he uses in the title of one of his important works, is meant to emphasize its occasional character.

Wolin is mainly concerned with the challenges to democracy that come from the established power structures—concentrated in corporate economic organization and state institutions—that reduce democracy to *de jure* legitimization of this system, which has now evolved into a Superpower, the United States. He envisions a twofold path toward achieving true democracy: liberating democracy from its role as a tool of formal legitimization of the power system and re-appropriating it as a means for the people to address their needs and strive for their rights. Instead of the total integration of the system, democracy needs to shake off the monolith of power and promote the diversity stemming from the grass-root initiatives of the people: “The central challenge at this moment is not about reconciliation but about dissonance, not about democracy supplying legitimacy to totality but about nurturing a discordant democracy . . . discordant because, in being rooted in the ordinary.”<sup>153</sup>

While Wolin calls for drastic changes, which are emblematic of postmodern societies, he advises caution so that “discussions about the forms of change [are not] pre-empted by governmental, corporate, and academic elites.” He admonishes that top-down change will only perpetuate the power of the elites. Instead, he stresses the need for a decisive role to be played by ordinary people, who act as political agents. To the *big*-scale structures—of increasingly centralized and institutionalized economic-political-governmental system of big corporations, big government,

and two big political parties, cemented in institutions of Superpower, self-serving, self-perpetuating, and alienated from the people—Wolin opposes *small*-scale organizations and activities, created by individuals and small groups at the local level, which directly express their interests and serve their needs economically, politically, and culturally. These are political spaces still available for mobilizing democratic power, within inverted totalitarianism, “given the political limitations imposed by prevailing modes of economic organization.”<sup>154</sup>

To the concentrated power of a centralized system, Wolin opposes a plurality of spontaneously emerging political forms:

The power of a democratic politics lies in the multiplicity of the modest sites dispersed among local governments and institutions under local control . . . and in the ingenuity of ordinary people in inventing temporary forms to meet their needs. Multiplicity is anti-totality politics: small politics, small projects, small business, much improvisation, and hence anathema to centralization, whether of the centralized state or of the huge corporation.<sup>155</sup>

The rejection of centralization and concentration of power can be logically extended to the international system, which heretofore, the United States has tried to transform into an empire-centric world order. As he concludes, “in the era of Superpower, the task is to nurture the civic conscience of society,”<sup>156</sup> and, I might add, on a global scale as well.

To a static view of democracy as regime, Abensour opposes a dynamic view of democracy as process, mode of action, and contestation, which he terms, “insurgent democracy.” He further elaborates that “true democracy” is not identical to the state and does not entail the political and economic power of the state, which is the antithesis of the power of the people.<sup>157</sup> But it is neither an anarchist escape from politics through the spontaneous coordination of social interests nor a post-political society. The battle of democracy is waged by *demos* that creates a public sphere of struggles that counters political bureaucracy and representation. However, for Abensour, the political activities of *demos* do not mean solely the negation of institutions and ideals. Rather, he views relationships between democracy and the state dialectically: the *demos* challenges the state and to some degree transforms it, gaining and regaining a genuinely human existence.

Ingram highlights the idea that democracy emerges not as a design to be implemented, but as a mode of political action and a principle of transformation: “Democracy, like cosmopolitan universalism, can then be understood as an infinitely repeatable claim against the limits, injustices, and usurpations of any given set of institutions.”<sup>158</sup> He further develops

ideas of democratic universalism as cosmopolitics. He invokes the works of Balibar and Rancière, wherein he finds support for the idea that we can see “the demand for equal freedom as the basic claim of emancipatory politics, a claim that is by nature indefinitely expansive.”<sup>159</sup>

In contrast to those who view liberty and equality as contradictory, Balibar advocates for the unity of the two concepts and argues for judging them to be of equal importance. In the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* of 1789, he points to the identification of equality and freedom, in contrast to those who choose to give primacy to liberty over equality or vice versa. He states that each is the “measure” of the other. To capture the identification of the two concepts, he has coined the term “equaliberty,”<sup>160</sup> which means the right of each individual to freedom and equality, in the social, political, and private spheres. Their unity is also reflected in that “the negation of freedom de facto destroys equality and the negation of equality de facto destroys freedom.”<sup>161</sup>

In his interpretation of the American Declaration of Independence, Balibar also notes the identification of “man” and “citizen.” He argues for the convergence of citizenry and humanity, both in the document, and in the political imaginary.<sup>162</sup> Within the equation of man and citizen, as the very reason for its universality, resides the proposition of equaliberty, which has the status of a self-evident truth. The consequence of this equation is the idea that the emancipation of the oppressed can be achieved only by their own efforts. Equaliberty simultaneously rejects both subordination and domination, privileges and tyranny, hierarchy and inequality, the struggle against which remains at the center of modern political movements. The notion of equaliberty is particularly salient for cosmopolitics, because it underscores the universalizing character of these politics. Ingram opines, “the universality of equaliberty, however, owes nothing to the metaphysical status of the concepts themselves,” but it rather emerged from political struggles.<sup>163</sup>

In Rancière’s work, Ingram finds more support for the idea that struggles against inequality and domination can be understood as universalistic, which is essential for a bottom-up cosmopolitics. A situation of exclusion or inequality can change only when the excluded or subordinated respond to it “by engaging in the very activity that the prevailing order says is impossible for them, namely, political action, by deliberating and demanding a say.”<sup>164</sup> Rancière’s contribution to the thinking of radical heterogeneity sheds new light on political questions. He examines the conditions of the possibility of breaking with the logic governing social hierarchy. He points to the importance of dissensus as much as by consensus in this process. He examines what he calls

“democratic paradox,” by which he means the difference between democracy in name and in fact.<sup>165</sup> As an example of the democratic paradox, he refers to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 under the pretext of “spreading democracy.”

In summary, emancipatory struggles are always directed against both inequality and subjugation, not only within the state but also beyond it. It has been argued by some that national borders are one source of inequality and unfreedom, which they argue is currently evident in the immigration crisis. This generates new equalibertarian claims that have been proliferating in many areas of the world. Struggles for freedom and equality expand their scope and are cosmopolitan. Ingram notes that the contestatory approach to cosmopolitanism does not tell us precisely how to solve the dilemmas in each particular political situation or about preferable institutional forms, but it advocates for a normative basis and a general moral-political orientation toward emancipatory struggles.

In concert with Balibar and Rancière, Ingram advocates for a politics of radical democratic transformation, which he hopes will emerge through struggles for freedom and equality, challenging particular obstacles to the expansion of the universal principle of equal freedom. A democratic cosmopolitics from below is described as resulting from the sum of those challenges. He reinterprets the idea of radical democracy as a type of political action and logic of social transformation. He argues that we can see the demand for equal freedom as the basic claim of emancipatory politics, a claim that is by nature indefinitely expansive, saying, “on this view, democratic politics can be seen as the realization of the universalistic content of modern democracy through always particular struggles, an infinitely repeatable process by which people struggle to expand their autonomy to match the scale of the forces that determine their lives.”<sup>166</sup>

Ingram’s critical rethinking of cosmopolitan theories and democratic politics, involving the analysis of radical thought, outlines the distinctive characteristics of a new conception of cosmopolitan politics—a new conception of democratic cosmopolitics from below—as an alternative to the previous ones. First, instead of the views of politics as related to institutions, Ingram’s conceptualization is conceived mainly as a domain and an activity.<sup>167</sup>

Political action promises social change. Democratic political activity expresses the equal autonomy of its participants. It creates a common realm. Political freedom is active and public.<sup>168</sup> Such political action is understood to be a means for democratic transformation. Democratic politics is adversarial and carried out through contestation over democratic ideals.<sup>169</sup> This type of politics can arise outside institutions and against

them as a public demand that they become transformative and more democratic.<sup>170</sup> Finally, the politics of radical democratic transformation emerges through struggles for freedom and equality, challenging particular obstacles to the expansion of the universal principle of equal freedom.<sup>171</sup>

Ingram opines that universal values are useful in challenging the status quo, rather than defending it. He identifies cosmopolitanism with adversarial politics, through which universal values are implemented from below. Thus, universality should be understood as coming about through such contestation.<sup>172</sup> Through tracing the ideas of universalization and of the emergence of normative standards from the bottom up in the radical thought of Arendt, Butler, Wolin, Balibar, and Rancière, Ingram sees in them frameworks for radical politics, namely, “the constitutions of new movements, publics, peoples, and collective subjects.”<sup>173</sup> This clarifies, to some degree, the question about the political agency of cosmopolitics.

Although Ingram calls his proposed conception of cosmopolitics radical and shows his solidarity with theorists of radical democracy, his thought remains within the general democratic framework in a radical but egalitarian and emancipatory version. From this perspective, Ingram draws a line between radical democratic cosmopolitics and the radical theories that try to construct their political conceptions in opposition to democracy and to wage a politics of protest outside and against institutions. Ingram makes critical comments regarding Simon Critchley’s “anarchic metapolitics.”<sup>174</sup> He also criticizes Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* trilogy,<sup>175</sup> in which they declare that there is emerging “a new form of global order that we call Empire.”<sup>176</sup> Hardt and Negri number among those who assert that the world has already entered into the age of empire and that a new global order is allegedly emerging before our eyes. Such a conclusion would not be anticipated as a dystopia to be avoided, but as a preordained inevitability, viewed through rose-colored glasses.

Instead of undifferentiated radical conceptions, Ingram proposes a more nuanced, dialectical approach to oppositional politics: “We better understand the modalities, point, and potential effects of oppositional politics by understanding them in dialectical and not merely negative relation to existing normative and institutional structures.”<sup>177</sup> This approach tries to properly combine progressive initiatives and the energies of protesters from below—of those suffering from injustice, inequality, and unfreedom, and those protesting against it, thus demanding changes—and their use of the possibilities of institutions of constitutional democracy for addressing their claims and striving for the transformation of society. He writes, “the alternative is to regard existing ‘fictive’ universals as always potentially available for democratic rearticulation and existing

institutions as potential sites of a democratic cosmopolitics from below.”<sup>178</sup> This, however, should not be confused with opportunism. At the same time, he stresses that this struggle should not be limited to merely reforming the existing institutions but rather it is an open-ended process aiming for democratization and equaliberty:

This does not mean, as some cosmopolitan democrats imagine, that those institutions that make a normative claim to inclusiveness, or even democracy, like the UN or perhaps the EU, need only be somehow reformed in line or their underlying or implicit principles. . . . To the contrary, a central element of radically democratic politics is to open up new and unforeseeable domains to politics.<sup>179</sup>

Radical democratic politics should not be seen as disruption for its own sake. Rather, it is oriented toward inclusion and equality, thus having an explicit normative trust and at the same time universalized.

Ingram proposes reinterpreting the notion of right as “claims against unfreedom and inequality, addressed precisely against this kind of asymmetry by those who suffer from it.” In this approach, “we would see right in the underdetermined but still meaningful sense of equaliberty; the struggle to overcome particular forms of unfreedom and inequality.”<sup>180</sup>

A cosmopolitan orientation in politics calls for a support of “a democratic cosmopolitics from below, defined first and foremost by the efforts of political agents themselves to overcome obstacles to freedom and equality.”<sup>181</sup> Ingram places local claims for equality and liberty within a global context and bridges the particular content with its universal meaning. Although democratic cosmopolitics is most likely to consist of particular struggles, waged in particular sites and using local strategies to make local claims, such claims are made in the name of the universal right to have a say in the decisions that affect one’s life. Therefore, “to the extent that these claims serve to expand the scope of equal freedom—above and below as well as within the nation state—they may be properly seen as universal in their significance and, moreover, as the only democratic cosmopolitics worthy of the name.”<sup>182</sup>

Democratic politics is open-ended, and universal claims of equaliberty can be made from many locations and in any circumstances whenever power is exercised undemocratically without accountability and whenever objections are denied. International institutions, which claim to act in general interests, could be challenged on democratic grounds and requested to operate up to their declared principles. Ingram also suggests that the oppositional movements create their own institutions: “The ever denser networks between countries are increasingly leading various actors

to develop institutions to coordinate their affairs; any of these can create opportunities for contestation.”<sup>183</sup> Presumably, such institutionalization should be free from bureaucratization and any kind of exclusion.

The insights of radical cosmopolitics can help to bridge the sound core of cosmopolitan democratic thought, its normative ideas and models, with the political activities of individuals, groups, and social movements as political agents in their struggle oriented toward the practical implementation of the universal values and principles of freedom, equality, and justice.

If all politics are “local,” local struggles of individuals and groups against concrete cases of exclusion and injustice are indispensable as fertile soil for the growth of cosmopolitics. They are necessary, but insufficient to fully achieve rights, freedom, or equality. Because there are systemic causes of inequality and injustice, which permeate the whole socio-economic-political system all the way up to the top levels of the government, the struggle against all manifestations of inequality and injustice can be effective only if it is waged in proper forms at all levels of the democratic system—local, municipal, state, federal, regional, and global—and within the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. Initiatives must be energized from the bottom, from the grass-roots movements, but the struggle cannot be effective if it is only spontaneous; it needs to be properly organized and must have political structures, as well as genuine leadership.

Democratic cosmopolitics is a valuable contribution to this quest for an ethical-political theory, orienting to the struggles for the democratization of societies and international relations, aiming for a cosmopolitan order.

### *Beyond Cosmopolitanism?*

An original approach to the problems of democracy, cosmopolitanism, and world citizenship was offered by Jacques Derrida. He referred to “the democracy to come” as the unrealized but realizable future potential of democratic political arrangements within sovereign states, in conformity with international law, in order to achieve a far higher degree of social justice. The anguished question of how to “live together” underpinned Derrida’s writings on cosmopolitan law and hospitality in relation to the contemporary problem of refugee immigration.

“Asylum-seekers knock successfully on each of the doors of the European Union states and end up being repelled at each one of them.”<sup>184</sup> Perhaps surprisingly, this statement issues not from today’s mass media about the current refugee migration crisis in Europe, but from Derrida’s

prescient address to the International Parliament of Writers in Strasburg in 1996, on the subject of cosmopolitan rights for immigrants, which aimed to set up a network of cities of refuge. Since that time, the situation has been getting worse, not only because the European Union states did not improve their immigration policies, but mainly because the root causes—extreme poverty, violence, and war—which are forcing millions of people to leave their homelands and seek asylum, are also getting even worse. The most salient example of hegemonic geopolitics in recent times was the 2003 invasion in Iraq (followed by Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria), by the United States and its “coalition of the willing,” including some of its NATO allies, under the pretext of “spreading democracy.” This triggered civil wars and further destabilization of the region, which resulted in a new wave of mass migration of desperate refugees into the European Union.

Derrida raised his voice in defense of human rights and he advanced the case for a right of immigration for those seeking asylum. He strongly criticized anti-immigration policies and practices as a “violation of hospitality.” In his argument, he refers to the historical tradition of the law of hospitality in the West (for example, in Saint Paul, the Stoics, and the Enlightenment) and uses the term “city of refuge,” alluding to the Bible and also to the use of this term by Emmanuel Levinas, who viewed hospitality toward the Other as the criterion of humanness.<sup>185</sup> He also refers to Arendt’s analysis, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, of the modern history of the “nation of minorities,” of the stateless, homeless, and deported persons.<sup>186</sup>

In grounding his claim of the immigrants’ right to “hospitality,” Derrida finds support in Kant’s philosophical formulation of universal hospitality and cosmopolitan law in the Third Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace: “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal *hospitality*.” And Kant stressed that “it is not a question of philanthropy but of *right*.”<sup>187</sup> Derrida further explains, “Kant seems at first to extend the cosmopolitan law to encompass universal hospitality *without limit*. Such is the condition of perpetual peace between all men. He expressly determines it as a *natural law (droit)*.” Derrida’s comment is remarkable in two respects. First, it highlights the paramount importance of cosmopolitanism as the indispensable condition for lasting peace for humanity. We can add that the cosmopolitan order stands as the peaceful alternative to hegemon-centric designs of world order imposed by the superpower relying on force, which means a continuation of antagonism between dominating and dominated and a perpetuation of wars. Second, it stresses that this right (law), given its natural derivation, is therefore both “imprescriptible and inalienable.”<sup>188</sup>

The inalienable rights exist prior to and independent of any human organization, positive law, or politics. Inalienable rights are “inherent,” “imprescriptible,” and “irrefutable.” Inalienable rights are not transferable or refutable; they cannot be taken from or given away by the individual who possesses those rights. One may choose to sacrifice one’s own life, but not to surrender the freedom to be the master of one’s own life.

As Kant explained:

*hospitality* (hospitableness) means that right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the *right to be a guest* (for this a special beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain time), but the *right to visit*.<sup>189</sup>

Kant argued that this right to visit belongs to all human beings “by virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface.” Originally, no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth. He added, that since earth is a globe we cannot leave, human beings cannot disperse infinitely but “must finally put up with being near one another.” This point is very relevant in our age of globalization, requiring peaceful coexistence in the “planet-home” for all its inhabitants. Kant believed that hospitality, including the seeking of commerce, can facilitate peaceful relations among the people from distant parts of the world, “which can eventually become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.”<sup>190</sup> At the same time, Kant criticized the violation of this right, both in the cases of “the inhospitableness” of the coastal dwellers in plundering adjacent seas, as well as the “inhospitable” behavior of the colonizers from “civilized” states conquering foreign countries.

Derrida applies the Kantian concept of hospitality to the contemporary problem of immigration, taking its core principle while at the same time pointing out its limits and the need for the reformulation of the law, and for developing a culture of hospitality. He sees two limits in Kant’s conception. First, Kant “excluded hospitality as a *right of residence* (*Gastrecht*); he limits it to the *right of visitation* (*Besuchsrecht*).”<sup>191</sup> Derrida also opined, “the right of residence must be made the object of a particular treaty between states . . . it is this limitation on the right of residence, as that which is to be made dependent on treaties between states, that perhaps, among other things, is what remains for us debatable.”<sup>192</sup> Despite that Derrida translates this passage from Kant as a

“treaty between states,” when Kant mentioned the “right to be a guest” (a more precise translation of *Gastrecht* than “right of residence”), which would require a “special beneficent pact” or friendly agreement, he did not necessarily mean to imply an interstate treaty.

A second limit of Kant’s concept as Derrida points out, is the legal aspect of hospitality, involving the state, when it is applied to foreigners seeking the right of residence in a state other than the one in which they were born. He writes:

in defining hospitality in all its rigor as a law . . . , Kant assigns to it conditions which make it dependent on state sovereignty, especially when it is a question of the *right of residence*. Hospitality signifies here the *public nature (publicité)* of public space, as it always is the case for the juridical in the Kantian sense.<sup>193</sup>

Thus, hospitality is controlled by the law and the state police, and with regard to immigrants this creates serious problems for them, which Derrida called tantamount to the “violations of hospitality.” This shows that the “sovereignty of cities” (or states) is a problematic concept. Thus, Derrida addresses the real problem of refugees as human beings having the right to hospitality, but at the same time, whose claims are hitting the wall of either the physical barbed wire and excessive force of the border police or a legal quagmire.

Derrida’s approach is to consider the problem of hospitality with its dual aspects of unconditional and conditional hospitalities as a paradox or aporia. These two hospitalities are at once heterogeneous and indissociable. On the one hand, it is conditional hospitality of *invitation* that is most commonly practiced by individuals, families, or states: “We offer hospitality only on the condition that the other follows our rules, our way of life, even our language, our culture, our political system, and so on.”<sup>194</sup> That is hospitality corresponds to the right of invitation, as it is commonly practiced according to laws and conventions on the national, international, and “cosmopolitical” levels.

On the other hand, the concept of pure or unconditional hospitality is practically impossible to realize and no state can incorporate it into its laws, because unconditional hospitality is irreconcilable with a sovereign state. Nevertheless, unconditional hospitality is hospitality *itself*, which “is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign *visitor*, and a new *arrival*, non-identifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other.”<sup>195</sup> Derrida calls this a hospitality of “visitation.” Without pure hospitality, we would not even have the idea of love, of the alterity of the Other, or of “living together” in

a way free of any totality. Unconditional hospitality is transcendent with regard to the political, the juridical, and even to the ethical. However, at the same time and paradoxically, unconditional hospitality is the condition of the political, the juridical, and even the ethical. “Political, juridical, and ethical responsibilities have their place . . . between these two hospitalities, the unconditional and the conditional.”<sup>196</sup>

The idea of unconditional hospitality and an ethics of hospitality confront us with the most pressing political concerns of our time. Derrida addresses these concerns, moving back and forth between philosophical reflections and the political discussion of immigration laws, democracy, and cosmopolitan citizenship. He admits that these are difficult questions. As an immediate task, he suggests transforming and reforming the laws and the national and international juridical structures:

It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which takes place *between* the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered *a priori* to every other, to all newcomers, *whoever they may be*, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which *The* unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency, and of even being perverted at any moment.<sup>197</sup>

Due to the urgency of the matter, Derrida calls for an immediate and just response, “more just in any case than the existing law” to violence and persecution related to immigration.<sup>198</sup> The issues of hospitality (including tolerance), however, cannot be solved through the legal medium alone, if mentalities remain unchanged. It requires the transformation of social consciousness and culture, including learning through experience. As Derrida writes, hospitality is culture itself:

insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics is hospitality*; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality.<sup>199</sup>

Derrida highlights the image of cities of refuge as a model for the transformation of societies worldwide, in approximation of a cosmopolitan ideal. He writes, “I also imagine the experience of cities of refuge as giving rise to a place (*lieu*) for reflection—for reflection on the questions of asylum and hospitality—and for a new order of law and democracy to come to be put to the test (*experimentation*).” He also refers to the

Levinasian figure of the door at the threshold of the home, hospitably opened as a manner of relating oneself to the Other: “Being on the threshold of these cities, of these new cities that would be something other than ‘new cities,’ a certain idea of cosmopolitanism, *an other*, has not yet arrived, *perhaps*.”<sup>200</sup>

Derrida generally favors the cosmopolitan ideal. He writes, “the idea of cosmopolitanism emerges out of a very old tradition” that goes back to Saint Paul, to the Stoics, and to Kant, who grounded the idea of a cosmopolitical law, which would be the condition for approaching perpetual peace. However, in order to cultivate the spirit of cosmopolitan tradition,

we must also try to adjust the limits of this tradition to our own time by questioning the ways in which they have been defined and determined by the ontotheological, philosophical, and religious discourses in which this cosmopolitical ideal was formulated.<sup>201</sup>

He is concerned with the continued inertia of conceiving cosmopolitanism within the state-centric framework and that “cosmopolitanism as it is classically conceived presupposes some form of state sovereignty, something like a world state.”<sup>202</sup> He is critical of the form of state and deconstructs its concept as aporia: on the one hand, the “state” form (the sovereignty of the nation state) plays the positive role in providing citizens with protection against certain dangers (which is why refugees seek asylum and citizenship in foreign states). On the other hand, a state has negative effects by monopolizing violence, excluding or repressing noncitizens, enfranchising citizens’ freedoms, and perverting technological advances into weapons of mass destruction.

Thus, Derrida warns that these negative characteristics could be reproduced in an idealized quasi-cosmopolitan “world state.” In the realistic view of the contemporary world, he states: “I believe that everything must be done to extend the privilege of citizenship in the world: too many men and women are deprived of citizenship in so many ways.”<sup>203</sup> However, in putting this into long range perspective, as an ideal, he envisions that in some distant future the state form “should, one day, no longer be the last word of the political” and eventually it will undergo gradual transformations toward some forms of shared and limited sovereignty.<sup>204</sup>

Derrida suggests that we should think beyond the nation states, citizenship, state-centric international system, and the traditional cosmopolitical ideal. “Beyond” is his signature word in trying to broaden the horizon of philosophical thinking about his vision of a future world

order. In this respect, he expresses the ideas of “democracy to come” and “singularity.” He laments that existing democracies “remain inadequate to the democratic demand,” whether in the world, anywhere that human rights are violated and many millions are “grossly deprived not only of bread and water but of equality or freedom.”<sup>205</sup>

In his reflection on democracy, Derrida finds paradoxical sets of dualities or aporias: between freedom and equality, heterogeneity and homogeneity, self-determination and sharing, sovereignty and democracy. On the one hand, democratic freedoms, such as freedom of speech and press, as well as liberties, are indispensable for a democratic society. Freedom allows free interpretations of the concept of democracy and its openness to self-improvement and transformation. On the other hand, because of their commitment to equality, democracies are characterized by an equal sharing of power among the people. For a democracy to remain true to itself it must ensure that all people have equal opportunities to represent and to be represented, and to govern as well as to be governed. Freedom implies thinking the self as immeasurable, while equality implies the self to be understood in an equitable and measurable manner. Democracy respects the citizen or political subject as a singular individual to be counted. At the same time, there is the universality of rational calculation, the equality of citizens before the law.

Derrida argues that democracy opens up the question of the citizen or the subject as a countable singularity. Democracies are consumed with counting votes and the calculation of majorities. Calculated majorities always prevail in democracy, which obliterates the singularity of the counted. By being larger than the minority, the majority can enforce its will upon the minority. Ironically, because democracy is inherently concerned with vote counting and calculation, it is possible for the enemies of democracy, by a rhetorical simulacrum, to present themselves as staunch democrats, to accumulate a numerical majority of votes to come into power through formally democratic electoral processes, and to engineer the dissolution of the very democracy.

A democratic state may either allow the seizure of power through formally democratic elections or it may seek to prevent this by suspending democratic procedures. But either outcome is risky for the democracy. The aporia of freedom and equality has to do with the freedom at play in the concept of democracy. Derrida raises the question: “must a democracy leave free and in a position to exercise power those who risk mounting an assault on democratic freedoms and putting an end to democratic freedom in the name of democracy and of the majority that they might actually be able to rally around to their cause?”<sup>206</sup>

This aporia shows the susceptibility of democracy to the logic of “autoimmunity,” which is “that strange behavior where a living being, in quasi-*suicidal* fashion ‘itself’ works to destroy its own protection.”<sup>207</sup> Among the symptoms of suicidal autoimmunity are “the Cold War in the head,” the nuclear “balance of terror,” and the global “war on terrorism.”<sup>208</sup> This posits a challenge to democracy and requires its constant self-improvement: “the inherited concept of democracy is the only one that welcomes the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself.”<sup>209</sup>

To go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism as world citizenship, we have seen that Derrida speaks of democracy to come. Here, he is challenging the established meanings of “democracy” and suggesting a new way of thinking about democracy in relation to the renewed views of individual “singularity,” alterity of the Other, responsibility, the ethical, and the political. He explores the concept of democracy in two modalities of discourse. On the one hand, he describes in a neutral fashion what the concept of democracy implies. This description includes: the semantic void of the concept, its promise, the event to come, messianicity and intrinsic historicity, an autoimmune self-critique, and its aporias. On the other hand, beyond the level of a neutral conceptual analysis, democracy to come can also “inscribe a performative attempt to win conviction by suggesting support or adherence”<sup>210</sup> implying an imperative injunction to believe in it and to take action.

The concept of democracy to come can oscillate endlessly between these two modalities of discourse. They can alternate from being addressed to the first person or to the other. This also means that it is political, for democracy opens the publicity of public space: “It thus already opens, for whomever, an experience of freedom, however ambiguous and disquieting, threatened and threatening, it might remain in its ‘perhaps,’ with a necessarily excessive responsibility of which no one may be absolved.”<sup>211</sup> Derrida says that the “to come” is “not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the *future*, but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise—and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now.”<sup>212</sup> Hence, democracy to come is supposed to play an active role in the present and it is a “call for a militant and interminable political critique.”<sup>213</sup>

Democracy to come would go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, understood as world citizenship. As Derrida explains, “it would be more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone) ‘live together,’ there where they are not yet defined by citizenship, that is, by their condition as lawful

‘subjects’ in a state or legitimate members of a nation state or even of a confederation or world state.”<sup>214</sup> It would involve an alliance that goes beyond the “political,” but does not lead to depolitization.

In commenting on a dialogue she had with Derrida, Giovanna Borradori writes:

Even though Derrida explicitly stands by cosmopolitanism and world citizenry, he feels that commitment to justice cannot be fully exercised within the boundaries of law and cosmopolitanism. For justice, as well as democracy, is not just about our conduct within the framework of the state or under the obligations of citizenship but also in the face of a stranger.<sup>215</sup>

She underlines that Derrida’s belief that room needs to be left for something “beyond” politics and world citizenry, is based on the distinction between the conditional and unconditional registers. She adds:

It is feasible to interpret the double register of the conditional and the unconditional as a version of Kant’s transcendental argument. Scholars have explored this possibility, which, if accepted, considerably dispels Habermas’s preoccupation that bashing politics on its ‘beyond’ is irreconcilable with democracy.<sup>216</sup>

Derrida suggests to broaden the horizon of our views of cosmopolitanism: “Progress of cosmopolitanism, yes. We can celebrate it, as we do any access to citizenship, in this case, to world citizenship.” He stresses that beyond the traditional cosmopolitical ideal we should see “the coming of a universal alliance or solidarity that extends beyond the internationality of nation states and thus beyond citizenship.”<sup>217</sup>

### ***Developing a New Cosmopolitanism— Critical, Democratic, and Dialogic***

In the last decade, the concept of cosmopolitanism has become one of the key concepts in social science. In response to the challenges of hegemonic globalization, it has evolved significantly, with distinctive characteristics such as being rooted, reflexive, critical, democratic, dialogic, and transformative.

The *rooted* or grounded dimension of cosmopolitanism is articulated, for example, by Kwame Anthony Appiah. For him, to have roots or to be embedded in a specific history, nation, or people, is perfectly compatible with also being a cosmopolitan citizen of the world. One can feel deeply committed to the local while at the same time adhering to global identities

and universal values. Rooted cosmopolitanism arises from awareness of one's location, nationality, and cultural heritage. It is "a form of universalism that is sensitive to the ways in which historical context may shape the significance of the practice."<sup>218</sup> Cosmopolitanism balances our "obligations to others" with "the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance," what Appiah calls "universality plus difference."<sup>219</sup> Such cosmopolitanism is an attempt to integrate the similar and different aspects of cultures around the world.

The *reflexive* dimension of cosmopolitanism refers to the self-reflection of cosmopolitanism on its philosophical and methodological assumptions. Cosmopolitanism must become aware of its own conditions of possibility: "If cosmopolitanism becomes aware of its ability to connect and balance the various modes of dealing with otherness and difference, then it can be understood, and theoretically and empirically developed, as *reflexive cosmopolitanism*."<sup>220</sup> Cosmopolitanism is not only self-reflexive but should also reflect on the point of view of the Other. It is reflexive about its material basis and its rootedness in social institutions and socio-political systems. Cosmopolitanism should also emerge from below, from those at the bottom of socio-economic pyramid who most suffer the negative consequences of hegemonic globalization. "Reflexive cosmopolitanism is a universality plus difference that reflects on its own conditioned claims. It is thus . . . diversity plus reflexivity of historical contingency."<sup>221</sup>

The *critical* dimension of cosmopolitanism plays an important role in a critique of the status quo and of hegemonic domination, which has been discussed above. Ulrich Beck has called this approach "methodological cosmopolitanism."<sup>222</sup> Gerard Delanty asserts, "the idea of a critical cosmopolitanism is relevant to the renewal of critical theory in its traditional concern with the critique of social reality and the search for immanent transcendence, a concept that lies at the core of critical theory."<sup>223</sup> According to Mignolo, critical cosmopolitanism has a twofold task: one is clearing up the encumbrances of the past; the other is to point toward the future. He develops the concept of "de-colonial cosmopolitanism." Critical cosmopolitanism comprises projects located in the exteriority and issuing forth from the colonial difference. It is developed as the necessary project of an increasingly transnational and postnational world as an alternative to imperial designs.<sup>224</sup>

The *democratic* dimension of cosmopolitanism asserts democratic principles and values within the society and in international relations. A number of philosophers and political scientists have contributed to the theory of democratic cosmopolitanism.

The *dialogic* dimension of cosmopolitanism articulates the cultural diversity harmonized through dialogical relationships. It embraces cosmopolitanism's recognition of the Other and the normativity of dialogical relationships with the Other—engaging in dialogue among individuals, social groups, nations, cultures, and finally, in a “dialogue of civilizations.” It critically deconstructs the Eurocentric and Western-centric narratives of human history and corresponding cosmopolitan projects, monologically presented from “one” perspective.

Cosmopolitan claims imply universality claims, but at the same time philosophers criticize what they call universalistic pretensions and pseudo-universalistic ethnocentrism. In contrast to the abstract universality, they offer a concept of concrete universality, which is supported by a pluralistic view of the world and of the different paths of human history, such as “multiple modernities.” By breaking the monologic image of the world in favor of the pluralistic view, they lay the groundwork for the recognition of the social-cultural diversity of humanity and of different perspectives in views of histories and an ideal world order that gives voice to the Other, to the subaltern, which can be in “dialogue” as a participant of a worldwide conversation or the multivoiced “polilogue” regarding the past, present, and the future of humanity.<sup>225</sup> Dialogic cosmopolitanism emerges from the various spatial and historical locations of the colonial (and imperial) difference. This refers to global processes of “dewesternization” and “decoloniality” as disassociating from the matrix of Western power and as a movement toward a global future, when human beings are not exploited and the natural world is not undermined. It should be oriented toward “pluriversality,” or a combination of diversity and universality that Mignolo calls “diversality.” Instead of a homogenous world centered on an ideology or a state power, critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism is “a cosmopolitanism of multiple trajectories aiming at a trans-modern world based on pluriversality rather than on a new and good universal for all.”<sup>226</sup>

A *transformative* orientation is the crucial characteristic of new cosmopolitanism—as an ideal which is guiding political practices toward the transformation of the social world. Cosmopolitanism as political philosophy orients toward an ideal of a possible future world order as an alternative to both the existing conflicted state-centric international system and to hegemonic domination. An important characteristic of the new cosmopolitanism is the attempts to connect it with the social reality of today's world. It is committed to the amelioration of the world and to an ideal of a possible cosmopolitan future as opposed to hegemonic totalizing integration. It could become the regulative principle for understanding the interaction between universalistic, national, and cosmopolitan principles in

contemporary society. It emphasizes that, contrary to hegemonic globalization, there are processes within culture, the public consciousness, and political movements around the world that manifest cosmopolitan views and practices of social transformation, and which are alternatives to neoliberal hegemonism.

The transformative and emancipatory role of cosmopolitanism is rooted in reality, and at the same time, is inspiring. It guides efforts to transform social reality, and urges us to aspire to a more just and humane world. Gerard Delanty tackles the dialectic relationship between the cosmopolitan ideal and reality, writing that cosmopolitanism is “never an absolute or fixed category, but a dimension of social life that must be actively constructed through practices of meaning-making in social situations.”<sup>227</sup> Cosmopolitanism is viewed as a cultural medium of societal transformation based on the principle of world openness, and “today global publics are playing a critical role in such processes of transformation.”<sup>228</sup> Thus, “a sociologically driven critical cosmopolitanism concerns the analysis of cultural modes of mediation by which the social world is shaped and where the emphasis is on moments of world openness created out of the encounter of the local with the global.”<sup>229</sup> The very notion of cosmopolitanism compels the recognition of multiple kinds of post-universalistic thought, “which is not merely a condition of diversity but is articulated in cultural models of world openness through which societies undergo transformation.”<sup>230</sup> World disclosure is one of the central mechanisms of cosmopolitan transformation, which occurs on macro-social and micro dimensions. Delanty develops a conception of cosmopolitan political community, of personhood, and a transformative conception of belonging whereby the citizen is neither a passive entity nor a pre-political being but an active agent.

Benhabib reflects upon the political transformations and makes a case for a “cosmopolitanism without illusions.” She opines that we need to use the human rights covenants to enable the growth of counter-hegemonic transnational movements, claiming rights across borders. In contrast to some premature declarations of an age of cosmopolitanism, she argues that currently, we live not in an age of cosmopolitanism, but “in an age of cosmopolitization,” anticipating its realization:

The interlocking of democratic iteration struggles within a global civil society and the creation of solidarities beyond borders, including a universal right of hospitality that recognizes the other as a potential co-citizen, anticipate another cosmopolitanism—a cosmopolitanism to come.<sup>231</sup>

Benhabib examines the social forces contributing to cosmopolitization. Human rights treaties have “jurisgenerative” effects in that they enable women, ethnic, religious and other minorities to enter the public sphere of social and political contestation, to make claims, and to anticipate a justice to come in processes of democratic iterations. Difficulties stem from the necessary boundedness of democratic authority and the historically specific expressions of national solidarity by ethnicity. For example, she notes that the culture of human rights has shown the dialectical play between sovereignty and cosmopolitan right, in which nation states are simultaneously affirmed and denied.

The central problem is how to imbue cosmopolitan moral thought with a legal and enforceable status for individuals as well as states and governments. International human rights norms need contextualization in specific polities through democratic iterations. Citizens can reiterate these norms and incorporate them into democratic will-formation processes through arguments and contestation, thus becoming increasingly convinced of the validity of cosmopolitan norms. In this process, the principles of human rights are progressively incorporated into positive law of democratic states, facilitating the emergence of cosmopolitan law. Jurisgenerative politics mediates between universal norms and the will of democratic majorities. Democratic iterations are matched at the global level by cosmopolitan iterations, which are jurisgenerative.

Fred Dallmayr, reflecting on an emerging global city or community, views it as a historical journey of humanity toward “cosmopolis.” He argues for harmony in diversity:

Hence, any move or journey in the direction of cosmopolis today can only occur in the mode of sustained dialogue, the mode of cross-cultural and inter-religious interaction. . . . Going beyond the narrow confines of anthropocentrism, the journey has to make ample room for dialogue and listening, for the humanizing demands of education, ethics, and spiritual insight. Differently put: *homo faber* has to yield pride of place to *homo loquens*, *homo quaerens*, and *homo symbolicus*.<sup>232</sup>

In summary, in contrast to “humanitarian imperialism” and other hegemonic designs, cosmopolitanism offers its own approach to the solution to the problem of human rights violation and other social and global problems, in which the moral goals are achieved by moral means. The cosmopolitan perspective elucidates a heuristically fruitful approach to the solution of these problems. Cosmopolitanism represents a viable, peaceful alternative to hegemony, which exacerbates the global disorder.

## *Conclusion*

Anyone who reflects upon the current world situation is confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, the need for positive transformation of societies and international relations has never been so urgent as it is now, in a world facing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, economic underdevelopment, and the ecological crisis that cause suffering for many and threaten the future of humanity. On the other hand, the task of transformation has never been so difficult as it is in today's world of political and economic polarization and hegemonic domination. Researchers show that the hegemonic superpower, contrary to its universalistic pretensions to represent the interests of humanity, is a self-maintaining system with its own political and economic interests, and while it claims to be the world leader, it is actually unable to provide genuine leadership in searching for the solutions to global problems. Moreover, hegemonic domination and unilateralism, inclined to disregard international law and institutions, is not conducive to the peaceful and collaborative relationships among the nations, which is *sine qua non* condition for the steps toward the solution or at least the mitigation of world problems.

Continuation of this current tendency only exacerbates these problems, with potentially catastrophic consequences. At the same time, researchers, assessing the US reliance on military preponderance and economic power and the entrenched vested interests of its ruling elite which benefits from its privileged position of dominance in the world, consider unlikely any voluntary changes in its hegemonic geopolitics, unless the possibility of a "post-catastrophe" global situation arises.<sup>233</sup> However, in a nuclear age, a catastrophe may leave nothing to change, because it would be the end of civilization. Does this mean that the only choice we have is between which types of catastrophes?

This time of crisis poses challenges for philosophy. Philosophy, facing world problems, can critically examine the nature, current effects, and future consequences of these problems, awaken the global consciousness, and assist in understanding the urgent need for joint efforts by nations in finding possible solutions. Cosmopolitan philosophy responds to this call. It offers a new approach to the contemporary world order and an alternative to both the traditionally anarchic international system and the hegemon-centric "world state."

The cosmopolitan project envisions the progressive transformation of the international system through its liberation from hegemonic "capture" and consequently through strengthening international law and institutions,

regaining their roles in securing the rule of law and greater equality, which would create conditions for the peaceful and collaborative relationships of the nations for the solution to the social and global problems. Furthermore, this project views the process of dehegemonization and the democratic self-transformation of societies and international relations as steps on the long-range path of transition from an international to a cosmopolitan order of law and peace.

Cosmopolitanism as “realistic utopia” expresses the possibility and thus the hope for a brighter future of humanity. This, however, does not mean trivializing the gravity of the situation of the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thus, ideas of cosmopolitan democracy and radical cosmopolitics should play their important role in the critical assessment of the current situation, in unmasking the anti-democratic tendencies imposed by the hegemonization of world politics and its negative consequences. This hegemonization of the international system is dismantling brick-by-brick its foundation, weakening and taking away the rule of law and the basic principles of sovereign equality of nation-states, non-interference, collective security, and collaboration, which were enshrined in the UN Charter. These principles need to be regained as conditions for the further transformation of the international system toward greater democracy and peace, protection of human rights, and global justice—the very direction epitomized by the cosmopolitan ideal. In its critical role, cosmopolitan theorizing should clearly distinguish genuine cosmopolitan ideas from their distortions and hegemonic pseudo-universal imitations in “imperial cosmopolitanism.”

Cosmopolitan theorists show that global hegemony is a flawed design, which is unsustainable and which has no future. But this still doesn't mean that the adherents of cosmopolitanism should just idly sit by, hoping that eventually, the hegemonic bubble will burst, or hoping that in the after-hegemonic future, the international system will automatically evolve toward lawful normalization. Passively doing nothing more than waiting will not start the movement toward global democracy and cosmopolitanism even if imperial designs were to falter under their own weight. Such passivity might very well have the opposite result—further hegemonic deterioration of the international system, undermining any possibility of its recovery and normalization. The battle for the democratic cosmopolitan future needs to start here and now.

Thus, adherents of cosmopolitanism should play an active role in wakening the global consciousness and mobilizing social movements—national and international—for the defense of peace, freedom, justice, and democratic principles on a global scale and for the transformation of

societies and of international relations. Cosmopolitan theorizing should elaborate the recommended course for the promotion of the cosmopolitan alternative to the hegemonic regression: the struggle for cosmopolitanism in the time of hegemony. In this respect, the cosmopolitan theorists are making an important contribution to the development of the institutional models for the global cosmopolitan democracy. Radical cosmopolitics tries to connect the ideals with reality and explores the possibilities of the political agencies at local level for implementing the grass-roots changes and a democratic cosmopolitics from below.

The transformation of societies and international relations will not come automatically: all the democratic achievements have been the result of people's struggles for their legitimate interests. The future of democracy, including global and cosmopolitan, depends to a large degree on the present and future actions of the social forces interested in and capable of defending it. The powerful ideas of cosmopolitan democratic transformation should become the guiding and mobilizing force, becoming the real power of political agencies—national and transnational social movements, leaders, and active individuals, pursuing this goal.

The prospect of a cosmopolitan order remains a positive alternative toward which we should strive. There is reason to strive, reason to hope, and we must continue the process. While we still do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism, there is a hope that the joint efforts of humanity will contribute to an approximation of it. Neither the success nor the failure of cosmopolitan project is predetermined. Its implementation depends on many factors, mainly on the choices and actions of the political actors, individually and collectively.

This analysis has provided arguments supporting the thesis that an effective solution to social and global problems can be achieved only by peaceful means and international cooperation, in a world free from hegemonic domination and normalized international relations, and through the transformation of the social world aiming for a gradual realization of the ideal of the cosmopolitan order of law and peace. This possibility gives us hope. Realization of this possibility depends on us, as peoples and individuals—the citizens of the world.

## Notes

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22. José E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-makers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 200–1, 644.
23. Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden MA, Cambridge UK: Polity, 2006), 103.
24. Habermas, Derrida, and Richard Rorty were among many intellectuals who were concerned about the US invasion of Iraq. They took part in an initiative in which Umberto Eco, Adolf Muschg, Fernando Savater, Gianni Vattimo published articles in newspapers in European countries, which were later published in a

volume *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War*, eds. Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, John Torpey (New York: Verso, 2005).

25. Habermas, *The Divided West*, 39.

26. Cosmopolitanism contributes to the philosophical grounding of human rights. Jean L. Cohen extends the political conception of human rights and advocates for a new conception of sovereignty that recognizes the status of individuals as being members of the international community with the right to participate in global governance institutions. Sovereign equality and human rights are two interrelated legal principles of the dualistic international system, both of which are crucial to make it more just. See Jean Cohen, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization," *Political Theory* 36, no. 4 (2008), 596.

27. I mentioned somewhere hegemonic implications of "democratic peace" theories as opposed to cosmopolitan democracy. E. Demenchonok, "From a State of War to Perpetual Peace," in *The Challenges of Globalization* (Malden: Blackwell, 2007).

28. Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, ed. Max Pensky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

29. Habermas, *The Divided West*, 149.

30. *Ibid.*, 148–9.

31. Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 333.

32. Jürgen Habermas, "The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society," *Constellations* 15, no. 4 (2008): 452.

33. Daniele Archibugi, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 277.

34. *Ibid.*, 278.

35. *Ibid.*, 279.

36. David Held, "Principles of the Cosmopolitan Order," in *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12–5.

37. *Ibid.*, 18.

38. David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideas and Realities* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2010), 177.

39. *Ibid.*, 173.

40. *Ibid.*, 177–8.

41. Raffaele Marchetti, *Global Democracy: For and Against. Ethical Theory, Institutional Design, and Social Struggles* (New York, London: Routledge, 2008), 1.

42. *Ibid.*, 40.

43. *Ibid.*, 42.

44. *Ibid.*, 52.

45. *Ibid.*, 55.

46. *Ibid.*, 54–5.

47. *Ibid.*, 57.

48. Marchetti, "Models of Global Democracy: In Defence of Cosmo-Federalism," in *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*, eds. Danielle

- Archbugi, Mathias Kenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24.
49. *Ibid.*, 25.
50. *Ibid.*, 25.
51. *Ibid.*, 38.
52. *Ibid.*, 39.
53. *Ibid.*, 40.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Raffaele Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement: States and Non-State Actors in Global Governance* (New York, London: Lexington Books, 2016), 161.
56. *Ibid.*, 160.
57. Marchetti, *Global Democracy*, 55.
58. Cf. Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti, eds., *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Raffaele Marchetti, *Global Strategic Engagement: States and Non-State Actors in Global Governance* (New York, London: Lexington Books, 2016).
59. Richard Falk, “The Promise and Perils of Global Democracy,” in Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti, *Global Democracy*, 274–84, at 283.
60. *Ibid.*
61. Mark Wenman, *Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power in the Era of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4.
62. *Ibid.*, 46.
63. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples: With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
64. See William McBride, “The Philosophical Quest for Perfect Justice,” in *Intercultural Dialogue: In Search of Harmony in Diversity*, ed. Edward Demenchonok, 255–70 (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).
65. Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 3.
66. *Ibid.*, 2005, 4.
67. *Ibid.*, 2005, 9.
68. Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (Verso, 2013), 1.
69. *Ibid.*, 2013, xii.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Mouffe, *On the Political*, 15.
72. *Ibid.*, 4.
73. *Ibid.*, 16.
74. For Carl Schmitt, the possibility of conflict must always be kept in mind, and the terms “enemy” and “combat” should be understood in an existential sense, it is potentially violent and implies a possibility of war: “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity, war is the existential negation of the enemy”; see *The Concept of the Political*, expanded ed., trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932/2007), 33.
75. Mouffe, *On the Political*, 17.

76. Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically*, 133.
77. Mouffe explains her attempt to think “with Schmitt against Schmitt” and to revise his concept of the political. She insists that her approach allows for pluralism inside of a political community, whereas for Schmitt, democracy requires the existence of a homogeneous *demos*, and the only possible and legitimate pluralism is a pluralism of states. See *On the Political*, 14.
78. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, xii.
79. Mouffe, *On the Political*, 20.
80. See Martin Beckstein, “The Dissociative and Polemical Political: Chantal Mouffe and the Intellectual Heritage of Carl Schmitt,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 16, no. 1 (2011): 33–51.
81. Mouffe, *On the Political*, 52, 120.
82. See John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 221.
83. Fred Dallmayr, *Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginning* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 73.
84. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, xiii, 22.
85. Mouffe, “Which World Order: Cosmopolitan or multipolar?” 465.
86. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, 23.
87. Oliver Marchart, “The Political, the Ethical, the Global: Towards a Post-Foundational Theory of Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in *Re-Grounding Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Post-Foundational Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Tamara Caraus and Elena Paris, 181–202 (New York: Routledge, 2016), 189.
88. *Ibid.*, 190.
89. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, 23.
90. *Ibid.*, 9.
91. For more about this, see in Chapter Six of this volume, Fabio Petito’s “Reflections on Multipolarity, Regionalism, and Peace.”
92. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, xiii.
93. *Ibid.*, 20.
94. Mouffe, “Which World Order . . .?”, 465.
95. Mouffe, *Agonistics*, 21.
96. Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy, human rights and cosmopolitanism: an agonistic approach,” in *The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights*, eds. Costas Douzinas, Conor Gearty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 185.
97. *Ibid.*
98. See Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, 59; Mignolo, “Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option,” 111.
99. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 185.
100. See James Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 264.
101. *Ibid.*, 318.
102. Bonnie Honig, *Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 11.

103. William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 185.
104. *Ibid.*, 184.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Ibid.*, 195.
107. *Ibid.*, 200.
108. Wenman, *Agonistic Democracy*, 15.
109. *Ibid.*, 9.
110. *Ibid.*, 269.
111. *Ibid.*
112. Mark Wenman, "Cosmopolitanism without Banisters: Humanism, Agonism, and World Disclosure," in *Re-Grounding Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Post-foundational Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Tamara Caraus and Elena Paris, (London: Routledge, 2016), 29.
113. *Ibid.*, 30.
114. *Ibid.*, 41.
115. *Ibid.*, 29.
116. Wenman, *Agonistic Democracy*, 264.
117. *Ibid.*, 269.
118. *Ibid.*, 294.
119. *Ibid.*, 297.
120. See Tamara Caraus and Elena Paris, eds., *Re-Grounding Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Post-Foundational Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Routledge, 2016).
121. Walter D. Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism," *Public Culture* 12, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 721–48.
122. Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis," 742–4.
123. James D. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 129–30.
124. *Ibid.*, 130.
125. *Ibid.*, 131.
126. *Ibid.*, 132.
127. Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 18.
128. Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, 35.
129. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 141.
130. *Ibid.*, 143.
131. *Ibid.*, 152.
132. Theodor W. Adorno, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, trans. Thomas Schröder (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 19.
133. Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (Fordham University Press, 2005), 7.
134. *Ibid.*, 39.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 170.
137. *Ibid.*, 18.
138. *Ibid.*, 175.

139. Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 241.
140. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 180.
141. *Ibid.*, 181.
142. *Ibid.*, 182.
143. *Ibid.*
144. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
145. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin, 1977), 25.
146. *Ibid.*, 241.
147. Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*. Expanded edition. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2016), 599–600.
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149. *Ibid.*, xxiii.
150. *Ibid.*, 601.
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152. *Ibid.*
153. *Ibid.*, 605.
154. *Ibid.*, 603.
155. *Ibid.*
156. *Ibid.*, 605.
157. Miguel Abensour, *Democracy against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment*, trans. Max Blechman and Martin Breaugh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
158. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 202.
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160. Étienne Balibar, *Equaliberty: Political Essays*, trans. James Ingram (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 46.
161. *Ibid.*, 101.
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164. *Ibid.*, 215.
165. Jacques Rancière, *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, trans. and ed. Steve Corcoran (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 53.
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167. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 223.
168. Cf. Arendt, *On Revolution*.
169. Cf. Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, trans. David Macey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
170. Cf. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*; Abensour, *Democracy against the State*.
171. Cf. Balibar, *Equaliberty*; Rancière, *Dissensus*.
172. Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 18.
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179. Ibid.
180. Ibid., 222.
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184. Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 13.
185. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
186. Cf. Hannah Arendt, "The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man," in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 267–302; (reprinted 1966).
187. Cf. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace*, 328-329.
188. Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, 20.
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194. Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides. A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida," in *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, ed. G. Borradori, 85–136 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 128.
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218. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 256.
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221. Eduardo Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism?” *Ethics & Global Politics* 2, no. 3 (2009): 252.
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224. Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” in *Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Carol Appadurai Breckenridge, 157–188 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 173.
225. Cf. *ibid.*, 179.
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227. Gerard Delanty, ed., Introduction to “The Emerging Field of Cosmopolitanism Studies,” in *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (London & New York: Routledge, 2012), 2.
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230. Ibid., 25.
231. Seyla Benhabib et al., *Another Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 177.
232. Fred Dallmayr, “After Babel: Journeying toward Cosmopolis,” in *Intercultural Dialogue: In Search for Harmony in Diversity*, ed. Edward Demenchonok, 365–78 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2016), 366.
233. In assessing the current world politics, Richard Falk points out the obstacles posed to the implementing of global democracy coming from the entrenched and non-accountable national elites and major powers, which continue the old geopolitics relying on their rights of veto at the UN and military might. He concludes, “the prospect of moving toward global democracy, unless possibility in the altered atmosphere of a post-catastrophe global setting, seems currently inconceivable” (Falk, “The Promise and Perils of Global Democracy,” 282.) See Richard Falk, *Power Shift: On the New Global Order* (London: Zed Books, 2016).

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